DiPLO

Humanitarian Diplomacy Course

REPORTS ON ACTION



Selected students' research papers
from the first ten years of the course
2012-2022

International Federation
of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
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Ambassador Christopher Lamb

Humanitarian Diplomacy course author and lecturer

FOREWORD

DiploFoundation is celebrating ten years of the Humanitarian Diplomacy course, offered in partnership with the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). This booklet marks that celebration with the publication of 23 of the best research papers submitted by course participants over those years.

Each paper is the culmination of the study which takes place in the course. The essence of the papers is that they must research the place humanitarian diplomacy has in searching for solutions to a researched issue. They add to eight weeks of work on modules and assignments on the different aspects of humanitarian diplomacy, beginning with an examination of the definition of the term, contained in the policy document adopted in 2009 by IFRC's Governing Board.

This helps the participants use this all-encompassing definition of humanitarian diplomacy as an action-oriented tool which humanitarian diplomats can use in any situation. It includes, of course, action in conflict situations, but the bulk of the participants' research topics are in non-conflict situations, such as disaster management, public health, migration and capacity-building.

A recurring theme is the relevance of humanitarian diplomacy to work with affected communities. It helps build the capacity of organisations to strengthen their relationships with both the communities and the senior people who make decisions and lead opinion.

The 23 papers in this booklet are selected from nearly 600 that were submitted by course participants from 122 countries. The basic requirement for the papers is that they cannot exceed 5,000 words and they should be written at approximately the standard that is expected of a university paper for a master's or graduate diploma course.

Papers, as well as the main written work for the course, can be in English, French, or Spanish. Tutors with the requisite language skills are provided to help participants with their work.

The course is not itself accredited by any university, for it is our intention that it should be open to all people in humanitarian organisations, including volunteers and persons without formal education qualifications as universities normally understand this. It helps people and their organisations improve their own capacity to work for the vulnerable in all situations. The course brings together people with experience and highly developed skills at the operational end of humanitarian diplomacy.

The course offers a wonderful variety in terms of participants and occupations. While most are from humanitarian organisations, and within that category the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement, we regularly have participants from governments, intergovernmental organisations, academia, as well as individual experts.

The atmosphere in the course, even though it is all online, is one which stimulates sharing and exchange among the participants and the lecturing team, and the results are evident in this wonderful collection of research papers. Most have not been published before, but this booklet will be used to measure the value of future publications.





Nooshin Erfani-Ghadimi

US Representative, Wits University
(at the time of writing: Director, Wits Justice Project, Wits University)

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Advocating on behalf of remand detainees in South Africa

Advocating on behalf of remand detainees in South Africa

Research Paper for DiploFoundation Humanitarian Diplomacy Course

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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This paper analyses the use of remand detention in South Africa in order to throw light on some of the failings of the entire criminal justice system, which have led to unacceptable violations of international human rights principles.

A third of the South African prison population are remand detainees and have been behind bars for years, waiting for their trials to begin or reach a conclusion. Yet many of these inmates will eventually be acquitted. This means that a staggering number of innocent people are being deprived of their freedom.

Many of these detainees are eligible for bail, but cannot afford to pay relatively small sums. As a consequence ordinary people, potentially innocent of any crime, languish in appalling conditions (including severe overcrowding) in prisons across South Africa not for days, weeks or months, but for years.

The serious failures of the criminal justice system in South Africa – including unreliable chains of evidence, record keeping, excessive delays and postponements in courts – increase the chances of miscarriages of justice.

This paper looks to provide a background to prisons in South Africa, including a short historical summary and an analysis of the current situation. This includes an overview of the criminal justice system and an analysis of public perceptions of crime and of the efficacy of the system dealing with it.

Particular attention is paid to the practice of using pretrial or remand detention, showing it to be a symbol of systemic failures along the continuum of justice. This includes data on inmate numbers, overcrowding and length of detention, as well as comparisons with global figures and with data from similar countries.

Finally, this paper then looks at the various potential avenues of humanitarian diplomacy action, both in "quiet" and public spheres, and at the most effective mix of public and private advocacy, alone and in partnerships, on the issues.

2. INTRODUCTION

It can be argued that as a country South Africa was founded on injustice and crime: from the start of white settlement and colonization in 1652, through to its institutional oppression and the apartheid system which only ended in 1994.

As a democratic state, therefore, South Africa has only just turned 18 and its achievements and remaining challenges should be viewed in that perspective. Although most of the problems of the criminal justice system are not unique to the country, the burdens of the past add an extra dimension of complexity to the issues.

The numerous dysfunctions of the criminal justice system in South Africa have led to unacceptable miscarriages of justice. The reasons for these systemic failures must be understood and investigated, and solutions found to alleviate such violations.

Humanitarian diplomacy provides an excellent methodology in carrying out a contextual analysis of the situation, as well as formulating activities to help persuade decision-makers and opinion-leaders to effect the changes necessary to protect the human rights of every individual.

3. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO PRISONS IN SOUTH AFRICA

Incarceration as punishment in South Africa began after the abolition of slavery in 1834 (Institute of Security Studies, 1998), and the resultant decline in the supply of labour to farms. A penal system was devised to put convicts to work, both in public projects as well as on mines and farms. This practice continued even through to the depression in the 1930s, when prison labour was made available to farmers at a very low cost.

In 1959, in line with the state's institutionalised racism - *apartheid*[1] - new prison legislation was promulgated which entrenched the racial segregation of prisons. Furthermore, the new legislation reinforced the military culture of prison management. "Although staff members were defined as civil servants", explains the Institute of Security Studies (1998, p.2), "their status was that of paramilitary personnel. In addition, all prisons became closed intuitions: all media and outside inspections were prohibited".

After the increasingly vehement anti-apartheid protests in the early 1960s, the incarceration of political detainees and sentenced prisoners became characteristic of South African prisons (Singh, 2005). Among these political prisoners were the leaders of the anti-apartheid struggle, including the country's most famous prisoner, Nelson Mandela. His plight, and that of other high-profile detainees, helped to galvanise global support for the anti-apartheid struggle, and raised concern about prison conditions among international organizations such as Amnesty International, the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).[2]

After the release of Nelson Mandela in the early 1990s, and in the lead-up to the first democratic elections in 1994, moves were made to transform the prison system. This included changing the name of the responsible agency from the Department of Prisons to the Department of Correctional Services, signalling a shift of focus towards becoming an "institution that was transparent and accountable" (Institute of Security Studies, 1998, p.2).

With the adoption of the new Constitution in 1996, the rights of detainees were clearly defined and enshrined. This includes, in section 35(2)(e):

> Everyone who is detained, including every sentenced prisoner, has the right to conditions of detention that are consistent with human dignity, including at least exercise and the provision, at state expense, of adequate accommodation, nutrition, reading material and medical treatment.

[1] A policy of segregation and political and economic discrimination against non-whites

[2] The work of the ICRC in prisons in South Africa has often been praised and commended after the end of apartheid. Nelson Mandela himself has said, "in those early years, the International Committee of the Red Cross was the only organization that both listened to our complaints and responded to them... This was vital, because the authorities ignored us". As cited by ICRC on its web site: http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/5t9klb.htm (accessed 30 April 2012)

In 1998 a new Correctional Services Act was promulgated, incorporating the values of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. It recognised international principles on correctional matters and established certain mandatory minimum rights applicable for all prisoners that cannot be withheld for any disciplinary or other purpose (Dissel, 2002).

4. CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN MODERN SOUTH AFRICA

In his 2010/2011 report (Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services, 2011, p.6) the Inspecting Judge of the Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services, Judge Deon Van Zyl, gave a profound description of the problems facing the current penal system in South Africa:

> ...the transformation of the correctional system, from its pre-democratic emphasis on retributive justice and the "warehousing" of detainees to its new democratic focus on restorative justice directed at rehabilitation and reintegration of offenders, is no simple task. It is in fact complex and onerous...

The fact that, in addition to the prison system, both the police and the judiciary were also used as tools of an oppressive regime for decades means that Judge Van Zyl's explanation can be applied to the whole of the criminal justice continuum. It also means that any meaningful reform and remedy must take stock of the entire system in order to be effective.

4.1. Perceptions of Crime

Perceptions of crime in South Africa, and of the efficacy of the criminal justice system in dealing with it, are also important in assessing the environment in which the sector works. The country has had a reputation, both internally and globally, of being a "crime capital" and especially riddled with violent crime (Institute of Security Studies, 2001, p.1).

In fact, according to a September 2011 report by the Institute for Security Studies (2011, p.1), crime levels have decreased dramatically in the last few years: "... the South African crime rate peaked in the 2002/03 financial year recording its highest level since 1994. Between 2002/03 and 2007/08, the total crime level decreased by about 25%".

These results are largely reflected in the 2011 Victims of Crime survey carried out by Statistics South Africa (2011), which showed how people felt about crime, its prevention and the justice system. One of the report's findings was that more than 40% of households believed that the level of both violent and non-violent crime had decreased in their area of residence during the period 2008 to 2010. Less than 35% said that crime had increased, while about a quarter of the population believed that crime had stayed the same.

Nonetheless, South Africans continue to be inundated with news of horror rapes and murders,[3] of corruption and ineptitude in the higher echelons of the police force and in the legal profession. There has been an increase in vigilante mob justice, especially in poorer neighbourhoods and townships, with many expressing frustration with the application of justice in the country.

4.2. The Criminal Justice Continuum

It is important to assess the criminal justice system as one entity. Where a bottleneck occurs in processing crime scene evidence, for instance, it is likely to cause a resulting backlog at the courts, with the case being postponed and the accused further held in remand, in facilities that are overcrowded and difficult to manage.

Although the focus of this paper is on the prison system, and remand detention in particular, given the interconnected nature of the entire system, it is useful to have an overview of the whole continuum. Some of the issues faced by the police and the judicial system include:

[3] See news reports online, such as http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/2-in-court-for-Dullstroom-murder-20120227

Police	Judicial system
Arbitrary arrests (arrests in contravention of domestic law).	The poor and indigent disproportionately affected by miscarriages of justice: – Have less access to bail – Have less access to legal advice and assistance – Are less likely to understand their rights
Secondary victims (e.g. those affected, through a link to a primary victim of crime, by failures in investigating and making arrests).	Over-stretched court resources: – Not enough personnel (both legal and administrative) – Lack of equipment – Not enough courtrooms
Unreliable chain of evidence.	Over-reliance on remand (instead of considering it as a means of last resort).
Corruption (endemic and pervasive).	Over-reliance on adjournments and postponements.
Missing files and dockets.	Poorly functioning Legal Aid system.
People kept in police custody after arrest for longer than legislated maximum of 48 hours.	Accused persons lack free and transparent access to their own transcripts, dockets and records (which affects their ability to appeal their conviction or sentencing).
	Those in rural areas have less access to legal assistance.
	No limits on time it takes judges/magistrates to deliver judgements.
	No penalty for officers of the court when they cause unnecessary postponements and adjournments.
	No clear guide on what is a "reasonable time" to keep someone in remand.

4.3. Detention facilities: Remand and Prison

A similar analysis of the prison system shows that it bears the brunt of the inefficiencies and failures in the rest of the justice continuum. This includes the following:

- Intuitional violence and torture.
- Spread of communicable diseases.
- Social stigma (particularly unfair for those in remand who are later found innocent).
- Increases propensity to commit crime.
- Lack of information and data (who, why, when, how long).
- Disproportionate effect on those with mental disabilities and non-nationals (especially undocumented ones).
- Suicide (higher in remand than in prisons due to "confinement shock", hopelessness, violence and rape).
- Loss of employability.
- Socio-economic impacts of remand
  - on families: loss of a breadwinner, loss of home, impact on children especially with mothers in detention
  - on communities: physical and mental health impacts of receiving detainees back who now have communicable diseases like HIV or TB, and who have been traumatised and de-socialised

- on society: opportunity cost of large remand population – inmate cost per head, effect of eroding "presumption of innocence", loss of faith in criminal justice system.

– Culture of impunity: those causing harm to inmates, or breaking laws and regulations, not brought to book.

– Lack of public understanding of how bail works: seen as the accused "getting away with it" by being out on bail.

4.4. Overcrowding

In its 2010/2011 Annual Report (2011), the Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services gave the number of inmates in the country as 160,545. They were held in 241 correctional centres around the country, which are on average 135% overcrowded. Distressingly, 18 centres were overcrowded by 200% or more.

When the facilities have to host more than the number of people they were designed for, many serious repercussions occur, including damages to the physical and mental health of inmates and warders. It also leads to infringements on the human rights outlined in the Constitution itself.

Gordin and Cloete (2011, p.4) provided this example of overcrowding in one facility:

> Medium A [a remand facility] in Johannesburg, for example, is 246% overcrowded. This means that a structure designed to hold 2 630 men has in it 6 480 men. In a communal cell designed for 80 men, there are 200. This means that about half of them have to sleep on the floor, and that 200 men have to use two shower heads and one toilet. Overcrowding brings with it a host of other problems. For example, the strain on other prison infrastructure, such as kitchens, hospitals and water reticulation is increased. Overcrowding also contributes to the levels of violence in prisons, as warders are less able to monitor inmates, and the competition for scarce resources heightens tension among inmates.

4.5. Remand Detention

Penal Reform International (2012, p.1) defines remand detainees to include "prisoners in pre-trial detention, or on remand, are those who … are awaiting legal proceedings. They are also known as untried or unconvicted prisoners". They are people who have been arrested and charged, but whose trials have not been completed. They have not yet been found guilty, and are to be presumed innocent under Section 35(3)(h) of the South African Constitution (Gordin, 2010).

Under international law,[4] people awaiting trial may only be detained pending trial in exceptional circumstances. There must be reasonable grounds to believe the person committed the alleged offence and a real risk of the person absconding, posing a danger to the community, or interfering with the course of justice. Furthermore, excessive and arbitrary use of remand undermines the presumption of innocence: one of the cornerstones of a rights-based system (Open Society Justice Initiative, 2008).

In its 18 April 2012 submission to the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, the Community Law Centre (2012, p.1) concluded that:

> …the decision to detain someone before he or she is found guilty of a crime is one of the most draconian a State can make. The decision is made in an instant, but the results are long lasting, severe and adverse. The person loses their liberty and may also lose their home, job, income, family and community ties.

In the Judicial Inspectorate's 2010/2011 report (2011) there were 47,880 remand detainees in South Africa (a third of the inmate population), with half having been incarcerated for three months or more. The report does not give a further breakdown of the numbers in remand for longer than 3 months. However, it has been documented that in September 2011 in one centre in Johannesburg alone there were approximately 400 people who had been in remand detention for two years or more. Gordin and Cloete (2011) included the following table in their 2011 paper for the Wits

[4] Including the "Tokyo Rules", or the UN Standard Minimum Rules for Non-Custodial Measure.

Justice Project:

REMAND DETAINEES IN DETENTION FOR 24 MONTHS AND ABOVE (2010 statistics)[5]				
>2-3 Years	>3-5 Years	>5-7 Years	>7 Years	Total
1516	488	73	3	2080

Many of these detainees are eligible for bail[6] but cannot afford to pay even relatively small sums. As a consequence ordinary people, potentially innocent of any crime, languish in appalling conditions in prisons across South Africa not for days, weeks or months, but for years. On the issue of bail, Judge Deon van Zyl (Judicial Inspectorate of Correctional Services, 2011, p.15) says:

> It is also in conflict with one of the most fundamental constitutionally protected human rights, namely the right to freedom and security of the person as provided in section 12 of the Constitution, more particularly section 12(1)(a) which states that no one should be "deprived of freedom arbitrarily or without just cause". Imposing a bail amount which the accused will clearly not be able to pay must be regarded as 'arbitrary or without just cause'.

4.6. Global comparisons in remand detention

Schönteich (2008) provides an excellent overview of the global use of remand detention, showing that it is not a uniquely South African problem. He estimates that on any particular day, about three million people are held in pretrial detention around the world, and that on average, 10 million are admitted into remand in the course of a year.

Other indicators Schönteich gives of the extent of the global problem include:

- In late 2006, almost every third incarcerated person was in pretrial detention.
- The region with the highest proportion of pretrial detainees is Asia (47.8%), followed by Africa (35.2%). Europe had the lowest portion, with 20.5%.
- By reducing their estimated annual expenditure on pretrial detention by just over 10 percent, European countries could save enough money effectively to double the annual budget of the United Nations.
- The average length of remand detention in 2003 for 19 member states of the European Union was 167 days, or 5.5 months.
- In Nigeria, the average length of pretrial detention was 3.7 years.
- Presuming that the global average period of pretrial detention is 167 days, then three million persons in pretrial detention will spend an annual combined total of 501 million days in detention.

4.7. Solutions to combat excessive use of remand detention

Just as it is instructive to analyse the global extent of the problem, so it is extremely useful to survey the measures put into place around the world to combat the problem. Penal Reform International (2005) published an "Index of Good Practices in Reducing Pretrial Detention", with an emphasis on African examples.

Some of the remedies to over-reliance on remand, which are most useful in the South African context, and suggested ways to reduce the number of people being held in pretrial detention include:

- Remand should be measure of last resort with alternatives to custodial detention considered first:
  - Affordable bail
  - Community custody and guarantees

[5] According to a presentation given by the Justice, Crime Prevention and Security Cluster Departments to the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services, 2010. Available online at http://www.pmg.org.za/files/docs/101103jcps.ppt *(accessed 29 April 2012).*

[6] Section 35(1)(f) of the Constitution provides that everyone who is arrested for allegedly committing an offence has the right to be released from detention if the interests of justice permit, subject to reasonable conditions.

    - Electronic tagging
    - Mandatory bail review
- Credit (on sentence period) for entering early guilty plea
- Prison screening sessions (holding hearings in remand facilities, especially for petty offences)
- Diversion for juveniles
- The use of information technology to digitise evidence, proceedings and detention data. All relevant government departments should be linked
- Encourage civil society engagement and participation in finding solutions
- Lay person visitors to police custody, courts and in detention facilities
- Community mediation and resolution
- Case management committees (with representatives of police, courts, prosecution) to identify and resolve bottlenecks in individual cases.

5. EFFECTING CHANGE IN THE JUSTICE CONTINUUM: POTENTIAL AVENUES FOR HUMANITARIAN DIPLOMACY

Humanitarian Diplomacy is defined as "persuading decision makers and opinion leaders to act, at all times, in the interests of vulnerable people, and with full respect for fundamental humanitarian principles" (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 2009, p.2). It involves engaging and persuading those with the ability to effect change (be it as a lawmaker or as an individual) through a mixture of public advocacy, private diplomacy and building the right policy environment.

The practice of pretrial detention should be used to demonstrate systemic failures in the criminal justice system as a whole. Since many people have very little sympathy for those who have been convicted of crimes, it is easier to garner support for humanitarian diplomacy actions which focus on those who are still innocent before the law but are incarcerated.

As explained above, in order to be able to reduce the number of people in lengthy periods of remand, and the over-reliance on pretrial detention as a whole, attention needs to be paid to the whole justice continuum. Problems along the continuum will manifest themselves in unacceptable situations for people in pretrial.

5.1. Building a Conducive Policy Environment

In the South African context, the legal framework for ensuring a fair and effective criminal justice system which protects human rights and dignities in an equitable and predictable way already exists.

The South African Constitution, one of the world's newest and most highly praised, resolutely protects the dignity and rights of both victim and accused, of the innocent and the guilty. The legislation that emanates from it, including the Criminal Procedures Act and the Correctional Services Act, are extensive and well-respected although clearly not without fault.

In addition, South Africa is party to many international treaties and statutes, obliging it to protect the human rights of its citizens and to ensure minimum standards are maintained in dealing with those it incarcerates.

However, despite these advantages, the criminal justice system in South Africa clearly has a long way to go before it lives up to its potential. There are instances in which the current regulations and laws are simply not followed (lack of sufficient exercise for detainees, for example, or length of police custody sometimes being longer than 48 hours), and instances where the law is not clear (on what is a "reasonable time" to be held in remand, for example).

Humanitarian diplomacy actions to work towards rectifying these issues could include:

- Targeted educational and advocacy campaigns, designed specifically for those who work within the criminal justice system: police men and women, officers of the courts, members of the legal fraternity, administrative staff, prison officers and parole monitors. Such campaigns would aim to foster a sense of pride and responsibility for upholding the law and as guardians of the citizens of South Africa. They would also ensure an understanding of the regulations governing the criminal justice system and of the inalienable human rights enshrined in the Constitution. Such understanding is assumed to already exist, but in reality often does not, leading to actions that are outside the law they are there to protect.
- Research into shortfalls in the existing legislation and regulations would pinpoint loopholes and oversights. Such research would need both an understanding of the law, and of the realities on the ground, and would therefore benefit from being carried out through the collaboration of a range of organizations and actors. This should include the authorities themselves as well as those working in the sector.
- The results of the above research could then be presented as a white paper to parliamentarians and to the government, as a start to a legislative advocacy project aiming to see necessary changes made to regulations, to overcome previous oversights.
- As a last resort, where authorities are intransigent and refuse to engage in a transparent appraisal of the system, and fail to implement statutes and laws, application could be made to the courts (including the Constitutional Court itself) to oblige the state to make necessary changes.

5.2 Using Quiet Diplomacy

An unfortunate hangover from the pre-democratic apartheid era is a lack of transparency in correctional service facilities. Lack of access, both to detainees and updated information, makes it very difficult to have outside scrutiny and oversight. Many organizations working in the sector have expressed deep frustration in working with the Department of Correctional Services, and in trying to carry out their civil society obligation of keeping authorities accountable. Worryingly, many of these organizations also fear publicly voicing this frustration, as they believe their access to detainees would be curtailed even more if they are seen to be critical.

The chasm of mistrust between the authorities and civil society must be overcome before any meaningful change can be made in the use of remand detention in particular and overcoming systemic failures in general.

Efforts to pillory individuals who work within the system should be avoided. It is easier to win support for humanitarian diplomacy actions from those who feel they are part of the solution, rather than the problem. Of course, those in authority and higher in the chain of command must be held to a higher standard and should be held accountable for their actions.

Efforts at engagement with those in authority should be made constantly and across the board. Private meetings should be sought, not just with members of cabinet and their staff, but with officials lower down the ranks, who would have a more operational viewpoint. The support of technocrats for any diplomacy and advocacy is crucial to providing the base of evidence needed for credible action.

5.3 Carrying out public advocacy

The public's perceptions of crime in South Africa, as outlined above, and its frustration with the authorities in dealing with the problem provide a challenge in advocating for those accused of breaking the law. Many people mistakenly believe that the worse the situation in prisons is, the more of a deterrent it becomes. This has clearly shown itself not to be the case.

It is important for people to understand the rights enshrined in international human rights law, and in the South African Constitution. Even more importantly, it is crucial that people understand that when systemic failures deprive even one person of their rights, it can spread as a contagion and affect the whole of society.

Advocacy activities could therefore include campaigns aimed at educating the public about basic human rights, and the strength of the South African Constitution. A link should be made with the anti-apartheid struggle and people be

reminded of how hard-won these rights are. In addition, a public campaign could be designed to show how prisoners were treated under apartheid and to show that many of the overcrowding and sub-standard conditions still exist.

The plight of prisoners, and especially those in remand detention, should be widely publicised. The role of investigative journalists is invaluable in finding and bringing to light both individual cases of injustice as well as wider systemic failures. Regular, well-researched media outputs (including news stories, radio inserts, TV packages and shows) help to build a conducive environment for other humanitarian diplomacy activities and build a ground swell of support when calling for change. Social media should be used as an adjunct to traditional media, helping to distribute the information through wider channels and to a different audience.

It is important to personalise public advocacy efforts, to use first-person accounts of being in remand or in prison. This will help create empathy and to put a face to the statistics. For example, there is a lot of emotional impact from communications about a single mother who stole a loaf of bread to feed her hungry child and has been awaiting trial for a year because she cannot afford bail. It will elicit sympathy and empathy and help demonstrate the human cost of a non-functioning system.

In addition, a public campaign to publicise the wider socio-economic effects of incarceration should be devised to raise support for the decrease in the use of remand detention. Such a campaign could highlight the costs to the taxpayer of each inmate and show the preferable uses of the public funds. The effects of remand detention on families and communities (described above) should be outlined, making the case that in order to decrease criminal activity changes need to be made to the ways in which the criminal justice system operates.

5.4 "It Could Be You" campaign

An example of a campaign that uses a mixture of all three of the above approach is one being carried out by the Wits Justice Project (WJP), a project of the Journalism Department of the University of Witwatersrand in Johannesburg which aims to impact significantly on the lives of people by striving for changes in the criminal justice system.

Through the four arms of the project – journalism, advocacy, law and education – WJP strives to bring substantial changes to the law and its practice and the wider criminal justice system as a whole. It uses transparent activism to promote the foundational values enshrined in the South African Constitution and international and Human Rights law.

The WJP's 2012 advocacy campaign is entitled "It Could Be You", which captures its key messages: that people in remand are innocent as they have not yet been judged guilty; that unreasonably spending years in a remand facility is a deprivation of a basic human right; that there are systemic failures which are causing such delays; that it could happen to anyone: it could be you.

The WJP intends to host, in partnership with relevant organizations and agencies, a series of events throughout 2012, targeting opinion leaders and policy makers, encouraging a transparent and frank appraisal, and a search for implementable, sustainable and contextual answers.

The list of events includes:

- It Could Be You Talk Show: An evening at Constitution Hill, with an ex-prisoner, an ex-warder, a parolee, a political detainee, an independent monitor, a human rights lawyer and a judge. The "It Could Be You" talk show will explore personal accounts of people from different sides of the justice system.
- "Guardians of Justice" Roadshow: The roadshow will be interactive and solution-orientated, asking participants to contribute their professional expertise towards practical solutions for systemic failures. The roadshow targets people who work within the criminal justice system including court personnel (stenographers, translators, clerks and registrars), staff of forensic and toxicology labs, SAPS crime-scene staff etc. It will also be taken to magistrates, judges and law firms, to gain their specific input.
- A one-day seminar for members of the legal fraternity, including judges, magistrates and lawyers. Tying in with ongoing WJP research on bail and unreasonable delays, the seminar will focus on challenges faced by the legal fraternity and on ways to mitigate them.

- A training workshop for journalists, editors and station managers, as part of the Power Reporting conference of the Wits Journalism Department, to improve their understanding of human rights law, the Constitution and of the continuum of justice in South Africa.
- A briefing for members of Parliament, of outcomes of the other campaign events and highlighting priorities and solutions raised by their participants. This will ensure that the law-makers will receive expert input and suggestions from a wide-range of stakeholders.

5.5 Working in Partnerships

The sheer scale and complexity of the problems of the criminal justice system described above means that no one agency will be able to tackle them alone. South Africa's civil society is a strong one, with a successful history of human rights activism. Coalitions and partnerships of organizations and agencies working in the relevant sectors need to be created, to ensure concerted efforts and lack of duplication.

6. CONCLUSION

This paper has sought to show that although many gains have been made in building a strong criminal justice system since South Africa's first democratic elections in 1994, there are still many shortfalls that need to be addressed.

Any efforts to do so will need to be holistic and to take account of the entire justice continuum, as failings in one sector (be it with the police, the courts or the prisons) will have knock-on effects on the others.

As a symbol of the failures of the criminal justice system, none is more fitting than the overuse of remand detention and the thousands of people who are deprived of their liberty despite being presumed innocent.

Humanitarian diplomacy is the ideal tool to effect changes in the criminal justice policy environment, and in public perceptions of crime and the system, and of helping responsible authorities protect the rights of all citizens of South Africa – even those behind bars.

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Mark Dinnen

Assistant Professor, Faculty of Society and Design, Bond University

Humanitarian Diplomacy September 2012

Bridging the gap between practice and theory: An evaluation of the integration of humanitarian diplomacy into tertiary courses

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Over the last decade the world has witnessed an increased demand for the provision of humanitarian assistance to those who need it most. Nowadays the humanitarian worker is required to call on a multitude of skills and knowledge in order to successfully provide assistance to the most vulnerable. As states maintain the ultimate control of the their territory, humanitarian workers are required to engage with state, and in some circumstances non-state, actors to guarantee access to vulnerable people. Increasingly, this skill set is being referred to as the practice of humanitarian diplomacy. Given the infancy of the concept of humanitarian diplomacy it is important to comprehend the role of universities in its proliferation. The potential role of universities in preparing humanitarian workers for the dilemmas they will encounter in the real world is not that well understood. Indeed, by developing a comprehension of the practice of humanitarian diplomacy, universities may be able to bridge a gap between the classroom and reality. This paper evaluates the potential for universities to integrate humanitarian diplomacy into the university environment. While this particular study is limited to Australian universities, specifically members of the Group of Eight universities, it is the author's opinion that similar results would be replicated on the global scale.

In his 2011 piece for *International Studies Review* Professor Paul Sharp speaks of the resurgence of diplomacy, and by default, diplomatic studies. Sharp (2011, p.717) maintains that 'Diplomacy, the institutions and processes by which states and, increasingly others, represent themselves and their interests to one another in international and world societies, is back on center stage'. The amount of attention being paid towards modern diplomacy, arguably driven by globalisation, and increased media attention, has spurned a resurgence of academic interest within the field. Contrastingly, the smaller, at least academically, subfield of humanitarian diplomacy has struggled to acquire the attention it arguably deserves. Such a situation is not difficult to comprehend. Traditionally, diplomacy has been considered the domain of statesmen, and women, constructed out of "hard power politics", in order to seek a more stable world. Humanitarian diplomacy, on the other hand, occupies the area of "soft power politics", dealing with the non-traditional threats that have always struggled to attract, and maintain, the attention of the academic world.

Yet now, more than ever, humanitarian workers around the world are executing diplomacy on a daily, if not hourly, basis. The majority of these workers have not received any formal training. The wealth of knowledge possessed by these 'humanitarian diplomats' is usually acquired through personal experience. As a field of academic study, the area of humanitarian diplomacy is practically non-existent. Arguably, this absence is a likely result of the recent introduction of the term humanitarian diplomacy, although that alone should not justify such a significant absence. This paper seeks to further investigate the field of humanitarian diplomacy to evaluate its viability as a university level subject. Specifically, the paper argues that the lack of humanitarian diplomacy courses within the 'Group of Eight' Australian universities is indicative of a lack of appreciation for the utility of the field. The paper will establish such an argument by first introducing the concept of humanitarian diplomacy and the increased demand for the professionalisation of the humanitarian worker. Secondly, the paper will assess the potential humanitarian diplomacy courses that exist within the Australian 'Group of Eight' universities.[1] Finally, the paper will illustrate the utility of offering such a course by establishing the knowledge and skill set required by the modern day humanitarian worker. In doing so, this paper seeks to affirm that humanitarian diplomacy, as an academic area of a study, offers a vital insight into 21st century international relations, albeit one that has rarely been appreciated within academic circles.

HUMANITARIAN DIPLOMACY

The field of diplomacy traverses many avenues in the subject of international relations. Berridge (2002, p.1) contends that diplomacy can be seen as an 'essentially political activity and well resourced and skilful'. Such a foundational definition provides the opportunity for widespread interpretation and application to multiple vocational exercises. Traditionally, diplomacy has been thought of as 'the formation and execution of foreign policy' usually carried out by representatives of the nation state (Morgenthau, 2005, p. 152). However, diplomacy is becoming far more loosely defined to embrace multiple interpretations. For instance, White (2006, p. 388) maintains that diplomacy simply refers to 'a communications process between international actors that seeks through negotiation to resolve conflict short of war'. Mansbach and Rafferty (2008, p.362) simplify this interpretation further to maintain that diplomacy merely

[1] A more detailed account of the results of this section of the paper is provided in appendix one.

'involves negotiation to manage relations among actors'. The evolution of the definition of diplomacy may be a result of diplomacy's resurgence in both the actual, and academic discipline of international relations.[2]

Professor and head of political science at the University of Minnesota, Paul Sharp argues that 'the return of diplomacy has been mirrored by increasing interest in its academic study' (Sharp, 2011, p.717). Sharp goes further to contend that:

> It has become almost impossible to examine any problem in contemporary international relations effectively without considering the diplomatic challenges which it poses, the innovations in diplomatic practice which it calls forth, and the contribution which diplomacy can make to easing the problem in such a way as to contribute to a more peaceful, just, and orderly world. (Sharp, 2011, p.717)

One such contemporary problem that diplomacy makes a contribution to relates to the 'rapid and effective international response to sudden and slow onset disasters' (Holmes, 2010, p.6). Responding to these disasters inevitably rests in the hands of humanitarian workers, who increasingly find themselves in protracted negotiation with government agents. In essence, they engage with these agents diplomatically to bring about the required response.

The expansion of the role of humanitarian workers has led to calls for a stronger focus on university training and education in humanitarian action. A 2010 study by the Geneva Centre for Education and Research in Humanitarian Action contends these calls are a result of the need for humanitarian workers:

> To be able to comprehend the role of the societal and cultural norms and values of the populations with whom they work, [they] must have basic knowledge of international humanitarian law or of political economy, and be capable of understanding the implications of day-to-day political events for their own security and for that of their organization. (Rainhorn, J. *et al.*, 2010)

The need for an enhanced capacity by humanitarian workers has contributed to the development of competency frameworks by both non-government, and international non-government, organisations (ELRHA, 2011, p.22). A large component of these frameworks involve the development of negotiation skills and other capabilities that the humanitarian worker can utilise in their day-to-day work.

While the process of humanitarian negotiation is not new, the acknowledgement of these negotiations to be a form of diplomacy is (Régnier, 2011, p.1212). The institutionalisation of humanitarian diplomacy can perhaps best be seen in the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies establishing a division in charge of humanitarian diplomacy in 2010 (*ibid.)*. Within academia, however, the acceptance of humanitarian diplomacy as an academically credible field is questionable.

The reluctance of academia to embrace humanitarian diplomacy is perhaps best illustrated by the dearth in humanitarian diplomacy literature. As Régnier (2011, p.1215) confirms, 'unlike traditional diplomacy and international negotiations, there is as yet no body of literature or specific manual dedicated to humanitarian diplomacy.' The most significant academic literature pertaining to the field of humanitarian diplomacy appears to be *Humanitarian Diplomacy: Practitioners and Their Craft* by Minear and Smith. The motivation for Minear and Smith (2007, p.1), as outlined within their introduction, was to 'aid to understanding the challenges and the experiences recounted' of humanitarian diplomats. For them, the field of humanitarian diplomacy encompasses:

> The activities carried out by humanitarian organizations to obtain the space from political and military authorities to function with integrity. These activities comprise such efforts as arranging for the presence of international humanitarian organizations and personnel in a given country, negotiating access to civilian populations in need of assistance and protection, monitoring assistance programmes, promoting respect for international law and norms, supporting indigenous individuals and institutions, and engaging in advocacy at a variety of levels in support of humanitarian objectives. (*ibid.*)

[2] See Murray, S. Sharp, P. Wiseman, G. Criekemans, D. and Melissen J. (2011) 'The Present and Future of Diplomacy and Diplomatic Studies.' *International Studies Review* 13, 709-728.

One specific program designed to assist humanitarian workers has been the training program in humanitarian diplomacy by the Geneva based Diplo Foundation in partnership with the International Federation of the Red Cross. The course being offered by the Diplo Foundation is still in its infancy, with the first course being conducted in 2012. However, the course clearly fills a gap within the training for humanitarian workers.

As a field of study, humanitarian diplomacy is multidisciplinary in its nature. Arguably, to be successful in the field, the humanitarian diplomat requires a wealth of knowledge to call upon in order to be as effective as possible. As Rainhorn *et al.* (2010, p.9) illustrate, on top of 'their basic technical training, humanitarian workers now need to have additional expertise in disciplines which are normally taught at the university level.' Covering aspects of international law, refugee law, disaster management law, advocacy, negotiation, and diplomacy, humanitarian diplomacy is a subject that covers many fields, all of which tend to exist within universities. Given the presence of these subjects within the academy, the question becomes to what extent have universities sought to institutionalise humanitarian diplomacy as a field of study within their institutes. Furthermore, if a recent high school graduate expresses a desire to enter the humanitarian field, could Australian universities meet this demand, and provide them with the adequate knowledge and skills required by the industry? In order to ascertain the answer to this question, this paper now assesses the presence of humanitarian diplomacy, as a subject, within major Australian universities.

THE GROUP OF EIGHT AND HUMANITARIAN DIPLOMACY

In September of 1999 the 'Group of Eight' was formally incorporated as a secretariat that would work to 'maximise the potential for collaboration in a competitive environment for individual universities and for Australia' (The Group of Eight, 2013). The Group of Eight were chosen for this paper in order to provide an indication of the level of attention that is being paid toward the field of international humanitarian diplomacy by leading institutes within Australia. In choosing to focus solely on the Group of Eight this paper has limited the scope of its study quite significantly. However, as has already been alluded to, the field of humanitarian diplomacy is one that is heavily underrepresented within tertiary education.

Methodology

This paper has adopted a simplified methodological approach for obtaining data. Data for this article was gathered via an analysis of the Group of Eight Universities' websites. Searches were conducted for the terms "humanitarian", "humanitarianism", "diplomacy", and "humanitarian diplomacy". Results were then analysed to determine the viability of the program, or subject, being offered by the university in relation to humanitarian diplomacy. These results are summarised below in Table 1, a full list of relevant programs and courses is presented in Appendix 1. The simplified approach to data collection was intentionally designed to mimic the search that a humanitarian worker, or a potential humanitarian worker, could utilise in seeking information regarding university courses that would further their knowledge of the field. While such an approach does place some limitations on the analysis, it also illustrates the difficulties potential humanitarian students, and workers, are confronted with when seeking to further their education.

University	Search Term and Result			
	Humanitarian	**Humanitarianism**	**Diplomacy**	**Humanitarian Diplomacy**
Australian National University	26 Programs 29 Courses	6 Programs 2 Courses	23 Programs 24 Courses 6 Majors	5 Programs 2 Courses
The University of New South Wales	14 Courses (UG) 18 Courses (PG)	1 Course (UG) Nil (PG)	4 Courses (UG) 1 Program (PG) 4 Courses (PG)	18 Courses (UG) 1 Program (PG) 22 Courses (PG)
The University of Adelaide	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
The University of Queensland	2 Programs 2 Courses	Nil	1 Program (PG) 4 Courses	Nil
The University of Melbourne	1 Program	Nil	Nil	Nil
The University of Western Australia	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
Monash University	Nil	Nil	1 Course (PG)	1 Course (PG)
The University of Sydney	6 Courses	Nil	7 Courses (PG)	3 Courses (PG)

Table 1: Humanitarian Diplomacy Courses within the Australian Group of 8 Universities

Overwhelmingly, the data supports the argument that the field of humanitarian diplomacy is one that is not well understood, or represented, within the Group of Eight Universities. A response to the search term 'Humanitarian Diplomacy' was received in 50% of the universities, however further investigation reveals very little alignment of these programs with humanitarian diplomacy. The strongest relevant response was in regard to the post-graduate courses on offer from the University of New South Wales.

The twenty-two courses that were generated in response to the humanitarian diplomacy query covered a diversity of topics relevant to the field. These topics include: *Forced migration and human rights in international law*; *development, human rights, and global health*; *the politics of human rights: theory and critique*; *legal and moral problem of international violence*; and *international criminal law & transitional justice*, to name a few. Absent from the courses on offer though was the incorporation of diplomacy as a field of study, although the subject *settlement of international disputes* does, albeit arguably, allude toward an aspect of diplomacy.

Monash University was the only member of the Group of Eight Universities that returned a result aligned with diplomacy in the 'Master of Diplomacy and Trade'. Indeed, the program description provided by Monash University reinforces the multidisciplinary nature of modern diplomacy (Monash University, 2013b). Furthermore, the Monash program does allow for either the selection of electives, or a research thesis component. Arguably, the additional electives, or even the research report elective, could be tailored to compensate for the absence of an international humanitarian diplomacy aspect to the course. However, there is no indication of humanitarian diplomacy as a viable topic to study within the program's structure.

Overall, the brief survey of the Group of Eight Universities within Australia indicates a dearth in the provision of university level courses for potential humanitarian diplomats. Such a finding reinforces Régnier's (2011, p.1217) asser-

tion that 'no well-established career or university training programmes in humanitarian diplomacy are available anywhere in the world'. The absence of humanitarian diplomacy programs within universities leads to the final question this paper aims to address, namely: is there any utility in having humanitarian diplomacy as a tertiary level subject.

THE UTILITY OF HUMANITARIAN DIPLOMACY AS A TERTIARY SUBJECT

As higher education institutes it is the role of universities to further the knowledge of society. Furthermore, there exists a responsibility for universities to make a positive contribution towards society. Such a contribution can only eventuate if universities adapt and transform their traditional impressions of society, and in this instance international society. Within the field of international relations and diplomacy this transformation must move the field beyond the traditional domain. As Cullen (2008) maintains within the international relations and diplomacy field, 'the areas studied need to include an analysis of the broad range of official and non-official diplomats that now permeate government, business and private sectors of any nation'. Failure for universities to adapt to change may be detrimental, as 'industry will increasingly compete with universities in a number of specialist professional programs' (Bokor, J. 2012, p.11). Within the field of humanitarianism the responsibility for the establishment of specialised programs has indeed, as suggested by Bokor, fallen to organisations within the industry.

In institutionalising training programs organisations are already illustrating the utility of humanitarian diplomacy as a subject. However, it is the central argument of this paper that the university community should embrace a subject as broad as humanitarian diplomacy. As Rainhorn *et. al*. (2010, p.8) contend 'the professional humanitarian workers of today are constantly required to analyse the economic, sociological and political changes… they are called upon to negotiate with non-state actors who have their own hierarchy and discipline'. When provided with a strong foundation of knowledge the professional humanitarian worker has a higher likelihood of success. Such a strong foundation requires a comprehensive appreciation of humanitarian diplomacy subjects, which non-academic institutions may struggle to provide.

The absence of professional training within the field was an impetus for the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue constructing and publishing a handbook dedicated to humanitarian negotiation. According the handbook's authors, Mancini-Griffoli and Picot (2004, pp. 11-12), three dilemmas exist for the humanitarian negotiator:

- It involves negotiating the non-negotiable
- It typically takes place from a position of relative weakness
- At most, it can usually only hope for second-best outcomes

The ability to overcome these dilemmas is vital to successful humanitarian negotiations. That being said, the same three dilemmas could apply to numerous other fields. Clearly the utility of humanitarian diplomacy goes beyond the realm of humanitarian work.

The question becomes whether or not universities are the appropriate medium for such training to occur. The interdisciplinary nature of the modern university makes it the ideal training ground for potential humanitarian diplomats. Rainhorn *et. al*. remind that it is 'the tools forged by interdisciplinary thinking to gain a better understanding of the complexity of contemporary crisis situations, and through that understanding improve the personal capacity to deal with situations which are often unforeseen and sometimes difficult' (Rainhorn *et. al.* 2010, p.10). Simply put, the field of humanitarian diplomacy should not be perceived as one unique to international relations, or even international law, but one that requires a diversity of knowledge and capabilities.

The Enhancing Learning & Research for Humanitarian Assistance (ELRHA) study regarding the professionalisation of the humanitarian sector (ELRHA, 2010) provides some insight into the demands of the industry that a university may consider. In surveying over 1,400 humanitarian workers the top key knowledge requirements for the humanitarian sector were needs assessment, safety and security issues, international humanitarian law, and monitoring and evaluation (ELRHA, 2010, p.31). In response to the central skills required the top three responses were multi-tasking, negotiation mediation, and team building (ELRHA, 2010, p.32). Arguably, a number of these skills can be acquired through on-the-job training, or enrolment into short courses. However, with the size of the humanitarian workforce

growing at an annual rate of 6% (Holmes, 2010, p.6) adequate training, particularly at the university level, could only be perceived as beneficial.

The task of this paper has been threefold. First, the paper looked towards the field of humanitarian diplomacy and its placement within the diaspora of diplomatic studies at the university level. Second, the paper sought to establish the academic options for both the actual, and the potential, humanitarian worker in the Australian "Group of Eight" universities. In doing so the paper revealed that while some universities did return a positive result for the search of 'humanitarian diplomacy' the relevance of these results to a future career in humanitarian diplomacy are questionable at best. Finally, the paper briefly discussed the utility of humanitarian diplomacy as a tertiary level subject. The paper reveals that as the field of humanitarianism continues to evolve other institutions have taken the responsibility of knowledge generation within this field away from universities. There is, however, a potential for universities to reclaim this responsibility by actively seeking to establish courses that meet the requirements of the field. If universities are able to do so, the humanitarian diplomats of the future shall have a wealth of knowledge at their disposal as they seek to alleviate the suffering of vulnerable persons the world over.

APPENDIX ONE

Humanitarian Diplomacy Programs and Courses on Offer at the Group of Eight Australian Universities

The following list provides a brief overview of the various programs and courses available for those wishing to study humanitarian diplomacy at one of the "Group of Eight" universities. The list provided below is the result of course and degree search requests via the individual universities website. Arguably, other courses exist within the degree programs that would align themselves with humanitarian diplomacy. However, these subjects have been excluded on the grounds that the university has not identified them as being relevant in a search for humanitarian diplomacy courses and programs.

The Australian National University (ANU)

Program

Master of International Security Law

Administered by the Faculty of Law, the Master of International Security Law seeks to 'provide students with an understanding of the core principles of the contemporary law in the field, including international peacekeeping.' The ANU contends that the program's 'key aspect is to provide specialist education and training in the area of international security law to the Australian Public Service'. (Australian National University, 2013b)

Program Requirements

- 30 Units of compulsory courses
- Minimum of 12 units for A list of electives
- Maximum of 6 units from B list of electives

Admission Requirements

- A strong pass degree
- Relevant employment experience

Website

http://studyat.anu.edu.au/2013/programs/7318XMISL;overview.html

Graduate Diploma in International Security Law

Similar to the Master of the International Security Law, the Graduate Diploma in International Security Law is administered by the Faculty of Law. The Graduate Diploma also seeks to 'provide students with an understanding of the core principles of contemporary law in the field, including international peacekeeping.' The ANU contends that the program's 'key aspect is to provide specialist education and training in the area of international security law to the Australian Public Service.' (Australian National University, 2013c)

Program Requirements

- 24 Units of compulsory courses
- Minimum of 12 units for A list of electives
- Maximum of 6 units from B list of electives

Admission Requirements

- A strong pass degree

- Relevant employment experience

Website

http://studyat.anu.edu.au/2013/programs/6318XGDISL;overview.html

Graduate Diploma in International Affairs

The School of International Political and Strategic Studies administers the Graduate Diploma in International Affairs. The Graduate Diploma 'is designed for those who are seeking academic preparation for a career in international affairs, whether in diplomacy, the civil service, teaching, journalism or business.' The Graduate Diploma also serves as a 'stepping stone to the Master of International Affairs or Master of Arts (International Relations).' (Australian National University, 2013d)

Program Requirements

- 3 Compulsory 12-unit core courses
- 2 6-unit electives

Admission Requirements

- A Bachelor degree with a credit average

Website

http://studyat.anu.edu.au/2013/programs/6815XGDIAF;overview.html

Master of International Affairs

The School of International Political and Strategic Studies administers the Graduate Diploma in International Affairs. The Graduate Diploma 'is designed for those who are seeking preparation for a career in international affairs with an Asia-Pacific focus, whether in diplomacy, the civil service, teaching, journalism or business.' The ANU contends that the program is a 'professional master-by-coursework degree taken over two semesters full time.' '(Australian National University, 2013e)

Program Requirements

- A 48-unit coursework program
- 2 Compulsory 12-unit core courses
- 4 6-unit electives

Admission Requirements

- Domestic applicants - A distinction average in a Graduate Certificate, Graduate Diploma or Honours or the equivalent
- International applicants – at least a distinction average, or its equivalent, in a four-year Bachelors degree or a Graduate Certificate, Graduate Diploma, or the equivalent.

Website

http://studyat.anu.edu.au/2013/programs/7815XMIAF;overview.html

Master of Arts (International Relations)

The School of International Political and Strategic Studies administers the Master of Arts (International Relations). The Masters program 'is designed for those who are seeking preparation for a career in international affairs with an Asia-Pacific focus, whether in diplomacy, the civil service, teaching, journalism or business.' The ANU contends that the program is 'also for those requiring a foundation for doctoral studies in international relations.' (Australian National University, 2013f)

Program Requirements

- A 72-unit coursework and research degree
- 2 Compulsory 12-unit core courses
- 4 6-unit electives
- 24 units of thesis (15,000 words) on completion of a distinction average in the coursework component of the degree

Admission Requirements

- Domestic applicants - A distinction average in a Graduate Certificate, Graduate Diploma or Honours or the equivalent
- International applicants – at least a distinction average, or its equivalent, in a four-year Bachelors degree or a Graduate Certificate, Graduate Diploma, or the equivalent.

Website

http://studyat.anu.edu.au/2013/programs/7818XMAIR;overview.html

Courses

DIPL8006 – Diplomacy, Politics, and the UN

INTR8063 – Japan & Northeast Asia postwar

The University of New South Wales (UNSW)

Program

Master of Arts (Specialisation)

Administered by the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, the Combined Master of Arts in International Relations (MA (IR))/Master of Public Policy (MPP) 'offers postgraduate students the opportunity to…extend and deepen their existing skills, knowledge and understanding of global politics and public policy.' The program seeks to combine the strengths of UNSW with Peking University (PKU), by allowing students to complete the MA (IR) at UNSW, and the MPP at PKU. (The University of New South Wales, 2013b)

Program Requirements

- UNSW MA (IR)
  - 4 core courses
  - 4 elective courses
- PKU MPP
  - 7 core course
  - 3 elective course
  - Masters thesis

Admission Requirements

- A bachelor degree from the UNSW, or an equivalent qualification from another university or tertiary institution

Website

http://www.handbook.unsw.edu.au/postgraduate/programs/2013/8221.html

Courses[3]

JURD7468 –Law of Armed Conflict

JURD7387 – Forced Migration & Human Rights in Int. Law

JURD7388 – Settlement of International Disputes

POLS5121 – International Organisations and Global Politics

COMD5002 – Development, Human Rights, and Global Health

JURD7372 – Australian Immigration Law and Practice

JURD7417 – The Politics of Human Rights: Theory and Critique

JURD 7467 – International Criminal Law & Transitional Justice

ZHSS8438 – The Justice of War: States, Self-Defence & Force

ZHSS8417 – Air Power in the 21st Century: Strategic Issues

ZHSS8404 – Legal and Moral Problems of International Violence

PHCM9662 – Health Aspects of Crises, Emergencies and Disasters

PHCM9783 – Communicable Diseases Control and HE & D

POLS5129 – The Foreign Policies of Great Powers

ZHSS8228 – Understanding Asia: North Korea

ZHSS8300 – Media and Democracy in South East Asia

Monash University

Program

Master of Diplomacy and Trade

Managed by the Faculty of Business and Economics, the Master of Diplomacy and Trade 'provides formal academic study across a range of disciplines relevant to the needs of organisations operating in the global environment.' Monash contends that the program 'provides high-level training in the field of economics, law and contemporary politics'. Ideally, the course is 'aimed at individuals who presently work, or who hope to work, in both the public and private sectors…for individuals in the government sector…[and] individuals who are operating, or looking to work, in an international capacity in both the corporate or not-for-profit sector.' (Monash University, 2013b)

Program Requirements

- A 72-unit coursework and research degree
- 6 core 6-unit courses
- 6 elective 6-unit subjects
- The program also offers a research report elective for 24 units

Admission Requirements

- The program requires a 'completed Australian bachelor degree or an equivalent qualification and a Weighted Average Mark of 55%'.

Website

http://monash.edu/pubs/handbooks/courses/2643.html

[3] The University of New South Wales offers a number of results for coursework related to humanitarian diplomacy at both the post-graduate, and under-graduate level. Given the limitations of this paper, only the post-graduate subjects have been incorporated into this summary.

The University of Sydney

Program

International Security Studies

The University of Sydney offers three different programs in the field of International Security Studies: a graduate certificate, a graduate diploma, and a Masters. The Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences administers the International Security Studies program. The program 'is designed to provide students with the knowledge and skills relevant to understanding both traditional and contemporary security challenges.' The University of Sydney contends that the program 'will engage students with the multifaceted causes and consequences of contemporary conflicts, as well as threats to human security that arise from environmental degradation, infectious disease, climate change and the activities of non-state actors.' Presented below are the program requirements, admission requirements, and website for all three programs. (The University of Sydney, 2013b)

Graduate Certificate in International Security

Program Requirements

- A 24-unit coursework degree
- Students must complete four 6-unit courses of study

Admission Requirements

- The Graduate Certificate is seen as a stepping-stone for students that have not received the credit average required for entry into the Master of International Security

Website

http://sydney.edu.au/courses/programs/master-of-international-security-studies/Graduate-Certificate-in-International-Security

Graduate Diploma in International Security

Program Requirements

- A 36-unit coursework degree
- 3 core units of study (18 credit points)
- 3 elective units of study (18 credit points)

Admission Requirements

- The Graduate Diploma is seen as a stepping-stone for students that have not received the credit average required for entry into the Master of International Security

Website

http://sydney.edu.au/courses/programs/master-of-international-security-studies/Graduate-Diploma-in-International-Security

Master of International Security

Program Requirements

- A 60-unit coursework degree
- 3 core units of study (18 credit points)
- 7 elective units of study (42 credit points)

Admission Requirements

- A bachelor's degree, graduate diploma, graduate certificate or equivalent
- Relevant work experience

Website

http://sydney.edu.au/courses/programs/master-of-international-security-studies/Master-of-International-Security

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Dave Elseroad

Head of Advocacy & Geneva Office, Human Rights House Foundation
(at the time of writing: Manager, Global Road Safety Partnership, IFRC)

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Employing humanitarian diplomacy in national society-led road safety policy advocacy

Employing humanitarian diplomacy in national society-led road safety policy advocacy

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In 2012, the Global Road Safety Partnership (GRSP), a hosted program of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, launched a ten country pilot program designed to engage National Societies in so-called road safety advocacy. Recognizing the unique position of National Societies vis-à-vis government, GRSP sought to integrate work with National Societies in a pre-existing program which was already working to reduce road traffic injuries and deaths in ten countries. To date, the "National Society Advocacy Program" is working in five countries (Cambodia, China, Egypt, Kenya, and Viet Nam).

This paper tells the story of road safety advocacy in Cambodia, Egypt, Kenya and Russia. In particular, the paper analyzes the advocacy program based upon key questions related to the efficacy of humanitarian diplomacy principles in road safety policy advocacy: what are the components of humanitarian diplomacy which have proven successful or unsuccessful in road safety policy advocacy and why? What, if any, characteristics of National Society projects might predict the success, or lack of success, of a policy campaign? Beyond this, however, this paper will look at the lessons learned by GRSP and National Societies in conducting road safety advocacy and how those lessons might be utilized moving forward.

INTRODUCTION

According to the World Health Organization, nearly 1.2 million people will die this year on the world's roads and an additional 20 to 50 million will suffer serious injuries (WHO, 2013, 1). When compared with other major leading causes of death globally, road traffic injuries ranked eighth (WHO, 2013, 1). For men, ages 15–29, road traffic injuries are the leading cause of death worldwide (WHO, 2013, 1). While not an issue that always generates popular support among the world's celebrities, road traffic injury and death remains a serious global crisis.

The Global Road Safety Partnership (GRSP) is a hosted program of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). Formed in 1999, GRSP is ". . . dedicated to the sustainable reduction of road-crash death and injury in low- and middle-income countries." GRSP largely works to accomplish this mission through partnership building, capacity building, policy advocacy, and the provision of technical support and assistance.

In 2010, GRSP became one of six international partners responsible for implementing a project, funded by Bloomberg Philanthropies, designed to reduce road traffic injury and death in ten low- and middle-income countries. Under this project, unofficially named "Road Safety in 10 Countries (RS10)", GRSP is responsible for three key activities: building the capacity of traffic officers to effectively enforce road traffic policies; work with National Societies to advocate for the adoption and implementation of evidence-based road safety policies; and provide grant funds to civil society organizations to also advocate for road safety policies.

The second component of GRSP's work under the RS10 project, working with National Societies to advocate for the adoption and implementation of evidence-based road safety policies, is a pilot program. This pilot program provides resources for GRSP and National Societies to utilize the unique status of National Societies as auxiliary to the government to engage in road safety advocacy. The program is coordinated by a GRSP staff member based in Bangkok with technical support from GRSP staff in the RS10 countries. GRSP also makes small grants available to participating National Societies for staff and activity costs. To date, and under the RS10 project, GRSP has engaged with National Societies in Cambodia, Egypt, Kenya, and Russia.

This paper seeks to explore the humanitarian diplomacy concepts used in road safety policy advocacy. This paper will analyze the program based upon key questions related to the efficacy of humanitarian diplomacy principles in road safety policy advocacy: what are the components of humanitarian diplomacy which have proven successful or unsuccessful in road safety policy advocacy and why? What, if any, characteristics of National Society projects might predict success, or lack of success, of a policy campaign? Beyond this, however, this paper will look at the lessons learned by GRSP and National Societies in conducting road safety advocacy and how those lessons might be utilized moving forward.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Beyond those resources produced within the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement, the literature on humanitarian diplomacy remains fairly sparse. This is largely due to the fact that, as Regnier explains, "humanitarian diplomacy is not yet a solidly established concept generally recognized by the international community" (2011, 1213). However, within the Movement, much attention is paid to the topic in terms of definition and how it is practiced.

Lamb describes humanitarian diplomacy as "persuading decision makers, policy makers, opinion leaders and other stakeholders to act, at all times, in the interests of vulnerable people, and with full respect for fundamental humanitarian principles" (2008). This is repeated, verbatim, by the IFRC's Humanitarian Diplomacy Policy, adopted by the Governing Board in 2009. Perhaps at its most basic level, this "persuasion" is simply on-going negotiation and is alluded to by Mancini-Griffolli and Picot: "[Humanitarians] do nothing but negotiate" (2004, 12). In any case, attempting definition through theory may be less useful than definition through illustration.

Minear and Smith write that "the concept of humanitarian diplomacy encompasses the activities carried out by humanitarian organizations to obtain the space… within which to function their integrity" (2007, 1). In its Humanitarian Diplomacy Policy, the IFRC lays out the following goals and objectives of effective humanitarian diplomacy:

- Greater access to and influence with decision makers
- Greater humanitarian access and space for National Societies and the International Federation
- Strong visibility for and public understanding of Red Cross and Red Crescent activities
- Stronger capacity to mobilize all relevant resources
- The facilitation of effective partnerships when responding to the needs of the vulnerable

The IFRC's literature suggests that "it is only through the establishment of humanitarian diplomacy… that the humanitarian objectives referred to above can be effectively realized" (2009, 1).

Yet, how does humanitarian diplomacy differ from traditional advocacy? Advocacy, unlike humanitarian diplomacy, is widely discussed in a plethora of scholarly forums. Cohen et al. explain that, from a value-neutral perspective, "advocacy is the pursuit of influencing outcomes… that directly affect people's lives" (2001, 7). However, VeneKlasen and Miller argue that "there is no pure form of advocacy" (2002, 14). Perhaps, like humanitarian diplomacy, a clear definition is not altogether necessary and that on-going debates around definition in fact draw parallels between the objectives of humanitarian diplomacy and the objectives of advocacy – promoting the needs of the vulnerable in the policy arena. In any case, the clearest departure of humanitarian diplomacy from traditional advocacy may come as a result of the issue of neutrality.

The Red Cross and Red Crescent Fundamental Principles include neutrality. Under the Fundamental Principle, "in order to continue to enjoy the confidence of all, the Movement may not take sides in hostilities or engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature". The literature, however, appears to agree that the principle of neutrality does not necessarily forbid policy advocacy on the part of the Movement. The HD policy recognizes the balance that must be achieved – public advocacy should only be deployed when the context permits it." (IFRC, 2012, 8).

Interestingly, the literature appears to lack substantial and independent in-depth analysis of the efficacy of humanitarian diplomacy, or strategies employed under the umbrella of humanitarian diplomacy, in achieving policy change designed to promote humanitarian goals and objectives.

ROAD SAFETY ADVOCACY IN PRACTICE

Cambodian Red Cross

Brief Overview

GRSP began working with the Cambodian Red Cross (CRC) in 2012 to advocate for changes to Cambodia's motorcycle passenger helmet wearing legislation. Under Cambodia's 2007 Road Traffic Law, passengers on motorcycles are not required to wear helmets. This lack of official policy is largely credited with only 6% of motorcycle passengers wearing helmets (Abdulgafoor et al. 2012, 32). The project, which provides funds to the CRC to undertake advocacy efforts, seeks to address this policy loophole.

The key strategies of the project are as follows:

- Influence decision-makers to approve changes to the motorcycle passenger helmet sections of the Road Traffic Law
- Gain membership on relevant government legislative and technical bodies responsible for making policy recommendations
- Engage the media to influence decision-makers on the importance of the policy proposal
- Build strategic partnerships with civil society organizations to advocate for the policy proposal

By October 2012, the government body responsible for drafting the new policy had done so and sent the proposal to the body under the Council of Ministers for consideration. To date, the CRC and its allies are continuing efforts to see the new legislation adopted. In many ways, the work of the CRC is seen as a success story under the RS10 project.

Principles of Humanitarian Diplomacy

Under their project, the Cambodian Red Cross effectively leveraged their status as auxiliary to the government to play a useful behind-the-scenes role with policy-makers (GRSP, 2012). Rather than make strong public pronouncements and act in conflict with the government, the CRC worked closely with relevant government bodies and legislative development agencies to see their policy proposal progress through the policy making process. Indeed, they often employed persuasion rather than more aggressive forms of advocacy. This fit well both within the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement's philosophy as well as the specific Cambodian political context.

Status of Internal Resources

Prior to the start of the RS10 project, the Cambodian Red Cross already enjoyed access to relevant government entities responsible for road safety policy development and implementation. Due to its status as auxiliary to the government, the CRC sits on the National Road Safety Committee, the lead governmental road safety agency in Cambodia. During the project, the CRC was also able to join the Council of Jurists, the state body responsible for drafting the proposed changes to the Road Traffic Law. As the only non-governmental actor on this body, the CRC enjoyed tremendous access to policy-making. Finally, within the Cambodian Red Cross, there has been recognition of road safety as a humanitarian issue as well as strong support from its senior leadership for the issue. This allowed the project team to leverage the senior leadership at important moments throughout their humanitarian diplomacy efforts.

Finally, the status of the CRC, like all National Societies, as an auxiliary to the government and a politically neutral entity, was very useful throughout their activities. It allowed the CRC to host seminars with relevant stakeholders, hold dinners with government officials, and invite high-level members of government to meetings to discuss the issue. It is unlikely that other non-governmental bodies would have had this same level of access.

Status of External Resources

In addition to substantial internal resources, the Cambodian Red Cross also had several key external resources available to it. GRSP was able to provide significant technical assistance to the CRC through its staff on the ground. This allowed for close cooperation, collaboration and coordination. Likewise, GRSP conducted an early political map which outlined the legislative policy development process, key government stakeholders and decision-makers, and major governmental agencies and bodies. CRC was able to provide their input into the map while concurrently utilizing the information captured within it to inform their strategy development. Finally, GRSP provided funding to the CRC which allowed staff to dedicate some of their time to the project and conduct various activities.

Another important external resource which the Cambodian Red Cross possessed was a relatively broad coalition of partners from throughout civil society. Beginning in 2012, the CRC approached a number of organizations and hosted a meeting in September 2012. Organizations were able to sign onto the campaign and call on the government to support passage of the proposed legislative change. This broad base of support strengthened the CRC's position vis-à-vis the government.

Egyptian Red Crescent

Brief Overview

GRSP also began engaging in road safety advocacy in Egypt in 2012. A number of internal bureaucratic issues delayed the beginning of the project with the Egyptian Red Crescent. However, it finally got off the ground in late 2012. Data concerning road traffic injury and death in Egypt is relatively difficult to come by. However, according to the World Health Organization, Egypt experiences approximately 9 deaths per 100,000 (WHO, 2013). Under the project funded by GRSP, the Egyptian Red Crescent is advocating for changes to the National Traffic Law by the Shura Council (Egyptian Parliament).

The key strategies of the project are as follows:

- Influence and support decision-makers to revise the traffic law
- Increase involvement in relevant road safety bodies by the ERC
- Build civil society support for the draft law by involving them in dialogue with technical ministries
- Engage the media to advocate for the draft law
- Build internal Red Crescent support for the road safety advocacy issue

As of the finalization of this paper, the revised traffic law remains stalled in government. Some progress has been made in raising the need for the revisions within government, however that has not yet led to any substantial movement.

Principles of Humanitarian Diplomacy

Much like the Cambodian Red Cross, the Egyptian Red Crescent has also been particularly effective at leveraging their auxiliary status. Despite political strife which made civil society engagement with the government very difficult, the ERC has been able to create a traffic law working group composed of representatives from several key government agencies. While no specific recommendation has yet come from this body, it is clear that such a body will have significantly more influence within the Egyptian government once a policy recommendation is issued (GRSP, 2012). In addition, the ERC has been able to use its position in Egyptian society to promote general road safety messages throughout the media. While not directly tied to a specific policy recommendation, these media activities help to raise general awareness among the public and policy-makers and will likely make future policy work easier.

Status of Internal Resources

By many accounts, the Egyptian Red Crescent has been involved in various road safety-related activities and initiatives for several years. This work has included, as in many National Societies, first aid training. However, they have also conducted some public awareness campaigns, including school-based education programs. The project represents one of the first major forays into road safety policy-making. The ERC, like many National Societies, enjoys close connections with several key government agencies and bodies responsible for road safety. These include the Ministry of Health, Traffic Police, and the General Authority for Roads, Bridges and Land Transport.

In terms of internal support for road safety advocacy, GRSP did have to work to build support among the senior leadership. In February 2012, GRSP met with the ERC's Secretary-General to discuss the project, however early signs of support were encouraging. In any case, it was deemed necessary to include "building internal support" as one of the key strategies of the project. From an analytical standpoint, however, it is difficult to identify a correlation between this lack of early support and lack of political movement on road safety. The internal political turmoil in Egypt makes such analysis difficult.

Status of External Resources

GRSP does not have an office or staff in Egypt. As such, the provision of day-to-day technical support and assistance is hampered. However, technical assistance is provided through GRSP's regional office in Beirut and some trips to the ERC have been made since the project began. From a financial standpoint, the project did provide the Egyptian Red Crescent with funds to pay for staff time and some limited programmatic activities.

However, one cannot speak of external factors without addressing internal political strife in Egypt. Indeed, while road safety is not a political topic which garners significant opposition, advocates are often required to ensure that it remains at the top (or near the top) of the political agenda. Competing political priorities can often be the death of well-intentioned road safety policy initiatives. In Egypt, "competing political priorities" can be used as a euphemism for severe internal political strife. As such, road safety is not necessarily seen as terribly important.

Kenya Red Cross

Brief Overview

In Kenya, the RS10 implementing partners are focusing on two key road safety risk factors: speed and helmet wearing. In mid-2012, GRSP approached the Kenya Red Cross (KRC) about advocating for the passage of a draft amendment to the National Traffic Law which had been sitting in Parliament for some time. The draft sought to strengthen speed, drink-driving and helmet wearing provisions of current legislation. Interestingly, in October 2012, only four months into the start of the project, the Kenyan parliament passed the draft amendment.

The key strategies of the project are as follows:

- Engage media to influence decision-makers to approve the draft amendment
- Attract the interest of high profile personalities to advocate for the approval of the draft amendment
- Build strategic partnerships to advocate for the approval of the draft amendment

Since the passage of the draft amendment in October 2012, the project with the Kenya Red Cross has suffered from a lack of clear policy objectives. Activities have largely been disconnected from a broad objective and tended towards social media-focused social awareness activities with no measurable impact.

Principles of Humanitarian Diplomacy

One of the important components to humanitarian diplomacy is the importance of knowing and understanding local context. In this regard, all of the National Societies with whom GRSP is engaged are well-placed. The Kenya Red Cross, in particular, capitalizes on its knowledge of local moods and interests and engages heavily throughout social

media (GRSP, 2012). They regularly tweet about road crashes, traffic injuries, and traffic deaths. Like the work of the Egyptian Red Crescent, this is not tied to a particular policy objective (namely because they have no clear policy objective); however, this type of social media engagement does help to keep road safety within public discourse and can be quite useful in future advocacy campaigns.

Status of Internal Resources

In terms of overall internal resources, the Kenya Red Cross is one of the most financially sound of the non-donor National Societies. It enjoys close connections with the Kenyan government and is very visible within Kenyan society due to its work in various humanitarian crises. The KRC is also very present on a variety of social media and regularly utilizes this medium for conveying a number of messages to the general public.

In terms of the project, the Kenya Red Cross appointed a relatively junior and inexperienced manager to lead the project. This has two major impacts on the project: it severely limits the extent to which the KRC engages in any meaningful humanitarian diplomacy efforts because the project manager lacks the necessary skills, and it disallows the manager from accessing senior leadership within the KRC at critical moments.

Status of External Resources

Like Egypt, GRSP does not have an office or staff in Kenya. While the organization does have representatives in Africa, they lack experience in policy advocacy or the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. Therefore, technical support has fallen largely to the Bangkok-based coordinator for the entire National Society project. Given the aforementioned inexperience of the KRC's project manager, this situation does not allow for the full provision of capacity building or technical assistance.

The KRC receives significant financial support from donor National Societies as well as its own business interests. Under this project, funding was provided for staff and activity costs. However, it was a relatively small amount of funding given the overall KRC operating budget and, perhaps due to this fact, the project failed to generate significant internal focus or commitment.

Russian Red Cross

Brief Overview

Involvement between GRSP and the Russian Red Cross (RRC) began in early 2012. A project to support the RRC's limited road safety activities was finalized in June 2012. For the first 8 months of the project, however, there was no clear policy objective. Rather, the project focused on activities designed to build internal support within the Russian Red Cross for road safety initiatives and build connections with relevant road safety policy-making organs of the Russian federal government. The project would be the first road safety project outside of first aid training in which the RRC would engage.

In early 2013, however, the project was reoriented around a specific policy goal. Under the project, the RRC would advocate for changes to the Russian traffic regulations which govern child restraint usage in vehicles. The key strategies of the project are as follows:

- Influence decision makers to support traffic rules changes on child restraints
- Partner with other organizations to make them strategic stake-holders to advocate for child safety
- Push the media to spread the public opinion of child restraint usage and strategy, and the need for the improvement of the traffic rules
- Build and maintain internal support within the Russian Red Cross

Principles of Humanitarian Diplomacy

One of the strengths of the Russian Red Cross is its ability to effectively implement so-called "quiet diplomacy". Given the aforementioned sensitivities about political activities by non-governmental actors, Red Cross quiet diplomacy is incredibly effective and useful. This willingness to keep activities behind closed doors has allowed the Russian Red Cross to gain access to relevant government ministries as well as entities attached to the government, namely the Public Chamber. This access allows the Russian Red Cross to have a seat at the table of important road safety decision-making bodies.

Status of Internal Resources

GRSP had early indications of strong support from within the Russian Red Cross. The RRC was one of the National Societies which endorsed a GRSP-organized road safety pledge in 2011. In initial discussions with the RRC leadership about project funding, the leadership expressed support for policy advocacy, citing road safety as a humanitarian crisis in Russia. In addition, the leadership seconded the head of the Disaster Management Department, in which their road safety programs sit, as the manager for the GRSP-funded project.

On the other hand, any efforts at policy influence must be handled with great sensitivity within the Russian Federation. Non-state actors are hesitant to be seen as trying to influence the government or the policy development process. Coupled with the relative lack of experience in advocacy or policy work in general, the project suffered in the first year from a lack of any real substantive progress.

Status of External Resources

Russia is one of the countries in which GRSP has a staff member able to provide some technical support to the RRC. The GRSP staff member has a long history of collaboration and work with the RRC as staff of the IFRC in Moscow. This relationship has allowed GRSP to provide on-going support to the RRC in a number of their activities. On the other hand, while the GRSP staff member possesses adequate road safety knowledge and expertise, that knowledge and expertise does not extend to policy advocacy. As such, some level of technical support has had to be provided from both GRSP Geneva and the Bangkok-based coordinator of the National Society project. This lack of support, coupled with internal capacity limitations, has significantly delayed real progress under the project.

ANALYSIS

The Importance of Experience

One of the key lessons drawn from the experience of GRSP in implementing the road safety advocacy project with National Societies is the influence that experience – on the institutional or individual level – can have on successful road safety policy advocacy. In the case of the Cambodian Red Cross, the organization leveraged its past experience in road safety very effectively. Its past work allowed the organization to sit on critical government decision-making bodies as well as to build close cooperation with other road safety stakeholders. The CRC is seen as an expert in road safety and a national player in the road safety arena. On the individual level, one can also point out that a lack of experience in the managers of the Russian Red Cross and Kenya Red Cross has key holes in the potential efficacy of those projects. Lacking experience in political mapping, developing key advocacy strategies, or implementing those strategies, the managers relied heavily on GRSP resources which significantly delayed, or stopped, the progression of their work.

Leveraging Auxiliary Status

National Societies have a unique status as auxiliaries to government. While the implementation or manifestation of this status varies from one National Society to the next, in many cases it can allow the National Society to play a role in policy-making. In the case of the Cambodian Red Cross, its auxiliary status allowed it to sit on the national road safety policy-making body. In Egypt, the Red Crescent can bring together various government bodies to discuss important road safety issues and push for legislative action. The Russian Red Cross can work with the Public Chamber, a key policy advising body in Russia, to make clear policy recommendations while still avoiding problems that NGOs face when trying to influence policy-making. These are unique activities which National Societies can pursue as they work towards road safety policy change. National Societies must continue to exercise the unique auxiliary to government status.

Recognizing Resource Limitations

The Global Road Safety Partnership is a small organization which lacks a presence in every country in which it seeks to promote road safety initiatives. While this is not necessarily an indicator of future challenges, it can lead to challenges in providing adequate levels of technical support and assistance to National Societies, particularly those which may require quite a bit of support. Early capacity assessment of National Societies can be an important way to identify technical assistance requirements. This, in turn, can be analyzed against GRSP's resource allocation should GRSP lack an in-country presence. In Kenya and Egypt, the National Societies would benefit from closer support, and perhaps even oversight, from GRSP technical staff. Certainly at the early stages of their advocacy activities, day-to-day assistance could lead to policy-change success.

Setting Clear Policy Goals

In any policy advocacy, the identification of a clear policy objective is key. In road safety policy advocacy with National Societies, this is also important. In the cases of Russia and Kenya, a lack of a clear policy objective led to projects which attempted to tie together a series of activities under the broad umbrella of road safety. While in Russia the lack of a policy objective of the Russian Red Cross was recognized and a mid-course correction took place in early 2013, the same cannot be said for Kenya and the Kenya Red Cross. The early passage of the amendment to the national traffic law effectively left the Kenya Red Cross without a policy objective. As a result, their activities have lacked any real coherence.

Conflicting Political Priorities & Effective Policy Advocacy

As was mentioned previously, road safety advocates often face the conflicting political priorities of policy makers when advocating for road safety policy change. There are not typically opponents to road safety policy recommendations, however these recommendations can be quite quickly removed from policy discourse by those issues which

are deemed of greater importance by policy makers. In the case of Egypt, internal political strife made the advocacy work of the Egyptian Red Crescent quite difficult. In Kenya, a number of on-going humanitarian crises and challenges prevented the leadership of the Kenya Red Cross from dedicating sufficient attention to the organization's road safety activities.

Yet, competing political priorities need not completely push road safety from the policy agenda. Rather, they require new strategies for engagement with political stakeholders and other partners in order to illustrate the importance, indeed urgency, of road safety as a public policy issue. This is where organizational and individual experience in advocacy can be a critical factor in allowing the National Society to understand the challenge of a conflicting political priority and react accordingly.

CONCLUSION

The principles of humanitarian diplomacy can very clearly and effectively influence the road safety policy advocacy undertaken by National Societies. Quiet diplomacy, understanding local context, serving as an auxiliary to government roles, and other concepts which underpin humanitarian diplomacy can be equally effective for road safety policy advocacy. These, and others, are important concepts for National Societies to consider and integrate into any road safety policy advocacy in the future.

However, there are a number of other factors which, while not directly related to humanitarian diplomacy, are equally important for review and analysis. Policy advocacy and road safety experience, resource limitations, lack of policy objectives, and external political factors are all important issues while considering the potential efficacy of a National Society-led road safety advocacy campaign or project. Indeed, these may be critical issues.

Road safety is a humanitarian crisis which disproportionately affects the world's most vulnerable populations. It is a topic and issue which is closely linked to the Core Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. National Societies can, and should, engage in humanitarian diplomacy to promote effective and evidence-based road safety policies in order to begin to reverse this deadly trend. A close understanding of humanitarian diplomacy principles and the key lessons learned from the GRSP National Society advocacy project can provide National Societies with useful roadmaps in this regard.

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Claire Whiting

Senior Associate/Independent Consultant,
Proteknon Foundation for Innovation and Learning
(at the time of writing: Director, Pakistan Humanitarian Forum)

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ACRONYMS

AMEF	Access Monitoring and Reporting Framework
EAD	Economic Affairs Division, Government of Pakistan
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
HD	Humanitarian Diplomacy
ICVA	International Council of Voluntary Agencies
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOI	Ministry of Interior
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
PHF	Pakistan Humanitarian Forum
UN	United Nations
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Pakistan Humanitarian Forum (PHF) is a membership organisation for INGOs operating in Pakistan. A key service of PHF was advocacy and the foundation of the advocacy strategy, at the time this paper was written, was humanitarian access. In 2012-13 PHF developed and implemented a humanitarian diplomacy action on the access constraint 'impediment on entry into the country' – specifically the issue of delayed issuance of visas to humanitarian workers, both within Pakistan and from global embassies.

The action was identified through the deteriorating situation and the lack of willingness for influential interlocutors to engage decision shapers and makers on the issue, due to the absence of a clear evidence base. Subsequently, the action sought to consistently and strategically gather data on a quarterly basis on visa delays and to analyse the data to demonstrate the impact of delays on programming, including the financial cost of the delays. The evidence was used to develop supporting materials to leverage the support of three key third parties including: UNOCHA, the Humanitarian Coordinator, and a group of like-minded donors. These third parties were leveraged, through quiet diplomacy, to engage decision shapers and makers on the issue. Low key public diplomacy was drawn on at strategic points, using the robust data set as the foundation to engage local and international media.

The action detailed in this research paper is long term and at the time of publication, was on-going. However, the research evidenced a clear impact: increased awareness of the delays amongst all stakeholders; the three targeted parties were on board and supporting the action at the decision making level; and, a number of clarifications and improvements were made in visa processing at both national and international levels. In the wider picture, the research evidences an added value of NGO consortia engaging in humanitarian diplomacy on issues of access constraining humanitarian work.

Whilst the short-term objective of this initiative has been achieved, there is still a way to go to achieve the long-term objectives. The following recommendations can facilitate the next steps:

- Development of a strategy to leverage donors to engage in quiet diplomacy on access issues with interlocutors in Pakistan and with embassies and ambassadors overseas.
- Establishment of working relations at EAD, MFA and MOI by PHF to enter into dialogue on delays that the data evidences at a working level.
- Increased engagement of both PHF directly and through third parties including donors and the UN Humanitarian Coordinator utilising the PHF data.
- Development of targeted supporting materials and data sets for decision shapers and makers, and an increased level of analysis of the data sets.
- Development of a parallel public humanitarian diplomacy action leveraging the media to improve the public perceptions of NGOs and the humanitarian community in Pakistan.

1. CONTEXT

1.1 Background and history of PHF

The Pakistan Humanitarian Forum (PHF) represents over 50 International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) delivering humanitarian assistance and development projects in Pakistan. It is an independent coordination forum that supports and represents the work of INGOs to address humanitarian and development needs across Pakistan. PHF works closely with national and provincial Government authorities, local NGOs, United Nations (UN) agencies, donor organisations, and other stakeholders. The PHF seeks to work with all partners with transparency, impartiality and integrity. These foundations lie at the heart of the PHF and are outlined in its vision, mission and mandate statements[1] and Code of Conduct defining the principles that all PHF members are bound to adhere to[2].

PHF delivers three core services for and with members. These are:

Coordination and Information includes positioning on operations and policies related to humanitarian and development assistance. The PHF also carries out data collection, analysis, assessments and compiles reports for its members on priority topics.

Policy and Communications includes raising issues and ensuring representation for members, through established relationships with stakeholders and seats at policy and operational fora; development of external positions and briefing papers on priority subjects; and engagement in media outreach to increase understanding of the way humanitarian work is coordinated and delivered. The focus of PHF Advocacy Work is Principled Assistance and Humanitarian Access.

Safety and Security includes the collection and sharing of information on the operational environment to support members working in some of the most challenging areas of Pakistan to deliver assistance. Regular updates, messages and additional resources help minimise risks to staff, assets and beneficiaries in the field.

1.2 Definition of humanitarian access and the impediments on humanitarian access

There is no one universally agreed definition of humanitarian access in either law or practice. Different actors, with different purposes, define humanitarian access through different lenses. For PHF, and for the purpose of this report, humanitarian access is defined as: *Humanitarian actors' ability to reach populations affected by crisis, as well as an affected population's ability to access humanitarian assistance and services.*[3] This is similar to the definition that UNOCHA uses under their mandate for supporting and monitoring humanitarian access.[4] Access is a fundamental prerequisite for effective humanitarian action and is essential for all aspects of humanitarian relief and disaster management on behalf of vulnerable communities.

In addition to security and natural access impediments, such as physical terrain, humanitarian organisations struggle with access constraints imposed by authorities, including local and federal government.[5] This type of imposed access constraint often attempts to control and regulate humanitarian activities within state borders. State imposed limitations on access include: travel restrictions of movement within the country, immigration control, government approval for humanitarian projects, etc.

The OCHA Global Access Monitoring and Reporting Framework (AMRF), defines nine categories of access constraints and aims to provide a tool to collect and analyse data to classify the impact of access constraints. The nine constraints are:

> Denial of need or entitlements; Impediments to entry into country; Restrictions on movement within country; Active hostilities; Violence against personnel, facilities and assets; Interference in

[1] See Annex 1

[2] Pakistan Humanitarian Forum. (2012). PHF Code of Conduct.

[3] United Nations Office For the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (n.d.). Humanitarian Access. https://www.unocha.org/fr/themes/humanitarian-access

[4] United Nations (1991, December 19). General Assembly Resolution 46/182. http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/46/a46r182.htm

[5] European Commission for Humanitarian Aid and Global Public Policy Institute. (2012). *Evaluation and review of humanitarian access strategies in DG ECHO.* http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/evaluation/2012/GPPi_Access-Report.pdf

implementation; Presence of mines and ERWs; Physical environment; and, Restriction or obstruction of population's access.

At a working level, the PHF Co-Chairs the Humanitarian Access Working Group (a working group of the Pakistan Humanitarian Country Team) with OCHA. This group was established with the intention to monitor the nine categories of access constraints listed above and to gather evidence on the negative impact on access to assistance by vulnerable communities. In practice this was a huge task and the Access Database failed to take hold. This has since been re-visited and in 2013 PHF collects data, and together with OCHA, monitors and advocates on three main categories:

- Impediments on Entry into the Country
- Restrictions on Movement Within the Country
- Attacks on Humanitarian Personnel

Impediments on Entry into the Country refers to administrative and bureaucratic requirements for entry into a country when an organisation is, or seeks to be, in operation. Since early 2011 this access constraint became increasingly de-habilitating for INGOs in Pakistan, with greater time and funds being diverted to ensure adequate staffing of programmes in the country. However there was no blueprint for effectively addressing the constraint – or any access constraint. In response, PHF established a system to monitor the trend with the purpose of utilising the analysed data to engage in humanitarian diplomacy for policy change to enable timely entry of humanitarian aid personnel into the country.

1.3 Defining Humanitarian Diplomacy

The International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies define Humanitarian Diplomacy as *'persuading decision makers and opinion leaders to act, at all times, in the interests of vulnerable people, and with full respect for fundamental humanitarian principles.'*[6] Humanitarian actors may be required, and, within the parameters of their mandates, indeed have a responsibility to leverage their voices and power through Humanitarian Diplomacy to promote the consideration of humanitarian principles and needs in decision making at all levels. This may require engagement with various actors, including state actors, who bear primary responsibility and overall control of their territory. In the case of the access constraint 'Impediment on Entry into the Country' the prime decision maker is the state.

As humanitarian diplomacy involves persuading others, an evidenced based and solution focused approach is important, as is engagement with those that make and shape decisions.[7] Whilst methods of humanitarian diplomacy vary according to the subject matter, they often entail discrete and context sensitive engagement with decision makers and shapers, but at the same time, do not rule out public diplomacy when appropriate and where it will best serve the leading principle of humanity, from which all other humanitarian principles flow,[8] and unimpeded humanitarian access.

2. THE STUDY

The commitment of PHF to engage in humanitarian diplomacy and, as part of that process, to consistently and strategically collect and analyse data on the access constraint 'Impediment on Entry into the Country' was one of the first attempts of the INGO consortium to engage in humanitarian diplomacy in a planned, structured way on a specific access issue over a considerable period of time. This research details the action, identifies successes and limitations and provides recommendations for the next steps in the action.

[6] International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. (2012). Humanitarian diplomacy Policy – Explanatory Memorandum.

[7] International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. (2011). *Humanitarian Diplomacy Guidance Series. Part 1: General Guidelines for the Practice of Humanitarian Diplomacy*. Final Consultative version

[8] International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. (1979). *The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross*. Commentary. Jean Pictet.

2.1 Research objectives

This research fulfils the following objectives:

Document the Humanitarian Diplomacy action.

Document the outcome and impact of the action so far.

Make recommendations for next steps in the action.

2.2 Research questions

The following four research questions guided the research:

- What has been the impact of the HD action in response to this access constraint to date?
- What has limited the impact of the action and what could make the action more effective moving forward?
- What are the next steps based on analysis of the action to date?
- What are the lessons learned of NGO Consortia in influencing humanitarian access?

2.3 Methods employed

A. *Desk review*

Background documentation on the access constraint 'Impediment on Entry to the Country' was collected and reviewed. All documentation and products of the action were gathered and reviewed. This included: background information, datasets, and analysis papers written. The desk review resulted in documentation of the action.

B. *Identification through purposeful sampling of key informant participants and development of interview schedule*

Purposive sampling was employed to select key informant interviewees for the research. The research required four targeted interviews. Given the limited timeframe for the research eight potential interviewees were approached. This resulted in seven interviews being completed. All interviewees have been engaged or involved in the action in one respect or another. Interviewees included: three PHF members, three UNOCHA staff and one donor representative.

C. *Data Collection*

A detailed interview schedule was developed and used to collect qualitative data from the seven participants. Data was compiled and analysed.

3. OUTLINE OF THE HD ACTION

3.1 Defining the area of focus

Principled humanitarian assistance and access are the foundations of the PHF advocacy strategy, identified by the membership due to common interest and relevance to all members. Issues of delays in visa issuance, both in Pakistan and from global embassies started to increase in early 2011. PHF sought to raise the issue to the attention of the Humanitarian Country Team,[9] UN Humanitarian Coordinator, OCHA, and a group of like-minded donors. However, through mid-to-late 2012, requests came back that any action would first require clear data supporting the reports of delays in visa processing. At the same time, INGO members' concern over the lack of a clear policy for NGO visa issuance, and the increasing delays in processing duration grew. The membership united on the agreement to systematically gather data from all members over a one year per period to provide an evidence base for HD on the access constraint 'Impediment on Entry into the Country', and specifically on visa issuance for international staff within

[9] The Humanitarian Country Team is the forum for humanitarian coordination between the Government, the United Nations and humanitarian. It is led by the Humanitarian Coordinator and has Secretariat support from UNOCHA.

Pakistan and from global embassies. The purpose being to show the scale of delays, the impact on programming for vulnerable communities, and to use the data to advocate for timely visa processing.

3.2 Defining the humanitarian diplomacy objective

The long-term objective of the HD was: 'to have clear policy guidance in place for NGO visa issuance in Pakistan and at global embassies that is adhered to by 2014.'

The short-term objective of the HD was: 'to systematically gather NGO visa data and engage in impact analysis bi-annually to provide a solid evidence base and to engage the support of three allies in the action.'

The objectives were defined with the PHF advocacy working group, a group composed of members, at the start of the action led by the Country Coordinator.

3.3 Defining the approach

The foundation of the action was to gather data to provide a solid evidence base that also outlined the impact of visa delays on programming, and, on the basis of the data to determine key asks of the Government in relation to timely NGO visa processing.

The data and key asks were then to be shared, through quiet diplomacy – in meetings, and worded into information sheets and analysis and impact papers – with third parties who would be able to engage decision makers and decision shapers on behalf of PHF to achieve the defined asks, and in doing so the long-term objective of the action.

The outcomes sought were clear policy guidelines on NGO visa processing and timely processing of visas within Pakistan and at global embassies.

In the longer term, PHF would then seek to engage directly with decision shapers and makers. The initial decision to engage third parties to undertake engagement, as opposed to engaging decision makers and shapers directly, was based on the capacity of PHF in terms of limited staff numbers, competing priorities, its age in terms of standing and credibility with senior government on the executive and legislative side, and the lack of existing government relations at most levels. In the year prior to this research, PHF had commenced the process of building direct relations with decision makers and shapers, which will continue to develop going forward.

3.4 Gathering and analysing information on the issue

The initial focus was defining the evidence required and collecting the data from all members. To ensure ownership of members the data collection formats were developed with the PHF Advocacy Working Group and were endorsed by the membership. Data was collected quarterly in 2012 and continued to be collected quarterly in 2013. Data included: visas applied for, duration in process, visas issued, visas denied, number of international staff in Pakistan, number of support visits cancelled due to lack of timely visa issuance, number of trips to country of residence for entry visa issuance, and number of staff in Pakistan with no valid visa due to delays in issuance. See Annex 2 for the data collection forms.

PHF achieved a 98% response rate on quarterly data requests and the data sets represented the visa data of 52 INGOs in Pakistan.

On a quarterly basis PHF compiled and sanitised the data of reference to any agency. The compiled and sanitised data was shared with UNOCHA. Analysis was undertaken and documents produced as detailed below.

3.5 Identifying stakeholders and allies

The initial targets to achieve the short- and long-term objectives were third parties. These were defined through a participatory process with the Advocacy Working Group as:

- OCHA
- The Humanitarian Country Team

- The UN Humanitarian Coordinator
- PHF like-minded donor group

PHF members and head offices and the global NGO coordination organisation ICVA and InterAction were identified as allies due to their vested interest and connections with third parties, and decision makers and shapers.

3.6 Message development

Following the analysis of the first data set, a working group came together to define the key messages. Once internally agreed and endorsed, the key messages were shared with OCHA for input prior to finalisation. Messages were updated as required through the action.

3.7 Supporting material development

Throughout the action, documents to support the action have been developed, endorsed and finalised. These are detailed in Table 1. below

Table 1. Supporting Material: Document, Audience and Impact

Period	Document	Audience	Impact
April 2012	Compilation of sanitised data	OCHA and PHF members	OCHA increased support to NGO visa issues
May 2012	NGO Visa Background Paper: Humanitarian and Development Visas Key Constraints and Messages	OCHA, PHF Members, Like Minded group of 12 donors, ICVA and InterAction.	HC and donors increased support to NGO visa issues. June 15th 2012, following the paper, HC sent Note Verbale to MoFA requesting timely issuance of visas.
August 2012	Impact Analysis. Impact of delays in NGO Visa application and extension processing. January – August 2012	OCHA, PHF members, Humanitarian Coordinator, like minded, ICVA and InterAction.	Four members reported using the report to meet Pakistani Ambassadors in the country of registration of the NGO on global embassy visa issuance. Two donors took the issue to head offices and engaged with Pakistani embassies.
September 2012	Humanitarian Country Team Donor Briefing: NGO Access Constraints.	OCHA donor group, OCHA, Hu-manitarian Country Team, Humanitarian Coordinator	Two donors reported raising the issue in meetings with government officials from EAD, MOI and MOFA. OCHA set NGO Visa issues as a key advo-cacy priority for 2013. December UNOCHA Humanitarian Bulletin Article: NGO visa issues, obstacles to access.[10] Verbal clarification on INGO visa processing process and timings by the MOI
February 2013	Compilation of sanitised data.	OCHA and PHF members	Adjustment of data collection form for 2013 IRIN Article No Relief. The Friday Times Article.[11]

[10] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2012, December 17). *NGO Visa Delays, Obstacles to Access*. Humanitarian Bulletin Pakistan. Issue 10. http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Pakistan%20Humanitarian%20Bulletin%20December%202012.pdf

[11] Zia Ul Rehman. (2012, February 1). No Relief. *The Friday Times*. https://afpakwatch.wordpress.com/2013/02/23/no-relief/.

Annex 1 PHF Vision Mission and Mandate

Vision

The Pakistan Humanitarian forum envisages a society where all stakeholders commit to humanitarian principles and good practice for effective and efficient assistance to vulnerable communities. Through collaboration and cooperation the forum seeks to strengthen transparency, trust and unity within the humanitarian community enhancing response to disasters, recovery and longer-term development initiatives in Pakistan.

Mission

The Pakistan Humanitarian Forum is an independent forum for the collective voice of INGOs operating in Pakistan to enable them to address the needs of communities, through coordination, advocacy and information exchange services. The forum is committed to working in partnership with each other, national NGOs, the government of Pakistan, donors and civil society, whilst strengthening the representation of PHF members at relevant fora.

Mandate

- Create an environment that ensures trust, transparency and unity among members.
- Influence policies and practices on the basis of humanitarian and development principles and standards.
- Promote best practice, standards and programme quality in emergency, recovery and development responses and promote adherence to humanitarian principles.
- Provide safety and security analysis of changes to the working environment that may affect delivery of assistance by its members.
- Represents members at all relevant forums and reports back to members through notes/minutes of those meetings.
- Provide a consistent representative body to donors, government, the UN and other stakeholders and enhance linkages, collaboration and coordination with the Government of Pakistan and other partners in the humanitarian and development sectors.
- Gather and collate data and opinions on relevant topics for engagement with, and advocacy to, key stakeholders.
- Enhance shared learning and information exchange.
- Promote transparency and partnership with key humanitarian stakeholders.

Annex 2 Research Interview Schedule

May 7 2013

PHF Research: PHF Advocacy on Visa Constraints

Introduction

PHF has been working on the Access Constraint 'Impediment on Entry into the Country' for the last year. This research looks at the work PHF has done on visa issues which is ongoing at this time. Recommendations from the research will influence the PHF approach going forward. The objectives of the PHF action on visas are as follows.

Short term objective:

'...to systematically gather NGO visa data and engage in impact analysis bi-annually to provide a solid evidence base and to engage the support of three key allies in the action.'

Long term objective:

'...to have clear policy guidance in place for NGO visa issuance in Pakistan and at global embassies that is adhered to by 2014.'

This research is for a course I am undertaking with DiploFoundation and IFRC. The report will be submitted as an assignment of the course but will also be used for PHF to assess the approach taken and form recommendations for the coming year on the action.

Questions

1. How is PHF currently working on the access constraint 'impediment on entry into the country' in relation to visas?
2. What is your overall impression of the PHF action on the visa issues faced by INGOs?
3. Do you feel that the PHF approach to advocacy on this access constraint is appropriate?
4. What in the PHF action on visa delays has worked well? And Why?
5. Are you aware of any specific achievements made to date on INGO visa delays at global embassies and in Pakistan – if so, please detail them?
6. What factors do you feel have limited the action?
7. What could be improved in the PHF approach on this access constraint?
8. Looking forward, what recommendations would you make to change the approach to be more effective?
9. In terms of advocacy on humanitarian access, do you feel that public advocacy (media etc) is beneficial? Why?
10. In terms of advocacy on humanitarian access, do you feel that quiet advocacy (i.e. meetings with decision makers) is beneficial? Why?
11. Overall what do you feel is the added value of an INGO consortia working on issues of humanitarian access?

Annex 3 PHF Visa Data Collection Format

Organization:

Visa data October – December 2012

Question

Number

Detail per case

1

# of International staff on contract for Pakistan Country Programme

2

When visas expires and prior to renewal does your agency keep staff in Pakistan with expired visas or do a visa run to country of origin?

3

staff in country with EXPIRED visa

Type of visa applied for in Pk:

Nationality:

Date of Application:

No weeks application in process:

Type of visa applied for in Pk:

Nationality:

Date of application:

No weeks application in process:

Add as needed

3a

staff returned to country of origin to apply for new one month visa and

Type of visa applied for at embassy:

Nationality:

Date of application:

No weeks application in process:

Type of visa applied for at embassy:

Nationality:

Date of application:

No weeks application in process:

Add as needed

3b

Duration out of country whilst on payroll (in days)

4

staff out of country on payroll waiting for visa prior to start of contract

Nationality:

Country where applied:

Type of visa applied for:

Date of application:

No weeks visa application in process:

Add as needed

5

staff out of country waiting for visa to start Contract

Type of visa applied for at embassy:

Nationality:

Date of application:

No weeks application in process:

Add as needed

6

technical management visits cancelled due to lack of timely visa processing

Type of visa applied for at embassy:

Nationality:

No weeks application in process:

Add as needed

7

visas denied

Type of visa applied for:

Location of application:

Nationality:

Date visa applied for:

No weeks application in process:

Reason for denial:

8

visas cancelled

Type of visa cancelled

Nationality of passport holder:

Reason for cancellation of visa:

PHF Member Visa Data: Priority

Rationale: Issues around visas continue to prove a challenge to effective operation of NGOS in Pakistan. Overall it is believed that the visa situation for international staff has deteriorated over recent years however this is based on anecdotal evidence and DONORS are waiting, requesting and expecting concrete data from PHF to demonstrate the real visa issues being faced by INGOs. The HCT endorsed a decision on May 17th for the HC to take a strong position on the timely issuance of NGO visas.

PHF encourages reporting of specific visa delays and denials to the access database along with all access constraints. At the same time, to support evidence-based advocacy efforts PHF is collecting visa data from members bi-monthly: **Please do allocate responsibility for this and prioritise response to PHF.**

Narrative: Other visa/access issues

Issue

Detail

Annex 4 PHF Background Paper May 2012

Humanitarian and Development Visa key constraints and messages

May 2012

Introduction

The NGO and UN community value the continued issuance of visas for humanitarian and development staff in Pakistan that enable timely, effective and principled life saving and life enhancing support to the most vulnerable. Whilst visas are rarely denied, the work of humanitarian and development agencies is being considerably hindered by delays and inconsistent procedures both in Pakistan and through global Pakistani embassies. The key issues and requests for clear policies and timely issuance of visas to enable timely humanitarian and development assistance are outlined in this document, it is envisioned that clearly laying out the constraints will facilitate resolution of problems commonly experienced.

Constraint 1: Global Embassies Shift in Timely Visa Processing

Until recently, processing and issuance of NGO visas from global embassies was a clear and timely process, taking a maximum of 14 days for processing of one month single entry visas, in most cases, for both UN and NGO organisations. This situation has recently changed with several new common practices:

- **Requirement for clearance from the MoI for one month single entry visa:** Global Embassies are requiring, in some cases, clearance from the Ministry of Interior in Pakistan prior to issuing the visa. Clearance from the MoI takes between 2 and 4 months. This is a significant change from the usual timely processing.
- **Denial of issuance of NGO visas:** A number of Global Embassies have denied processing of NGO visas since January 2012, in several cases the reason provided is that 'NGO visa quotas are full.'
- **Issuance of location specific visas:** Several instances of visas being issued for specific cities only. Previously visas were issued for Pakistan; applications for travel NOC were then submitted if travel to a restricted area was planned.

Implications of Constraint 1:

The new requirements being applied by some global embassies for clearance from the MoI in Pakistan prior to issuing a one month NGO single entry visa, the denial of issuance of NGO visas and the issuance of location specific visas is resulting in:

- essential programme staff not being able to enter Pakistan in a timely manner at the start of their contract or inability to retain recruited staff due to lack of timely visa issuance
- essential programme staff returning to country of origin at expiry of one month single entry visa, not being able to renew their one month visa and return to Pakistan in a timely manner
- essential short term technical staff not being able to come to Pakistan for short term training, monitoring and support visits – from January to March 2012, 40 technical support/training visits were cancelled due to lack of timely visa processing
- essential programme staff not being fully utilised due to restrictions on movement to areas where projects and partners are based.

This results in under-spend of allocated funds that then must be returned to donors, loss of skilled and experienced staff which lowers the quality and effectiveness of programmes in Pakistan and loss in capacity development of local staff.

Key Question:

To MoFA: What are the policies of global embassies in terms of one month NGO visit visas for Pakistan? Is it a policy that some global embassies require clearance from MoI prior to issuing one month single entry NGO visas, if so which embassies? What are the policies of global embassies in terms of longer term NGO visas for Pakistan? Are there quotas for NGO visas or countries that do not issue NGO visas?

Key Ask:

To MOFA: Clear policies and procedures that enable timely issuance of NGO visas from global embassies.

Case Study

An international staff member had been working in Pakistan for one year. When the visa expired on 7th April, the visa renewal had been in process for 10 weeks but was still not approved. With no valid visa, the agency sent the international staff member back to their country of origin to apply for a one month single entry visa. The visa was issued in 7 days and the staff member returned to Pakistan. One month later, as the one month single entry visa was expiring and the one year multiple entry visa renewal was still not approved, the agency sent the international staff back to their country of origin for a second time to apply for a second one month single entry visa. After 14 days the Embassy stated that they required clearance from the MoI in Pakistan to issue the one month single entry visa. The staff member remains on the payroll working from their country of origin, the anticipated time frame for clearance by MoI is 2-4 months.

Constraint 2: Delay in Extension of Visas In-Country:

- Same type conversion from one month single entry to one year multiple entry: International staff commonly enter Pakistan on one month single entry visas. This visa is then extended in the country to one year multiple entry NGO Visas. According to the GoP the process should take 6-8 weeks. This is longer than the validity of the one month single entry visa. In practice the process takes a minimum of 8 weeks and commonly 12-16 weeks for both NGOs and the UN. The delay sits at the MoI level, and the length of delay is seen to be increasing.
- In-country extension of same type visa: international staff staying in Pakistan over one year require extension of the same visa. According to the GoP the time frame for this is 4 weeks. In practice, the processing time for extension of the same type visa is a minimum of 8 weeks and commonly 12 weeks and over.

Implications of Constraint 2:

The one month single entry visa expires before the one year multiple entry visa is issued and the one year multiple entry visa expires before the second year multiple entry visa is issued. This means that staff either:

A. Have to leave their responsibilities and return to their country of origin to apply for a new one month single entry visa. This takes anywhere between 1 and 16 weeks – as Global embassies are now commonly requiring clearance from MoI in Pakistan prior to issuance of the one month single entry visa, even where staff have previously had work visas for Pakistan, other embassies are not issuing at all at this time. Between January and March 2012 17 NGO staff spent a total of over 300 working days (over one year) out of Pakistan whilst on a 'visa renewal run' as the in-country renewal was not processed in time. This diverts funds for humanitarian programming into travel costs and negatively impacts on the implementation and monitoring of humanitarian and development work as staff are out of the country.

B. Remain in Pakistan during the gap between the one month visa expiring and the one year visa being issued. The GoP has stated verbally that it is no problem to stay in the country once a visa has expired provided the application of the extension is in process. However this is not in writing – giving questionable status of this verbally endorsed practice. During this period staff commonly stay in Islamabad which negatively impacts on the implementation and monitoring of programmes as travel to programme sites to support staff and programmes is not possible. Without a valid visa it is also not possible to exit the country, so stopping required movement outside of Pakistan.

There are limited cases of visas being denied, the concern is delays in the process and the negative consequences on humanitarian and development programming.

Key Asks to MoFA, MoI and EAD:

- Timely conversion and extension of visas in the country – within the Government stated maximum processing time of 6-8 weeks.
- Issuance of two month single entry visas from country of origin to match the Government stated maximum processing time 8 weeks or
- Recognition of the gap that the conversion/extension processing period leaves and written notification that NGO staff can remain in Pakistan, including field travel, on an expired visa whilst the conversion/extension is in process or
- Timely issuance of interim visas of adequate duration in Pakistan for staff where the one month single entry visa has expired and the one year multiple entry visa is still in process.
- Clear process in place for exiting (and re-entering) the country once a visa has expired, where the process of renewal is underway.

  Case Study:

  An international Staff member arrived on a one month single entry visa. The agency applied for the one-year multiple entry visa extension in Pakistan, submitting the application to EAD on March 6th. It was forwarded to MOI on 11 March. As of May 30 the processing has been underway for 12 weeks and approval is still pending.

  During the period since the visa expired, the staff has been confined to Islamabad – a key issue as it is a programme technical advisor who should be mainly field based. Due to this constraint the agency applied for a one month visa extension – based on the need to be in the field, this was approved. The agency had to pay the fine for visa overstay and is awaiting issuance of the one month visa extension – as processing time is a minimum of one week, giving 3 weeks visa validity from date of issue. In the meantime, the application for the one-year multiple entry visa remains in process.

April 2013	Visa Processing and Extension delays. Impact Analysis Paper.	OCHA, PHF mem-bers, like minded donor group, ICVA, InterAction	Monitoring in progress.

4. ANALYSIS OF THE HD ACTION

The action detailed in this research paper is long-term and on-going at this time. However the research evidences a clear impact and demonstrates the added value of NGO consortia engaging in humanitarian diplomacy on issues of access constraining humanitarian work.

The approach of evidence based, quiet diplomacy targeting third parties with the possibility of low key strategic public diplomacy through local and national media was defined at the outset. The desk review and interviews demonstrate the initiative was well planned, taking into account the capacities of PHF and available human resources, as well as an accurate analysis of both the priority HD needs as well as an approach appropriate to the national context. All interviewees felt that the approach taken was appropriate, although there are areas that require development to reach the next steps. At the time of this study, the action plan has been consistently executed over a one-year period and PHF has successfully achieved the short-term objective of 'systematically gather NGO visa data and engage in impact analysis bi-annually to provide a solid evidence base and to engage the support of three allies in the action'.

> *'I believe it is an effective and well-planned strategy and that PHF has managed to secure some breakthroughs' PHF Executive Committee Member*

The strong dataset has been the foundation of the successes achieved to date. Ensuring member ownership of the data collection by developing formats with the membership, drafting support materials and key messages with the membership and ensuring endorsement of members prior to finalisation and release has been essential in achieving a data response rate of 98%. As per the HD plan, the solid data, and supporting materials and key messages then enabled, through quiet diplomacy, the engagement and increasing support of key allies for the HD. These are OCHA, the UN Humanitarian Coordinator and a set of donors. In the period analysed, all three allies have taken action and engaged with decision shapers and decision makers on behalf of PHF and its INGO members on the access constraint 'Impediment on Entry into the Country'. At the start of the action, none of these allies were on board due to the lack of evidence, the lack of clear messages and the lack of supporting documentation or follow-up.

> *'Efforts to gather data so that we all have an evidenced based approach is making progress and I don't know how you (PHF) or we (OCHA) would advocate without it'* UNOCHA interviewee

This is a significant outcome, as with the data set in place, PHF has been able to leverage their support, connections and influence with decision shapers and makers within the Government of Pakistan resulting in increased awareness of the issues including a commitment by the Government to share the visa processing policy in June 2012, in late 2012 an improvement in processing times, in early 2013 a clearance of backlogged visas, and, in January 2013 a verbal clarification of the visa policy and processing times in place by the Government. *'The Government is now taking note, because you (PHF) have painted a story, the Government knows the data is out there and are concerned about it. The Humanitarian Coordinator is now much more prepared to advocate now there is solid data. The data also allows PHF and us (OCHA) to push donors to advocate.'* UNOCHA interviewee. At the same time, the reluctance of the Humanitarian Coordinator to be vocal and persistent on this issue was listed as the main cause for limited progress.

Whilst the lower level of engagement, directly by PHF, of decision makers in this action has resulted in some criticism by members, the decision to engage and gain the support of third parties in the initial year of the action was a good one and efforts have also been made to engage with both the EAD and MOI. This, and other input from stakeholders show that expectations can be high and must be managed through communication on the role and level of current and planned action of PHF. That said, moving forward PHF does need to build the process of relation building with decision shapers and makers at both working and senior levels.

The approach taken has primarily been quiet diplomacy, with interspersed public diplomacy efforts through planned interaction with journalists. In addition, after PHF agreement OCHA led on one article in the OCHA Humanitarian Bulletin which resulted in two media articles on NGO visa delays. This approach was taken due to the complex operating environment in Pakistan as well as cultural 'ways of working', whereby individuals frequently hold the power to make the change. Interviewees highlighted the need to continue with quiet diplomacy and use public diplomacy only with caution to the potential repercussions. Overall public diplomacy was seen as potentially more confrontational and likely to be less effective and potentially dangerous for NGOs operating in Pakistan as well as less likely to result in change. At the same time the preference to avoid public advocacy was linked to a second access constraint that PHF

is also working on, relating to registration of NGOs with the Government of Pakistan – which at the time was frozen. Where public diplomacy is used, emphasis was placed on it being constructive focusing on negative implications but not placing blame *'...it should not be a blame game, rather how the delays have impacted on assistance'* UNOCHA interviewee.

'Usually public advocacy is good, in Pakistan it is unlikely to be effective, here quiet diplomacy is needed and with a consistent and coordinated approach but the main question is with who – really the army is the interlocutor but with very limited (to no) communication channels' Donor interviewee.

One donor raised the need for greater engagement of traditional diplomacy actors that potentially have higher levels of access and influence with senior government and military officials than humanitarian actors such as OCHA or the UN Humanitarian Coordinator have. *'To improve the approach on access constraints, more high diplomatic level engagement is needed from in and out of the country' Donor* interviewee. This was repeated by PHF members and OCHA *'PHF should be clearer of what exactly we want embassies to do, PHF can be more strategic in how we leverage power influencers'* PHF member interviewee.

This study also evidences a 'spiderweb' effect of the action, outside of the work taken forward by PHF as a forum, individual members have shared and used data and supporting materials to advocate directly in Pakistan and globally through their head offices, with embassies and ambassadors. This action has resulted in 53 INGOs talking with a common voice on a common issue of concern using common data.

That said, there is some way to go to reach the long-term objective: '*to have clear policy guidance in place for NGO visa issuance in Pakistan and at global embassies that is adhered to by 2014'*. Analysis of interview responses highlights various reasons for the possibility that this objective will not be reached in the given timeframe. The majority of these are outside of the control of PHF. For example: turnover of staff in Government positions; the complex complicated operational environment in Pakistan relating to safety and security, the war on terror and concerns over western agendas and operators; the role of the army in state matters; the role of Intelligence Agencies and the inaccessibility to decision makers within Intelligence Agencies or the Military; and the reluctance of the UN Humanitarian Coordinator to heavily push this issue.

These issues highlight the identified need for high-level diplomatic engagement at all levels, as well as increased efforts of PHF to develop relations and engage directly with decision shapers. At the same time, some of the factors that have constrained the action could potentially be countered and influenced through additional humanitarian diplomacy efforts, linked to this action. For example, a consolidated media campaign focused on the positive perception of NGOs aiming to influence public perceptions and gain positive coverage of the work of INGOs.

Strengths of the action

- The ability of PHF to harness the engagement and action of its members and to unify them on the issue.
- Well defined and realistic objectives that provided a structure and purpose for the HD.
- Consistent and robust collection, analysis and sharing of data over a long-term period.
- Identification, targeting and engagement of third-party allies throughout the action period.
- Ensuring that the pressure on third parties to act was sustained and that key messages were adapted as momentum was gained.

Weakness of the action

- Limited direct engagement and interaction with decision makers and shapers.
- Limited development of supporting materials for decision makers – most materials developed were targeted at third parties.
- The possibility for greater detailed data analysis but the lack of human resources at PHF to undertake the work.

5. LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This research details a number of lessons learned and recommendations that are relevant for the continuation of this action and future HD as well as for other NGO consortia globally when engaging in HD on issues of humanitarian access.

Lessons Learned

- NGO Consortia can play a significant role in humanitarian diplomacy on humanitarian access. The added value is the possibility to gather data, the strength in numbers, the ability to speak without fear of direct repercussions to one single organisation or agency, the web of impact that results with all members speaking from a common position, and having a single point of contact for the INGO community on issues of mutual concern.
- A robust evidence base is essential to gain support from third parties and to influence decision makers and shapers to achieve change. It must be managed within the capacity of human resources available and updated and analysed on a fixed schedule.
- Expectations of stakeholders can be high and unrealistic and must be managed consistently.

Recommendations

This study highlights a number of recommendations and next steps for this action. These include:

- Influence donors within Pakistan and at Head Offices to engage in quiet diplomacy on access issues with interlocutors in Pakistan and with Embassies overseas. Base this on a consistent strategy of engagement. The dual approach of the humanitarian community and the donor and diplomatic community engaging on the same issue with the same messages will add significant value.
- PHF should establish working relations at EAD, MFA and MOI to enter into dialogue on delays that the data evidences.
- Working level engagement with government entities should be paired with continued engagement of donors and the Humanitarian Coordinator, and increased engagement of PHF, at the senior level within the above ministries.
- Development of specific targeted supporting materials and datasets for decision shapers and makers, for example datasets for embassies of visa delays by nationality, or by national embassy.
- Increasing the level of analysis data to enable case by case review and analysis based on nationality, country of processing etc.
- Development of a parallel humanitarian diplomacy action that seeks to proactively and positively profile NGOs in the media in order to shift public perceptions about aid organisations and help to eliminate access constraints.

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Keith Powell

Head, External Relations (Hague Branch)
International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals

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Humanitarian diplomacy in the digital age analysis and use of digital information in the context of the 2010 Haitian earthquake

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Tutor: Atoussa Parsey

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Haitian Earthquake of 2010 ushered in a new era in humanitarian information gathering, where Information and Communication Technology (ICT) were measurably used during the crisis for analysis and decision making. In particular, two projects emerged as being the major components of the ICT response: Ushahidi, a crisis-mapping tool, and Mission 4636, an SMS campaign used to collect information for responders.

After the earthquake, Haitians communicated their needs through social media and SMS and were tracked on crisis maps using the Ushahidi online platform. However, there are questions that arise from the use of these tools in terms of how responders used the information they received and if the information was credible and accurate.

The objective of the study is to examine how information was transmitted and collected using ICT after the Haitian earthquake and determine how it was used in humanitarian diplomacy. The methodology consisted of the analysis of the case studies prepared by researchers and those who worked on the platform during the crisis. A further analysis of the types of messages that were sent and their classifications is provided to determine how the messages were sent and received and if and how they were acted upon by humanitarian diplomats.

Ushahidi is an online platform for information collection, visualization and interactive mapping. It works on the concept of crowdsourcing, where volunteers classify information and are mapped in a way where clusters of information can be visualised to facilitate the actions of responders. A parallel effort during the crisis was Mission 4636, a collaborative effort between a network of NGOs and the U.S. State Department to work with mobile providers in Haiti to set up an SMS shortcode for people to communicate their needs.

When the earthquake struck, staff at Ushahidi put the initial crisis map online in a matter of hours. During the early stages of the crisis, volunteers worked through social media sources such as Twitter, Facebook and blog posts.

Verification was an issue. There were issues with accuracy, particularly in terms of geo-location and the use of untrained volunteers classifying the messages. Other issues were that there was a low knowledge of and capacity to use the information, possibly because the tools were previously unknown to responders. Information security was also a concern with the use of personally identifying data being used in the publicly available maps. As a consequence, despite the reputation of ICT being a major factor in the response to the Haitian earthquake, it appears its role was somewhat exaggerated.

There is little evidence of this information being used for humanitarian diplomacy purposes. Further study is required to determine how humanitarian diplomats could integrate ICT into their toolkit. Further areas in need of study include how to ensure accuracy of data being collected, maintaining privacy and the security of information, particularly for at-risk groups. Engaging with local populations to create trust and legitimacy could also lead to more comprehensive data, resulting in more accurate data to draw from.

1. INTRODUCTION

Social Media has emerged as an important tool in crisis response. Tools such as Twitter, SMS (Short Message Service, but more commonly known as texting), and interactive maps are used both by those affected during crises and by responders (Ingram, 2011). Independent of any one location, volunteer responders can collect and process data from social media sources in support of humanitarian workers inside crisis zones.

The Haitian Earthquake of 2010 ushered in a new era in humanitarian information gathering, where Information and Communication Technology (ICT) played a measurable role during the crisis for analysis and decision making (King, 2010). In particular, two projects were major components of the ICT response to the crisis: Ushahidi, a crisis-mapping tool, and Mission 4636, an SMS campaign used to collect information for responders.

There are, however, questions that arise from the use of these tools in terms of how responders used the information they received and if the information was credible and accurate. In the context of humanitarian diplomatic discussions, it is important to know if the information collected was useful and if so to determine the advantages and challenges of using crowdsourced information gleaned from social media and SMS.

There is a wealth of literature on many aspects of the ICT response to the Haitian earthquake in 2010, and it is impossible to cover all the ground that has been studied. This paper will focus on the following areas: How information was gathered and how it was used by responders in the context of humanitarian diplomacy, specifically how the information gathered was analysed in terms of quality and accuracy, and discuss what, if any, action was taken by humanitarian diplomacy practitioners during the crisis.

This study explores these questions in particular in how social media was used in the crowdsourced Ushahidi interactive map platform and SMS communications in the Mission 4636 project. It also examines lessons learned. Finally, a short discussion is presented on how these lessons were applied to Typhoon Yolanda in the Philippines in November 2013.

2. EMERGENCE OF SOCIAL MEDIA AS A CRISIS RESPONSE TOOL

Although social media is becoming a ubiquitous tool in peoples' daily lives it is important to define it for the purposes of this discussion. For a definition, social media "consists of tools that enable open online exchange of information through conversation and interaction" (Yates and Pacquette 2010). For example, a tool like Facebook allows a person to maintain social ties through interaction surrounding an individual's profile and their network, known on the platform as "friends". Twitter, another social media platform, allows people to interact using short public messages or declarations – 140 characters or less, including spaces – to their networks, known as “followers”.

Researchers have looked at how the internet, including social media, has been used in the context of the war between Georgia and Russia in 2008 (Edmunds et al., 2010), the California wildfires in 2007 and 2008, the 2008 Mumbai massacre and the crash of US Airways Flight 1549 in 2009 (Veil, Buehner and Palenchar, 2011).

Yates and Pacquette (2010) argue that disaster response is the "ideal environment" for proving the usefulness of social media as a knowledge management tool because the "information currency of disaster response is increasingly text messages, images, short videos, blog posts and web links – all encapsulated knowledge chunks". Social media, they argue, is perfect for this because it is designed to "create order from chaos, using media as an artifact around which knowledge is organised in clusters".

As mobile phone penetration is high in developing countries all over the world, "even some of the world’s most impoverished communities now have access to voice and data services" (Crowley and Chan, 2011). Given this, people will still be able to connect after a sudden crisis situation. Mobile phone towers, like the ones in Haiti, were left largely intact after the earthquake and the ones that were damaged were quickly brought back online (Munro, 2013). Munro goes on to write that, as a consequence of this, after a sudden-onset disaster, "people will begin calling, texting, e-mailing or using social media to connect with their family, friends, governments, and aid organisations". This creates a wealth of actionable information from which to draw on and gives a view on the ground the situation and what the affected peoples' needs are.

Another type of electronic communication, Short Messaging Service (SMS), has also been used in crisis situations. It was used the first time in Haiti under the umbrella of Mission 4636, which processed over 80,000 SMS messages following the earthquake (Munro, 2013). These messages were used to let people send messages to the number #4636 if they were in need of some kind of help, whether it was medical, in need of food, etc. and the message would be classified by volunteers. This will be discussed in more detail in the next section.

The Haitian Earthquake

On 12 January 2010, an earthquake with a magnitude of 7.0 struck Haiti, killing more than 230,000 people. Some of the country's most populous areas suffered mass destruction (Heinzelman and Waters, 2010). The Haitian government estimated that 250,000 residences and 30,000 commercial buildings had collapsed or were severely damaged (Renois, 2010). The response effort involved hundreds of agencies from many different areas of activity. At the time, early search and rescue teams began their efforts by performing a local search aided by satellite maps and other information (Van de Walle, Van Den Eede and Muhren (2009) in Dugdale et al, 2012).

Ushahidi and Mission 4636

During the Haitian earthquake, two ICT platforms emerged in conjunction with the humanitarian relief efforts: Ushahidi, an interactive mapping service run largely through crowdsourcing, and Mission 4636, a response platform built around SMS. These will be briefly described in the following section.

Ushahidi

Ushahidi (Swahili for "testimony" or "witness") is an online platform for information collection, visualization and interactive mapping**.** It was originally developed in response to the disputed election in Kenya in 2007. The site's founder, a blogger named Ory Okolloh, placed her email address on her blog and was subsequently inundated with messages from people giving eyewitness accounts of the post-election rioting. She enlisted some fellow bloggers to help her build a Google Map displaying where violence, destruction, as well as any peace efforts, were taking place (Bahree, 2008).

Some early benefits of the tool were that there were messages sent to Ushahidi that were not yet reported by the mainstream media, which made it a kind of early warning system. Another benefit was that it covered a more diverse geographical area than the media and included a larger number of violent incident reports than those reported by the media (Heinzelman and Waters, 2010).

It has since been used to monitor elections in India, Mexico, Lebanon and Afghanistan, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to track unrest and in Zambia to monitor medicine stockouts (Ushahidi, n.d.).

Ushahidi works on the concept of crowdsourcing. Crowdsourcing, according to the dictionary definition, is "the practice of obtaining needed services, ideas, or content by soliciting contributions from a large group of people and especially from the online community rather than from traditional employees or suppliers" (Merriam-Webster, n.d.). In the context of Ushahidi, crowdsourcing can be defined as "the structuring of data by a parallel workforce: translation, categorising, extracting location names, mapping, filtering/prioritising reports, etc" and was done largely through a network of volunteers (Munro, 2013).

This has led to the emergence of crisis mapping. Crisis mapping is "the use of real-time crowdsourced crisis event data, satellite images, data visualization, data modelling, and web-based applications to develop early warning and response systems for use in crisis events world-wide" (Pierson, 2012). This has the potential to create an information space that allows for quick visualisations of areas that are in most need and, depending on the type of information collected, provide decision makers with the information they need to act upon. For humanitarian diplomats, this creates an easy visual for them to determine which areas needed the quickest intervention and to make arrangements to gain access to these areas.

Mission 4636

A parallel effort during the crisis was Mission 4636, a collaborative effort between a network of NGOs and the U.S. State Department to work with mobile providers in Haiti to set up an SMS shortcode for people to communicate their needs. A shortcode is like an alias for a longer number that is easier to remember and communicate to a large audience. The #4636 shortcode was set up and running on DigiCel (Haiti's largest carrier) within either 72 hours of the earthquake (Crowley and Chan, 2011) or 48 hours (Munro, 2011). Like Ushahidi, Mission 4636 worked on the basis of crowdsourcing, but where Ushahidi aggregated different types of information (e-mails, SMS, social media), Mission 4636 worked exclusively with SMS messages.

3. METHODOLOGY

The methodology in reviewing how social media and SMS were used in response to the Haitian earthquake consisted of the analysis of the case studies prepared by researchers and those who worked on the platform during the crisis. A further analysis of the types of messages that were sent and their classifications is provided to determine how the messages were sent and received and if and how they were acted upon by humanitarian diplomats. Unfortunately, the data sets are not public so these messages will be analysed based on secondary resources. Finally, an analysis of the technology that was used in the response to Typhoon Yolanda in the Philippines is examined to measure progress since the Haitian response.

4. DISCUSSION - ICT RESPONSE

When the earthquake struck, staff at Ushahidi put the initial crisis map online in a matter of hours (Morrow et al., 2011). During the early stages of the crisis, volunteers worked from a living room in an apartment in Boston, Massachusetts, combing through social media sources such as Twitter, Facebook and blog postings. As Heinzelman and Waters (2010) wrote, "If a piece of information was deemed useful and had a location attached to it, volunteers would find the GPS coordinates through Google Earth and Open Street Map and map it on haiti.ushahidi.com for anyone to view and utilise." This, they further explain, allowed crisis mappers to aggregate individual reports and identify clusters and urgent needs.

Haitians sent out hundreds of thousands of messages to not only social media and SMS, but to the Haitian diaspora around the world who were receiving messages from friends and family in the country and not to responders. These groups were engaged through online communities in translating the received messages (Crowley and Chan, 2011).

Verification became an issue, but despite that, Heinzelman and Waters note that several organisations were using Ushahidi to cross-check reports from other sources, with more than 25% of security reports including a reference to food or aid supplies, which confirmed what responders were observing.

The information was used to some extent because it was the only map aggregator available in the early days following the earthquake (Morrow, et al., 2011) and was used mostly for situational awareness. There is some evidence that the information was being used for "specific operational and tactical actions targeting specific communities (Morrow et al., 2011).

Mission 4636 Response

The shortcode for #4636 was relayed by radio and word of mouth to Haitians around the country. Munro (2013) describes the workflow of how messages were processed:

The task, for a volunteer or worker, was very simple. A person would see a form with an unstructured text message and fields for translation, categories and any additional notes. For messages with an identifiable location, the person could also click on an embedded map to generate the longitude and latitude... From this single form, unstructured messages in Haitian Kreyol were turned into structured, geo-located reports in English. The messages were streamed back to various response organisations via an api-key-protected geo-rss data feed.

The messages were organised with the following general fields with, as Munro notes, other fields being manually created by the volunteer. Categories were defined using a United Nations classification system.

Table 1: Example messages (Munro, 2013)

1. Haitian Kreyol message (in bold)			
2. The English translation			
3. Intel Type	4. Coordinates	5. Location	6. Date Received.
7. Categories			

Nou tigway, nou pa gen manje nou pa gen kay. Tel nou se [PHONE NO.] ak [PHONE NO.] m.			
'We are Petite Goave, we don't have food, we don't have a house our phone number is [PHONE NO.] and [PHONE NO.] Thanks.'			
Actionable	-72.86537, 18.43264	Petite Goave	1/22/2010 16:59
2a. Pneurie d'aolments (Food Shortage), 2b Penurie d'eau (Water Shortage)			

Voye manje, medikaman, pou moun ki nan lopital gonives yo			
'Send food, medicine for people in the Gonaives hospitals.'			
Actionable	-72.7171, 19.4588	Gonaives	1/23/2010 7:34
1f. Medical Emergency			

Munro further goes on to explain that messages were replied to with a neutral reply of "message received" in order to let people know that their message was read but also not to commit to a response.

Mission 4636 did integrate into the Ushahidi system, utilising their network of volunteers for translation and categorisation (Munro, 2013, Crowley and Chan, 2011) but the system shut down after the emergency period ended (Heinzelman and Waters, 2010) leaving further mapping work of the reconstruction to traditional methods. This, as Munro notes, created a missed opportunity because security information could have been aggregated on issues that triggered violence, such as food shortages.

5. ANALYSING THE QUALITY OF INFORMATION

The case studies focused mostly on the how of the technology, rather than the outcomes. What is clear is that there are several ways the information was analysed and used, particularly by the United States Coast Guard (USC) in their response. Dugdale et al. (2012) report that there were issues with accuracy, particularly in terms of geo-location, and quote a Search and Rescue Team Leader who revealed that "When it got down to street level, the information was not very accurate... up to 90% of reports of people trapped in the rubble were not correct."

Further, Heizelman and Waters write that verifying the information was difficult, noting that of "more than 3,500 messages on the Ushahidi-Haiti crisis map, only 202 messages were tagged as "verified", mostly from early web submissions that had been based on media reports.") They further note that it was hoped at the time that inaccurate reports would be outweighed by the potential benefit to the system.

What responders did find useful was that the information, when used in the aggregate, gave responders a more accurate picture with the Search and Rescue Team Leader explaining that "even though 90% may not be accurate at the street level, 80% may be accurate at the area level, when you aggregate the information" (Dugdale et al., 2012). This is an area where data can be used by humanitarian diplomats to make the case to enter an area that was previously denied them.

In the case of Ushahidi, it is important to note, as Munro (2013) indicates, that the incidence of Twitter may be over-estimated with, by his estimation, Twitter making up less than 0.16% of the communication. Further, he notes that the media may have over-exaggerated the importance of social media in the response, almost mythologizing its role. He cites the opening paragraph in the best-selling book *Macrowikinomics* (Williams and Tapscott, 2010), which claimed

that on January 17 a text message sent from a cell phone in Haiti was translated into English from Kreyole and posted on a crisis mapping site being monitored by responders. Munro says bluntly that this did not happen, and in fact could not have happened as Ushahidi did not start importing 4636 data into their system until January 19. This raises the point that the fiction must be separated from the fact in analysing the information at the time. It also re-enforces the idea that information must be independently verified and not count on media reports so humanitarian diplomats are properly informed when they are negotiating their entrance into an area or advocating on behalf of a particular group.

Another issue that arose is the use of categorisation by volunteers, many of whom lacked formal training in disaster response. There were instances where messages were miscategorised, some even deliberately as the volunteers in question felt that particular messages, such as ones asking for immediate help, were placed in categories that the volunteer imagined would get help to that person sooner (Morrow et al., 2011).

To the extent that social media messages were used, Morrow et al. (2011) wrote in their independent evaluation of the Ushahidi Haiti Project that barriers to use were "significant, but not surprising." Issues with using the Ushahidi platform included that among humanitarian workers there was "low knowledge of and capacity to use the information."

The main problem was that it was simply not well known to responders, lacking a distinct "corporate identity" that resulted in this lack of awareness. Further, Morrow et al. noted in interviews with responders that this lack of awareness also revealed a "general suspicion of the crowd" in terms of representativeness and quality of the data.

This indicates that there was not only a lack of awareness but suspicion of the process in general. Morrow et al. quoted a senior US official who wondered "how much of this is just the tool that picks up neighbourhoods where they know about it or where they have cell phones?" Based on this evidence, using the Ushahidi platform in Haiti seems to be a test case for this previously unheard of tool.

From an information security standpoint, using open systems to collect, analyse, translate and process information opens up significant privacy concerns (Yates and Paquette, 2010) that could cause quality control issues. Although the datasets have since removed any personally identifying information, placing messages and locations on a publicly available map while the crisis is on-going may carry some risk for the people sending the message.

It is important to note that while there were instances where this information was used to administer aid, there is also a fear that this information could be harvested and used to steal identities and take advantage of at-risk populations (Yates, Shute and Rotman, 2010, in Yates and Paquette, 2010). Yates and Paquette note that "the implications of publicly crowdsourcing disaster information are not yet well understood."

This could create its own issues from an information quality point of view. There may be instances of under-reporting that would not give a true picture of the situation in the area.

Heizelman and Waters (2010) believe that the ability to communicate privately is important for a system to be legitimate. They quote the co-founder of a local NGO who expressed the view of people attending training in a SMS reporting system that "If we report, they will retaliate."

This underscores the need for some privacy protocols to be built into the system to build trust and help maintain accuracy. For example, it must be explored how to handle if, for example, a cluster of messages reporting violent incidents from an armed group comes from an area where the armed group is in control. If the group is monitoring the same publicly available crisis map as responders they may be able to determine who is sending the messages and retaliate. This could also create a situation where humanitarian diplomats would have to act more urgently.

On the other side of the same coin, if both sides are looking at the same information, there is a kind of transparency that would lend credibility to negotiations if everyone is working from the same dataset. But when developing policy on this, clearly the safety of the affected populace takes priority.

How ICT information was used by humanitarian diplomats

From the review of the available literature, there was little on how humanitarian diplomats used this information during discussions and negotiations. There were more oblique references to how this information was used but this seems to be an area that needs focused research.

The lack of information on use of HD is partly due to communication issues between aid workers and the affected population. For example, Heinzelman and Waters (2010) report a lack of engagement with the local population in Haiti and that "when large aid groups circulate around Port-au-Prince, they're often in sealed vehicles with their windows up." This may indicate a lack of local engagement in general that would mean negotiations to gain access to certain areas would have to start on the human level first.

One area that required some negotiations was from the Mission 4636, where negotiations with local media, particularly radio, to advertise the #4636 shortcode took place (Munro 2013). How this was performed is unclear.

Given that the use of ICT by humanitarian responders was new and Ushahidi was basically a test case, it is perhaps not surprising to find a lack of information in this regard, particularly given that the technology and crowdsourcing was greeted with suspicion in the first place. It speaks to a lack of protocol and planning to use these tools on a large-scale disaster-relief effort.

6. ASSESSMENT

This section will confine itself to the areas that would need to be looked at in the context of humanitarian diplomacy. While research still needs to be done to determine how and how well ICT information is used in humanitarian negotiations, perhaps a starting point would be to assess how the information was used and how it could be adapted for humanitarian diplomacy purposes. The following are identified as areas needed further study.

Accuracy

Evaluating ICT messages for accuracy is vital in gathering information to use in humanitarian negotiations. Using mostly untrained volunteers (Heinzelman and Waters, 2010, Morrow et al., 2011) has resulted in mis-categorisation of messages and resulted in a diminished data set and missed opportunities for action.

Privacy and Security

A system must be developed that balances the need for public information in crowdsourcing efforts and the need to keep personal information private. Perhaps a system could be developed where personally identifying information would be displayed in a granular fashion based on a series of user permissions. Public volunteers would see only the information needed to categorise a message and responders working for an aid organisation can see more information and can aggregate information behind a firewall.

Engaging local populations

Creating relationships with local organisations, such as community groups, NGOs, etc will help with locals becoming familiar with, and ultimately accepting of, these tools. As user acceptance practices go, this is important to gain credibility and use, and will result in less suspicion by responders, like the US official that Morrow referenced, expressing scepticism of who was actually being helped in using these tools.

Integrating with humanitarian processes

These tools were used as test cases and utilised without a clear mandate that clarifies their implications on the effectiveness of humanitarian response. A review of humanitarian response processes, along with a discussion on how ICT tools would be of benefit, would result in more effective use of the tools.

Integrating into the humanitarian diplomatic tool kit

To be effective as a humanitarian diplomacy tool, an examination of how a humanitarian diplomat would use these tools, both conceptually and practically, is required. Conceptually, an examination is needed to determine how a humanitarian diplomat would access the tools and what analytical tools would be at their disposal. Practically, they

would need to know how they would present the information to their counterparts during negotiations, particularly if the person they are negotiating with does not have the same technological advantage.

7. NEXT STEPS

A short examination of the response to Typhoon Yolanda in the Philippines in November 2013 may be useful to understand the progress on using ICT during a humanitarian crisis.

As a starting point, crisis-mapping has become much more robust. Google has put together a crisis map (http://google.org/crisismap/a/gmail.com/TyphoonYolanda) that, when the map was last accessed (26 November 2013), mapped evacuation centres, hospitals and police stations, and contained colour-coded imagery that indicated if a province or city was under a state of calamity. Data seems to be coming from different sources, which possibly indicates closer coordination.

Responders using a tool called Micromappers (https://micromappers.wordpress.com/) engaged volunteers to not only categorise Tweets but also assess the amount of damage in an area in an image clicker. There were two issues identified in the assessment of the tool. Tweets were identified from users who used the Twitter hashtag #YolandaPH. The use of untrained volunteers in categorising messages may still result in the quality issues discussed earlier. Further, many of the messages to be categorised were more noise than substance with many being people just tweeting about the Typhoon.

From this quick overview, it appears that the technology has come a long way since the Haitian earthquake, but issues surrounding volunteers and the subsequent quality concerns regarding information still seem unresolved. Further study is required to analyse and address quality control matters.

8. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

In order to fully understand the potential of ICT and integrate it into humanitarian diplomacy the following actions can be taken:

Develop capacity for trained volunteers to properly classify incoming messages from inside a crisis zone. This could be an online certification course. Those volunteers that were certified could be placed in a database and contacted in the event of a humanitarian crisis.
Develop new or revise existing policies on information privacy. This could help in developing any tools that are used to display potentially private information in a crisis-mapping system.
Engage in a full examination of how ICT could integrate with existing humanitarian response processes.

Develop a training programme for workers engaged in humanitarian diplomacy on the best practices surrounding these tools, including modules on privacy and ethical use of data.
Create localised programmes in individual communities to understand how to safely communicate information in the event of a crisis and fully integrate this into all disaster risk reduction and preparedness activities, especially where population density is high.

9. CONCLUSIONS

Despite the reputation of ICT being a major factor in the response to the Haitian earthquake, it appears its role was somewhat exaggerated. While some responders found the information useful there were questions about the quality and reliability of the information received. As it was a new, untested platform for large-scale humanitarian response, there were questions that arose about how it would work for those on the ground, or whether it was a feel-good exercise from people in developed countries. As a humanitarian diplomacy tool, it appears to be something that needs to be examined and integrated into the diplomatic tool kit. There is much potential for it to be used as a diplomatic instrument, but questions surrounding quality, privacy, and transparency would have to be answered before it could truly be an important tool used by humanitarian diplomats.

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Jonathan Wood

Postdoctoral Research Associate, Department of Archaeology,
Classics and Egyptology, University Of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK
(at the time of writing: Planning, Monitoring, Evaluating and Reporting (PMER) delegate,
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), Kabul, Afghanistan)

Humanitarian Diplomacy February 2014

Reflecting on the Afghan Red Crescent society's strategic planning process through the lens of humanitarian diplomacyy

Reflecting on the Afghan Red Crescent society's strategic planning process through the lens of humanitarian diplomacyy



Tutor: Timothy McInerny

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:

For a National Society to be well-functioning in its negotiations with decision-makers in state government, it needs to have a coherent, unambiguous strategic direction. To encourage the National Society to speak with one voice, this strategy is generally written down in its strategic plan. The plan itself, however, can quickly become an obsolete document unless discussions and negotiations result in commitment to the plan, with all decision-makers in the National Society understanding these commitments. The strategic planning *process* endeavours to do this.

In 2011, Afghanistan's National Society, the Afghan Red Crescent Society (ARCS), needed to update its strategic plan in line with the IFRC Strategy 2020 (IFRC, 2010). In essence, *Strategic Plan 2012-2015* (ARCS, 2011) was the written expression of the strategic planning process that was carried out during August and September 2011 - a process in which ARCS made decisions on where it wanted to be and why, and how it was going to get there. The specific reasons for developing such a plan, however, were not immediately apparent to the majority of staff (apart from that it was mandatory to have one), even those at senior level. Identifying the reasons for planning and how to approach the process therefore played a significant role in developing the final document.

As strategic plans are generally functional documents which provide little information on the process that formed them (thus limiting the applicability of textual discourse analysis), this paper focuses on the strategic planning process. Furthermore, as strategic planning often involves a series of high-level closed meetings held primarily to update the previous plan, this paper is unusual as it also illustrates the diplomacy required to build a policy environment for a plan that also included organisational restructuring. Essentially, this paper attempts to show how humanitarian diplomacy can, and often needs to be applied to Red Cross Red Crescent (RCRC) National Societies during strategic planning in order to affect positive changes.

The role of facilitator as a humanitarian diplomat is discussed and it is considered how modifying the mode of discourse in an organisation can affect the power relations to encourage a more inclusive approach to developing strategies. A situational analysis prior to the process, and a survey at the start of the process are both shown to inform how the strategic planning sessions were conducted. Quiet diplomacy and a series of open communicative tasks based on social constructivist theory was applied to support the creation of a shared reference framework that encouraged cooperation, rather than competition, between members of the strategic planning committee. Some of the techniques used in sessions, which are commonly used in classroom teaching, are presented. An evidence-based logos approach to organisational restructuring , which was used to develop strategic goals on which the mission and vision of ARCS is now based, is evaluated, highlighting the need to use a variety of tools from the humanitarian toolbox when dealing with complex decision-making processes.

Plans are of little importance, but planning is essential. **Winston Churchill**

BACKGROUND: HUMANITARIAN DIPLOMACY AND STRATEGIC PLANNING

Humanitarian diplomacy is organised around three main sets of activities (IFRC, 2009):

- Developing a policy environment
- Private advocacy or negotiations
- Public advocacy

These activities are usually considered to be applied by humanitarian agencies to promote humanitarian values and principles in diplomatic and policy-making communities to persuade decision-makers (e.g. state officials) that the interests of vulnerable people should always be considered in their decisions and actions. However, these activities can also be applied to humanitarian agencies during strategic planning to ensure that they remain credible organisations. To be credible, an organisation must not only derive legitimacy from its knowledge and expertise (IFRC, 2012) but also be able to define and communicate its mission and vision (IFRC, 2006), i.e. present and promote how it makes a difference to vulnerable people both now and in the future. Furthermore, a humanitarian agency, which relies on persuasion to influence decision-makers outside its organisation, must also be credible to those inside its organisation. Ensuring decisions are considered valid, by staff and volunteers, is a vital component for successful implementation.

With RCRC National Societies there should be a common understanding among the personnel of the fundamental responsibility of action towards the vulnerable, i.e. staff in the RCRC Movement are advocates of humanitarian action. However, participants of the strategic planning process come with interests and objectives which may not align with the consensus or even the fundamental principles of the Movement. Furthermore, when strategy is informed by external influences (e.g. Federation Strategy 2020 (IFRC, 2010), the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (UN, 2013), frameworks such as Building Strong National Societies (IFRC, 2011) etc.) there can be clear positioning, as changes can affect how power is distributed within the organisation. This is especially pertinent when previous strategic plans have had limited buy-in, resulting in turf battles. It is therefore imperative that power relations (Foucault, 1974) are understood before strategic planning begins (Chan and Garrick, 2002).

The fundamental questions behind this paper are:

- Are the skills and terminology of humanitarian diplomacy applicable to strategic planning?
- Did the application of humanitarian diplomatic tools facilitate the ARCS strategic planning process?

Sources come from the facilitator (the author of this paper), recorded summaries of planning sessions, analyses of tasks carried out by the ARCS strategic planning committee, and the strategic planning documents. Retrospective analyses of these sources has been performed through the lens of humanitarian diplomacy by utilising literature related to negotiations, planning, humanitarian diplomacy and social constructivist theory.

FACILITATOR AS A HUMANITARIAN DIPLOMAT

A strategic planning facilitator is essentially a humanitarian diplomat, in that a combination of skills and knowledge is required, including negotiation, leadership and effective listening skills, as well as knowledge of document drafting, protocol, etiquette and intercultural communication. Furthermore, the facilitator needs knowledge of international rules, principles, key actors and institutions, as well as an understanding of the operating environment (IFRC, 2010a). The role of the facilitator is not to overtly persuade and advocate for a particular position. In fact, in strategic negotiations, as with humanitarian diplomacy, it is necessary to emphasise that positions are much closer than initially supposed in order to include the interests of all parties to the negotiated solution, rather than forcing parties to concede (Fisher and Ury, 2003). Essentially, the facilitator is there to *actively remind* (i.e. a subtle form of advocacy) the planning committee of the boundaries (e.g. RCRC Humanitarian Principles, Strategy 2020 etc.) and to elicit decisions that can be formulated into a coherent strategic planning document. The facilitator therefore goes into the planning room with no particular preconceptions about how issues will evolve. However, in strategic planning, the facilitator is

also viewed as a change agent, especially in regard to improving an organisation's impact, sustainability and integrity, and therefore takes on a number of roles that include (Malunga and Banda, 2013):

- supporter – giving the organisation a sense of worth and value
- raiser of consciousness – generating data and information in order to restructure preconceptions (essentially, acting as a mirror of the reality of the situation and how things could be)
- confronter – pointing out value discrepancies in the beliefs and actions of those working in and with the organisation
- prescriber – on rare occasions, telling the organisation what to do to solve a problem
- trainer – teaching the client organisation concepts, frameworks, and principles so that the organisation can diagnose its own problems

The facilitator's role has its roots in social-constructivist theory (Foucault, 1991): just as modern educational theorists (e.g. Vygotsky) advocate for the teacher to be a scaffold (Wood et al., 1976), encouraging cooperative learning among students involved in problem solving, the facilitator employs reflexivity (Oliver, 2010) to encourage continuous interaction so that participants can learn from each other and inform the issue or problem being addressed. This process is not linear, with each circle of interaction influencing previous circles and also the circle of reasoning patterns that follow. Effectively, the facilitator, like any negotiator, is part of the team, setting a clear agenda, prioritising and breaking the process down into manageable phases, outlining discussions on procedural issues, but also representing a 'wider international system of values, principles and legal standards' (Mancini-Griffoli and Picot, 2004).

RECOGNISING OPPORTUNITIES: DEVELOPING A POLICY ENVIRONMENT IN ARCS

Meetings held between the Head of Mission of the IFRC and the Secretary General of ARCS had decided that an independent strategic planner should be employed to lead the process. As the strategic planning facilitator had not worked for the RCRC before, having been brought in from another humanitarian organisation in Afghanistan, an opportunity revealed itself to start the strategic planning process with 'quiet diplomacy'.

Introductory meetings held with all the main actors in ARCS, IFRC and ICRC formed the basis of the situational and stakeholder analysis (IFRC, 2012). Names, roles, relevance to organisation (e.g. previous roles held) were all recorded, and any information on their position regarding strategy (generally determined from descriptions of their departments and/or programmes) and their relationships with other senior staff was also collected. Furthermore, the facilitator took the opportunity to encourage these actors to submit criteria used for selecting who should be involved in the strategic planning process. These criteria (Figure 1) were then developed and applied to form the Strategic Planning Committee, i.e. the planning committee was chosen through a representative process based on transparent criteria. Moreover, each participant was recognised as the legitimate (if not always respected) representative of the interests of their respective departments.

Selection Criteria for Planning Committee:

1. All ARCS departments should be represented.
2. Representatives of the senior management and the board should be present.
3. Representation is fairly distributed (e.g. HR/IT/Finance will have three representatives despite currently being one department).
4. Planning Committee members should have the authority to represent their departments and to disseminate information throughout the organisation.
5. Planning committee members should be respected members of staff and should work to ensure the process is successful.
6. Observers from ICRC and IFRC should be present.

Figure 1 Selection Criteria for Planning Committee

This quiet diplomacy also provided information on the status quo of ARCS. Figure 2 shows the organisation diagram of ARCS prior to the strategic planning process (Private Communication - ARCS, 2011).




Figure 2 ARCS Organisational Diagram

What is immediately apparent is that ARCS was highly hierarchical: The post of General Directorate of Control was shared by the Vice President and the Secretary General (i.e. no clear delineation between operations management and governance), and the Secretary General personally line-managed sixteen heads of department, as well as being the first port of call for regional and branch managers. Furthermore, the Secretary General was new to the post, and strong allegiances to the former Secretary General as well as historic, political and ethnic divisions had engendered a culture of discord inside ARCS.

It also became clear that the majority of the planning committee did not feel connected to the previous strategic plan (i.e. *Strategic Plan 2008-2012*) (ARCS, 2008). This was evidenced by the fact that many organisational responsibilities had failed to find ownership, with key areas left unaccounted for. There was insufficient *buy-in* at all levels of the organisation, evidenced particularly by a lack of any mid-term reviews to assess its impact. It had also taken two years to develop. At project level, this had resulted in several short-term donor-led projects, often inadequately monitored, while at organisational level, departments had been created without clear strategic directives.

The Secretary General, who had the support of the President, considered himself a 'new broom' and envisaged massive restructuring. The facilitator used quiet diplomacy with the Secretary General to ask the following questions:

- What do you expect from the strategic planning process?
- What do you plan to do after you leave ARCS?
- What do you expect from the strategic planning process?

The first question, was aimed at eliciting his expectations for the process, while the second (which he found at first somewhat surprising for someone who had just joined the organisation) aimed to focus his views on succession and developing something sustainable. The third question (which was the same as the first) focussed discussions on how

to develop a sustainable strategic planning document. Rather than direct persuasion, this awareness-raising approach provided time for the Secretary General to focus on his legacy, and question the methods required to achieve it. The facilitator developed a series of bullet points highlighting the Secretary General's expectations, but more importantly, successfully advocated for an inclusive (rather than top-down) approach which could reflect changes in such an open multi-stakeholder environment (Kurbalija, 2010), i.e. strategic planning was viewed as a process, not just as a final product.

EVALUATING POWER RELATIONS IN ARCS:

In line with the role of a humanitarian diplomat, the facilitator needed to be well-informed about both formal and informal aspects of organisational dynamics, as they may influence the outcome of the planning process. The facilitator identified how power was asserted in ARCS by attending a number of meetings as an observer. Although each participant of a meeting was allowed, if not tacitly required, to speak, hierarchy remained, with the Chair being highly autocratic. The transmission of information or opinion in this fashion did not encourage a mode of discourse appropriate to debate or problem-solving (Oliver, 2010), but was essentially a presentation, or appeal, by each participant that would be subsequently deliberated later behind closed doors. Essentially, although the meeting system appeared rational, it was neither interactive nor democratic, with close confidants dominating and exercising influence on the main decision-maker. It was also highly time-consuming.

Certain senior managers clearly felt disenfranchised by the ARCS meeting process, as it was difficult to ascertain on what grounds decisions had been or were going to be made. Furthermore, the type of discourse in ARCS meetings made it difficult to hold people accountable as there was no culture of taking minutes, making it very difficult to validate what was said or agreed upon in a meeting. There was also no strict schedule, allowing the Chair to extend or curtail meetings at will, and for participants to leave (and return) during meetings. In essence, meetings were perfunctory, acting as a prelude to behind-the-scenes decision-making. This is not to say there was no resistance to decisions in ARCS. Resistance, however, often took the form of non-compliance during the implementation phase, de-railing directives and programmes, often with serious repercussions, and highlighting that 'when trying to change things, group dynamics can be the biggest barriers and the biggest motivators for change' (Ross and Nisbett, 1991).

DEVELOPING A SHARED REFERENCE FRAMEWORK IN ARCS:

A series of meetings and workshops were held during and immediately after the Ramadan period (August and September 2011). Despite a reduced working day, this time of year was negotiated by the facilitator with the support from the Secretary General and proved positive for participant attendance, with most managerial staff being available throughout the period.

Motivation at the start of the strategic planning process was not high, despite being sanctioned at the highest level by the ARCS President (who, in addition to the Secretary General) would sign off on the final document. Furthermore, there was little knowledge of the purpose of a strategic plan among the committee other than that it was required by the RCRC Movement and needed to be delivered in time for 31st International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies held in Geneva. One of the main concerns, held by the facilitator and IFRC observers, was that the strategic planning participants would remain passive in the meetings, and oppose the plan (or parts of it) once it had been developed. There seemed to be an expectation by participants, as with most ARCS meetings, that they would attend, voice some opinions, and wait for the document to be written before agreeing or disagreeing with the contents. The facilitator advocated for a change in the mode of discourse (Oliver, 2010).

The process aimed to combat previous planning pitfalls, by considering (ARCS, 2011):

- Ownership – Encouraging members of the planning committee to include their staff throughout the process
- Sense of Progress – Planning sessions were held regularly, each with tasks to complete between meetings, to maintain momentum
- Accountability – Each task was designated to a participant (or group) to ensure ownership and accountability

- Communication – As communication between headquarters, regions and branches was problematic (see below), the draft plan was to be presented at the Branch Presidents' Annual Meeting (attended by the heads of all regions, branches and headquarters), ensuring communication of the plan before adoption, allowing feedback and revision
- Implementation – The strategic planning process was designed to ensure that the planning document wasn't seen as an end in itself

Moreover, the facilitator primed the strategic planning committee for what was expected of participants in terms of knowledge and expertise, by providing copies of the previous strategic plan (Strategic Plan 2008-2012), IFRC Strategy 2020 and the schedule of the planning process. The first session was dedicated entirely to explaining what a strategic plan was (and its components) and how it benefited organisations (Figure 3).




Figure 3 A slide used to explain strategic planning

The purpose of this briefing was to have a shared reference framework underlying the reasoning and logic of the process. This was considered necessary because strategic planning is largely a western concept which, to some extent, was being imposed on a non-western culture. For some on the committee this would potentially reinforce their power, i.e. their knowledge of such procedures would make them better able to assert dominance (Oliver, 2010). Others would be excluded from access to decision-making processes (and potentially disrupt the process) because of their inability to influence or understand the increased complexity of the decision-making process. Models and metaphor (Woodward, 1991) provided the best way to get the purpose of strategic planning (e.g. ships sailing in the same direction etc.).



Figure 4 A picture used to support metaphor

THE STRATEGIC PLANNING PROCESS: INTER-PROFESSIONAL COMMUNICATION

To counter anticipated passivity and to encourage an interactive process, several systems were put in place at the start of the process:

- Registers – Each session a register of attendance was taken.
- Clear time limits were enforced on the duration of each session.
- Participants sat in a horse-shoe shape during discussions and feedback on tasks.
- Each session was summarised by the facilitator immediately after each session and copies of these summaries were provided to each participant prior to the following session (these summaries were used as springboards for the next session, as well as acting as minutes of the previous session).
- A new protocol was negotiated in which the facilitator controlled the order of responses during discussions and feedback on tasks.

This last point was especially pertinent and it was necessary to highlight the need to conduct meetings in a more inclusive manner. The same questions were asked of the strategic planning committee as had been asked privately to the Secretary General (i.e. What do you expect from the strategic planning process? etc.). Participants developed their expectations in small groups and *afterwards* compared their expectations with those from the Secretary General. This had two aims - content (in order to find out the expectations) and, more importantly, process (which highlighted that more 'true' information could be elicited when the most senior participant's views were consulted last). Practically, this meant that during sessions the responses of the most junior female were often elicited first. Furthermore, several classroom techniques were employed to promote discussion and to prevent dominance of the few. These techniques included pair-work, group work, team projects, presentations on a specified topics, self assessments, administration of surveys and data analysis exercises. Furthermore, a loop input method (Woodward, 1991), where content and process were combined (e.g. collaborative tasks were used to determine what strategies would best improve collaboration between departments) was found to highlight the importance of considering both content and process.

The facilitator monitored tasks, recorded salient points for the session summary and led feedback. Summaries were vital in that they not only acted as minutes, but also made clear from the outset that any opinion or suggestion was valued, and could therefore be used to develop the strategic plan, i.e. the tasks were not 'games' but had definite objectives. The summaries also primed the participants for the following session.

DEALING WITH RESISTANCE

Despite support from the committee for the systems put in place, there was initial non-compliance regarding the completion of tasks. This was dealt with by highlighting the need for cooperation from all departments and achieved by presenting the results of a survey (i.e. Figure 5 - *Do we need a Strategic Planning Process?*) administered by the strategic planning committee. With data, rather than people, being brought to the fore (i.e. an evidence-based approach), each departments' credibility became the focus, instead of solely each managers' accountability.

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

Strategic Planning 2012-2015

Exercise 1 – Staff and Planning Committee

DO WE NEED A STRATEGIC PLANNING PROCESS?

The following questionnaire will help determine whether the ARCS requires a strategic planning process. Please complete it and hand it back to the person who gave it to you. You do NOT have to include your name.

Instructions:

Read the statements on the next page and tick (√) the box you agree with.

Where a statement has two parts and you would answer "definitely" to one part but not another, then go with the weaker response. So, for example, in the first statement, you may be able to answer "definitely" your organisation has a clear vision, but not be sure whether there is consensus about the vision. Your response then is "not sure".

Score the ARCS as follows on each statement:

1 = Definitely
2 = Maybe/Not sure
3 = Definitely not

If your total is 20 or more, then the ARCS is ready for a strategic planning process.

If it is 15, or between 15 and 20, then the ARCS would probably benefit from a strategic planning process.

Under 15, then there is no urgency but you should at least do strategic planning three years after your last strategic planning process.

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

Strategic Planning 2012-2015

Please put a tick (√) against your role and location of work in the organisation.

	Headquarters	Regional Office	Branch Office
Management			
Programme Staff			
Admin/Support Staff			

For each statement please put a tick (√) in the box you agree with.

Statement	Definitely	May be Not Sure	Definitely Not	SCORE
The ARCS has a clear vision of what it wants to achieve and there is a consensus about this vision.				
Value issues are often discussed in the ARCS and there is agreement on the values base of the organisation.				
The current mission statement of the ARCS reflects clearly what the organisation does, for whom, and why it is important.				
The ARCS regularly reflects on its strengths and weaknesses and on the opportunities and threats in the environment.				
The ARCS has clear goals and objectives for what it wants to achieve – these goals are SMART .				
The ARCS finds it easy to prioritise, making a distinction between what it must do, what it should do and what it would like to do.				
The ARCS has clear indicators by which it measures the impact of its work.				
The way in which the ARCS is structured internally makes sense in terms of efficiency and effectiveness.				
The work done by the ARCS fits together coherently – the different areas of work fit well with one another.				
The external and internal contexts in which the ARCS operates are relatively stable and there have been no major changes in the past year.				

Total Score _____

*SMART = Specific / Measurable / Agreed Upon (by everyone involved) / Realistic / Time bound

*Figure 5 SEQ Figure * ARABIC 5 Survey - Do we need a strategic planning process?*

The graphs below (Figures 6 and 7) were presented by the facilitator and subsequently analysed by the committee in an open meeting.




Figure 6 Number of staff surveyed (by department) - Organisational Development/Communication and Dissemination/ Marastoon (Social Welfare)/International Relations/Youth and Volunteers/Health/Logistics/Finance-Human Resources-Information Technology/Secretary General and Board of Directors




Figure 7 Number of staff surveyed (by location) - 'Don't know' corresponds to surveys without a location specified.

The task, although useful in terms of the information it provided (i.e. *Do we need a strategic planning process?*), was actually set by the facilitator to ascertain whether a ten-question, tick-box, survey in English could be successfully communicated to ARCS staff within the time between planning sessions (i.e. one week). The purpose of the analysis session (which was run in small groups) highlighted that:

- There was consensus for the need for the strategic planning process.
- Some departments hadn't administered the survey yet (i.e. *data* still needed to be collected).
- Certain planning committee members considered it unnecessary to share extensively strategic planning issues with their departmental staff.

Furthermore, the analysis of the survey conducted by the committee, raised several interesting points that informed the remainder of the strategic planning process:

- Interdepartmental communication in ARCS was limited, even within the Headquarters, e.g. although the survey had been translated by one department, it was not shared with other departments.
- Intradepartmental communication was almost non-existent between Headquarters and satellite offices, i.e. even the department that translated the survey did not distribute it at Regional and Branch level.
- There was no 'email culture' within the organisation (even at HQ).
- Departments were not utilising their staff to full capacity (such as their linguistic resources).
- Departmental decisions were generally top-down, with senior managers representing the views of their subordinates.

This inclusive analysis made it much easier to rationalise what was possible in the time available, i.e. realistic expectations emerged. For example, it became clear that full consultation with the whole organisation was not possible on every issue. Furthermore, co-operation between strategic planning members developed as they tackled each task. For the facilitator this was the most gratifying part of the whole strategic planning process, and was to some extent generated in response to the classroom-style of the sessions (i.e. the facilitator was the 'teacher' who showed 'disappointment' rather than castigation for 'lack of effort', and 'praise' for as a reward for 'cooperation'). Moreover, the feeling among the committee that they were 'all in it together' reinforced the fact that they owned the process, and were therefore responsible for its outcome (Kritzman, 1990).

ADVOCATING FOR ORGANISATIONAL RESTRUCTURING: AN EVIDENCE-BASED LOGOS APPROACH

With the committee on side regarding the approach to strategic planning, its first test was to deal with the issue of organisational restructuring that had emerged from and had been advocated for (at least in principle) by the strategic planning committee through their administration of an organisation-wide survey. The role of the facilitator was to ensure that this topic remained on the planning agenda, despite the fact that strategic planning is best carried out during a period of organisational stability (Bryson, 1988).

The primary approach was to redress the previous strategic plan. Here metaphor was again useful: to avoid a barrage of criticism (or blind defence) of the former plan, the new plan was framed as righting and setting the organisation back on course (ship metaphor, again). The main issue was conveyed as follows: if restructuring occurs after the plan is written, staff and volunteers may no longer consider the issues outlined in the plan valid. Furthermore, if a strategy is allocated to a department, any changes in that department during the duration of the strategic plan (i.e. if the department is merged/downsized/abolished in the restructuring) will increase the chance that the strategy will not be implemented.

By framing restructuring as an opportunity to put their 'ship' back on course, in line with the other departmental 'ships', the planning committee focussed on positions that benefitted the organisation as a whole rather than interests that benefitted an individual or department. It was emphasised that this may involve 'a mutually hurting stalemate' as power and resources were redistributed, but also as 'mutually enticing opportunities', with the chance to define or redefine their departments (Mancini-Griffoli and Picot, 2004). The relevance to the cross-cutting themes in IFRC Strategy 2020 were also highlighted.

With agreement that organisational restructuring should be tackled, it was imperative that the process was fair and transparent. An evidenced-based logos approach was used to negotiate organisational restructuring with the strategic planning committee. The approach focussed on the organisation as a whole by dividing it into four strategic areas. The strategic areas were:

- Beneficiaries/Communities
- Financial
- Internal Processes
- People (e.g. staff and volunteers)

To develop strategic issues from these areas, a four-stage process was required:

- Data from the planning process (e.g. comments, surveys, presentations etc) was grouped into similar topic areas, e.g. comments such as '*there isn't a clear chain of command*', '*the way ARCS is structured internally doesn't make sense in terms of efficiency and effectiveness', 'We need to improve the line of reporting from branches'* were grouped together.
- Strategic Goals (long-range, broad-reaching statements) were written from the thematically grouped data, e.g. *Strategic Goal: Develop a current, written organisation chart with a clear, unambiguous chain of command, and ensure it is followed.*
- Strategic Goals were placed under the four Strategic Areas, e.g. the Strategic goal in (2) was placed under 'Internal Processes'.
- Mini-vision statements (Strategic Issues) were created to best represent the goals placed in each Strategic Area.

Steps 3 and 4 involved an iterative process, i.e. these general categories (the Strategic issues) emerged from the data, but were also guided by the data as it emerged. Essentially, as common themes start to emerge, category titles were created and further goals were placed under these categories until the title was no longer appropriate. The category title was revised and the goals were re-ordered until there was a best match between the category and the

strategic goals. The category title that best fit the strategic goals became the Strategic Issue for that group of goals. Using this process, the strategic issues in Table 1 emerged.

Table 1: Strategic Areas and Strategic Issues

Strategic Area	Strategic Issue
Beneficiaries/Communities	Improve performance and impact
Financial	Improve financial effectiveness and stability
Internal processes	Enhance operational efficiency
People	Develop the workforce

This framework allowed statements to be made that very few people in ARCS could disagree with, i.e. each strategic issue had buy-in, as it came directly from the strategic planning process. However, the problem with a complex logos approach is that its validity can be questioned unless it is presentable. To support the strategic planning committee to convey their work to their staff, more approachable ways of demonstrating the decision-making process were devised.

Figure 8 shows how conversations, generated through strategic planning activities, were used to demonstrate the coherence of the strategies to ARCS staff.




Figure 8 Planning activity - advocating the plan

The outcome of this process was that goals were generated *without* the need to consider who would be responsible in implementing them, i.e. gaps between where the organisation was and where it would like to be were readily identified, as ownership had yet to be allocated. These goals were then used to formulate the mission and vision statements of ARCS. With all the goals (literally) on the table, each planning committee member selected Strategic Goals appropriate to their department, and created department-specific strategic objectives based on these goals. This approach was completely *opposite* to the previous planning process, where the strategic areas had been matched to each department on a one-to-one basis using a top-down process, resulting in fierce turf battles for resources and power. In other words, the goals themselves were holistic, so any changes or restructuring of departments within the lifetime of the strategic plan would not result in *ad hoc* changes to the strategic goals, thus safeguarding the overall mission and vision of the organisation.

EVALUATION OF HUMANITARIAN DIPLOMACY IN THE STRATEGIC PLANNING PROCESS:

Overall, the strategic planning process was successful, with all relevant actors participating, and contributing to the final strategic planning document, which was completed on schedule. Furthermore, the process was more transparent and inclusive than previous strategic planning, having buy-in from all levels within the organisation. The evidenced-based logos approach to organisational restructuring came from the planning process and was highly successful, generating strategic goals that informed both the mission and vision statements of the organisation.




Figure 9 Revised Organisational Diagram

Although immediate provisional changes to the organisational diagram (Private Communication - ARCS, 2011) resulted from the strategic planning process (Figure 9), to some extent, the transparency afforded to the process was also its weakness. Limitations to the logos approach were highlighted when it was **not** applied, i.e. when strategic issues which had emerged through this process were vetoed. This occurred over the strategic issue of *Improving Financial Effectiveness* (Table 1) which did **not** emerge from negotiations. In fact the iterative process described above had generated *Increase Revenue Opportunities* as the Financial strategic area, i.e. any shortfall in a department's financial resources were to be filled by applying for more funding from the RCRC Movement. The reason for the veto, which was initiated by the IFRC and advocated by the facilitator, was as follows:

Over the lifetime of this strategic plan foreign military forces in Afghanistan may be scaled down and potentially withdrawn. This is likely to have repercussions not only on security in Afghanistan, but also on Afghanistan's visibility in terms of media representation in donor countries.

It was necessary to persuade the committee that increasing revenue opportunities could not be the main focus of the *Financial* strategic area (i.e. a non-negotiable situation). Resistance was inevitable – the strategy (i.e. Improve Financial Effectiveness) would have consequences throughout the organisation, especially regarding the number of staff required at headquarters and the curtailing of some programmes, particularly social welfare programmes.

Furthermore, the committee felt that the evidenced-based logos approach that they had bought into, was now being undermined.

The new advocacy approach focused on the ethos of the organisation (i.e. remaining credible by ensuring it focussed its resources on areas of well-established expertise) and pathos (i.e. emotional persuasion in order for the committee to accept a strategy that they had not generated) by highlighting the potential geopolitical ramifications of the withdrawal of foreign troops (Note: at this time, such a withdrawal was not certain).

A solution to the impasse came from the acknowledgement that revenue should be generated from multiple sources (i.e. development of a fundraising management department) but also that existing revenue sources would be used in a more cost effective fashion (i.e. higher accountability by budget holders). The strategic issue was extended from *Improve Financial effectiveness* to *Improve Financial Effectiveness and Stability* to reflect this change (Table 1). Nevertheless, as a strategic issue (i.e. a mini-vision statement for the financial side of ARCS) the emphasis was successfully moved away from viewing the future in the same way as the past.

CONCLUDING REMARKS: LESSONS LEARNED

The skills and terminology used in humanitarian diplomacy clearly apply to strategic planning. Developing a mode of discourse that encourages the development of a policy environment that is conducive to co-operation and negotiation is vital. Understanding the power relations by utilising stakeholder and situational analyses encourages inter-professional communication. Furthermore, by laying down ground-rules, encouraging an interactive approach to problem-solving and outlining realistic expectations creates a sense of ownership over the process. Essentially, everyone around the table has a voice and influence over decisions, reducing issues surrounding decreased motivation, non-attendance or active de-railing of the process.

What also emerged, however, is that a single approach is not always possible. The evidenced-based logos approach was quite a broad brush for organisational restructuring, i.e. however logical an approach appears, there will be occasions when it can't deal with all the issues that arise. The temptation for a facilitator is to carry on regardless, as applying one approach appears to be fairer, and, of course, simpler, to justify. In the case outlined, it could be argued that the evidence-based logos approach would have entirely succeeded if a more thorough situational analysis had been performed (one that considered all aspects of the geopolitical backdrop). Moreover, the fact that an evidenced-based process was accepted at all (as shown by the resistance when this approach was vetoed), could be considered positive. However, this would be missing the point – a facilitator, as with a humanitarian diplomat, needs to utilise all the tools in the toolbox, as a one-size-fits-all approach will generally be too restrictive. Moreover, this needs to be conveyed to those involved in the process. In other words, presenting an approach as a panacea can dash expectations and goodwill if the approach falters. This is something that must be avoided if negotiations are to succeed.

Overall, it is important to recognise that strategic planning is as much a process as a final product, and therefore requires skills and techniques to facilitate this process. Humanitarian diplomacy clearly provides many useful tools to support strategic planners.

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Louise Sarsfield Collins

PhD Candidate and Occasional Lecturer, Maynooth University
(at the time of writing: International Humanitarian Law Advocacy Officer at Irish Red Cross)

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The role of the International Red Cross Red Crescent movement in shifting the nuclear disarmament debate from one of security to humanitarian considerations and the path forward

The role of the International Red Cross Red Crescent movement in shifting the nuclear disarmament debate from one of security to humanitarian considerations and the path forward

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The international disarmament discourse and debate regarding nuclear weapons has changed significantly in the past number of years. While notions of deterrence, geopolitics and security still dominate in many arenas there has been an epochal shift towards considerations of the humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons. The Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement has played a role in this shift and continues to promote the 'humanitarian agenda' at the local, national and international level.

Key to the actions of the Red Cross has been the Council of Delegates Resolutions concerning nuclear weapons in 2011 and 2013. For many National Societies (NS) these resolutions have provided a roadmap for the humanitarian diplomacy activities they have undertaken on the issue. In this paper, the actions of the American and Australian Red Cross National Societies are examined, through the lens of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent National Societies (IFRC) Humanitarian Diplomacy Policy.

The analysis finds that while the actions of the two national societies have been quite different, they both fit within the humanitarian diplomacy framework laid out by the IFRC and both draw successfully on the Council of Delegates Resolutions. These two resolutions are grounded firmly in international humanitarian law and accepted international legal norms. Drawing on a research base provided by the Red Cross Movement they further strive to address the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and call on states to commit to never using them again, and to work towards their elimination. This of course would signify a momentous shift in policy for a number of states. The resolutions however are flexible enough to allow national societies discretion in choosing how best to further the Movement's humanitarian agenda.

A number of factors were identified as contributing to the movement's influence on the shifting international nuclear disarmament discourse. These were the strong credibility of the Red Cross, the timing of the Council of Delegates Resolutions and as outlined above the strong legal basis for the resolutions along with a flexible basis for humanitarian diplomacy efforts.

In closing the author proposes the following recommendations for continued success in this area:

- The responsibility to persuade should be understood to not only create an obligation to persuade decision makers but also to assist sister NS in building capacity to do the same. This is also in keeping with the Movement's Fundamental Principle, Unity.
- Council of Delegates Resolutions should be mindful of the range of political environments National Societies operate in, and strive to create resolutions that are flexible enough to allow National Societies to take actions appropriate to their domestic context.
- All Red Cross People should be aware of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons to allow the Movement, at all levels from local to international, speak with one coherent voice.

1. OVERVIEW

International disarmament discourse and debate regarding nuclear weapons has changed significantly in the past number of years. While notions of deterrence, geopolitics and security still dominate in many arenas there has been an epoch shift towards considerations of the humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons. The international community has witnessed similar shifts before in campaigns to ban weapons such as anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions. However, neither of these weapon systems inspired the same level of emotion and reaction as nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons, credited by many as ending World War II in the Pacific and preventing the Cold War from becoming a hot war, are a weapon of prestige as well as great power. Whilst not alone in its endeavours the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (the Movement) has played a significant role in this shift and continues to promote the 'humanitarian agenda' in both national and international circles at a variety of levels (Caughley, 2013). Throughout the creation of this space within the disarmament debate, the Movement has been driven by the principle of humanity and the notional framework underpinning international humanitarian law.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has taken the lead in this process, supported by other components of the movement including a number of Red Cross Red Crescent (RCRC) National Societies that have been instrumental in the process. The Council of Delegates (CoD) 2011 Resolution and subsequent 2013 Resolution provided particular impetus for engagement. NS however are situated in a diverse set of contexts. NS are located in countries that possess nuclear weapons, countries that allow nuclear weapons to be stored on their territory, countries that have had nuclear weapons used against them, as well as countries that do not have nuclear weapons. Consequently each NS has had to analyse its own domestic environment and carefully choose how it wishes to pursue humanitarian diplomacy on the issue.

This paper aims to critically examine how the Movement developed its nuclear weapons campaign and how the different components of the Movement have managed this process. The key question that this paper strives to answer is: *what factors have allowed the RCRC Movement to contribute to the international reframing of the nuclear disarmament debate from one almost exclusively focused on security to one that is concerned with humanitarian issues?* In answering this question the paper focuses on the role of NS, in particular American RC and Australian RC as well as the role of the ICRC. By conducting a comparative analysis of the experiences of these NS programmes for the implementation of the CoD Resolutions the research will provide an overview of approaches that have worked. Recommendations can then be drafted to increase the likelihood of similar future endeavours being successful and to further strengthen plans for ongoing work related to the campaign for the elimination of nuclear weapons. The following sections provide a concise review of the relevant literature, an overview of the methodology utilised and the key findings of the research, before outlining recommendations.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

The purpose of this section is two-fold. First, before examining the role of the Red Cross Movement in reframing the nuclear disarmament debate using humanitarian diplomacy it is important to explore what is meant by terms such as 'diplomacy', 'humanitarian' and 'humanitarian diplomacy'. Second, given the subject matter of this paper it is also necessary to examine the role of non State actors in the international disarmament debate.

Traditionally, diplomacy is conceptualised as relating to international relations and the conduct of foreign policy through peaceful means (Collins English Dictionary, 2012). By many, it is understood as being deeply connected with politics and political life, (IFRC, 2009). However, in the broadest sense of the word it also refers to problem solving within society and not just at the inter-state level, (*ibid*). It is this broad sense of the word that is to be taken on board when considering diplomacy in the humanitarian sector.

The notion of humanitarianism derives from the principle of humanity, one of the seven fundamental principles of the Movement. These principles, as currently formulated, date from 1965, however conceptually they pre-date the establishment of the Red Cross. Humanity is arguably the most important of the principles, providing what Pictet (1979: 14) referred to as the expression of the profound motivation of the Red Cross, from which all other principles are derived – "the spark which ignites the powder".

Humanity has also been adopted by the United Nations (UN) as one of the global 'humanitarian principles' in UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182, 1991. While the two definitions vary, there is nevertheless a common thread evident with regard to a need to address human suffering, protect life and human dignity. The humanitarian imperative is also heralded as being paramount in all subsequent activities in the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent National Societies (IFRC) Code of Conduct, (1994) which has been adopted by many humanitarian organisations outside the Red Cross Movement.

Humanitarian Diplomacy brings together these two notions, to give a name to action that humanitarians have been engaged in on a variety of levels for centuries. In naming and defining humanitarian diplomacy the IFRC strives to provide practitioners with a "new confidence and clarity", (IFRC, 2009, p1). Maurer (2014) has said that principled humanitarian action and diplomacy is about the preservation of "neutral, impartial and independent space: an embodiment of our shared humanity". The IFRC (2009: 3) defines humanitarian diplomacy as "persuading decision makers and opinion leaders to act, at all times, in the interests of vulnerable people, and with full respect for fundamental humanitarian principles". The IFRC further explains that this definition is best understood as a "sequence of terms that act as signposts for action", (*ibid*: 4) rather than a stagnant notion. These signposts include the responsibility to persuade, persuading with the appropriate diplomatic tools and actions, focusing on areas of knowledge and expertise, and engaging at appropriate times with partners outside the Movement, and will be explored further in Section Four below.

Turning to disarmament, the ICRC has been instrumental in the development and promotion of international humanitarian law treaties since its very foundation. In the field of disarmament, the ICRC role stretches as far back as the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, 1925, (Borrie, 2005). There is also a long history of non-governmental organisation (NGO) involvement in disarmament affairs. However, according to Atwood (2002) what has changed since the 1990s, is that this NGO involvement is now part of a new phenomenon of increased transnational civil society engagement with global issues. This was particularly evident in the campaign to ban anti-personnel mines which resulted in the Ottawa Treaty, 1997. Despite this involvement however, there is a dearth of analysis in the literature, and what exists is largely focused on case studies of NGO involvement with particular disarmament issues, rather than a broader analysis of the various issues at play.

Nevertheless, what is clear from the available literature is that the process which began in Ottawa and many said could not be repeated, was again evident in the negotiations to ban cluster munitions which resulted in the Oslo Convention, 2008. Borrie et al. (2009: 20) maintain that initially anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions were treated solely as issues of arms regulation. However, the "Ottawa and Oslo processes that subsequently emerged were framed in humanitarian terms using concepts and terminology that fit a humanitarian discourse". Nonetheless it is important to note that actors such as Borrie (2005) remain "to be convinced that human security ideas did more than inform the views of those negotiators already openly disposed towards them in the turmoil of drafting and deal-making". This remains a concern in the nuclear disarmament debate. Many states view the humanitarian consequences discourse as a means to collect information and strengthen the evidence base for policy decisions they already support and promote in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons review conferences rather than an opportunity for states not currently supporting these ideals to be convinced (anon, per con, 2014).

The importance of an evidence base for reframing the disarmament agenda is evident in the literature. The humanitarian impact of landmines, cluster munitions, and other unexploded remnants of war was easily documented as they remain live issues in many post-conflict settings. The detrimental effect that they have on development was easily demonstrated and this humanitarian perspective makes sense to international policy makers. Hubert (2000, cited in Borrie 2005) maintains that the "the wide-spread use [of anti-personnel mines] ...provided the evidence on which to build the campaign". Borrie (2005: 26) contends however that similar approaches to weapons of mass destruction have been less successful, partly because this evidence base, so important in humanitarian diplomacy, does not exist. Additionally, nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programmes tend to be shrouded in secrecy, as well as being central to state concepts of "national security and prestige". The construction of a strong evidence base has been central to the Movement's campaign which will be discussed in the next section.

3. METHODOLOGY

The nature of the research questions identified above required a largely qualitative methodology so as to allow the researcher to gain an insight into the thought process behind the Movement's campaign. This paper draws on aspects of both descriptive research and explanatory research. With many of these varieties of research, the methods of data collection employed may remain the same or similar but the objectives and reasoning behind the research changes.

Two key methods of data collection are utilised. First, primary data gathered through semi-structured interviews and second, desk research of largely publically available secondary data. The sampling method to identify respondents draws on a number of different techniques, with the focus on 'Theoretical Sampling'. This method is the "process of data collection for generating theory", (Glazer and Strauss, 1967, p. 45, cited in Sarantakos, 2005, p. 166) or in this instance for answering the research questions outlined above. This method of sampling involves the researcher choosing an initial respondent, based on the relevance of the respondents knowledge. From the data collected, the researcher then chooses another respondent to study. This continues until a saturation point is reached in which further data collection does not contribute to the capturing of 'new' data. This was combined with snowball sampling[1] and some elements of stratified sampling.[2] It should be noted that given the limits of the research period and its coincidence with the third international conference on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons hosted by the Government of Austria the saturation point was not reached and there remains scope for further in-depth research on this topic.

There were a number of reasons why semi-structured interviews were chosen over structured interviews or questionnaires. First, due to the presence of the interviewer, the interviewee's responses are spontaneous, gut reactions to questions. Furthermore the semi-structured design of the interviews allows the researcher to engage the respondents in the subject matter teasing out issues that may come up during the interviews. Open-ended questions not only allow for the subject to be explored from a number of angles, but also allow the respondent to elaborate on issues they feel were most important. Despite these strengths, interviews are not without their flaws. The interviewer's ability to develop a rapport with the respondent is paramount to the success of the interview. If not comfortable with the interviewer, respondents may close down and give short, incomplete answers. Luckily this situation did not occur during the research process.

4. HUMANITARIAN DIPLOMACY IN ACTION

This section will examine the activities of various components of the Movement, in particular the ICRC, the American RC and the Australian RC on the topic of nuclear weapons. These activities will be analysed through the lens of the four signposts for action identified by the IFRC in their humanitarian diplomacy policy outlined above.

4.1 INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS

As mentioned above the ICRC has long held concerns about nuclear weapons and first spoke out about their destructive power shortly after their use in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, (ICRC, 1945) and again in 1950 (ICRC, 1950). The privileged position of the ICRC has provided the opportunity to address the UN General Assembly First Committee on Disarmament regularly. In 1996, following the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons the ICRC informed the UN that in light of the serious danger posed by nuclear weapons they found it "difficult to envisage how the use of nuclear weapons could be compatible with the rules of international humanitarian law", (ICRC, 1996).

[1] Snowball sampling involves the choosing of a few respondents by the researcher using any appropriate method. These respondents are asked to recommend other respondents who meet the criteria of the study. A saturation point is reached when either there are no more available respondents or no more information can be acquired from additional respondents (Sarantakos, 2005).

[2] Stratified random sampling is a method in which the target population is divided into a number of strata, with a sample being drawn from each stratum (Sarantakos, 2005).

International developments during 2009 and 2010 provided the impetus for the reinvigoration of the ICRC's appeals for the end of nuclear weapons, (Kellenberger, 2010). In his statement to the Geneva Diplomatic Corps, Kellenberger recalled the testimony of Dr Marcel Junod[3] and the appeals that the ICRC had made regarding nuclear weapons. He further recalled the ICRC's welcoming of the ICJ Opinion in 1996 and restated that the ICRC finds it "difficult to envisage how the use of nuclear weapons could be compatible with the rules of international humanitarian law", (*ibid*). Importantly, he also went on to say that the "position of the ICRC, as a humanitarian organisation, goes ... beyond a purely legal analysis", (*ibid*) to consider the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons.

This language has been echoed in the CoD Resolutions in 2011 and 2013 as well as in statements by ICRC to the UN General Assembly First Committee each year. In 2010 it was asserted that "the debate must equally be informed by the implications of these weapons for human beings, the fundamental rules of IHL and the collective future of humanity", (ICRC, 2010). Earlier this year, the ICRC told the First Committee that there is an "urgent need for robust action to advance nuclear disarmament" (ICRC, 2014). The ICRC has also had the opportunity to represent the Movement at international conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons in Norway, Mexico and most recently Austria.

4.2 AMERICAN RED CROSS

The activities of the American RC have largely been in the area of quiet diplomacy and direct dialogue with their government. This dialogue has focused on the humanitarian consequences of a nuclear weapons detonation and ensuring that the position of the Movement as laid out in the CoD 2011 and 2013 resolutions is understood.

There has been very little public outreach on the topic of nuclear weapons. This is understandable given that the American RC is one of the few NS operating in a state that has nuclear weapons, and the only state that has ever used these weapons. An examination of the American RC website (www.redcross.org) yields no reference to nuclear weapons despite the numerous pages dedicated to both IHL and disaster preparedness. There is also next to no mention of nuclear weapons in their twitter feed (www.twitter.com/RulesofWar).

According to a representative of the American NS, (NWRC001), while they engage in some public speaking on nuclear weapons, it is limited. When they do speak publically, the focus is very much on the potential humanitarian consequences of a nuclear detonation as well as attempting to debunk some myths about the role of the Red Cross. Examples of such events include a panel in congress hosted by Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. The Boston Chapter of American RC also hosted an event on the topic with a speaker from American RC headquarters and a speaker from an NGO campaigning for a nuclear weapons ban.

4.3 AUSTRALIAN RED CROSS

In contrast, the Australian RC has been one of the most vocal NS on the topic of nuclear weapons. While Australia is not a nuclear power, the country has been the site of nuclear testing, the effects of which are still evident amongst some aboriginal communities. The Australian RC's first engagement with the topic was during the drafting of the Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions, 1977 when they made a submission to their government that a prohibition on nuclear weapons be included in the Protocols (NWRC003). More recent engagement however began in 2010 and was promoted by Kellenberger's speech mentioned above (NWRC002).

The Australian RC has taken a three pronged approach, focusing on the general public including friends and members of the RC, parliamentarians, and other NS, especially in the pacific region. The public campaign has been mostly online through the use of social media (Target Nuclear Weapons, 2013), the Australian RC website (www.redcross.org.au) and a campaign microsite (http://targetnuclearweapons.org.au/).[4] There have however also been offline activities such as flash mobs (Young Humanitarians Make a Stand, 2012), origami peace crane folding initiatives and other events (NWRC002; NWRC003). The Australian RC has also used regular IHL publications and events to highlight the Movement position on nuclear weapons.

[3] Dr Marcel Junod, an ICRC delegate, was the first foreign doctor to arrive in Hiroshima after the bomb detonated.

[4] To see more about how the online campaign worked see Target Nuclear Weapons (2012).

Within the Movement, the Australian RC has been at the forefront of encouraging other NS to engage with the topic and encouraging the adoption of the CoD Resolutions in both 2011 and 2013 (Robert Tickner Presenting at Council of Delegates Meeting, 2013; Red Cross Must Target Nuclear Weapons, 2013).

4.4 SIGNPOST 1 – THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PERSUADE

As outlined above the IFRC asserts that humanitarian diplomacy is best understood as a series of signposts to be followed with the ultimate goal of persuading decision makers to act in the interests of vulnerable people. The first of these signposts, the responsibility to persuade leads the way for all other humanitarian diplomacy actions, much as the principle of humanity compels organisations to action to alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found. IFRC policy (IFRC, 2009) makes it very clear that humanitarian diplomacy is not an optional activity for the RC Movement but rather all components must engage in action to persuade decision makers to always keep in mind the needs of vulnerable people. In the case of nuclear weapons, this signpost is evident in many of the statements made by the ICRC at the UN, in Robert Tickner's statement at the CoD in 2013 (Red Cross Must Target Nuclear Weapons, 2012), and in the CoD Resolutions themselves.

In the two case study NS, the Australian RC appear to comply with this signpost more easily and more readily than the American RC. The Australian RC became active on the issue before the agreement of the 2011 CoD Resolution, prompted by the speech of ICRC President Jacob Kellenberger and the growing international understanding that the risks of a nuclear weapon detonation are too great given the catastrophic consequences that would ensue. One respondent referred to this as "the wake-up call" (NWRC002). The Australian RC further, identified within their campaign a track focused solely on building capacity within other NS to raise the issue of nuclear weapons in their own countries. One interviewee reported that the pacific region has a long history with nuclear weapons and nuclear testing and the Australian RC felt it was really important to use this and take a stand on the issue of nuclear weapons (NWRC003) – a responsibility to persuade. By contrast the American RC representative seemed to be less convinced that nuclear weapons are an issue that the RC should be proactively involved with or attempting to persuade decision makers about. The representative also stated that the RC Movement's position is not going to have an influence on the nuclear weapon states (NWRC001).

4.5 SIGNPOST 2 – PERSUADING WITH THE APPROPRIATE DIPLOMATIC TOOLS AND ACTIONS

There are numerous tools available to the humanitarian diplomat but not all are suitable in every context. This is especially true when speaking about topics as politically charged as nuclear weapons. Not only is it essential to know the different methodologies, for example quiet diplomacy with private advocacy and negotiation, public advocacy engaging with the general public and stakeholders through traditional and social-media as well as statements at public events and working to create a policy environment that is friendly to humanitarian diplomacy. It is also essential to know when to use the different tools to the best effect.

It soon became clear to the author that both NS studied had conducted careful analysis of their domestic political and civil environment as it applies to nuclear weapons. They were also all cognisant of the international environment and the impact that this had on domestic sentiment. Working in a highly charged political environment the American RC opted to concentrate efforts on quiet diplomacy, confidential dialogue and relationship building. While public speaking was not actively pursued, the NS did take the opportunity to state the Movement's concerns with the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons when invited to do so.

The Australian RC, while also not in an entirely open political environment on the issue of nuclear disarmament, nevertheless decided to pursue a very loud, public campaign in addition to the more discreet dialogue with parliamentarians and the government. One representative interviewed attributed the ability to do this to the good relationship that pre-existed with the government (NWRC003). The representative stressed the importance of keeping the lines of communication open with the government and not pointing fingers. The representative reported that it is helpful for Australian RC that the news reports and general public understanding is that the 'Red Cross' thinks nuclear weapons are so dangerous they should be banned rather than the 'Australian Red Cross' thinks that the Australian Government should do more to ban nuclear weapons.

Representatives from both NS were very complimentary of the CoD Resolutions. It was acknowledged that they were strong documents, firmly based in international humanitarian law and existing legal norms that also managed to have enough flexibility within them to allow NS to undertake different humanitarian diplomacy approaches.

4.6 SIGNPOST 3 – FOCUSING ON AREAS OF KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERTISE

Across the movement there is a wealth of knowledge, expertise and experience on humanitarian issues. This vast body of information needs to be harnessed and shared in the movement's humanitarian diplomacy work. As outlined in the IFRC Humanitarian Diplomacy Policy, (IFRC, 2009) and mentioned frequently in the literature as outlined above it is easier to persuade people if you have hard evidence and knowledge to back up your message. Knowledge also adds credibility to the humanitarian diplomat.

In the case of nuclear weapons, the Movement had drawn on the first hand testimony of ICRC delegate Marcel Junod for decades, however the past number of years have also seen research conducted on how the Movement would respond to a nuclear weapon detonation (Coupland and Loye, 2009; Loye and Coupland, 2007). Other organisations such as the UN Institute for Disarmament Research, Chatham House and others have also conducted research on this theme, (Borrie and Caughley, 2013) further adding to the growing body of evidence to support the Movement's position.

The Australian RC, in addition to the ICRC research and materials has also conducted research nationally on support for a nuclear weapons ban (Australian Red Cross, 2014). They also utilise experiences of victims of nuclear weapons and nuclear testing to highlight the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. These findings serve to bolster calls for a legally binding instrument to ban nuclear weapons. The American RC, seem to have relied more heavily on ICRC materials. Both NS representatives however agreed that not only was the collective knowledge of the RC Movement key for credibility but that the reputational currency of the ICRC and the Movement further increased the opportunities for NS and the ICRC to speak on the Movement's position.

The importance of the Movement, a traditionally conservative establishment, speaking with one clear coherent voice was also repeated in interviews and other sources. One representative from the Australian RC also stated that part of the reason for targeting their membership in the public awareness campaign was to ensure that all 'Red Cross People' had the same message and understood the situation (NWRC003).

4.7 SIGNPOST 4 – ENGAGING AT APPROPRIATE TIMES WITH PARTNERS OUTSIDE THE MOVEMENT.

At all times the RC Movement must be guided by the Fundamental Principles however, this does not mean that the Movement must work in isolation. There are many times when it is beneficial to engage with partners, through formal partnerships as well as the development of relationships and informal agreements. This must also happen at all levels. Humanitarian challenges are complex, they often do not respect borders and in times of crisis can be more than any one organisation or government can cope with alone, and this is definitely true of the effects of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, it is of huge importance to the integrity of the Movement that due diligence is carried out on all prospective partners.

The RC Movement has not forged concrete partnerships with other organisations involved with the nuclear weapons campaign internationally, but that is not to say that there is not a lot of information sharing and relationship building happening at a myriad of levels. At the domestic level different NS have taken different approaches. The American RC representative said that many activist organisations promoting a nuclear weapon ban in the US are not fans of the American RC as they feel they could be doing more (NWRC001). The representative went on to say that often the American RC finds it necessary to not only explain the RC Movement position on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons but also debunk myths about the mandate of the RC and the limitations of what the Movement can do.

The Australian RC in contrast, reported that they had collaborated on a number of events with other organisations but the strongest partnership has been with ICAN Australia. This has only been possible because the director of ICAN Australia knows the ethos and principles of the RC really well and so having an understanding of what the Australian RC can and cannot do makes things easier. When choosing partners for humanitarian diplomacy efforts, it is key that all involved fully understand the ethos, the mandate and the situation of other parties. If this understanding is not there, it creates potential for roadblocks that may lead to the partnership doing more harm than good.

5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This paper set out to consider what factors have allowed the RC Movement contribute to the international reframing of the nuclear disarmament debate from one of classic security to one concerned with humanitarian issues. This idea of reframing an issue is not new in diplomacy, and has understandably been taken on board by humanitarian diplomats.

It is of course impossible to quantify the impact of the RC Movement over other actors in the sector. Respondents did however believe that the influence of the RC had been significant, something that is also stated in publications on the issue (Caughley, 2013). In addition a multiplier effect was created, because as the humanitarian consequences discourse grew in strength it created more opportunities for the RC's message to be heard, which in turn further strengthened the humanitarian consequences discourse. As one respondent put it – it is a bit "like the chicken and the egg" (NWRC003).

Nevertheless, a number of factors have emerged as being instrumental in this shift in discourse. First the reputational credibility of the Red Cross name gives weight to the arguments being put forward. As the largest humanitarian organisation in the world, when the Movement puts its voice behind an issue, the world does listen. Second, the timing of the CoD Resolutions built on the growing international momentum and re-energised many that had been quietly working on the issue for years (NWRC001). Third, the CoD Resolutions were firmly situated in existing legal norms. In moving from a conversation purely about these legal norms to one also highlighting the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons they were flexible enough to allow NS as narrow or wide a scope of activities as they deemed appropriate for their operational context.

5.1 RECOMMENDATIONS

The responsibility to persuade should be understood to not only create an obligation to persuade decision makers but also to assist sister NS in building capacity to do the same. This is also in keeping with the Movement's Fundamental Principle, Unity.

CoD Resolutions should be mindful of the range of political environments NS operate in, and strive to create resolutions that are flexible enough to allow NS to take actions appropriate to their domestic context.

All Red Cross People should be aware of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons to allow the Movement at all levels, from local to international, speak with one coherent voice.

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Interview Reference	**Interviewee Description**
NWRC001	American Red Cross (current employee)
NWRC002	Australian Red Cross (former employee)
NWRC003	Australian Red Cross (current employee)



Giorgio Ferrario

Manager, Organizational Transformation

National Society Development Services department

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Enhancing resilience-supportive policy-making in South East Asia: a humanitarian diplomacy approach to ASEAN

Enhancing resilience-supportive policy-making in South East Asia: a humanitarian diplomacy approach to ASEAN

Tutor: Timothy McInerny

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The association of ten Southeast Asian nations, ASEAN, is a successful regional entity that has managed to create a conflict-free area and a dynamic economic platform for multilateral negotiations. While its successes are there for all to see, the very founding principles of ASEAN are at the same time its main limitations: the "ASEAN way", based on non-interference in domestic affairs and consensus decision-making, has resulted in a large volume of processes but a more limited number of regional policies and norms. ASEAN's political future seems dependent on its future interaction with the great powers (China, India, Japan and the USA) and on its capacity to overcome its own limitations.

The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) has recently developed a clear concept of resilience. The IFRC[1] has already, successfully, been engaging with ASEAN on a specific disaster management agenda, and is planning to scale up its future humanitarian diplomacy agenda. Since 2009, the IFRC has adopted a clear policy on humanitarian diplomacy (HD).

This paper will shortly brush the main features of the functioning of ASEAN, briefly analyse the different aspects of policy making in ASEAN focusing on three examples related to resilience, and revise past and present humanitarian diplomacy initiatives by the IFRC (membership and its Secretariat), to finally suggest next steps for a consistent HD approach to influence decision-makers during policy development in thematic areas linked to resilience.

The findings indicate that there is scope for the IFRC to increase its humanitarian diplomacy actions with ASEAN on a wider resilience agenda. In order to be effective, such HD shall take into account the specificities of decision- and policy-making in ASEAN, focus on areas of clear competency and avoid dispersion, build on its network of 10 National Societies in ASEAN countries, properly plan and structure its intervention, clearly identify roles and responsibilities, and build partnerships with key actors. As we shall see, the above is consistent with the four signposts of the IFRC HD policy (IFRC, 2009).

[1] Throughout this paper, unless otherwise specified, IFRC will stand for the 10 Red Cross and Red Crescent National Societies of South East Asia whose countries are members of ASEAN and their IFRC Secretariat. It is intended that the role of the IFRC Secretariat with its structur4e (country, region, zone and Geneva) is to support the membership to achieve individual and common strategic goals.

1. INTRODUCTION

This paper aims at better understanding the concrete opportunities to influence policy decision-making at the regional (South East Asia) level in order to foster resilience. The action-oriented research was guided by three main research questions:

- What are ASEAN (existing and in the making) policies related to IFRC resilience priorities?
- What is ASEAN's process for policy making ? Which are the main actors in policy making?
- What is the most effective coordinated IFRC approach to influence identified decision-makers on prioritised issues?

Most of the issues raised by the research questions have found an appropriate answer, despite some limitations in accessing free, recent and relevant academic research on ASEAN. The ASEAN policy-making process has proven quite different from what was initially hypothesised, and this has been duly captured in the paper. In addition, due to the limited time and word-count available, the research could not encompass all aspects needed to draw a comprehensive humanitarian diplomacy strategy on a resilience agenda with ASEAN. This was never the ambition of this paper. Further action research will be needed to develop such a strategy in a consistent and articulated manner.

The methodology included both direct interviews and questionnaires with selected key informants, and a desktop study of relevant documents. Primary data was gathered from one leader of a Red Cross National Society, one executive at one ASEAN entity, one ICRC delegate and five IFRC delegates involved in HD work with ASEAN.

Secondary data was accessed mainly online from public web pages of ASEAN, other related institutions and organisations, and a number of academics that have studied aspects related to the research. In addition, some existing relevant IFRC grey literature (internal reports, mission reports) was consulted. The analysis of the data gathered was, for the very nature of the research, qualitative.

2. ASEAN, A REGIONAL ENTITY AT A CROSSROAD

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was founded in 1967, mainly for security reasons as a protective association of countries facing the challenges of rivalries in a conflict-prone region (Acharya, 2012; Ul-Hassan, 2014). At the time of its establishment the founding members agreed to rule out the use of force and war to solve disputes (Acharya, 2012; Singh, 2008) and adopted common basic principles that later became known as the 'ASEAN way': independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, consensual decision-making and settlement of disputes by peaceful means and non-interference in domestic affairs (Caballero-Anthony, 2004, pp. 160–163, quoted in Gerstl, 2010).

These common basic principles, formalised in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 1976 (the first legally binding one) have been at the same time successful and limiting. ASEAN has successfully maintained peace in the region and has recently managed to multilaterally engage the great powers around its own agenda and mechanisms (Acharya, 2012). Non-interference has until very recently, however, justified turning a blind eye to flagrant violations of human rights or even military or despotic rule in several member countries (Singh, 2008).

In addition, the consensus needed for decision-making has limited the institutionalisation of ASEAN and resulted in extremely slow development of "rules-based, formal mechanisms of decision-making" seen by many as the needed next step towards a successful ASEAN (Singh, 2008).

As a result of such a consultative consensus-based decision-making process, the office of the Secretary General of ASEAN has never become a real executive body. This is one of the features that most differentiates ASEAN from other regional entities, like the European Union (Wunderlich 2012): to some extent, "world leaders do not know who speaks for the region" (Ul-Hassan, 2014).

The 1997 financial crisis was a turning point for ASEAN countries. Largely unprepared for the event, ASEAN has since set up financial mechanisms to cope with similar events (Kyung-Hoon, 2013; Singh, 2008). The recovery has been largely successful (Ul-Hassan, 2014), and ASEAN has done pretty well during the present (2008 onwards) financial crisis (Kyung-Hoon, 2013; Ul-Hassan, 2014).

Its work is, since the declaration in 2003 (ASEAN, 2003), structured along three pillars, namely on political and security cooperation, economic cooperation, and socio-cultural cooperation. It has by now accelerated the decision to open a single market in 2015, with free flow of goods, capital, skilled labour and services.

In the absence of any pan-Asian association, ASEAN has become the sole regional interlocutor for great powers in Asia (Acharya, 2012; Singh, 2008). It has since enlarged its relations to the main actors in the region and beyond, successfully managing a blend of bilateral relations with regional common issues. And recently, with the Bali Concord III, it has widened the scope of its global positioning, with:

> "A more coordinated, cohesive, and coherent ASEAN position on global issues of common interest and concern, based on a shared ASEAN global view, which would further enhance ASEAN's common voice in relevant multilateral fora. " (ASEAN Bali Concord III, 2011)

The above was reiterated in the very recent 25th Summit Declaration, with calls to:

> "Enhance ASEAN's participation in global economic governance and work towards building a common position, voice, and visibility in addressing key global issues including those raised at the global economic fora such as the G20." (ASEAN Nay Pyi Taw, 2014)

This seems especially relevant for IFRC's HD work in 2015 and 2016, when a series of global initiatives will take place (Hyogo Framework for Action 2 in Sendai, March 2015; Sustainable Development Goals at the UNGA in September 2015; International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent in November in Geneva; the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris early December 2015; and the first Humanitarian Forum in Istanbul early 2016).

The future of ASEAN depends on several factors. The relationship between ASEAN and the regional and global great powers (India, China, the USA and Japan) will be a key determinant: should the prevailing conflictual relationship based on mistrust among the great powers continue, then the regional role of ASEAN might still determine a balance of powers in the continent (Acharya, 2011). As Acharya states, ASEAN might well either be "the wise counsellor of Asia, or the marginalized relic of the past." (Acharya, 2011).

3. ASEAN AND POLICY-MAKING

What are ASEAN policies related to resilience? What is ASEAN's process for policy making ? Who are the main actors in policy making?

Public policy-making is almost never a straightforward process (Hallsworth et al., 2011). Even the definition of policy-making may be a contested one. According to a paper commissioned by the British Government, policy-making is the "formal expression of activities undertaken by government to achieve outcomes, often through legislation", although policy may be "inferred from practice", and "require government to do nothing" (Hallsworth et al., 2011).

For the scope of this paper, ASEAN policy-making refers to the deliberate initiatives of the ASEAN member states to shape collective decisions into effective transformative actions at the regional and national level. We will focus on two examples related to the overall resilience agenda: climate change and migration. Policy-making related to disaster management will be analysed under Chapter 3.

3.1 Climate change

According to various sources (Asian Development Bank, 2009; Stern Review, 2006 and the International Panel on Climate Change, 2007, the latter two quoted in Gerstl, 2010) southeast Asia is likely to "suffer more from climate change than the rest of the world". This could lead to conflicts on the use of resources and human migration (Sahraie, 2011) and "weaken state and civil society actors" (Gerstl 2010).

Despite a series of ASEAN declarations on climate change,[2] the seven working groups[3] established by the Senior Officials on the Environment (ASOEN) and the 2010 Climate Change Initiative (ACCI), it seems that the resulting policies

[2] Since 2007, the ASEAN member states have made many declarations on climate change. See Letchumanan, page 52.

[3] On climate change, coastal and marine environment, environmental education, environmentally sustainable cities, multilateral environmental agreements, nature conservation and biodiversity, water resources management.

have fallen short of the expectations (Gerstl, 2010; Trevisan, 2013; Sahraie, 2011). Trevisan goes further, noting how "southeast Asian countries seem not to consider climate change as a policy priority" (Trevisan 2013).

This may be for three reasons: one, not considering climate change as a "systemic problem" that requires unitary regional policy; two, the lack of mechanisms to monitor and sanction non-compliance within ASEAN (Sahraie, 2011); and three, the mentioned "ASEAN way" that seemingly impedes taking official positions on disputed issues (Trevisan, 2013; Sahraie, 2011). As such, even Letchumanan, Head of the Environment Division of ASEAN Secretariat, questions whether there exists an ASEAN policy on climate change at all (Letchumanan, 2010).

In terms of resilience it seems that the need for mainstreaming climate change adaptation in sustainable development planning and disaster risk reduction strategies is not yet part of the priorities of ASEAN member states. The main success to date seems to be the existence of a series of common bodies for debate. While this is a very good starting point, there is a need to better shape a common approach to a regional policy on climate change, and the consequent better positioning of ASEAN in global policy-making on climate change.

3.2 Migration

On Migration, ASEAN has in 2007 issued a *Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers* (ASEAN, 2007) that mentions amongst other things:

> "...promoting the full potential and dignity of migrant workers in a climate of freedom, equity, and stability... The receiving states and the sending states shall take into account the fundamental rights and dignity of migrant workers and family members already residing with them"

The same declaration defines the obligations of sending and receiving states, and the commitments of ASEAN. These clearly mention fundamental human rights, welfare, human dignity of migrant workers, harmony and tolerance, access to justice and social welfare services, and concrete measures to prevent or curb the smuggling and trafficking in persons.

Migration policy-making seems mostly related to two areas that sometimes appear to contradict each other: national immigration policies and border regimes on one side, and migrants' rights and the treatment of migrants on the other side (Hickey 2013, p. 7-8); the direct experience of the researcher in Indonesia seems to confirm that immigration officials and officials of other ministries (like manpower and labour) have a different perception of the problem. A specific area where there seems to be a need for further work is the protection of irregular (or undocumented) migrants (Huelser, 2014, p. 8) which seem to represent the hidden part of the iceberg in terms of migration (Hall, 2012, p. 33).

Once more, it seems that there is a gap between the declaration of intentions of the leaders and the proper policy development. From a Humanitarian Diplomacy point of view, it seems that addressing the problem of the respect of fundamental rights for irregular migrants is the priority. This is very much in line with the IFRC Policy on Migration.

4. IFRC AND ASEAN

The following chapter summarises some of the achievements in the relationship between ASEAN and the IFRC, and briefly touches on respondents' ideas and suggestions for future options.

4.1 Achievements so far

The IFRC has been engaging with ASEAN for several years, although it seems that little institutional track record of such engagement has been kept. The initial discussion focused on the establishment of a Memorandum of Understanding between the IFRC and ASEAN that has since 2009 been under scrutiny by ASEAN.[4]

[4] The dialogue started in 2009. The latest version was recently submitted by the ASEAN Secretariat to the ASEAN Legal Department for a final analysis.

In recent years, the IFRC has opted for a more pragmatic approach, engaging ASEAN in the specific area of Disaster Management (DM) as agreed upon with the ASEAN Secretariat.

In 2003, ASEAN established a Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM) and promulgated an Agreement on Disaster Management and Response (AADMER), a legally binding instrument for member countries that promotes regional cooperation for response to disasters (Lucero-Prisno III, 2014). From a pure disaster response approach, ASEAN countries have been moving gradually towards incorporating vulnerabilities, risks, and disaster risk reduction into development planning (United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction 2010), although the process is still at its beginning.

Falling under pillar three (socio-cultural community), the IFRC has so far achieved concrete results in several aspects related to DM. It has supported its 10 National Societies to engage more consistently with their respective DM national agencies (3 IFRC respondents). It has developed a series of concept notes that were shared with the members of the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM) and taken into account within the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) Work Programme (IFRC respondent). It has taken an active role participating in national and regional technical and thematic platforms (3 IFRC respondents) and actively participated in ASEAN Disaster Emergency Response Simulation Exercises (ARDEX) and ASEAN Regional Forum Disaster Relief Exercises (ARF DiREx).

It has developed an 'almost excellent'[5] working relationship with the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA centre, based in Jakarta) (4 IFRC respondents + 1 ASEAN respondent), including 'shaping the future leaders' of ASEAN through the AHA centre Executive Programme (ACE) (ASEAN respondent). It has successfully included its Disaster Law Initiative (previously called International Disaster Response Law – IDRL) in the above-mentioned simulation exercises, raising awareness of member states about the need to revise their legislation.

Work with the ASEAN Secretariat and more recently the AHA centre on the importance of legal preparedness for managing and responding to disasters has led to tangible outcomes, like the implementation and institutionalisation of the AADMER agreement at the national level, the adoption of key principles and standards contained in the IDRL Guidelines into national legislation, and even a clear mention of the IDRL Guidelines as a key tool in the AADMER work-plan (AADMER, p. 54) (2 IFRC respondents).

This in turn has given way to ongoing legal support to the revision of DM legislation in at least three countries, with the opening to next support the national authorities to revise all existing legislation from a disaster risk reduction perspective in one country (2 IFRC respondents).

One respondent invited the IFRC to be more 'strategic' in its approach, in order to explore and exploit the real 'potential' of such a partnership.

4.2 Future

In terms of suggestions for future focus, five respondents indicated that pillar three (ASEAN socio-cultural community) shall continue to be the main area of interaction, while one respondent indicated it would be appropriate to widen the scope to pillar one (ASEAN politico-security community).

Within the socio-cultural pillar, seven respondents indicated DM as a key area upon which to continue focusing. This includes the following suggestions: active engagement on the process of development of the new AADMER; disaster response, preparedness and civil-military relations; disaster law initiative; engage with AHA; and engage with the DM team in the ASEAN Secretariat.

Again within the socio-cultural pillar, six respondents indicated Health as a key area to develop. Besides suggesting to engage on the development of the post-2015 ASEAN health strategic plan, respondents included the following suggestions: engage with the working group on pandemic preparedness (AWGPPR), with the expert group on communicable diseases (AEGCD), and the focal points for non-communicable diseases (AFTNCD). Such collaboration could

[5] In the words of an IFRC respondent.

focus on contributions to the existing and future working plans. ASEAN recently suggested that the IFRC explore whether it can support developing specific Terms of Reference for ASEAN leadership in pandemics.

In addition to the above, and again in pillar three, socio-cultural, several respondents indicated other areas of possible future engagement: gender, disabilities, migration, violence prevention, protection of rights and welfare of women, children, elderly and persons with disabilities, and climate change.[6]

Within the same socio-cultural pillar, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) hinted at possible coordinated HD work with the IFRC on the issues of *migration* and *complex emergencies*. The ICRC is clearly focusing on pillar three, and has specifically been targeting the senior officials meeting on social welfare and development (SOMSWD). Interestingly, the ICRC combines track one diplomacy (direct action with ASEAN) with track two[7] initiatives, like research with academic centres on specific issues.

Three respondents indicated that contact with the representatives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs in each country would be key in influencing decision-making at the highest level. Three respondents referred to cross-cutting issues such as DRR, with a specific recommendation to target a task force composed of representatives of the ACDM, social welfare, defence and health, climate change and environment.

Two respondents clearly indicated the need not to lose focus and warned about the risk of dispersion. One indicated the need to establish a clear focal point for contact with ASEAN to avoid confusion in interlocutors, and one hinted at the need to properly equip anyone engaging with ASEAN so that s/he can contribute in a meaningful way.

From the above, it is clear that the IFRC has obtained solid results in terms of DM and related initiatives (disaster law) from its engagement with ASEAN so far. At the same time, it seems that the full potential of structured HD work is still to be explored. The complexity of the ASEAN organisation, in combination with its specific way of taking decisions (see above, 1, 'the ASEAN way') are perceived as challenges that somehow limit the extent of HD action. A more strategic and articulated approach to ASEAN seems necessary in order to achieve measurable and agreed upon targets in influencing decision-makers on a resilience-supportive agenda.

5. RESILIENCE

The IFRC defines resilience as:

> "...the ability of individuals, communities, organisations, or countries exposed to disasters and crises and underlying vulnerabilities to anticipate, reduce the impact of, cope with, and recover from, the effects of adversity without compromising their long term prospects." (IFRC, 2012)

The definition mentions not only disasters, but *crises* and *underlying vulnerabilities*. In addition, it talks about the effects of *adversity*. The concept of sustainability is embedded in the last sentence. The focus is on the *ability* of individuals, communities, organisations, or countries.

Such a definition of resilience encompasses more than just disaster resilience. Stemming from the IFRC's expertise in disaster risk reduction, it is a wider concept that bridges the gap between development and emergencies. It goes beyond even the radical expression that 'disasters are non-resolved development problems,'[8] and hints at the issue of "underlying vulnerabilities" in its political implications.[9]

ASEAN also uses the term resilience or resilient. As an example, the term is used five times in ASEAN's latest Declaration in Myanmar in November 2014 (ASEAN Nay Pyi Taw, 2014).

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[6] Although some respondents indicated climate change as a cross-cutting issue across the three ASEAN pillars.

[7] Track two diplomacy is often referred to as "non-governmental, informal and unofficial contacts and activities between private citizens or groups of individuals, sometimes called non-state actors." Diamond, L., & McDonald, J. (1991). *Multi-Track Diplomacy: A Systems Guide and Analysis*. Iowa Peace Institute, definition used by Wikipedia.

[8] This inspiring expression has been used by several researchers, including Dr Alan Lavell.

[9] This does not mean entering into politics or political disputes. It means recognising that there is a political dimension to resilience and that it is vital to understand it.

While there seems to be a high degree of resonance between the terms as used by the IFRC and ASEAN, it will be necessary to make sure no misunderstandings are generated by differential charging of the term in IFRC-ASEAN relationships.

6. HD IN ACTION - PROPOSAL OF CONCRETE STEPS FOR IFRC TO ENHANCE RESILIENCE IN SEA THROUGH INFLUENCING DECISION-MAKERS

6.1. HD policy signposts

The following proposal of humanitarian diplomacy for the IFRC to engage with ASEAN on resilience fulfils the four signposts of the IFRC policy on Humanitarian Diplomacy:

Signpost 1: IFRC's responsibility to engage with ASEAN

The ten National Societies and the IFRC Secretariat have a *responsibility to persuade* ASEAN leaders, Senior Officials and other decision-makers as well as opinion-shapers to act in the interest of vulnerable people in the ASEAN region. This is because they are well positioned to influence decision-making and have a clear agenda in support of resilience in the region.

Signpost 2: diplomatic tools and actions appropriate to ASEAN

The ten NSs and the IFRC Secretariat can identify for each proposed area of engagement the relevant decision-makers and opinion-shapers in each country and at ASEAN. They can identify the best way to engage, and have the ability to cultivate relationships with them over time. It will be necessary though to fully understand, respect and take advantage of the prevailing mechanisms for policy-making in ASEAN. This means understanding the limitations and advantages of the above-mentioned 'ASEAN way', and the limited institutionalisation of principled agreed upon decisions. Results will sometimes take a long time before becoming visible: indicators of success in plans shall be developed taking this into account.

Signpost 3: focus on resilience

The ten NSs and the IFRC Secretariat have knowledge about priorities in each country around resilience, they have the experience of working at community level on issues related to resilience, they increasingly adopt an evidence-based approach and act with professional integrity. In particular, the region has already developed a coordinated approach to Community Safety and Resilience.[10]

Signpost 4: proper planning and timing to engage with ASEAN

Four respondents to the questionnaire have clearly indicated that an enlargement of the scope of the relationship between ASEAN and IFRC is necessary, but warned about the risk of over-expanding IFRC's outreach to ASEAN in a non-manageable manner. In order not to create false expectations, such engagement must be properly planned with very clear goals and outcomes, so as to drive actions across the region in a closely coordinated way and to allocate the necessary resources (humans, time, research).

6.2. Thematic areas for future engagement on HD with ASEAN

Based on the analysis of the three ASEAN sectoral ministerial bodies and the strategic focus of the IFRC contained in its Strategy 2020 (IFRC, 2009) as well as in its definition of resilience (IFRC, 2012) and the responses of key informants, it seems that there are nine thematic areas in the three ASEAN communities where it will be appropriate for the IFRC to plan its future HD action.

[10] The 10 + 1 (Timor Leste RC) National Societies have developed a regional coordination body that gathers both NS leaders once a year and technical managers on various occasions.

These are summarised in the following table:

Community	Body	Thematic area	IFRC resilience thematic area	HD action areas
Political-security	Senior officials meeting on development planning (SOMDP)	Development Planning	DRR	Inclusion of a Disaster Risk Reduction perspective in development Laws
Economic	ASEAN Mekong Basin Development Cooperation Steering Committee (AMBDC SC)	Mekong Basin / Development	DRR / regional cooperation	Regional Disaster Risk Reduction approach for the 5 NSs of the Mekong basin
Socio-cultural	ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM)	DM	DM / Disaster law	Influence the development of a new AADMER (agreement on DM and emergency response) Establish common objectives with the ICRC on complex emergencies Widen the range of countries that include a Disaster Law initiative perspective in their DM legislation Influence a clear civil-military relation in DM
	ASEAN Senior Officials on the Environment (ASOEN)	Environment	Climate change	Of the seven working groups, focus mainly on climate change, environmentally sustainable cities, multilateral environmental agreements
	Senior Officials meeting on Health Development (SOMHD)	Health	Community health Health in emergencies	Influence the development of the new post-2015 ASEAN health strategic plan Focus on the following working groups: pandemic preparedness (AWGPPR) communicable diseases (AEGCD) non-communicable diseases (AFTNCD) Support ASEAN to develop specific ToRs for ASEAN SG on leadership in pandemics
	ASEAN Committee on the Implementation of the ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers	Labour Migration	Migration / Migration law	Establish common objectives with ICRC Foster national fora for discussion about the rights of migrants
	Senior officials meeting on Rural Development and Poverty Eradication (SOMRDPE)	Poverty eradication	Community development	Influence main actors and partners (Asia Development Bank and partner states) to include communities in decision-making processes on rural development and poverty eradication
	Senior Officials Meeting on Social Welfare and Development (SOMSWD)	Social Welfare	Social Mobilisation	Main focus on vulnerabilities. Influence on community inclusion in decision making on issues like care for victims of trafficking, community-based rehabilitation promotion, early child care development and education, quality of life and well-being of older people and persons with disabilities
	Senior Officials Meeting on Youth (SOMY)	Youth	Youth	Widen the offer of YABC to entities outside the RC as a contribution to principled youth leadership

In addition, four specialised centres shall be considered:

Community	Specialised Centre	Thematic area	IFRC resilience thematic area	HD action areas
Socio-cultural	ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance in Disaster Management (AHA)	DM	DM / DM training	Jakarta. Training of leaders on DM. Exchange of information in case of disasters.
	ASEAN Earthquakes information centre	DM	DM / DRR	Jakarta. Preparedness.
	ASEAN Specialised Meteorological Centre (ASMC)	Meteo	Climate change	Singapore.
	ASEAN University Network	Training	Applied Research	Bangkok. Action research related to resilience.

Although there are signals of interest by ASEAN to an enlargement of the engagement in areas other than DM, this shall be discussed with, and agreed upon by, the ASEAN Secretariat. As mentioned above, such an enlargement of engagement shall be gradual and properly planned.

Targets of the humanitarian action

6.3. Decision-makers

The primary target of a structured and properly planned HD action shall be the Senior Officials from each member country for each identified senior officials meeting or sub working group. They should be approached by their respective NS, together with IFRC Secretariat staff where available. This approach is key to prepare the ground for direct influence during the meetings, identify resistance or interests of each Senior Official, and coordinate HD activities to overcome resistance and create a conducive environment.

While in each working group there may be one or more 'leading country' (and more substantive work shall be done with those officials that 'lead' the work of a given working group), it will be necessary to focus attention on the two 'heavyweights' in the region, Indonesia and the Philippines. The presence of two strong Red Cross NSs and of two IFRC country offices should facilitate this approach.

The country office in Indonesia might serve as the contact point with the ASEAN Secretariat and those specialised centres that are based in Jakarta. Once the Cooperation Framework is signed, it will be necessary to assign one IFRC representative as the Permanent Representative accredited to ASEAN to manage daily relations, as it is the case in Addis Ababa with the African Union.

6.4. Decision- and opinion-shapers

There are by now seventy-nine accredited diplomatic missions to ASEAN. Some of those non-ASEAN-member States have a large direct influence on policy-making in ASEAN. The country office in Jakarta shall be tasked to develop a clear mapping of ASEAN-accredited diplomatic missions to ASEAN, looking at the type of partnership engaged, the type of support to ASEAN structures, and engage with the main non-member state actors in each of the nine identified areas. At first glance, the missions of Canada, New Zealand, Australia, South Korea, China, Japan, United States, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates and the EU seem the most relevant, together with Turkey and Nigeria (Mexico has no agreement with ASEAN so far).[11]

A powerful opinion-shaper in the region is Academia. Some NSs already have partnership agreements with a series of academic institutions across the region. ASEAN has a specialised University Network centre (AUN) based in Bangkok, Thailand. The Thai Red Cross, together with the IFRC Regional office, shall establish a permanent contact with

[11] That, together with Indonesia, seemingly might form a new powerful block of the so-called MINT countries (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey). See BBC, 2014.

AUN in order to identify areas for applied research in selected areas related to resilience and facilitate similar efforts at country level.

The media is also a relevant opinion-shaper in the region. Most newspapers have in the past hosted sporadic Opinion Editorials (Op-Eds) of the IFRC (e.g. for the fifth anniversary of the Tsunami). There is an established relationship with the main international broadcast companies, such as Al Jazeera, BBC, CNN, but this is rarely taken advantage of. A more structured approach is required, with clear milestones connected to the wider HD action.

7. CONCLUSIONS

ASEAN will most probably remain a key actor for policy making in South East Asia and possibly well beyond its borders. As Acharya recently stated,

> "ASEAN has the normative influence to make itself relevant in any eventuality... As long as normative regionalism is crucial for regional cooperation, especially of the great powers whose conflictual interests may lead to war, then ASEAN will always find itself the niche of regional politics." (Acharya, 2012)

The research findings support the idea that there is a greater role to play for the ten Red Cross and Red Crescent NSs and their IFRC secretariat to influence decision-makers in South East Asia towards resilience-supportive policy-making. They have the responsibility, ability, positioning and conceptual policy framework to do so.

There are nine priority potential areas proposed for structured, well-planned and properly coordinated humanitarian diplomacy action, as well as a first series of decision-makers and opinion-shapers as possible targets. This paper also recalls that in order to be effective, humanitarian diplomacy must be clear in its goals, define appropriate diplomatic tools and actions, be properly coordinated and professionally implemented, define the appropriate time to engage and ensure the results are fed into the system to adjust targets and reframe actions.

In today's world, national, regional and global decision-making is constantly taking new shapes and becoming more and more interconnected. The IFRC has the unique position to be able to interact at all those levels and foster an agenda that, based on resilience, contributes to **Save Lives, Change Minds** (IFRC S2020, 2009).

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Marieke van den Berg

Program Lead Human Trafficking at Netherlands Red Cross

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Humanitarian diplomacy to improve protection of migrants against human trafficking: recommendations for European Red Cross national societies

Humanitarian diplomacy to improve protection of migrants against human trafficking: recommendations for European Red Cross national societies



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ACRONYMS

A RC	Red Cross of country A (anonymous)
ATN	European Red Cross Action for Trafficked persons Network (formerly Anti-trafficking Network)
B RC	Red Cross of country B (anonymous)
COE	Council of Europe
ER	Emergency Response
EU	European Union
FP	Fundamental Principles
HD	Humanitarian Diplomacy
HT	Human Trafficking
IC	International Conference (of the Red Cross Red Crescent)
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
NLRC	Netherlands Red Cross
NRM	National Referral Mechanism (for trafficked persons)
NS	National Society (of Red Cross)
PERCO	Platform for European Red Cross Co-operation on Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Migrants
RCEU	Red Cross EU Office
RCRCM	Red Cross Red Crescent Movement
THB	Trafficking in Human Beings
UAM	Unaccompanied Minors
UN	United Nations
VoT	Victim of Trafficking

ABSTRACT

This paper starts out by describing how recently arrived migrants in Europe are vulnerable to falling victim to trafficking in human beings, which has led to increased humanitarian diplomacy by Red Cross components to improve protection of migrants against this crime. The researcher compares recent humanitarian diplomacy actions of Red Cross National Societies in two European countries and presents recommendations for Red Cross components on how to overcome common challenges, which are linked to the hidden nature of human trafficking, the fundamental principles and the fact that this is a relatively new field for the Red Cross Movement.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Trafficking in Human Beings (THB), also known as 'modern slavery', is included in global and European legal frameworks as a crime that states need to prevent and prosecute, while providing protection to victims. Following the influx of over 1 million migrants and refugees to Europe in 2015, their vulnerability to human trafficking is reported by EUROPOL, IOM, IFRC, Council of Europe and many others. As a result, European Red Cross National Societies (NS), often actively involved in assistance to migrants and in many countries already providing support to trafficked persons, are increasingly called upon to engage in humanitarian diplomacy (HD) for protection of vulnerable migrants against human trafficking.

In line with the fundamental principles of the Red Cross, HD messages of European Red Cross components focus on the needs and rights of vulnerable migrants and of victims of THB, including a call for awareness-raising, protection, assistance and reduction of vulnerability and appeal for a victim-centred and rights-based approach to THB, irrespective of legal status of the victim.

Common challenges that NSs encounter when engaging in HD on this issue:

- implementing the fundamental principles in relation to law enforcement
- maintaining credibility in this relatively new field
- building an evidence-base when data is lacking
- raising awareness as THB is not a commonly known concept

HD actions by Red Cross National Societies in European countries A and B, both destination countries, were analysed which led to recommendations on overcoming common challenges for the Netherlands Red Cross and other interested NSs:

- Link HD actions and messages to the mandate and role of the NS in the country
- Build HD upon an evidence-base from own humanitarian work. If statistics are unavailable, anonymous cases from victims can be used to strengthen HD messages
- If protection is linked to police investigation, and if other routes are unavailable, HD can be conducted in confidential dialogue with public authorities, in line with the auxiliary role
- Frame HD messages in such a way that they resonate with stakeholders
- Include awareness-raising as an important element of HD on THB
- The media can help engage the public and put pressure on public authorities to take action
- Engage on internal advocacy to increase organisational backing

Recommendations for IFRC and European Red Cross Action for Trafficked persons Network (ATN):

- Facilitate sharing of experiences between European NSs and IFRC on HD and on use of fundamental principles in concrete cases
- Finalise the guidance document on THB for European NSs, including a section specifically on HD
- Invest more capacity in providing support for HD activities (local, national or international level) in general and specifically on THB
- Support development of a European-wide evidence-base on THB of migrants

1. INTRODUCTION

Increased numbers of migrants coming to Europe are at risk of becoming victims of human trafficking (VoT) during their journey and after arrival. European Red Cross National Societies (NS) are as a result stepping up their response to protect migrants against various types of exploitation and/or to assist victims. Humanitarian Diplomacy (HD) can help improve protection of migrants by changing the legal and policy context, can improve access to (potential) victims and facilitate assistance activities. However, engaging in HD on trafficking in human beings (THB) of migrants also poses challenges to Red Cross (RC) components.

The Netherlands Red Cross (NLRC), employer of the researcher, is currently developing a HD strategic plan on THB. This research provides recommendations for the strategic plan by analysing HD actions on THB of migrants by two European NSs in destination countries.

The research addresses the following questions:

- What are the humanitarian concerns expressed by RC Components on THB of migrants?
- Which HD actions to improve protection of migrants against THB have selected European NSs conducted since 2015?
- What common challenges did NSs encounter during HD on THB of migrants and what lessons can be drawn?

The research is based on:

- articles and reports (mostly available online, some internal)
- topic-list interviews with two regional IFRC Migration advisors and two THB focal points from European NS

Access to information was expedited by the researcher's capacity as co-chair of the European Red Cross Action for Trafficked Persons Network (ATN).

Chapter 2 introduces the legal framework of THB, humanitarian concerns around THB of migrants in Europe and response of European NSs. Chapter 3 shows that European NSs are increasingly called upon to start HD activities on THB of migrants, presents the main messages and introduces common challenges that need to be addressed when trying to influence decision-makers on this issue. In Chapter 4 two case studies of HD actions by European NSs show how these challenges are met in practice, from which recommendations are drawn in Chapter 5.

2. HUMAN TRAFFICKING OF MIGRANTS

2.1 Definition and context

International legal framework

Trafficking in Human Beings (THB) is also known as 'modern slavery'. Multiple definitions exist in treaties and protocols developed within the United Nations (UN)[1], International Labour Organisation (ILO)[2] and European Union (EU)[3]. All definitions include three concepts related to the 'act', the 'means' and the 'purpose' of trafficking in human beings, with emphasis on the use of some kind of force or coercion and the purpose being that of exploitation. The UN Protocols states that exploitation "shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, forced marriage, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs".[4]

The 2005 Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings holds provisions on protection of victims, prevention of trafficking, prosecution of traffickers and development of partnerships at national and international level.[5] For EU member states, EU Directive 2011/36 gives further guidance on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims.[6]

Prevalence

Global estimates of the number of victims of THB vary widely. ILO's estimate of the number of victims of 'forced labour' (which includes most forms of human trafficking as identified by the UN and EU legislation, except forced marriage slavery, forced criminality and exploitation for the removal of organs) in 2012 puts the number at 20.9 million.[7] The more recent Global Slavery Index estimated the global number of victims of 'modern slavery' at 45.8 million in 2016, of which 1.2 million are in Europe.[8] Not only is THB by nature a hidden phenomenon, exacerbating the challenge of finding reliable statistics is the fact that countries have different approaches to administrating the number of identified (potential) victims, and *undetected* victims are being estimated with different scientific methods. As IOM noted in 2015, 'the absence of baseline data often handicaps the response to trafficking both in normal times and even more so in crisis situations'.[9] The exact prevalence of THB anywhere in the world, including in Europe, therefore remains a 'dark number'.[10]

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1 United Nations. (2000). *Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime* ('Palermo Protocol')

2 International Labour Organisation. (1999). *Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention*. No. 182

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United Nations. (2000). *Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime*. Article 3(a)

4 United Nations. (2000). *Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime*. Article 3(a)

5 Council of Europe. (2015). *Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings*. https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=090000168008371d

6 European Union. (2011, April 5). Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:101:0001:0011:EN:PDF

7 International Labour Organisation. (2012). *Global estimate of forced labour. Executive summary.* http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---declaration/documents/publication/wcms_181953.pdf

8 The Walk Free Foundation. (2016). *The Global Slavery Index.* https://www.globalslaveryindex.org/

9 International Organisation for Migration. (2015). *Addressing human trafficking and exploitation in times of crisis,* p.3. http://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/press_release/file/CT_in_Crisis_FINAL.pdf

10 J. van Dijk en P.G.M. van der Heijden. (2016). *Research Brief. Multiple Systems Estimation for estimating the number of victims of human trafficking across the world*. UNODC Research.

Migration and THB

Unlike human smuggling, persons can be trafficked either transnationally or domestically. However, destabilisation and displacement of populations increase individuals' vulnerability to exploitation through different forms of THB.[11] According to ILO in 2012, at least 50% of VoTs originated from another country.[12] The current migration situation, with over 65 million persons forcibly displaced, has led to a large increase of vulnerability to THB, as was also stated in the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants in September 2016.[13]

IOM recently published statistics based on Flow Monitoring Surveys conducted with migrants along the Mediterranean routes, stating that 71% of interviewees in Italy responded positively to at least one indicator on human trafficking. [14] Most had been exploited before arriving in Europe, especially in Libya. However, after arrival in Europe, the danger of falling victim to THB is still very much present for migrants.

THB of migrants in Europe

The number of migrants coming to Europe by sea in search of safety and a better life rose dramatically in 2015-2016, and there is evidence that as a result the numbers of VoTs are growing. The UN Refugee Agency UNHCR estimated that in 2015 over 1 million refugees and migrants crossed the Mediterranean.[15] Irregular migration flows stemmed mostly from the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa. In 2016, the EU-Turkey deal effectively closed the route to Greece, but 349,825 migrants still arrived in Europe by sea, mostly via Italy.[16]

EU police agency EUROPOL stated in May 2016 that 90% of all migrants arriving in EU countries had their journey facilitated by smugglers, while 20% of the smugglers were also involved in THB.[17] It is reported that smugglers' syndicates offer packages which, in addition to irregular entry, provide exploitative work opportunities in EU countries to pay back the travel debt.[18]

Migrants that are seen as particularly vulnerable to THB in Europe are Nigerian women and girls and unaccompanied minors (UAM). IOM (2016) estimates that out of Nigerian girls and women arriving by boat in Italy in the first half of 2016 around 80% will fall victim to sexual exploitation. There is evidence that a significant number of unaccompanied minors – some reports say as many as 10,000 in 2015[19] – go missing from asylum centres and are at risk of abuse and human trafficking for multiple purposes (sexual, labour, begging, criminality, etc.).[20]

The Council of Europe and the European Parliament show concern for the vulnerability of refugees and migrants to THB in Europe and have called for such measures as better identification of potential VoTs by border guards and protection measures for UAMs.[21]

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[11] Red Cross EU Office. (2015). *Perilous Journeys: Vulnerabilities along migratory routes to EU.* http://www.redcross.eu/en/upload/documents/pdf/2015/Migration/1511_EU%20booklet%20Migratory%20Trail_web.pdf

[12] International Labour Organisation. (2012). *Statistics and Indicators on Forced Labour and Trafficking.*

[13] United Nations General Assembly. (2016). *New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants.*

[14] International Organisation for Migration. (2016, October). *Analysis: flow monitoring surveys The human trafficking and other exploitative practices prevalence indication survey.*

[15] UNHCR. (2016). *Refugees/Migrants Emergency Response – Mediterranean.*

[16] UNHCR. (2016). *Refugees/Migrants Emergency Response – Mediterranean.*

[17] Europol-INTERPOL. (2016, May). *Migrant Smuggling Networks. Joint Europol-INTERPOL Report*, p. 9.

[18] Trace consortium. (2016). *Trace Human Trafficking. Handbook for policy makers, law enforcement agencies and civil society organisations.*

[19] European Council on Refugees and Exiles. (2016). *Europol estimates 10,000 underage refugee children have gone missing.*

[20] Trace consortium. (2016.) *Trace Human Trafficking. Handbook for policy makers, law enforcement agencies and civil society organisations*, and Kelly, A., Tondo, L. (2016, August 8). Trafficking of Nigerian women into prostitution in Europe 'at crisis level'. *TheGuardian.* https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/aug/08/trafficking-of-nigerian-women-into-prostitution-in-europe-at-crisis-level

[21] See for example: European Union. (2016, July 5). European Parliament resolution of 5 July 2016 on the fight against trafficking in human beings in the EU's external relations (2015/2340(INI)): http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P8-TA-2016-0300+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN and Council of Europe. (2016, July 30). Council of Europe Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (GRETA) Statement on July 30th 2016: http://www.coe.int/en/web/anti-human-trafficking/news/-/asset_publisher/fX6ZWufj34JY/content/statement-by-greta-on-the-occasion-of-the-3rd-world-day-against-trafficking-in-persons?inheritRedirect=false&redirect=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.coe.int%2Fen%2Fweb%2Fanti-human-trafficking%2Fnews%3Fp_p_id%3D101_INSTANCE_fX6ZWufj34JY%26p_p_lifecycle%3D0%26p_p_state%3Dnormal%26p_p_mode%3Dview%26p_p_col_id%3Dcolumn-4%26p_p_col_count%3D1

2.2 Red Cross response to Human Trafficking

To a humanitarian movement that is over 150 years old, THB is a relatively new topic. VoTs have been supported by RC humanitarian activities in various countries mostly through broader assistance programmes for vulnerable migrants. As a focus, THB has become more and more visible in the work of the Red Cross in the last decade. The risk of THB for migrants and the NSs' option to respond is laid down in the 2009 IFRC Migration Policy: "There are circumstances that expose migrants to heightened and acute risks to their physical integrity and well-being. This is the case when they are subject to *refoulement*, sexual and labour exploitation and human trafficking."[22]

Since 2015 the International Federation of the RC (IFRC) has coordinated the 'Rights of Migrants in Action' programme to strengthen the response to THB of migrants in 15 countries around the world.

In Europe, the Danish and the Serbian NSs were among the first to be involved in this issue.[23] The European Red Cross Action for Trafficked persons Network, ATN, was established in May 2004 as an informal collaboration platform. Currently, over 20 European NSs provide support to those affected or in danger of being affected by human trafficking.[24] Activities include awareness-raising, assistance to victims, referral and humanitarian diplomacy. Some NSs run safe houses for VoTs or provide legal advice, psychosocial support or casework support. Some NSs, particularly in the Balkan region, focus mostly on domestic THB.

The current migration situation has led many NSs to strengthen activities to protect and assist migrant VoTs. 12 European NSs committed to this by signing a pledge at the 2015 International Conference of the Red Cross, 'Responding to human trafficking of migrants in Europe'.[25] One of the listed possible activities is to engage in HD on this issue.

2.3 Netherlands Red Cross and Human Trafficking

While the NS has provided legal-practical support to foreign VoTs since 2009, it is now developing its first HD strategy plan on THB of migrants. Driving this is the concern that protection for migrants in the Netherlands against THB is deteriorating. Since 2015 foreign victims are less likely to be detected by authorities such as border police, and it seems that capacity has shifted from detection of trafficking to combatting migrant smuggling.[26] Trafficked persons that *are* detected are far less likely to receive a durable residence permit and the assistance and protection that comes along with that legal status.[27] The overall objective of the HD plan is to persuade relevant decision-makers to take into account the needs of vulnerable migrants and VoTs and to act to improve protection and assistance.

[22] IFRC. (2009). *Policy Guidance on Principle 5: Link Assistance, Protection and Humanitarian Advocacy for Migrants*.

[23] Danish Red Cross. (2005). *Good practices in response to trafficking in human beings.*

[24] European Action for Trafficked Persons Network. (2015). *Mapping of activities of National Societies on trafficking in human beings*. Internal document.

[25] European Action for Trafficked Persons Network. (2015). *Joint pledge Responding to human trafficking of migrants in Europe*. International Conference of the Red Cross Red Crescent 2015. http://rcrcconference.org/2015/12/06/joint-pledge-responding-to-human-trafficking-of-migrants-in-europe/

[26] Nationaal Rapporteur Mensenhandel. (2016). *Monitor mensenhandel, Cijfers mogelijke slachtoffers 2011-2015.*

[27] Netherlands Red Cross. (2016). *Slachtoffers mensenhandel en de verblijfsregeling B9*. Internal draft research report. and Centrum voor Kinder- en Mensenhandel. (2016). *Verblijfsrechtelijke bescherming van slachtoffers mensenhandel*. Internal draft research report.

3. LITERATURE REVIEW

3.1 Humanitarian Diplomacy and the Red Cross

The IFRC HD Policy (2009) states that for the Red Cross components "the decision to engage in humanitarian diplomacy is not a choice, but a responsibility"; a responsibility to persuade decision-makers to act in the interest of the most vulnerable people and that flows from the privileged access enjoyed by NSs as auxiliaries to the public authorities, the independence of the RC Movement and the range of its humanitarian activities across the globe.[28] The IFRC Strategy 2020 furthermore rates HD as an enabling action to highlight the needs and rights of vulnerable people, as well as reduce vulnerability by bringing support to people in need and by drawing attention to the causes and potential consequences of vulnerability.[29] The general obligation to engage in HD is clear, but choices remain on the selection of issues and on the methods to do this in the most effective way.

IFRC elaborates in the Explanatory Memorandum to the HD Policy (2009) that NSs and the IFRC can determine, through access at the community level, which groups are 'vulnerable people' and what actions need to be taken to advance their 'interests'.[30] Furthermore, it is vital for credibility and impact to focus on the areas of vulnerability they have particular expertise on, and, through analysis and experiences from the field, pursue an evidence-based approach to HD.[31]

When choosing the form of HD, RC components should take the 7 Fundamental Principles (FPs) into account. IFRC HD Policy advises to be guided by the FPs, but not to to let the principle of Neutrality[32] take priority over the most essential principle; that of Humanity.[33] Neutrality should be seen as a means to achieving important humanitarian outcomes. When public engagements in the debate might jeopardise future access to the most vulnerable, discreet forms of diplomacy could be deployed.[34]

3.2 Humanitarian Diplomacy on Trafficking of Migrants

As many European NSs are providing humanitarian assistance along the migratory trails, HD as a means to help protect vulnerable migrants from THB is becoming more visible and increasingly European NSs are called upon to engage in this. This is evidenced by the fact that THB is mentioned in a growing number of IFRC policy and advocacy documents.[35] NSs can take guidance from these documents and from common HD messages developed by IFRC in consultation with NSs. Messages that were shared recently include one or more of the following elements:

- reference to THB as one of the vulnerabilities that migrants face along the migratory trail and after reaching the destination
- call for awareness-raising, protection, assistance and reduction of this vulnerability, especially for UAMs
- reminder that NSs are supporting migrants and VoTs
- appeal for a victim-centred and rights-based approach to THB, irrespective of legal status of the victim

[28] IFRC. (2009). *Humanitarian Diplomacy Policy*, p. 1.

[29] IFRC. (2010). *Protocol Handbook.*

[30] IFRC. (2009). *Humanitarian Diplomacy Policy - Explanatory Memorandum.*

[31] IFRC. (2009). *Humanitarian Diplomacy Policy - Explanatory Memorandum.*

[32] Neutrality: 'In order to continue to enjoy the confidence of all, the Movement may not take sides in hostilities or engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature.'

[33] Humanity: 'The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, born of a desire to bring assistance without discrimination to the wounded on the battlefield, endeavours, in its international and national capacity, to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found. Its purpose is to protect life and health and to ensure respect for the human being. It promotes mutual understanding, friendship, cooperation and lasting peace amongst all peoples.'

[34] IFRC. (2009). *Humanitarian Diplomacy Policy - Explanatory Memorandum*

[35] Such as: Florence Call to Action (2014), San Marino Declaration (2015), RCEU Position Paper (2015) 'Addressing the Vulnerabilities Linked to Migratory Routes to the European Union', IC Pledge 'Responding to human trafficking of migrants in Europe' (2015), IFRC Statements at New York Summit on Addressing Large Movements of Refugees and Migrants (2016) and IFRC advocacy document 'One Humanity: Safety and Dignity for Migrants' (2016), IFRC European Migration Framework (2016)

- call for more legal avenues for migration to prevent people having to resort to dangerous routes, putting them at risk

In line with the mandate of the RCM and the FPs, these messages focus on the humanitarian consequences of THB for victims, not on prosecution of perpetrators. To better reflect this humanitarian role, in early 2016 the name of the platform ATN was changed from 'anti-trafficking' network (which can evoke an image of law enforcement) to 'action for trafficked persons' network.[36]

IFRC conducts HD at meetings with EU officials and at such international fora as the European Commission Civil Society Platform on THB, as well as at conferences. Here also, IFRC endeavours to reframe the discourse in terms of the rights and needs of victims.

3.3 Challenges

European NSs are called upon to engage in HD on THB of migrants. However, THB is a challenging topic and there is no guidance document specifically on when and how NSs should engage in HD on THB of migrants. The closest is the draft 'Guidance for European National Societies on Assistance and Protection to Victims of Human Trafficking' that ATN and IFRC are developing.

Challenges that can be identified:

- implementing the fundamental principles, especially in relation to law enforcement
- maintaining credibility in this relatively new field
- building an evidence-base when data is lacking
- raising awareness as THB is not a commonly known concept

[36] European Action for Trafficked Persons Network. (2016). *Abridged Annual Meeting Report 2016.* Internal document.

4. PRIMARY RESEARCH: HUMANITARIAN DIPLOMACY CASES

This chapter presents anonymised case studies on HD on THB of migrants from country A and country B. The selection was based on the fact that both countries are destination countries for THB, similar to the Netherlands. Both NSs were involved in HD on this issue for some years, where many others are just starting.

4.1 The case of Red Cross of country A (A RC)

Legal Framework

The Modern Slavery Act of 2015 consolidates slavery and human trafficking offenses.[37] The Act strengthened existing laws for perpetrators, increased protections for victims, and established the country's first independent anti-slavery commissioner.[38]

The National Referral Mechanism (NRM) stems from 2009 and is the process by which a VoT is formally identified and supported in Country A. The country provides accommodation and support to potential trafficking survivors referred to the NRM for a minimum of 45 days or until a 'conclusive grounds decision' is made to confirm identification as a trafficked person. If a negative decision is reached, the person does not receive further support, even if the police are still investigating a case. If a positive decision is reached, the person is eligible for support from local communities if the case is still being investigated and if support is available. Victim care often is not provided following the 45-day reflection period "after which authorities generally deported foreign victims".[39]

Human Trafficking

Country A is a source, transit and destination country for men, women, and children subjected to sex trafficking (mostly women) and forced labour (mostly men). Most foreign VoTs come from Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe.[40] In 2014, the Home Office estimated that there were up to 13,000 potential victims in the country.[41] In 2015 a total of 3,266 persons were referred to the NRM, of which 53% were female and 30% were minors during exploitation.[42] Most detected VoTs are migrants: 191 survivors in 2015 were citizens.[43]

Red Cross of country A

The Red Cross of country A (A RC) encounters trafficked people throughout its services, including: Refugee support services, Tracing and Emergency Response (ER) assistance at Rest centres after police interventions at potentially exploitative businesses.

Since 2014, the A RC headquarters has a focal point to expand the support to (potential) victims: the HT team of currently 3 persons. New activities, based on identified gaps and existing expertise, include casework for trafficked persons, a research project on the needs of trafficked asylum seekers and training for volunteers and staff to identify and adequately assist (potential) VoTs. The mentioning of THB in the Corporate Strategy summary shows that A RC has embraced the issue as a priority.[44]

Humanitarian Diplomacy

With the increased focus on THB, A RC has become actively involved in HD on this issue. The main messages are:

[37] Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner. (2015). *Strategic Plan 2015–2017.* https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/468729/IASC_StrategicPlan_2015.pdf

[38] US Department of State. (2016). *Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report.*

[39] US Department of State. (2016). *Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report.*

[40] US Department of State. (2016). *Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report.*

[41] Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner. (2015). *Strategic Plan 2015–2017.* https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/468729/IASC_StrategicPlan_2015.pdf

[42] National Crime Agency. (2016). *National Referral Mechanism Statistics: End of Year 2015.*

[43] National Crime Agency. (2016). *National Referral Mechanism Statistics: End of Year 2015.*

[44] British Red Cross. (2015). *Corporate Strategy Summary 2015-2019.*

- People should be protected from exploitation and trafficking while they migrate.
- Trafficking needs should be included in ER to migrants.
- The asylum system needs to be improved for trafficked people.
- The conditions that cause people to be trafficked need to be addressed.
- Improved support is needed before, after and outside of the NRM. All (potential) VoTs should be empowered to make an informed decision on whether or not to enter the NRM.[45]

HD message 5) is a short- to midterm objective. A long-term objective is to have the NRM system reformed to improve victim care after the reflection period and reduce immediate risk of deportation.

HD is conducted on national and regional levels and through various platforms. A RC is more and more viewed as an expert on THB, as evidenced by the recent invitation for the CEO to join the Prime Minister's Taskforce on Modern Slavery. This may provide an excellent platform to voice humanitarian concerns. Regionally A RC regularly meets with police and other public authorities, where it advocates for a victim-centred approach. Where possible, A RC uses HD frames that are interesting for stakeholders, such as: informed decision before entering NRM will also benefit law enforcement, as this leads to more motivated witnesses for investigations.

Evidence-base

Being new to the topic of THB, A RC initially had limited credibility. HD messages are purposely linked to humanitarian areas in which A RC has worked for a long time, but remain quite general. The organisation is currently developing its evidence-base on THB, which provides not only proof for the humanitarian concerns but also helps specify HD messages. For example, the organisation is piloting a project where it is providing assistance to (potential) VoTs after they are detected to ensure they can make an informed decision on entering NRM (linked to HD message 5). A RC was asked by local authorities to provide support, as they viewed the pre-NRM support gap as a reason for low numbers of VoTs entering NRM. A RC is collecting evidence from this project and finding additional humanitarian concerns, which are fed into HD actions.

While A RC is lacking data on THB, the organisation on occasion partners with IOM. As another solution, A RC uses cases and anecdotal information of victims instead of hard data. However, caseworkers often hesitate to ask VoTs to share their story for HD purposes as they feel victims have been through enough and as it takes time to build trust. One approach A RC has taken is to start a research project with the specific aim of collecting evidence by interviewing trafficked asylum seekers.

Organisational backing

HD is conducted by many different A RC staff. The HD messages link the issue of THB to a wide range of A RC's humanitarian activities both within the country and internationally. Therefore, the messages are actively being shared with and communicated by colleagues from other departments, such as Refugee Support and International Aid. Involvement of higher management, including the CEO, is also reported as a success factor as it increases access to resources and stakeholders.

Fundamental principles

A RC takes care to focus HD actions on protection of trafficked persons, in line with its humanitarian mandate. There is one exception. As formal support is only provided to persons that enter the NRM, A RC has occasionally conducted a confidential dialogue with police authorities, when they are blocking access to NRM, even after the (potential) victim has fully consented to entering it and A RC sees indications that a person is a victim of THB. In cases where a person would share information about a specific perpetrator, A RC would not disclose this information to authorities, but explore the options and risks of the person reporting it to the authorities themselves and advise that they speak to a solicitor as well.

[45] British Red Cross. (2016). *Summary of BRC's anti-trafficking work*. Internal document.

4.2 The case of Red Cross of country B (B RC)

Legal Framework

Country B prohibits THB through two Penal Code articles and includes in its definition exploitation for the purpose of: prostitution or other sexual purposes; labour or services, including begging; war service in a foreign country; and removal of any of the said person's organs.

Identified VoTs have rights to: temporary work and residence permit (reflection permit, 6 months, which can be extended to temporary permit if court case necessitates), legal aid, safe housing, allowance, health care, (vocational) training, safe return and reintegration in country of origin.[46]

Human Trafficking

Country B is a destination country for women and girls subjected to sex trafficking, and for men and women subjected to forced labour in domestic service, nursing, car washing, and construction.[47] Children are subjected to domestic servitude, forced begging and forced criminal activity. Identified victims primarily come from Eastern Europe and Africa, though the number of victims from Syria is increasing. All 290 identified victims in 2015 were migrants: 186 were sex trafficking victims, 95 were forced labour victims, three were a combination of both, and six types of exploitation were unknown.[48]

Red Cross of Country B

The Red Cross Society of Country B (B RC) provides support to VoTs in the capital city. The project 'Right to be seen' aims to "build, develop and run activities that assist and empower victims of trafficking in human beings, and to create awareness of the occurrence, the various means and methods as well as the needs of those affected, in Country B".[49] In 2016 the project had 3 staff members and around 70 volunteers.

The work began in 2010 with humanitarian assistance to female victims of sexual exploitation and has expanded ever since. In 2015, B RC intensified individual casework assistance to *other* victims of human trafficking (male victims of sexual exploitation and all victims of labour exploitation). Access to legal rights and protection for these persons is lacking, as the government dedicates the bulk of resources and attention to sexual exploitation.

Humanitarian diplomacy

B RC identifies two main messages:

1. Access to rights and protection for victims of THB should not be dependent on the type of exploitation (sexual or other) and the victim's gender.

2. Identification by public authorities of non-sexual types of exploitation (eg. labour exploitation or exploitation for criminal activities) and of male victims needs to be improved.

HD efforts focus on relevant national political, government and policy stakeholders and the public authorities in the capital city region that are responsible either for law enforcement (police, labour inspectors) or protection measures (social services, child protection services). Methods of HD are awareness-raising and training on other types of exploitation with relevant stakeholders (as lack of knowledge is one of the contributing factors), public advocacy (including use of media) and discreet diplomacy on individual cases.

B RC is perceived as an expert in the field of THB and takes part in meetings of the coordination unit for victims of THB, under administration of the police directorate, and is regularly invited to provide training on identification of

[46] Koordineringsenheten for Ofre for Menneskehandel (KOM). (n.d.). *You have been granted a reflexion period.* Retrieved 23 October, 2022, from: https://www.politiet.no/globalassets/03-rad-og-forebygging/menneskehandel/you-have-been-granted-a-reflection-period.pdf

[47] US Department of State. (2016). *Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report.*

[48] US Department of State. (2016). *Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report.*

[49] Norwegian Red Cross. (2016). *Right to be seen – Red Cross. Project brief 2015 – 2016, Oslo, Norway*, p. 2

labour exploitation. In platforms such as these, B RC speaks out about humanitarian concerns. The organisation has close relations with the police THB taskforce in the capital and other relevant stakeholders.

Organisational backing

HD actions are currently not based on a long-term strategy and action plan, but are driven by either opportunities or urgent client needs. This lack of a more strategic approach to HD is a major challenge and due mostly to constraints in human resources: as the project does not fall under B RC headquarters, project staff receive limited support from advocacy and communication colleagues and struggle to combine HD with humanitarian assistance work.

Evidence-base

A challenge when advocating for better identification of victims of other types of THB is the lack of evidence. Unidentified victims are a *dark number*: no-one knows how many cases of THB in country B exist. B RC solves this dilemma by using concrete cases of victims that managed to escape the exploitative situation by themselves: arguing that currently only persons that can save themselves are supported, while the most vulnerable victims are not detected by labour inspection or other public authorities.

Fundamental principles

In line with its mandate and FPs, B RC frames HD objectives on protection of vulnerable persons, VoTs, and not on law enforcement. However, in practice, the lines between law enforcement and humanitarian protection can be blurred. Due to the fact that victims need the police to recognise and investigate their case of exploitation to continue to have access to their rights after their 6 month reflection period, B RC on occasions found it necessary to try and influence police authorities to take action against perpetrators. The organisation discusses these individual cases behind closed doors, either with the police officers directly involved, or through the THB taskforce. Once in 2015, when this HD action did not lead to required results, the organisation confidentially informed a trusted investigative journalist about a case of labour exploitation that the police did not investigate on request from the victim. The resulting media attention helped to influence public authorities to investigate the case. Informing media on a potential criminal activity however presents a risk to the public image of the B RC and is only undertaken as a measure of last resort.

4.3 Comparison of cases

Both NSs report similar issues when engaging in HD actions:

- an evidence-base is needed but can be difficult to create. Obstacles include lack of statistical data and, for A RC, reluctance of staff to ask victims to share personal stories for HD
- the FPs are clear but occasionally lines get blurred because access to support for victims is linked to law enforcement in both countries
- RC as a new player in the field of THB needs to build credibility on this issue, which both NSs do by conducting HD that is directly linked to their humanitarian work
- HD on THB has to be combined with awareness-raising or sensitisation activities, as many stakeholders lack knowledge of the phenomenon

Differences between the cases:

- Having organisational backing is found to be an important success factor. Now that THB of migrants has been made a priority for A RC, impact and access to stakeholders has increased. B RC reports that it is difficult to get structural HD results with little support from other departments. Developing HD from ad hoc actions to a more strategic long-term approach takes time and resources that are currently lacking.
- The situation in country B, in which victims of labour exploitation are hardly being recognised by public authorities, has on occasion prompted B RC to take public action on issues related to law enforcement, after weighing the risk of damage to its neutral image against the protection needs of the victims.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the findings of the study, the followed is recommended for the NLRC and other European NSs when engaging in HD on THB of migrants:

- Link HD actions and messages to the mandate and role of NS in the country to increase credibility and protect the image of the NS
- Build HD upon an evidence-base from own humanitarian work. If statistics are unavailable, anonymous cases from victims can be used as examples and to strengthen HD messages. Research and collecting case stories should be done with minimum stress to victims
- If it is possible to protect vulnerable persons while staying away from law enforcement, this is to be preferred. If protection is linked to police investigation (as is the case in many countries), and if other routes are not available (such as referring to other organisations or solicitors) HD on individual cases can be conducted in confidential dialogue with public authorities, in line with the auxiliary role
- Frame HD messages in such a way that they resonate with stakeholders, such as: victims that have their humanitarian needs addressed make better witnesses in THB cases
- Awareness-raising is an important element of HD on THB: public authorities often lack expertise on this complex issue, or only focus on one part (eg. sexual exploitation, female victims, smuggling). In these cases HD might include sensitisation or training. Likewise, the general public needs to be informed about the issue of THB of migrants
- Consider using the media, as this can be a powerful way to engage the public and put pressure on public authorities to take action to protect migrants against THB
- Engage on internal advocacy as well as external HD to increase organisational backing

The following is recommended for IFRC and ATN:

- Organise a Webinar on HD of THB of migrants to share experiences between European NSs and IFRC and facilitate discussion on use of FPs in concrete THB cases
- Finalise and share the draft Guidance document on THB for European NSs and include a section specifically on HD
- Invest more capacity in providing support for HD activities (local, national or international level) in general and specifically on THB
- Support development of European-wide evidence-base on THB of migrants by reminding NSs to share case stories and research

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Alice Maillot

Strategic Advisor in the Office of the Director of Mobilization,
Movement Cooperation and Partnership
(at the time of writing: Project Manager in the Resource Mobilization Division)

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Digital diplomacy: scope and relevance for ICRC humanitarian diplomacy

Digital diplomacy: scope and relevance for ICRC humanitarian diplomacy



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Tutor: Roberta Zuchegna

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ACRONYMS AND DEFINITIONS

ICRC: International Committee of the Red Cross

ICTs: Information and Communication Technologies

IHL: International Humanitarian Law

NSAG: Non-state armed group

NGO: Non governmental organisation

PMSCs: Private Military and Security Companies

ICRC's humanitarian diplomacy stakeholders: state governments, cities and local governments, NSAGs, PMSCs, opinion leaders, public opinion, NGOs, international organisations, Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement components, communities, beneficiaries, private sector, lawyers, lobbyists, parliaments.

IHL, ICRC's definition: International humanitarian law is a set of rules which seek, for humanitarian reasons, to limit the effects of armed conflict. It protects persons who are not or are no longer participating in the hostilities and restricts the means and methods of warfare. International humanitarian law is also known as the law of war or the law of armed conflict.

Disruption,[1] **Cambridge dictionary definition:** an interruption or radical change in the usual way that a system, process, event, or business works.

Digital diplomacy, DiploFoundation's definition: Digital diplomacy describes new methods and modes of conducting diplomacy with the help of the internet and ICTs, and describes their impact on contemporary diplomatic practices. Related – and interchangeable – terms include cyber diplomacy, net diplomacy, and e-diplomacy. Cumulatively, the internet is having a profound effect on the two cornerstones of diplomacy: information and communication. DiploFoundation's digital diplomacy taxonomy looks at three aspects of the interplay between internet and diplomacy: internet driven-changes in the environment in which diplomacy is conducted (geo-politics, geo-economics, sovereignty, interdependence); the emergence of new topics on diplomatic agendas (internet governance, cybersecurity, privacy, and more); and the use of new internet tools in the practice of diplomacy (social media, big data, and more). The taxonomy goes beyond the typical narrow focus on social media and public diplomacy in contemporary literature on digital diplomacy to cover the overall interplay between internet and diplomacy.

Darknet, Wikipedia's definition: A darknet is an overlay network that can only be accessed with specific software, configurations, or authorization, often using non-standard communication protocols and ports. Two typical darknet types are friend-to-friend networks (usually used for file sharing with a peer-to-peer connection) and privacy networks such as Tor.

Soft power, Wikipedia's definition: a concept developed by Joseph Nye in the late 1980s, which describes the ability to attract and co-opt rather than coerce (hard power), the latter using force or giving money as a means of persuasion. It is the ability to shape the preferences of others through appeal and attraction. A defining feature of soft power is that it is noncoercive; the currency of soft power is culture, political values, and foreign policies.

Recently, the term has also been used in changing and influencing social and public opinion through relatively less transparent channels, and lobbying through powerful political and non-political organisations.

[1] Marsden, P. (2015, August 26). 10 Business models of digital disruption, and how to respond to them, *Digital Wellbeing Today*. https://digitalwellbeing.org/the-10-business-models-of-digital-disruption-and-how-to-respond-to-them/

ABSTRACT

What is the positioning of ICRC's humanitarian diplomacy in a disrupted diplomatic environment where increasing numbers of stakeholders are involved in decision-making processes, where states interact with each other in only 140 characters using Twitter, where anybody can have a voice and influence, and where data and information gathering and analysis become central for the conduct of an evidence-based humanitarian diplomacy effort?

This paper argues that a comprehensive and well-defined digital diplomacy strategy can efficiently support ICRC's humanitarian diplomacy in such a changing environment.

Digital diplomacy at the ICRC is not yet clearly defined. Some current practices are digital diplomacy, but are not labelled as such. These practices are mainly driven by the Communication Department, and there is scope for increased cooperation with humanitarian diplomacy practitioners in order to support ICRC's effort in this domain.

Digital diplomacy is not only about Twitter, Facebook and other social media, which are transient tools that will likely disappear within the next 10 years. The scope is much broader and has profound potential. This paper seeks to develop a definition of digital diplomacy applicable to the ICRC. It shows the linkages between digital diplomacy and humanitarian diplomacy, and argues that these linkages need to be further exploited. It proposes some ideas to maximise the opportunities and mitigate the risks brought by digital diplomacy in the frame of ICRC's humanitarian diplomacy effort.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The main competitive advantages of the ICRC lie in its multidisciplinary approach and in its capability to combine policy expertise, politics, operational expertise, and strong power to disseminate humanitarian values and to influence the way it is perceived by its stakeholders. These characteristics are key for the exercise of an efficient humanitarian diplomacy effort as they allow the practice of influence and persuasion at all levels: in the field through the delegations all the way to policy and decision makers at a strategic level.

In a world that is increasingly fragmented, the humanitarian diplomacy of the ICRC is facing disruption, as there are more stakeholders to interact with and to persuade. This new environment requires new approaches and methods in ICRC engagement strategy with states and other interlocutors, and allows more space for modern collaborative "network diplomacy", whilst recognizing the value of traditional bilateral "club diplomacy".

In a global collaborative environment, the main challenge is to maintain relationships with stakeholders whilst constantly reassessing who the relevant stakeholders are and the strategies for engaging with them. The ICRC needs to spot who the main influential people are, determine in a timely manner how to engage with them, while bringing an adapted facts and evidence based response, supported by internal data and external information that should constantly be monitored and reviewed. Additionally, ICRC stakeholders are highly connected on the internet and some, including governments and public opinion, expect the ICRC to speak the same digital language and to bring its humanitarian expertise to the digital arena.

In this context, digital diplomacy plays a crucial role. It cannot be confined to the communication domain only, and must be integrated into ICRC humanitarian diplomacy strategy. This should be seen as a "soft power tool" that reinforces ICRC persuasion effort and supports operational challenges.

The key objective of this paper is to demonstrate that ICRC humanitarian diplomacy is facing disruption in general, and digital disruption in particular, and to better understand the role and scope of digital diplomacy and the risks and opportunities it represents for ICRC humanitarian diplomacy.

This paper will briefly retrace the evolution from traditional to new diplomacy in general, and to digital diplomacy in particular. It will look at some diplomatic challenges raised by this new environment and how the ICRC is responding to them, using digital technologies for humanitarian diplomacy purposes. Lastly, it will share some ideas on cyberspace approaches for humanitarian diplomacy purposes based on (1) the risks and opportunities brought by digital diplomacy, (2) what some of ICRC's stakeholders are doing in this respect, and (3) relevant partners the ICRC could engage with to harness the possibilities offered by digital diplomacy.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Primary and secondary sources have been used to write this paper. Data and information were gathered from academics and practitioners, which informed an appreciation of the topic on theoretical and practical levels.

Secondary data was gathered from the internet, the WWW Virtual Library on International Affairs resources,[2] newspapers and publications. They enabled a broad understanding of the topic and helped with identifying the key issues. Based on these elements, a questionnaire has been elaborated to collect primary data through qualitative interviews.

After designing a mapping of relevant stakeholders within and outside the ICRC, humanitarian diplomacy and digital diplomacy, practitioners were interviewed to determine the stakes related to the matter.

List of interviewees, who the author thanks for their time:

From the ICRC

- **ALDERSON Helen** – Director Financial Resources and Logistics – former member of the World Economic Forum's Global Agenda Council on the future of humanitarian action
- **BRUDERLEIN Claude** – Strategic Advisor to the President and Head of project Humanitarian Negotiation Exchange
- **DACCORD Yves** – Director General
- **DALTON Clare** – Head of Humanitarian Diplomacy and Deputy Head of Policy and Humanitarian Diplomacy Division
- **DURHAM Helen** – Director of Law and policy
- **EL HAGE Ralph** – Regional Spokesperson/Public Relations for the Near & Middle East
- **FOURNIER Frédéric** – Head of Delegation Jordan – Former Deputy Head of Humanitarian Diplomacy Unit (2005–2007)
- **Lindsey-Curtet Charlotte** –Director of Communication and Information Management
- **MARTIN Christophe** – Former Head of Multilateral Affairs Unit (2015-2016)
- **SLIM Hugo** – Head of Policy and Humanitarian Diplomacy Division

External to the ICRC

- **BUZARD Nan** – Executive Director – International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA)
- **GODEFROY Béatrice** – International Coordinator Operations Advocacy and Representation – Médecins Sans Frontière (MSF)
- **Dr KURBALIJA Jovan** – Head of Geneva Internet Platform & DiploFoundation Director
- **RONZI Flavio** – Secretary General of the Italian Red Cross
- **ZAMBELLO Giovanni** – Senior Officer Social Media at International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)

[2] International Affairs Resources. (n.d.). https://internationalaffairsresources.com/

INTRODUCTION

The arena of diplomacy today: from 'club' towards 'network' diplomacy[3]

Heine defines the 'club' model as the traditional way of practising diplomacy, where members of the 'club', mainly state diplomats and some business people, only speak to their peers in cabinets, conferences, and formal settings. This exclusive model is highly hierarchical, implies a strong respect of protocols, and a low level of transparency.

In an environment where internal and external states' dynamics drastically evolve due to the proliferation of non-state actors[4] as sources of influence and power and to a huge increase of interactions between societies, traditional state structures are disrupted, as is humanitarian diplomacy. States as well as humanitarian diplomacy practitioners adapt, some faster than others, to what Heine defines as the 'network' model.

'Network' diplomacy is an inclusive model where diplomacy is no longer restricted to nation-states. Diplomacy becomes 'complexity management', where coalitions are less formal, temporary and comprise players of mixed nature (state, non-state, subnational[5] and regional powers).

Communication and information sharing between stakeholders are lateral, more open and transparent, while happening in frames of still limited rules and standardised procedures. This model imposes accountability and consistency mainly, but not only, to decision makers, while increasing civic awareness, and allowing democratisation of speech.

The practice of 'network diplomacy' is facilitated by new digital technologies like social media or big data gathering and monitoring tools, in the sense that they allow a broader and a faster connection to and between players while offering room for influence and mobilisation. The new methods and modes of conducting diplomacy with the help of the internet and ICTs, and their impact on contemporary diplomatic practices is called digital diplomacy.[6]

I – Digital diplomacy: a tactic to connect, mobilise and influence

Whether it be the migration crises, the Syrian conflict, the financial system, climate change, or the fight for preserving or holding on to natural resources, most challenges that the world faces today are of a global and interlinked nature.

Discussions and negotiations on global matters are happening at every level, from grassroots to state governments, in an environment disrupted by digital technologies where the internet and social media access give the possibility for everybody[7] to have a voice, to hear each other's voices, as well as to influence and have an impact, whether positive or damaging.[8]

In this expanding multi-stakeholder and digitally disrupted environment, the ability to connect with and mobilise the full range of interlocutors in a timely manner in order to pursue efficient persuasive actions based on evidence is essential to ensure the success of humanitarian diplomacy. Equally essential are data gathering, data monitoring, knowledge management and information sharing within and outside the organisation between humanitarian diplomacy practitioners.

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[3] See Heine, J. (2016, October 16). "On the Manner of Practising the New Diplomacy." *Centre for International Governance Innovation*. https://www.cigionline.org/publications/manner-practising-new-diplomacy/

[4] NGOs, International Organisations (OI), private companies, communities (local or not), Non-state armed groups (NSAGs), lobbyists, opinion leaders, citizens.

[5] On 'paradiplomacy': Tavares, R. (2016, October 4). Forget the nation-state: cities will transform the way we conduct foreign affairs. *World Economic Forum*. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/10/forget-the-nation-state-cities-will-transform-the-way-we-conduct-foreign-affairs/

[6] DiploFoundation. (n.d.). *What is diplomacy?* https://www.diplomacy.edu/ufaq/what-is-diplomacy/

[7] See Ryan, L. (2016, October 3). This Little Girl Is Tweeting About Her Life in War-torn Syria. *The Cut*. http://nymag.com/thecut/2016/10/a-little-girl-is-tweeting-about-her-life-in-war-torn-syria.html

[8] On ISIS' use of social media to recruit and promote violence against civilians as a means to conduct war: Bonzio, A. (2014, September 15). ISIS' Use of Social Media Is Not Surprising; Its Sophisticated Digital Strategy Is. *Huffpost*. http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/alessandro-bonzio/isis-use-of-social-media-_b_5818720.html

In its capacity to connect, mobilise and to be a tool for influence, digital diplomacy must be seen as a supporting tool for humanitarian diplomacy practice.

The 2012 Prevention of Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative[9] is a good example of successful digital diplomacy action in its ability to connect with and mobilise multiple stakeholders to pursue an influential action for humanitarian purpose. Here, decision and policy makers have been influenced by the inclusion of non-state actors into the policy-making process. The initiative was launched by the UK government and fed through digital platforms (the UK government's website, YouTube, Twitter, Flickr, Tumblr). Inputs given by communities were gathered from the above mentioned digital platforms in order to co-create the UK government's diplomatic agenda that resulted in 2013 in a G8 Declaration, in UN Security Council resolution 2106 on conflict-related sexual violence, and in the UN General Assembly Declaration of commitment to end sexual violence in conflicts.

The inclusion of non-state players like communities as supporters of the humanitarian agenda, whether for prevention, policy shaping or implementation purposes is increasingly encouraged by states and humanitarian actors. The use of new digital technologies in general, and of social media in particular, is one way to facilitate such inclusion. An illustration of this is the UN Security Council resolution 2250[10] unanimously adopted in 2015, on the inclusion of youth in decision making processes at local, regional and national levels, by giving them a voice and including them in the prevention of violent extremism agenda; social media and the internet being conducive tools. The UNDP World We Want campaign created in 2015 and aiming at soliciting input from civil society in general and beneficiaries in particular, on the next Millennium Development Goals and establishing their priorities, is another example.

Digital disruption: an opportunity for ICRC humanitarian diplomacy?

In the digital world, sources of power and influence become more diffuse and decentralised. While increasing the level of complexity for decision and policy makers, the growing number of stakeholders engaged in the diplomatic arena represents an opportunity for humanitarian actors in general, and for the ICRC in particular, to practise humanitarian diplomacy at different levels and thus enhance its power of persuasion. A reinforcement of ICRC's presence and engagement in cyberspace via the building of strong digital diplomacy tactics that go beyond the use of social media is one way to strengthen its humanitarian diplomacy strategy in an environment facing digital disruption.

II – Digital diplomacy: relevance for ICRC humanitarian diplomacy, risks and challenges

A - Digital diplomacy applied to ICRC humanitarian diplomacy

While no official definition has been given to digital diplomacy, if we look at how pioneer countries in the domain structure their digital diplomacy effort, it is agreed that digital diplomacy scope is broader than the use of and presence on social media.[11]

For instance the United States[12] has a dedicated digital diplomacy office of 40 full time employees, over 150 part time employees working on broader digital diplomacy related issues, a digital presence on over 600 platforms, and a virtual Embassy in Iran.[13] They structure their digital diplomacy in programs or clusters that cover the broad scope of digital diplomacy.

If we adapt and apply this structure to the ICRC in the frame of its humanitarian diplomacy action, we could come out with the following clusters to define the scope of ICRC's digital diplomacy:

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[9] Pamment, J. (2016). *British public diplomacy and soft power - Diplomatic influence and the digital disruption.* Palgrave Macmillan, p. 207.

[10] http://unoy.org/wp-content/uploads/2250-annotated-and-explained.pdf

[11] "Often, we overestimate the fast, immediate, and visible technological development, while underestimating the more profound changes in diplomacy. What we can learn from the past 20 years in Internet and diplomacy, is that the impact of technology on diplomacy is much more than the availability of technical tools. It depends on professional and institutional cultures, and ultimately, it represents an important interplay between the continu- ity of the diplomatic profession and the technology-driven changes. It is therefore, an interplay between tradi- tion and innovation", Dr. Jovan Kurbalija, founding director of DiploFoundation (https://www.diplomacy.edu/e- diplomacy) and Head of the Geneva Internet Platform. Pioneer in the field of digital diplomacy. Since 1992, he has been leading research and training on the impact of computers on diplomacy, and later on, the impact of the Internet on diplomacy.

[12] Rice, C. (2006). Transformational Diplomacy [speech]. https://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/59306.htm, on 21st Century Statecraft: Clinton, H. (2009, May 29). 21st Century Statecraft [video]. *US Department of State Youtube Channel*. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x6PFPCTEr3c

[13] US virtual embassy in Iran. https://ir.usembassy.gov

- **Knowledge management:** How to gather, retain, share institutional knowledge on humanitarian diplomacy, and how to optimise the use of internal data and experience collected at field and institutional levels, for humanitarian diplomacy purposes?
- **Information management:** How to get access to, filter and sort out external openly available information and data so that it can support a fact and evidence-based humanitarian diplomacy approach and so that the ICRC gets a sense of the decision- making processes, the interests and the opinions of its interlocutors?

  The ICRC Trends, Reputation, Analysis and Knowledge unit (TRAK)[14] has recently conducted a Twitter analysis related to the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) that identified main influencers and topics of interest in order to position itself accordingly and exercise influence in a targeted manner. The survey also allowed the ICRC to measure its visibility during the WHS.
- **Public diplomacy:** With billions of people connected online, how to maintain contact with ICRC's stakeholders? How to target relevant groups and deliver tailor made messages? How to determine what a key influencer is?[15] How to identify main influencers on a given topic and persuade them? How to communicate and mobilise in a timely manner?[16] How to measure ICRC's influence and visibility on social media?[17]

Public diplomacy is a useful complement to ICRC's humanitarian diplomacy in the sense that it helps manage perceptions and improve the image of the organisation. Stakeholders that the ICRC meets are following the digital presence of the organisation. A good management of public diplomacy that shows the positive impact of ICRC's activities complements face to face meetings by strengthening ICRC's credibility.

- **External resources:** What mechanisms could be developed to capture and exploit external expertise to serve and improve ICRC's humanitarian diplomacy effort?
- **Virtual representation:** In contexts where access to beneficiaries is difficult, how can we still ensure a virtual proximity? How to engage virtually with interlocutors that are not willing to discuss face to face (NSAGs)?

Building on positive experience:

The Health Care in Danger campaign[18] launched by the ICRC in 2011, is a great illustration of humanitarian diplomacy conducted at all levels (delegations, headquarters, stakeholders including weapon bearers, UN, public opinion) and supported by a digital diplomacy effort. A public awareness campaign was settled and consisted in a dedicated website, a digital newsletter that supporters could subscribe to, a communication toolkit supporters could download from the website and use to promote the cause, a worldwide broadcast of the campaign in the partners' websites and blogs. A 'community of concern' has been created around health experts, governments, weapon bearers, civil society representatives, NGOs and international organisations, to propose recommendations and practical measures to protect health-care services in war zones. Most of the discussions, debates, consultations and follow up have been made through a dedicated internet platform restricted to the community. The community also has the responsibility to support the implementation of these recommendations at national and local levels, and must ensure that their respective governments enhance domestic law in this regard. To support the community and the ICRC's delegations in promoting this campaign, publications, brochures, reports on incidents, campaign and audio visual materials, as well as online training have been made available online.[19]

This campaign resulted in the UN Security Council resolution 2286[20] on Health Care in Danger, adopted in May 2016.

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[14] TRAK unit helps the ICRC to optimise its understanding of its working environment. It monitors and analyses public information sources, thus contributing to ICRC strategy and facilitating decision-making.

[15] Twiplomacy. (2016). Twiplomacy Study 2016. https://www.twiplomacy.com/twiplomacy-study-2016

[16] New Tactics in Human Rights. (2013, May). Incorporating Social Media into Your Human Rights Campaigning. https://www.newtactics.org/conversation/incorporating-social-media-your-human-rights-campaigning

[17] Twiplomacy. (2015). Twiplomacy 2015 - How International Organisations Tweet. https://www.slideshare.net/luefkens/twiplomacy-2015-how-international-organisations-tweet
Purvis, K., Young, H. (2016, April 18). 10 of the best humanitarians to follow on social media. *TheGuardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2016/apr/18/10-of-the-best-humanitarians-to-follow-on-social-media

[18] HCID. (n.d.). *A global initiative*. http://healthcareindanger.org/hcid-project/


[19] HCID. (n.d.). *Ressources*. http://healthcareindanger.org/fr/resource-centre-4/

[20] UN. (2016, May 3). *Security Council Adopts Resolution 2286 (2016), Strongly Condemning Attacks against Medical Facilities, Personnel in Conflict Situations*. http://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12347.doc.htm

B - Specific diplomatic risks and challenges

Risks:

Data protection and confidentiality: the digital environment creates a new space to do harm. Mishandling of data resulting in inappropriate release or cyber attacks can put beneficiaries at risk and expose them to harmful repercussions from authoritarian regimes or from their own community. The ICRC needs to bring guarantees to beneficiaries on these issues and ensure privacy, encryption and anonymity of data.



By Rachel Dette, Global Public Policy Institute (GPPI) - ICT4D = information communication technologies for development

Complexity to monitor and mediate the content conveyed by internet and social media users, and complexity to mitigate the negative impact it can have on ICRC's perception.

The 'echo chamber' effect: People connect on the internet and engage on social media with people similar to them and who are likely to share their views. This restricts people's view and the reality we are facing. The example of Brexit that nobody saw coming, is an illustration of this. In this context, the risk is that the ICRC persuasion effort might not reach or miss its targets.

Clarity and consistency: The variety of platforms where the ICRC is present and the rapidity with which messages have to be delivered on such platforms, increases the risk of not conveying clear and consistent messages. The credibility of the institution is at stake.

Loss of key information: The digital world offers cost and time effective manners to discuss and collaborate, but the risk is the loss of key information by lack of recording.

Challenges:

Building and maintaining trust: Even though the informal nature of digital diplomacy simplifies access and first discussion with stakeholders by breaking the barriers of a physical meeting with heavy protocol, it is easier to build trust with physical proximity.

Complete control and monitoring of staff members' 'digital behaviour' is unrealistic. Any inappropriate content released on the internet or social media can ,in a few minutes, years of humanitarian diplomacy efforts by damaging the perception of the ICRC and putting its acceptance at stake in the field. It is crucial for all employees, beyond humanitarian diplomacy practitioners, to understand that their 'digital behaviour' has an impact on the good conduct of the institution's humanitarian diplomacy. It is the responsibility of the institution to raise awareness and train employees on this matter.

Jovan Kurbalija, Head of Geneva Internet Platform and Director of DiploFoundation, when talking about diplomacy, says that *"Representation is beyond profession. It is complete personality, and does not stop at 5.00 pm when leaving the office."*

Information and data gathering: To gather and mine internal and external data to identify trends and systemic issues in overwhelming flows is a challenge. Equally challenging is to combine this data with ICRC's legal expertise in order to support an evidence-based humanitarian diplomacy approach.

In addition, relying on external information released on social media can be misleading if people do not have the room to express their opinion freely in case of tight control of the internet by a government. The example of the Philippines during typhoon Hayian[21] where communities did not express their concerns about the situation they were facing, illustrates this challenge.

Substantial content: Social media is not interested in neutrality and dialogue on IHL. Most social media users are looking for public statements, strong opinions and controversies, which are against ICRC's fundamental principles.[22] The challenge is thus to find the right balance between expert messages and attractive messages. One example of this challenge being tackled is the work done by the ICRC on the format of its messages by creating short video clips[23] on IHL related issues, or by the launch of a new Law and Policy blog[24] hosting webinars.

The darknet is a cyberspace where the ICRC does not drive any humanitarian diplomacy action, whereas some non-state armed groups and groups like ISIS hold there a huge digital territory allowing them to disseminate without control messages supporting attacks on civilians as a means of war, to recruit, and to conduct psychological warfare based on fear.

According to Jared Cohen,[25] the "next prominent terrorist organisation will be more likely to have extensive digital operations than control physical ground."

The darknet is also used for private communication when public communication represents a threat for internet users or when the internet is shut down by a government. It can be used by political dissidents or unengaged members of society to maintain contact with the rest of the world.[26] How the ICRC will tackle this issue in its humanitarian diplomacy strategy remains an open question.

C - ICRC humanitarian diplomacy stakeholders and the relevance of digital diplomacy for impactful influence

The author's graphic below illustrates the 'multi-layered' nature of the ICRC scope of influence.

There are indeed various layers and complexities to this scope of influence, including knock- on effects such as influencing lobbyists leading to influence in parliaments, or influencing private sector companies leading to influence in states, and which are due to the influence that stakeholders exert on each other.

From communication to diplomacy

Even though not entirely framed, developed and implemented, digital diplomacy is not new for the ICRC. Some practices are already implemented, mainly by the Communication department, and linkages between digital diplomacy and humanitarian diplomacy need to be further explored.

One of the main consequences of digital diplomacy on humanitarian diplomacy may be the change of thinking to move toward the 'deinstitutionalization' of diplomacy. The role of humanitarian diplomacy practitioners will be more about digital behaviour, knowledge and information management, capacity to capture external expertise and capability to connect with the 'humanitarian diplomat' community and its stakeholders on digital platforms, rather than a formal status compliant with institutional processes. Internal buy-in at all levels of the institution to encourage the staff to practise digital diplomacy is key for success.

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[21] Humanitarian Technologies Project. (n.d.). http://humanitariantechnologies.net

[22] ICRC. (1996). *The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent.* https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0513.pdf

[23] ICRC. (2014, August 22). *The Rules of War (in a nutshell).* https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/audiovisuals/video/2014/rules-of-war.htm


[24] ICRC. (n.d.). Humanitarian Law and Policy. http://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/

[25] President of Jigsaw (previously Google Ideas) and Adjunct Senior Fellow at the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations. Cohen, J. (2015, December). Digital Counterinsurgency: How to Marginalize the Islamic State Online. *Foreign Affairs.* https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/digital-counterinsurgency

[26] See Egypt case, in 2011. DailyMail. (2011, January 30). *How the Internet refused to abandon Egypt: Authorities take entire country offline... but hackers rally to get the message out.* http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1351904/Egypt-protests-Internet-shut-hackers-message-out.html

Equally crucial is training for practitioners, regular information sharing and recording on successes and failures, as well as a strong technical service provided by ICT, close data monitoring from TRAK, and support from other relevant internal units like Communication, Information Management and Innovation.

Building up a digital diplomacy strategy to serve humanitarian diplomacy interests will take time, and the ICRC will have to overcome its culture of failure non-acceptance. It will have to accept that experiment goes with failure, and that it is okay to fail.



III – Implementation

A- Current practices outside the ICRC

United Kingdom (UK)

In 2008, the UK's Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) started to recruit digital diplomats and build in its digital strategy,[27] including social media guidelines, with the aim "to see digital embedded in every element of foreign policy work, leading to a more effective, more open Foreign and Commonwealth Office that can take full advantage of the networked world." Since then, the UK has become and remained one of the top three most powerful countries in terms of digital diplomacy.

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)

According to Giovanni Zambello, Senior Social Media Officer at the IFRC, digital technologies represent a powerful tool to strengthen public diplomacy efforts, as they allow direct access to any stakeholder present on social media or who is following conversations on social media. Also, social media's speed and spread allow messages to be dissem-

[27] Foreign and Commonwealth Office. (2012, November 6). *The FCO Digital Strategy*. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-fco-digital-strategy

inated much faster and reach much further than was ever possible with traditional diplomacy. Digital diplomacy is one of the components of IFRC social media strategy, and is also part of its policy and knowledge sharing efforts with National Societies (NS).

NS approved the humanitarian diplomacy policy at the IFRC General Assembly, and the IFRC supports them in its implementation. The IFRC empowers NSs to advocate with their respective stakeholders at the national level. In this regard, the IFRC shares sample social media content related to specific advocacy issues via 'Newswire', a weekly ad hoc email communication update sent to NS. NS, on their respective social media platforms, can use this content.

The scope of the IFRC's digital presence is: a blog, hosted on its website, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, Medium, and Flickr. These platforms represent a key space for the IFRC to engage its audiences around issues in which they can play a role and make a difference, as well as to change people's minds and perspectives on humanitarian issues (e.g. changing the public narrative on migration). In this regard, policy and advocacy messages are adapted to specific audiences and platforms (e.g. in terms of tone of voice, language, use of rich audio visual materials). Depending on the topic and the objective (e.g. awareness raising, policy change, public positioning) the IFRC may target different and multiple audiences, varying from states and governments, to media, the general public, Red Cross and Red Crescent staff and volunteers, etc.

Médecins Sans Frontière (MSF)

MSF is composed of 5 autonomous operational centres. Each centre has developed its own knowledge management project mainly conducted through digital collaborative platforms, but there is very little knowledge sharing between the centres. There is a thorough recognition of the necessity to capitalise on the experience of practitioners. This is the reason why MSF is a strategic partner of the Centre of Competence on Humanitarian Negotiation.

Due to the short cycles of the projects/missions, it is very challenging to work on a consistent information gathering system. Information is gathered, analysed and recorded according to the mission and the related needs at a specific time. MSF does not practice humanitarian diplomacy per se, and they focus more on public advocacy and testimonies. Communication teams are in charge of these files. MSF's operations are using more and more digital communication in fragile contexts in order to gain acceptance, but it is too soon to talk about digital diplomacy strategy.

Internal Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA)

Amongst ICVA members, the scope of digital diplomacy is very much narrowed down to the presence on social media, mainly for humanitarian activism purposes rather than for diplomacy per se. ICVA has a website and a Twitter account, mainly used to broadcast information. It doesn't have a blog nor Facebook account. It does use digital tools to connect with online communities of experts, as well as for advocacy purposes.

Although very much recognizing the growing importance of digital diplomacy and wanting to be more proactive in its development in the short term, the main question for ICVA remains in the capacity to measure the impact of digital diplomacy. What does it mean to follow someone on Twitter? What are people looking for when they follow ICVA on Twitter? What is the effectiveness of digital diplomacy for humanitarian diplomacy and advocacy purposes? These are pending questions that need to be tackled prior to any framing of a digital diplomacy strategy.

B - Suggestions for a supportive digital diplomacy to humanitarian diplomacy and Partnerships

Darknet: When framing its digital diplomacy strategy, the ICRC might want to look at how to promote IHL on the darknet. How to disseminate the Red Cross Movement's humanitarian principles on the darknet, for perception and acceptance purposes, is also to be taken into consideration.


Support to National Societies: While framing its digital diplomacy strategy, the ICRC might want to look at the options to support the National Societies in their digital diplomacy development beyond a presence on social media. The same way the ICRC supports and cooperates closely with the National Societies on Restoring Family Links activities, it may want to play a supporting role on digital diplomacy matters.

Training on digital diplomacy: Integration of a module on humanitarian diplomacy and digital diplomacy rules and best practices in the Staff Integration Programme agenda, and development of training through the Learning and Development Unit (LnD). The LnD training should also be opened to all IFRC and National Societies staff.

Additional institutional top risk: Determine appropriate indicators to evaluate ICRC's risk exposure in the digital environment, and the consequences on its humanitarian diplomacy effort. Understand and agree on ICRC's risk tolerance and risk mitigation when it comes to digital.

Building and leading of humanitarian diplomats community: Creation of an ICRC Humanitarian Diplomacy digital platform for internal and external practitioners and stakeholders. The portal would serve as a communication vehicle, a branding tool, and an instrument to support ICRC's humanitarian diplomacy effort. It would be a two-way communication platform that could transform the nature of ICRC's multilateral engagement through its potential to: engage the broad humanitarian diplomacy community to create and maintain a network, mobilise stakeholders and raise their awareness with accurate communication materials, influence, train, gather and retain internal and external data and information, all of this in a flexible and timely manner.

The ICRC platform enhances internal and external positioning of humanitarian diplomacy. It contains 3 sections allowing the 'network to do the work'[28] (see graphic below). One section dedicated to internal ICRC humanitarian diplomacy practitioners, another dedicated to external practitioners and stakeholders, and an IHL Virtual Academy that can serve both the internal and external public.



Section 1 – ICRC's internal practitioners: there is no humanitarian diplomatic function as such at the ICRC. Humanitarian diplomacy is practised at all levels, from the staff in the field negotiating access to beneficiaries and security at checkpoints, to the President engaging with states and speaking to the UN tribune. Internal experience and data collected at all levels need to be harnessed to support a humanitarian diplomacy effort based on facts, evidence, and experiences. Section 1 is a proper knowledge management tool where such experience and data are recorded and centralised for use by ICRC's humanitarian diplomacy practitioners. It is an instrument that supports the integration of humanitarian diplomacy efforts in the delegations. Section 1 also aims at creating and maintaining a network between staff at headquarters and in the delegations. It is a means of interaction between ICRC's humanitarian diplomacy practitioners so that rules, best practices, and failures can be discussed, in a dedicated forum for instance. It promotes a transversal approach of the policy- shaping and decision-making processes when it comes to human-

[28] Hinchcliffe, D. (2014, August 4). Let the Network do the Work. https://dionhinchcliffe.com/2014/08/04/let-the-network-do-the-work/

itarian diplomacy related issues. Experience and knowledge, including from practitioners leaving the ICRC, can be transmitted and is accessible to all current practitioners. This section also offers training on humanitarian diplomacy and on how to engage on digital networks (rules and best practices) for current practitioners and future humanitarian diplomats.

Section 2 - The external practitioners and stakeholders' section aims at facilitating collaboration and online discussions on a given topic of interest for ICRC's humanitarian diplomacy conduct. This section enhances ICRC's capability to interact with its stakeholders and is inspired by what the Digital Diplomacy Coalition[29] and the Humanitarian Practice Network do in terms of inclusion of communities' input in policy shaping. Virtual representation of the ICRC is made possible through this section to ensure digital proximity where physical proximity is prevented. For instance when access to beneficiaries is difficult or when engaging with actors the ICRC cannot meet in face-to-face meetings.

Section 3 - The IHL Virtual Academy is kept separated from Sections 1 and 2 to preserve the branding of the ICRC and its pertinence in regards to promotion of humanitarian law. At the same time, it allows a two way communication between the above mentioned sections in order to reinforce a very much needed collaboration between ICRC's IHL lawyers and humanitarian diplomacy practitioners. It is a platform that draws on and exploits external expertise on IHL through discussions between experts, lawyers, and military planners. It is also a dissemination vector to promote IHL, and it proposes virtual training to ICRC's stakeholders, including NSAGs. In a time where the application of norms established by IHL are being recognized less, and are less relevant to states, combatants and civilians,[30] it becomes more important than ever to use every resource available, including digital diplomacy and its proven impact on public opinion, to promote IHL.

Videos (and space for questions and answers), such as the one released on Facebook and made by Dr. Helen Durham35 on "Why people should care about the Geneva Conventions",[31] virtual reality and video games related to IHL, like the 'Serious Gaming' tools, have their space in this section.

Partnering for implementation and impact measurement:

The suggested Humanitarian Diplomacy platform is meant to create, develop, and maintain internal and external networks while developing a collaborative state of mind when it comes to humanitarian diplomacy. It could also be used as a "soft power tool" to strengthen ICRC global leadership on humanitarian diplomacy matters and to promote the capacity of the institution to innovate even in such a complex, subtle and risky domain.[32]

To implement this collaborative platform, an idea would be to partner with the Geneva Internet Platform (GIP).[33] GIP is a capacity building platform that mainly helps decision and policy-makers to understand the intersection between diplomacy and digital technologies, both as a topic for negotiations and/or as a tool for their activities. In this sense, they advise policy-makers, international organisations and other influential actors who want to better connect through digital means with those they have an impact on. In this regard, the GIP would have the capacity to support the ICRC in the development of a humanitarian diplomacy practitioners' online community.

How to leverage these collaborations to impact, and how to measure and monitor the impact at strategic, operational and policy levels, are crucial questions that need to be further thought about. The GIP would also be able to guide the ICRC in these regards. It could advise on digital risk management and impact measurement, foster an effective digital policy within the ICRC, as well as deliver digital diplomacy training to ICRC staff.

Discussions and workshops could also be organised with experts in the domain like Jared Cohen, head of Jigsaw (formerly of Google) and former advisor to the United States on digital diplomacy, or Scott Nolan Smith, Roos Kouwenhoven, Jed Shein and Floris Winters, founders of the Digital Diplomacy Coalition[34] (DDC). The DDC is an international community of more than 4000 members that brings together the diplomatic, international affairs, academic,

[29] Digital Diplomacy Coalition. (n.d.). http://www.digidiplomats.org

[30] See ICRC's report on 'People on War': ICRC. (2016). *People on War.* https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0758.pdf


[31] Helen Durham (born in 1968), an international humanitarian lawyer, is the Director of International Law and Policy at the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). She served as director of international law, strate- gy, planning and research at the Australian Red Cross, and has worked as ICRC head of office in Sydney. She has a PhD in international humanitarian law and international criminal law, and is a senior fellow at Melbourne Law School.

[32] Cooper, A. F., Heine, J., Thakur, R. (2015). *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy,* Oxford University Press, p. 456.

[33] Geneva Internet Platform. (n.d.). http://giplatform.org/

[34] Digital Diplomacy Coalition. (n.d.). http://www.digidiplomats.org

innovation, general public and tech communities to leverage digital technologies for diplomacy. Inviting Dr. Patrick Meier,[35] expert and consultant on humanitarian technology and innovation and author of the book *Digital Humanitarians* would also be an asset to discussions.



From best practices to innovation

The opportunities brought by digital diplomacy such as expansion of influence, knowledge- sharing, the capacity to offer virtual proximity and the possibility to connect, interact and crowd source from all the stakeholders that compose the fast changing and fast growing networked diplomatic environment, were identified a decade ago by some countries that are today leaders in the domain. It is the case for the UK and the US, but also for France and Russia which are amongst the top level digital diplomacy practitioners according to a ranking40 made in 2016 by the Digital Diplomacy Review pursuant to an assessment of 1098 digital diplomacy assets used by 210 MFAs worldwide.[36]

From humanitarian organisations' perspectives on the other hand, digital diplomacy is very much limited to presence on social media, while being conducted by communications teams. Very few linkages are being made with humanitarian diplomacy.

The ICRC has the capability to work on developing the full scope of digital diplomacy, by implementing concrete actions and collaborating with the right partners, so that its humanitarian diplomacy benefits from the whole potential of digital diplomacy.

CONCLUSION

Despite the remaining relevance of traditional 'club' diplomacy, 'network' diplomacy is a complementary model in which practices are partly supported by new information and communication technologies. Even though different in many ways, the two models share common objectives: mobilisation and persuasion.

[35] Meier, P. (n.d.). Bio. https://irevolutions.org/bio/

[36] Manning, A. (2016, June 11). The Countries Leading The Way In Digital Diplomacy. *Vocativ*. http://www.vocativ.com/338889/how-the-best-country-at-digital-diplomacy-failed-irl/

Digital diplomacy, mainly but not only conducted through social media, will not tip the balance of power but has a huge impact on public advocacy, multilateral engagement, and acceptance. It has proven a useful support to humanitarian diplomacy as it brings the ICRC and its stakeholders closer to the situation on the ground, while providing an immediate real time sense of a situation by getting access to open sources of information provided by states and people living and facing conflict or disaster. It is an inclusion tool that allows people to have a voice, including those not invited to the traditional negotiation table. It can be used as a vector of IHL dissemination, a communication vehicle to foster acceptance, and a tool to gather information and mobilise stakeholders in a timely manner.

However, the traditional quiet way to persuade remains the heart of ICRC's humanitarian diplomacy, and is not about to disappear. Digital diplomacy has very little impact on bilateral diplomacy which aims to work on relationships one at a time in order to build trust, persuade decision-makers to include humanitarian perspectives in their decisions, shape policies, and keep the door open to all parties to a conflict. While digital diplomacy continues to be developed to serve humanitarian purposes in many parts of the world, the role of traditional humanitarian diplomacy will become more important than ever in dealing with crises in places where insecurity and underdevelopment prevent ICRC's stakeholders from accessing digital tools, and thus limits the options for digital diplomacy.

Practising digital diplomacy is not without risk, and in the context of cyber warfare, confidentiality of data remains of utmost importance. In June 2016, NATO recognized cyberspace as a warfare domain and stated that cyber attacks on one of its allies would be considered an act of war.[37] How will the ICRC engage with states and other stakeholders on these issues? How can the ICRC respond in case of cyber-attacks? Is IHL relevant when dealing with cyber warfare related threats, and if it is, is IHL as it currently stands adapted to address these issues? A digital environment opens new arenas for engagement for the ICRC, and its humanitarian diplomacy strategy will have to adapt to address these challenges.

[37] Barnes, J. E. (2016, June 14). NATO Recognizes Cyberspace as New Frontier in Defense. *The Wall Street Journal.* http://www.wsj.com/articles/nato-to-recognize-cyberspace-as-new-frontier-in-defense-1465908566

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Barbara Busch

Advocacy Advisor International Cooperation

Humanitarian Diplomacy September 2017

Advocating for humanitarian aid and sustainable development with the Austrian Government – a roadmap for change in the legislative session 2017–2022

Advocating for humanitarian aid and sustainable development with the Austrian Government – a roadmap for change in the legislative session 2017–2022

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ABSTRACT

National elections in October 2017 offered a unique opportunity for the Austrian Red Cross to lay a strong base for its humanitarian diplomacy over the next five years. A literature review of internal as well as government and party documents was combined with interviews of key staff who played a lead role during the last legislative period. The findings indicate that the environment is more difficult for international cooperation issues now – however, there is a good foundation to build on both in terms of connectedness into the political sphere and in terms of previous advocacy work for humanitarian aid. The main challenge remaining is to keep forward momentum and to find ways of advancing international issues while expanding the Austrian Red Cross relationship base to fully include all parties from the local to the national through to the European level.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This paper looks at influencing the next Austrian government to include international issues into its working programme and thus lay the foundation for humanitarian diplomacy from 2017-2022.

The October 2017 election and subsequent government formation period has been used to bring an array of Austrian Red Cross positions into the government's plans from the start.

The research reviews both the current process and the previous legislative period 2013-2017 in order to draw conclusions on how the Austrian Red Cross can best achieve its aims with regard to humanitarian and development aid. This was done through a literature review using internal Austrian Red Cross reports and publicly available documents from the Austrian humanitarian and development sector as well as government and party programs.

While the Austrian Red Cross is much better prepared for political dialogue than at the time of previous national elections in 2013, the new government is national-conservative with possible changes in the foreign ministry that may present a challenge for international issues and require strategic adjustment.

Aligning positions with government interests worked well for the national agenda in the past. For the international agenda that means including migration in the narrative and keeping a firm focus on humanitarian aid, since there is a historic opportunity to further increase Austria's main humanitarian funding mechanism that must not be missed.

Starting from that minimum requirement, there may be room to advance additional requests such as multi-annual funding in protracted crises and funding for disaster preparedness risk reduction –

depending on which of the parties negotiating the coalition government wins the foreign ministry.

Another key finding is for Austrian Red Cross International Cooperation to use a consistent long-term humanitarian diplomacy approach with only a few well-defined main messages that should be negotiated in incremental steps.

The Austrian Red Cross started targeting the government working program with its persuasion efforts during the last elective period and now looks back on a period of building up relationships from almost scratch. This now needs to expand to include all current opposition parties after major shifts in government and parliament composition, in particular traditionally weak engagement with the national-conservative Freedom Party who will be part of the new government has to be brought up to speed. More systematic inclusion of Austrian Red Cross federal branches as well as the European level in political dialogue is another worthwhile option to be pursued for humanitarian and development topics.

Similarly, the Austrian platform for development and humanitarian aid, Global Responsibility, continues to be a strong ally for humanitarian diplomacy and for reinforcing the Austrian Red Cross's voice as the main humanitarian player in Austria.

INTRODUCTION

The chosen topic is about influencing the next Austrian government to include international issues into its working programme. The election and government formation period is an opportunity to bring humanitarian and development positions into the government's plans from the start – on a higher level than the technical ministerial working groups Austrian Red Cross (AutRC) regularly participates in – and to lay the basis for discussion and humanitarian diplomacy over the next five years.

Primary objective:

- to provide a strategic frame for introducing and positioning the AutRC international agenda to the prospective government and for influencing government throughout the legislative period

Secondary objectives:

- to increase funding for Red Cross movement international work
- to support AutRC leadership/advocacy advisors in recommendations within the international policy framework

Experience from the last legislative period showed that government action for international issues did happen, based on humanitarian diplomacy interventions, particularly in collaboration with other organisations and through campaigns. A recent example is the 2016 increase of the international disaster response fund from 5 to 20 million Euros yearly, which AutRC advocated for since before 2013.

However, even under previous governments, Austria has been comparatively low with its ODA contributions (OECD, 2015) in the European context, given its economic and living standards.

The Austrian Red Cross is an influential national actor, yet it is still a challenge to get support for international work since national action obviously has the highest priority for any government. This will be exacerbated with the new government being likely to shift towards ultra-conservative policies in a coalition between the winning conservative party (Austrian People's Party/Österreichische Volkspartei – ÖVP) and the nationalist liberal party (Liberal Party Austria/Freiheitliche Partei Österreich – FPÖ). The foreign ministry may be split or allocated away from ÖVP to FPÖ or to a candidate perceived as 'neutral', without party affiliations.

Therefore, a less favourable environment for humanitarian topics is a possibility, and what is certain is that relationship building will have to start from scratch. As a first step, AutRC sent out its positions to the two parties' negotiating teams and their experts in mid-November. The aim of this paper is to provide a strategic frame for introducing and positioning the AutRC international agenda to the prospective government.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The research is based on internal documents of the Austrian Red Cross (AutRC) and AG Globale Verantwortung (AGGV),[1] which will be referred to as 'Global Responsibility' through the paper, from this and the previous legislative period as secondary resources. This was supplemented with publicly available government and party programs.

No previous academic research on lobbying with the Austrian government is available in the online libraries of either the Vienna University Political Science Department or the Austrian Research Foundation for International Development.

Personal semi-structured interviews with those involved in agenda setting during the last elections served as a primary resource, held with the International Cooperation Advocacy Advisor 2011-2014 as well as the AutRC Head of Social Policy and Humanitarian Diplomacy, Robert Dempfer, who has an overview of both national and international concerns over the past legislative period (Dempfer, 2017). A telephone interview took place with the AutRC Head of International Cooperation 2007–2015.

[1] An umbrella organisation Global Responsibility, Austrian platform for development and humanitarian aid

1. LESSONS LEARNED FROM PREVIOUS LEGISLATIVE PERIODS

How RC national and international positions were advocated for before/after elections and related successes

At the time of the 2013 national election AutRC was not as well connected in the political sphere as it is today, particularly with members of parliament, parliamentary clubs and cabinets.

Networking with parliamentarians started in earnest through the Global Responsibility campaign *'Don't Care'* from 2012 to 2015, aimed at counteracting the government's austerity plans for development and humanitarian aid.

Therefore, there was not any systematic political dialogue during most of the legislative period 2008-2013. After that, the Austrian Red Cross prepared *55 demands for Austria* (AutRC, 2013) for the government program 2013-2018, which were then cut down to a manageable 19 requests.

One of the major successes on the national level over the legislative period was '*Rescue the rescuers*', triggered by an EU public tender regulation threatening to fragment ambulance services of which AutRC is the main provider. AutRC first pursued the issue through quiet diplomacy with the Federal Chancellery, and in early 2017 started an online petition campaign resulting in an exemption of emergency services from national public tender legislation – and for which AutRC received the national public relations award in November 2017.

While public pressure ostensibly brought the desired results, two further framing factors enabled success:

- it was a national concern affecting the whole population and therefore a potential stumbling block in the 2017 elections
- it could be presented as a danger to the welfare state, which generates interest not only in the public but also in the health sector and the political sphere

Activities and successes with umbrella organisation Global Responsibility

Among the 19 requests were five for international work. Two on international law were followed up by the legal division, the remaining three by the International Cooperation Division.

The table below shows that the latter, with an overview of whether they received support by Global Responsibility, were included in the government program and implemented during the elective period. It also links them to the three 2017 requests that focus on increased quantity and quality of humanitarian aid, on strengthening disaster preparedness and risk reduction and on implementing the SDGs with an efficient structure and strategy, particularly the 0.7% ODA target.

AutRC position/request international cooperation for government program	Govt. program	Global Responsibility position for govt program	Implemented	2017 position/ request
Efficient structure humanitarian aid: – increase international disaster fund to 20 Million EUR – coordination/coherence (efficient structure) – govt. strategy humanitarian aid – strengthen disaster preparedness/risk reduction	 yes no yes no	 Yes (campaign) yes no no	no yes no no no	**60 Million EUR +multi-annual funding** **– SDGs** yes **yes**
Stop cuts in bilateral ODA: – Legislation concerning direct project aid – Phased plan for increasing ODA – coordination/coherence (efficient structure)	- no yes no	yes (campaign) no (phased plan) yes yes	yes no no no	- no yes – **SDGs** – **SDGs**
Quicker release of international disaster fund	no	no	no	no

The information was compiled from a literature review and shows one major success with the increase of the international disaster fund from 5 to 20 Million Euros yearly in 2016, reflected in an amendment of the federal financial law in 2015. ÖVP's 2017 election programme (ÖVP, 2017) stipulated a further increase to 60 Million Euro yearly, incidentally higher than AutRC and Global Responsibility's initial pre-election demand.

However, there is no conclusive evidence here that a combination of AutRC and Global Responsibility's efforts are the main factor for success, since a multi-annual timetable of reaching the 0,7% ODA threshold has not been forthcoming despite being incorporated into the government program and taken up by AutRC and other organisations on multiple occasions.

There has nevertheless been an increase of direct project aid under bilateral ODA of 15.5 Million Euros, projected to continue on that level until 2021 (Global Responsibility, 2017). This points to the relevance of scale, with commitments of up to 100 Million Euros and increases over several years seemingly having a chance of success – whereas doubling ODA contributions at once to reach 0.7% of Austria's GNI means committing to an unrealistic increase of 1 billion Euros.

The table further shows that issues that are not included in the government program nor in Global Responsibility's priorities have a low likelihood of implementation.

Although one respondent maintained that Global Responsibility did advocate for disaster preparedness and risk reduction in its work generally, the alliance needs to strike a balance with development issues to represent all its members, and AutRC is usually the main voice speaking for humanitarian aid and disaster preparedness/risk reduction. AutRC clearly prioritised the former in its past Humanitarian Diplomacy work to the detriment of preparedness and risk reduction. Similarly, a quicker release of the international disaster fund was not really pursued since there is a functioning working mode – even if generally fragmentation, lack of strategy and coherence can be criticised in the Austrian approach to humanitarian and development aid.

The Global Responsibility campaign *'Don't Care'* from 2012 to 2015, while not directly connected to the legislative cycle, was an important vehicle for publicly pushing humanitarian and development issues. Triggered by the pre-2013 government announcing cuts in aid spending, the campaign started with individual talks to sensitise all parliamentarians. The Austrian Red Cross took an active part – usually two different organisations met with a parliament member – and laid the foundations of its increased connections into the political sphere at national level.

Later the campaign included demonstrations and public protests in front of parliament to gather news coverage. Its big success was that not only the proposed cuts were revoked but that the international disaster management fund was quadrupled in 2016, and that politicians' narratives do acknowledge the need for further increase since then.

The two interviewees previously working for International Cooperation both acknowledged the value and importance of Global Responsibility but also highlighted the need to balance AutRC investment in Global Responsibility with raising the AutRC profile separately, most importantly to keep AutRC's reputation as the main player in humanitarian aid as a competitive advantage. MSF was part of the alliance until 2014, and since then AutRC's role is both to champion humanitarian issues within Global Responsibility to enable coalition diplomacy but also to put humanitarian issues into a sharper focus on its own through direct confidential diplomacy.

Lobbying at the European level to influence Austrian government

According to the interviews there was a one-off visit to three Austrian European Parliament members of different parties by International Cooperation in the past, but no systematic follow-up or efforts to influence the development committee at the European Parliament, which currently has one Austrian ÖVP member, Paul Rübig. For International Cooperation this is definitely an avenue worth exploring together with the International Relations unit. A second possibility is establishing contact with COREPER II – the preparatory body of the European Council for foreign affairs – through the head of Austria's permanent representation, Ambassador Mag. Walter Grahammer. There would be synergies both with the national agenda but also with other European Red Cross societies in establishing permanent lobbying for intra-community and for international issues in an additional mandate for the Red Cross EU office, as Robert Dempfer has suggested (Dempfer, 2017). That, in fact, would bring a strong Red Cross voice to proactively shaping policy and to influencing the funding share attached to policy operationalisation for the Red Cross Movement.


2. CONTEXT FOR APPROACHING LEGISLATIVE PERIOD 2017

Political background

As the Federal chancellery explains, the 'Austrian government consists of the chancellor, vice chancellor and ministers meeting in weekly working sessions; one of its main responsibilities is drafting legislation for parliamentary deliberation. The bulk of government business is handled by the responsible ministries' (Bundeskanzleramt, n.d.).

This shows both the pivotal role of the foreign ministry for AutRC humanitarian diplomacy on international issues, but also the value of building relations with parliamentarians of all affiliations.

After the last national election on 29th September 2013, new elections were called almost a year early on 15th October 2017, effectively ousting the social-conservative coalition of SPÖ (Social Democrat Party Austria) and ÖVP. See graphic below.[2]



ÖVP won a slight majority of 31.5% and was tasked with forming the new government. The most likely outcome is a coalition with populist FPÖ (26%), rather than the continuation of the pre-election coalition with runner-up socialist SPÖ (26.9%). Thus parliamentary opposition will likely consist of SPÖ, neo-liberal NEOS and Liste Pilz (who replaced the Green Party in parliament after splitting from them prior to the elections).

ÖVP held the foreign ministry – the AutRC main point of contact for international issues – over the last few years, and cooperation with them could continue in a business-as-usual fashion. However, an allocation of the foreign ministry to FPÖ will most probably mean shrinking space for humanitarian and development work. This is still a matter of speculation. What is obvious is that the FPÖ election program focuses exclusively on Austria as a stand-alone country, with just one of twenty-five points considering external relations, specifically "keeping the Austrian identity within the European Union" (FPÖ, 2017). The fact that both ÖVP and FPÖ agree on reducing illegal immigration but also on maintaining a clear pro-European stance (Vytiska, 2017), may offer an opportunity and entry point for persuasion – particularly taking into account that EU Member States and the European Commission have already taken some initiatives to support developing countries in creating jobs and growth to prevent migration for a better life.

The new parliament was sworn in on 9th November, while the new government is to be announced on 18th Dec and sworn in on 20th Dec or 8th January. The two current options for the foreign minister are an ÖVP candidate or a 'party-neutral' candidate proposed by FPÖ as a compromise.

AutRC background

When comparing the previous legislative period to the current one, Robert Dempfer noted that even though the outright successes were few, most of the 19 requests of 2013 evolved to some extent with small steps taken in the right

[2] Wikipedia. (n.d.). Nationalratswahl in Österreich 2013. https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nationalratswahl_in_%C3%96sterreich_2013

direction, and were therefore updated and reframed for the current election (Dempfer, 2017). That is also the main implication for international issues: to work under consistent large headings over several elective periods, negotiating towards long-term goals in smaller steps according to external conditions and milestones achieved.

For 2017, a total of 34 requests were formulated by the different AutRC divisions (AutRC, 2017) and were sent out to the teams of ÖVP and FPÖ currently negotiating the new government coalition on 16th November. Opposition party members in parliament and the Federal Council will receive them at a later stage. There was a meeting between AutRC and parliament members on 22nd November, where the 34 requests were reduced to a short version of 13 requests, factoring in their chances of success with the next government. For international cooperation the request concerned with humanitarian aid is included, not included are disaster preparedness/risk reduction and SDG implementation including the 0.7% ODA target.

The AutRC communication team agreed to focus on the following issues in its work: education, international cooperation, public services and home-based care.

When the government is officially announced, AutRC leadership will have meetings with the new ministers to discuss priorities, and from there follow-through will be taken up for all 34 requests on all levels by the different AutRC divisions.

As in 2013, AutRC divisions will analyse the new government program for AutRC positions and for further entry points.

The AutRC communication team agreed to focus on the following issues in its work: education, international cooperation, public services and home-based care.

AutRC uses societal trends and their potential to exacerbate vulnerabilities as a filter to set priorities in national HD work. In practice, this translates into an AutRC focus on education whose quality has a direct impact on job earnings, and which is key in the current context of digitalisation of many services, leading to the cutting of low-level skilled jobs in the future. AutRC addresses this directly by working towards keeping children in school, but also postulates a guaranteed minimum income as a safety net for those who remain vulnerable (Dempfer, 2017). For international work that means using global trends like urbanisation with expert counterparts or in operational planning; it is less relevant for political dialogue in Austria.

All three interviewees mentioned the strong traditional relations AutRC has with ÖVP whose head and current foreign minister will hold the prime minister position in the new government.

At the same time, although International Cooperation had contact with FPÖ parliament members through the previous Global Responsibility campaign, durable relationships into the FPÖ party are virtually non-existent and will have to be built from scratch for all of AutRC.

Yet, all three respondents and the author see unique opportunities for working with FPÖ, not least in FPÖ's openness towards emergency response and humanitarian aid coupled with their reservations towards development work can serve as an entry point for AutRC playing on its strength in humanitarian aid.

3. RECOMMENDATIONS AND PROPOSED HUMANITARIAN DIPLOMACY (HD) ACTION

Proposed HD action

The table below summarises the proposed action, linking the three main AutRC international cooperation requests to the government with the two parties currently trying to form a new government in six scenarios. The AutRC process described in Chapter 2 indicates a need to select and prioritise positions further internally while retaining a wider array of issues in case of partial success or in case of unexpected opportunities for follow-through. The table highlights priority options in bold print.

1. Quantity and quality of humanitarian aid
2. Disaster preparedness risk reduction
3. SDGs and 0.7% ODA

a *In case ÖVP retains foreign ministry*

b *In case FPÖ acquires foreign ministry*

	HD format	Purpose	Outcome	Target public	Activities	Timeline
1a	Quiet diplomacy	Increase funding and its flexibility	Int. Disaster fund 60 Million Euro yearly **Multi-annual funds for protracted crises**	Foreign Ministry	Regular institutionalised meetings with section VII, political section and Austrian Development Agency	2018/19
2a	Quiet diplomacy	Put DRR & prevention on the map	**Funding mechanism for DRR**	Foreign Ministry	Push for inclusion into 3-year program Promote as part of triple nexus Use new OECD DAC DRR marker	2018 2018-2022 2019-2022
3a	Public influence Public campaign/Global Responsibility	Implement SDGs	Government plan to reach 0,7% target	ÖVP via general public Parliament/public	Press work Talks with parliamentarians/media	2018-2022 2018
1b	Quiet diplomacy Quiet diplomacy Quiet diplomacy Public influence Public campaign/Global Responsibility	Increase funding and its flexibility	**Int. Disaster fund 60 Million Euro yearly** Multi-annual funds for protracted crises	Foreign Ministry ÖVP/parliament opposition/parliament FPÖ/ÖVP via the public Parliament/public	Build relationship with new minister Regular institutionalised meetings with section VII, political section and Austrian Development Agency Remind of ÖVP election program Refer to ÖVP election program Press work Talks with parliamentarians/media	2018/19 2019 2020 2020/2021 2012/2022
2b	Quiet diplomacy	Put DRR & prevention on the map	Funding mechanism for DRR	Foreign Ministry	*link to humanitarian aid* Push for inclusion into 3-year program Promote as part of triple nexus Use OECD DAC DRR marker	 2018 2018-2022 2019-2022
3b	Quiet diplomacy Public influence Public campaign/Global Responsibility	Implement SDGs	Government plan to reach 0,7% target	Foreign Ministry FPÖ via general public Parliament	Build relationship, regular meetings Focus on climate angle & migration Prioritise FPÖ parliamentarians	2018-2022 2020-2022 2018

The first request on humanitarian aid has the highest chance of being included in the government working program and therefore of being implemented. It is part of the 13 requests channelled into the current negotiations through ÖVP/AutRC members, it is included in the ÖVP election program, and humanitarian aid is something that FPÖ also supports in principle according to interview responses and literature review.

In case ÖVP retains the foreign ministry, increasing the international disaster fund should require minimal follow-up, and HD action can focus on more flexible, multi-annual funding for protracted crises in the next period. As there is a standing working relationship and a good understanding of the issues within ÖVP, quiet diplomacy is the method of choice, and there is room for AutRC to be ambitious and introduce disaster risk reduction as a second longer-term priority.

There has not been much groundwork done, and the issue is not a big priority with Global Responsibility, yet there are a few windows of opportunity at present:

AutRC managed to include a paragraph on disaster prevention and risk reduction into the current draft of the Austrian Development Assistance 3-year Program 2019-2021, which will be finalised in the first quarter of 2018. Secondly, discussions around the humanitarian-development(-peace) nexus are taking off on a ministerial level now, and offer a good opportunity for establishing DRR as a third pillar that helps operationalise the nexus. Finally, ÖVP sees the potential of a stronger link between humanitarian aid and development (Global Responsibility, 2017).

With FPÖ in the foreign ministry, there is a bigger challenge in achieving results. While humanitarian aid is the international subject with the most chance of success and should therefore be the focus of AutRC HD work, FPÖ is not favourable to funding increases (Global Responsibility, 2017) and might therefore block the 60 Million Euro yearly funding proposed by ÖVP even though it is included in the government working program. The relationship with the new minister needs to be established, and the fact that the FPÖ candidate is a 'party-neutral' foreign relations expert on the Middle East may be an advantage. There may also be tactical opportunities for success through the technical-level working relationships with the Foreign Ministry that will most likely continue as before.

Thus, a quiet diplomacy approach is recommended to give the new set-up a proper chance, complemented by confidential meetings with ÖVP and opposition parties at a later stage, if the process with the Foreign Ministry stalls over the first two years of cooperation. There is a certain likelihood of having to resort to public influence if all else fails, and of shifting the Global Responsibility public campaign focus to humanitarian aid with active and visible participation of AutRC. This request must be pursued through all levels of escalation over the legislative period, since it has already come very close to fruition and may not make it into the winning party's election program in future elective periods.

Consequently, disaster prevention and risk reduction can only be tabled with FPÖ in connection with humanitarian aid and only if, contrary to expectations, the humanitarian funding increase is swiftly implemented.

The third request on reaching the 0.7% ODA target is a tough subject with both parties.

While ÖVP acknowledges the need for Austria to fulfil its international commitment in its narrative as well as in its election program, it has been promising an incremental plan of how to reach the target for years, and the time for quiet diplomacy has passed. AutRC already used opportunities for public influence via the media in the past two years, both on its own and as part of Global Responsibility.

FPÖ did not declare its intentions on the 0.7% target (Globale Verantwortung, 2017) but generally linked humanitarian and development questions to migration and postulated for concentration of Austrian ODA in two countries for maximum effect. There should not be high expectations for progress on development issues but the Global Responsibility campaign can nevertheless be used to build relationships with FPÖ, for awareness raising and factual information, using a link between development and migration or development and climate-change as an entry point.

Recommendations on *HD content*

Another recommendation included into the HD plan is to take a long-term view and be patient in reaching objectives, ideally negotiating an incremental approach towards long-term goals. This includes financial goals, as in the example

of ODA increases mentioned in Chapter 1. Methodically, a maximum of three basic messages was recommended for constant repetition on all levels and on all possible occasions.

The national examples in Chapter 1 indicate the need to be realistic with objectives that have a chance of implementation in the prevailing political climate, while linking 'difficult' issues to political priorities. Even though international issues do not win elections, they are linked to topics of national concern such as global climate change mitigation and preparedness or migration and displacement.

The fact that AutRC already decided that international cooperation issues will be part of the communications priorities for facilitating inclusion in the government working program needs to be capitalised on over the next weeks and months by actively supporting the communications team.

This could be complemented by making stronger use of AutRC publications for lobbying by choosing content that can facilitate dialogue or open new doors for discussion on current themes.

The International Cooperation yearly report 2017, for example, aims to focus on the humanitarian-development nexus in a protracted crisis, which can be used for pushing either multi-annual funding or disaster risk reduction with ÖVP (scenarios 1a, 2a) but also lends itself to confirming disaster funding increase with FPÖ (scenario 1b).

Regarding international frameworks, there is a case for prioritising the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) as part of AutRC concentration on humanitarian aid, while drawing on other available frameworks with more specialised audiences. The WHS gives a strong basis for addressing forced displacement but also on (climate) risk reduction and resilience, both of which can be framed as an aspect of the migration debate with FPÖ. The author sees WHS as an ideal theoretical underpinning for scenario 1a and 1b, possibly for 3b, however, for 2a the Sendai Framework on Disaster Risk Reduction must also be referenced.

RCRC international conference pledges have not been relevant for formulation of international cooperation requests in the past, since many of them focused on international humanitarian law (IHL) in the past years, which is part of AutRC legal division's portfolio. However, since the WHS also strongly supports IHL and since International Cooperation channels a substantial amount from the international disaster fund to ICRC country programs each year, it may be worth liaising more strongly with the legal division on IHL advocacy work, if only to open another channel of communication with the Foreign Ministry.

Recommendations on managing relationships for HD

There was a strong emphasis in interviews on continually building up contacts and managing relationships on all levels as it is unpredictable who will have power and influence in the future, and as AutRC does not really have a bargaining chip in political negotiations, relying instead on persuasion.

That also means working with all political parties as a neutral organisation, even when the ideological divide is great, as AutRC work is ultimately for the benefit of human beings and not a contest of beliefs. In practice, AutRC can use FPÖ's preference for humanitarian aid, build on traditional good relations with ÖVP and work with opposition parties as complementary partners where needed. There are reasonably good relations with former government member SPÖ, but the smaller NEOS is also a target audience with a new development spokesperson who previously worked for a human rights institute. Finally, Global Responsibility is well connected to the newcomer and green party offshoot *Liste Pilz* and to SPÖ. Apart from parliament, AutRC could try to increase strategic contact with the Federal Chancellery cabinet.

Another aspect of relationship building is to use AutRC federal branches as multipliers for political dialogue on their level both through their leadership and through their communication teams, using existing meeting forums for policy dialogue briefings. They have good access both to parliament members who originate from their province but also to the Federal Council in parliament which is composed of selected members from provincial governments.

The priority stakeholders for day-to-day international cooperation work are the Austrian Development Agency and the Foreign Ministry Section 7 on development including its units on humanitarian aid and the 3-year development program. Here, AutRC could work towards institutionalising regular meetings with counterparts to safeguard against personnel changes. Another action point for a more comprehensive approach is to extend relations to the Foreign Ministry unit dealing with development on the European Union level and with the United Nations.

CONCLUSION

The elections of 2017 are a change towards an ultra-conservative government and offer both opportunities and challenges for AutRC. The organisation is much better prepared for political dialogue than previously, through intense relationship building over the past five years and by having actively gone through the process of influencing the government working program once before. Defining factors for success in the past have been aligning positions with government interests, often meaning issues of public interest such as threats to Austria's welfare state.

It has paid off to invest sufficient energy to include issues into the government program, where they have a higher chance of implementation. Similarly, using Global Responsibility's connections and reinforcing AutRC positions by actively supporting Global Responsibility work has brought results, particularly when complemented with AutRC's own persuasion efforts on humanitarian aid.

Keeping that humanitarian focus to follow through on yet another substantial increase of the international disaster fund is one of the main recommendations – with FPÖ in the foreign ministry this will require a concerted effort, whereas with ÖVP continuing in the foreign ministry there will be space to additionally negotiate for multi-annual funding in protracted crises and for disaster preparedness risk reduction.

Generally, there is room for improvement where relations with FPÖ and with opposition parties are concerned nationally but also with regard to more systematic relationship management for influencing humanitarian and development topics on the European level.

A consistent long-term HD approach is key, using a few well-defined messages for international cooperation and using AutRC federal branches to reinforce those messages from the local to the national level.

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Thiwankee Wickramasinghe

Senior Lecturer attached to the Department of Social Studies, Open University of Sri Lanka

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Timing reconciliation: A case study of the Sarvodaya movement in building ethnic harmony through humanitarian diplomacy in the northern province of Sri Lanka

Timing reconciliation: A case study of the Sarvodaya movement in building ethnic harmony through humanitarian diplomacy in the northern province of Sri Lanka

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ABSTRACT

This study explores the extent to which humanitarian diplomacy is used by Deshodaya Forums attached to Sarvodaya to build ethnic harmony in the reconciliation process in Sri Lanka. Further, this study investigates how Deshodaya Forums can persuade decision makers such as local politicians, public officers, religious leaders etc. to act on behalf of the vulnerable people in strengthening relationships between the communities.

The Sarvodaya Shramadhana Movement, having served since 1958, has addressed issues related to ethnic harmony even before the conflict erupted, to ensure the wellbeing of diverse communities. For the first fifty years, Sarvodaya served local communities with self-help initiatives inspired by the Gandhian ideals of truth, non-violence and service for all. In 2008 having passed a landmark achievement of serving the nation for nearly fifty years Sarvodaya re-directed its main mission to right based initiatives. Deshodaya Forums were established with this focus and soon after the war ended these forums were engaged in the reconciliation process.

In order to capture perceptions, practices and ideologies a qualitative approach was adopted. Data was gathered through a purposive sampling technique and the respondents of this study represent the staff attached to the Sarvodaya Movement who serve in the Deshodaya Forums. These respondents represent the Jaffna and Mullaitivu Districts of the Northern Province of Sri Lanka.

The key findings of this study include weakness in capacities of the Deshodaya staff attached to Sarvodaya in advocating the reconciliation process through humanitarian diplomacy to establish ethnic harmony in the Northern Province, alongside the subservient culture of the local community. In spite of these, this study argues the initiatives taken in the past and the present engagements of Sarvodaya are urgently needed to establish ethnic harmony. The results of this study hence will be useful to strengthen the capacities of the Deshodaya staff to effectively promote the advocacy role with a clear focus on humanitarian diplomacy.

1. INTRODUCTION:

In the post-war period, mutual understanding, acknowledgment of past sufferings and changing of destructive attitudes are essential elements towards achieving sustainable peace in society. In this context humanitarian diplomacy (HD) plays a vital role to bring vulnerable people back to normalcy. Further, it is important for decision makers to comprehend that a HD-based reconciliation process is not only infrastructure and economic development but needs to be addressed beyond, especially ensuring the main prerequisites and reconciliation such as reestablishing lost relationships through ethnic harmony among the vulnerable groups. According to Thaheer *et al*. (2013) there is a tendency for state driven reconciliation programmes to exclude many societal issues, and the contribution of non-state actors with a proper sense of HD will be an effective solution under this context.

Sarvodaya Movement established in 1958 is Sri Lanka's largest non-governmental organization and is currently working on nine specific areas, namely Deshodaya, Disaster Management Unit, Early Childhood Development Unit, International Unit, Rural Technical Services Unit, Woodwork and Exports Unit, Community Health Unit, and Sarvodaya Institute of Higher Learning (Sarvodaya, 2018). Deshodaya means "awakening the nation" and this unit was established to promote a culture of democracy, good governance, reconciliation, and sustainable peace. There are 26 District Deshodaya Forums (Sarvodaya, 2018).1 Currently there are approximately 14,000 members attached to Deshodaya Forums. This study explores the initiatives carried out by the Deshodaya Forums to establish ethnic harmony in the Northern Province of Sri Lanka with reference to HD.

Impact of Humanitarian Diplomacy

HD is a process of influencing those who make decisions about developing, changing, and implementing policies (Lamb, 2018). It differs from humanitarian and development work since humanitarian aid is designed to save lives and alleviate suffering during and in the immediate aftermath of emergencies, whereas development aid responds to ongoing structural issues, particularly systemic poverty, that may hinder economic, institutional and social development in any given society, and assists in building capacity to ensure resilient communities and sustainable livelihoods (Humanitarian Coalition, 2015). The distinction lies in its connections to the fundamental humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence. Immediately after the end of the war, the state as well as humanitarian organizations and the private sector could use HD as a tool for raising awareness among vulnerable communities in order to establish strong relationships to build ethnic harmony.

Scholars argue that HD has to be developed to persuade decision makers and opinion leaders to act at all times in the interest of vulnerable people along with full respect for fundamental humanitarian principles. According to Kelly T Clements, U.N. Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees, "Humanitarian Diplomacy does not have a clear definition in international law but draws strongly on the principle of independence, neutrality and impartiality" (Clements, 2016). However, the main objective in HD is to promote decision makers to act in the interest of undermined or vulnerable people in relation to fundamental humanitarian issues or human rights (IFRC, 2009, p.3).

If there are repeated failures in the performance of human rights activities both in the government and private sector, relating to morals, secured life patterns and human dignity, HD is expected to bring measures to address these issues immediately to bring harmony among the affected community.

[1] In Sri Lanka, districts are the second-level administrative divisions, and are included in a province. There are twenty five districts in Sri Lanka. In order to serve in an efficient manner, Sarvodaya has divided a large district (Anuradhapura district in the north central province) into two parts and there are twenty-six Deshodaya Forums.

2. PURPOSE AND SIGNIFICANCE:

Sri Lanka was in the midst of a deadly civil war for a period of nearly 30 years in the north and the east of the country, between Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the armed forces of the government of Sri Lanka. This study analyzes the importance of humanitarian diplomacy and the timing of the reconciliation process in the northern part of Sri Lanka to normalize the livelihood of vulnerable people. In the first instance it is vital to approach vulnerable people through HD since the reconciliation process needs to be activated in a timely manner as HD plays a key role in building relationships.

2.1 Reconciliation Process

A reconciliation process cannot be sustained by imposing an artificial mechanism but by adopting a consultative approach acceptable to the key actors. For instance, one cannot argue that the reconciliation process in South Africa can be adopted in Sri Lanka, for the single reason that in South Africa the rights of the majority were discriminated against by the minority, whereas in Sri Lanka it is the other way around. It is important to identify the uniqueness of the context in the reconciliation process since humanitarian diplomacy requires adhering to the social, political, cultural and economic perspectives of the affected community as well as the prevailing order. Further, it is necessary to work it out in a systematic way rather than following adhoc strategies, because a post-war period needs to be addressed properly by persuading both vulnerable people and decision makers to establish peaceful relationships in society.

2.2 Research Interest

Communication and diplomatic relations with affected parties of a war or a conflict help to assure the protection of those seeking assistance in evolving the nature of conflict.

The present attitude explores the possibility and scope of HD as well as some of the challenges faced in Sri Lanka with a view to preparing the way for its eventual recognition and future action by all sides. Further, one of the objectives of the research is to provide information and recommendations for the improvement of the work of HD in Sri Lanka. This will be done through communication, and those findings will enable us to identify unresolved problems of vulnerable people and to interpret them in a timely manner to convey them to key actors who are involved in the issue.

2.3 Research Questions

Question 1: Has HD properly instituted by the Deshodaya Movement of Sarvodaya been successful in building ethnic harmony in the northern part of Sri Lanka?

Question 2: How have HD efforts been perceived by the staff of Sarvodaya attached to Deshodaya Forums as a tool in establishing relationships to strengthen ethnic harmony?

Question 3: What are the unresolved concerns of vulnerable people and how effectively can these issues be resolved in a timely manner by the Deshodaya Forums of Sarvodaya through HD?

2.4. Methodology

The research design refers, in accordance with De Vaus (2001, p.9), to the overall strategy that is selected to integrate the different components of the study in a coherent and logical way, thereby ensuring that the research problem is effectively addressed, and it constitutes the blueprint for the collection, measurement, and analysis of data. This study adopted a one stage research design strategy which is a case study based on the Sarvodaya Movement and its contribution in the reconciliation process with a humanitarian diplomacy approach in Northern Sri Lanka. According to Robert (1984, p.23) social scientists, in particular, have made wide use of this qualitative research method to examine contemporary real-life situations and provide the basis for the application of ideas and extension of methods.

The research paradigm is based on a qualitative approach. The qualitative data was collected through semi-structured telephone interviews. The prevailing pandemic restricted travel and due to health concerns the safest and

best mode to gather data was through telephone interviews. Twenty-five telephone interviews were conducted. The gender balance was fifteen males and ten females. Their designations ranged from Programme Officers to Programme Coordinators and the highest level of education is post-graduate masters level. The main themes discussed in telephone interviews were based on efforts taken by Deshodaya Forums on the conciliation process, the functions of Deshodaya Forums, the importance of HD in building ethnic harmony, the programmes conducted by Deshodaya Forums in the Northern Province, practices of HD principles in the context of building ethnic harmony, challenges in adopting HD in the reconciliation process, and finally recommendations to move forward.

This study was carried out in Jaffna and Mullaitivu districts in the Northern Province of Sri Lanka. The sample population represents the District Officers attached to the Deshodaya Movement, who are respondents in this study.

Data from primary sources was collected through telephone interviews. A purposive sampling method was used to select structured telephone interviews. The study was supported by a desk review of the Lessons Learned and Reconciliation Commission Report (LLRC), along with the documents connected to the Deshodaya Movement by Sarvodaya, scholarly articles and newspaper articles covering the reconciliation process in Sri Lanka with an emphasis on humanitarian diplomacy.

The qualitative data was analyzed through interpretive techniques which are useful in examining contextual features of experiences that might have direct relevance to practice (Oun & Bach, 2014, p. 255).

2.5 Ethical Considerations

Respondents of the said study participated on a voluntary basis with full consent and no incentive was paid for their effort. Confidentiality of data was ensured with anonymity of respondents since no names were used on the interview guides during data collection.

2. 6 Limitations of the study

The research design of the study would have been a mixed approach with qualitative and quantitative data analysis if not for the pandemic situation. The sample population would have accommodated the local community to analyze their perspective on this study alongside other concerned stakeholders such as the military, national and local level politicians, public officers and religious leaders if not for the pandemic, to obtain an objective result. However, the credibility of the study was increased through strict adherence to ethical considerations as mentioned in the methodology section.

3. LITERATURE REVIEW

Reconciliation process and the influence of humanitarian diplomacy in establishing ethnic harmony

The word reconciliation became very prominent in the local context since the aftermath of war in May, 2009. Reconciliation is a long and a difficult journey. It is vital to explore the definitions used by local actors as well as by scholars. This enables the study to identify how HD can be used in establishing ethnic harmony in Sri Lanka.

Reconciliation is defined by the state as "reconciliation as synonymous with reconstruction and restoration of normalcy" (Kanagarathnam, J, 2019, p. 55). The Tamil National Alliance[2] defines reconciliation as devolution of political power to the people of the former conflict area. Given the complexity of the two different definitions of reconciliation by the local actors it is prudent to use a broad definition as provided by Johan Galtung (2005, p. 222):

> *"Reconciliation is a process aimed at putting an end to conflict between two parties. It includes a closure of hostile acts, process of healing and rehabilitation of both perpetrators and victims."*

Galtung's definition can be considered the most appropriate for the Sri Lankan context because it sees reconciliation as a process that is broad enough to include all elements required to restore a relationship between two parties who

[2] The Tamil National Alliance is the political alliance in Sri Lanka that represents the country's Sri Lankan Tamil minority.

are separated if not divided (Thaheer *et al*. 2013). It explains a chasm or a divide that needs to be bridged, and also recognizes relationships that need to be mended. It identifies the parties, groups, interests and individuals who need to be subject to the process of reconciliation.

John Paul Lederach (1997, p. 30) defines reconciliation as comprising both "a focus and a locus." The focus of reconciliation is on building new and better relationships between former adversaries, enemies or groups that supported different parties in a conflict. Once relationships are strengthened it could facilitate a solution to the conflict. In this context relationships are identified as the core focus of reconciliation. As a locus, Lederach argues that "reconciliation represents a space, a place or location of encounter, where parties to a conflict meet." It follows from this that "the traumas of the past and the hopes for the future must be formulated and brought together by discussing the issues of truth, forgiveness, justice and peace" (Lederach 1997, p, 30). In this context HD plays a vital role since vulnerable people are approached and their issues are discussed at policy levels to establish ethnic harmony.

In the context of the post-war period, reconciliation can take two distinct forms. As a negotiated conflict settlement, reconciliation is most likely to be achieved through a process of dialogue. In the case of a decisive military victory for one party to the conflict, reconciliation can be imposed, ignored or improvised, and the Sri Lankan reconciliation process can be explained very much in terms of second form.

Andrew Rigby (2001, p.12)) provides important and useful explanation. "Reconciliation is not only a process but is also a goal. Recognizing when that condition of reconciliation has been achieved is somewhat problematic, and must always be context specific." In the case of Sri Lanka the main obstacle for reconciliation is the military defeat of the LTTE, which is seen as the only prerequisite for reconciliation (Thaheer *et al*. 2013). The root causes of the conflict or the minority rights are not considered in the reconciliation process. Further, the reconciliation process remains in the form of infrastructure development and the goals seem to have changed for the state as well as for the majority of the people outside the former war affected areas who continue to endorse the popular mandate of the state. In order to bring back the expected goal according to Rigby it is fundamental to install humanitarian diplomacy tools to establish ethnic harmony.

The definition by Galtung identifies that the perpetrators and victims are both equal irrespective of minority or majority status, and in the case of Sri Lanka, the relevance of these will appear problematic and even possibly be seriously questioned, due to the triumphalism that followed the decisive victory of the state over the LTTE (Thaheer *et al*. 2013). It can also be argued that the Tamil minority in the war zones and also in the state ruled territories had no choice but was forcibly influenced by terror tactics. The perception of the Sinhala majority is that LTTE represents the general aspiration of the Tamil community, which is difficult to disconnect and in this context state institutions also endorse and promote the same perspective. Both sides that seek reconciliation need to accept "reconciliation" as a societal process. First it is important to establish or build relationships which will pave the way for substantive reconciliation, which in turn is imperative for sustainable peace.

The next important factor is how can this problematic issue be mediated or influenced in the reconciliation process locally? HD plays a vital role in persuading decision makers to address the core issues which are sidelined at present, and HD tools provides the platform to revisit this issue from a humanitarian diplomacy angle. HD is defined by the IFRC as "persuading decision-makers and opinion leaders to act, at all times, in the interests of vulnerable people, and with full respect for fundamental humanitarian principles" (IFRC, 2012, p.3). The definition makes it clear that HD is rooted in the same process and ambition as that implied by the term 'advocacy:' the objective of persuading decision-makers and opinion leaders. Advocacy is defined by the IFRC as speaking in support of a particular individual, group of people, a cause or a policy (IFRC, 2012, p.3). Advocacy is the deliberate process of pleading in support of, or speaking in favor of someone or something (a cause or a policy). It is a means to an end, a tool for positive social change, a way to highlight the problems that may be solved through a change of government policy approach or emphasis, a change of funding or resourcing, through pressure brought to bear by the demands of the public or change to legislation.

According to the LLRC Report the following narrative reflects the importance of HD tools and also the influence that Deshodaya Forums carry in bringing back the lost lives of the minority and persuading the majority to follow a path which would enable the reconciliation process.

> *"Despite the new opportunities, there is a severe resentment among the Tamil people. Sinhalese visitors to Jaffna speak to us in Sinhala as if we are obliged to know Sinhala. Soldiers summon us from*

> *afar with a wag of a finger ..... we feel we are being treated like a conquered people although we ourselves suffered under the LTTE. Every day the Government delays a solution, the people wonder more if the LTTE was right after all. The opportunity to rebuild a nation must not be frittered away as seems to be happening" (LLRC Report, 2011, p.257)*

The LLRC Report recommends organizations or institutions to make progress with regard to this aspect. Interfaith Reconciliation and Peace Committees that may be established at District and Provincial levels could function as a feeder mechanism to support the functions of the Special Institution, in particular, by providing grass root level inputs in the implementation of measures aimed at inter-ethnic and inter-religious harmony. The activity carried out by the Deshodaya forums reflects the importance of the said recommendation by the LLRC Report.

In this context the contribution of internal nongovernmental actors plays a significant role since they are ideally situated to address the issue with vast experience of local dynamics.

3.1 The role of Deshodaya Forums in the reconciliation process

Deshodaya Forums attached to Sarvodaya is established as a people's organization formed to discuss issues related to modern democracy. It focuses on empowering the rural community and it is a political school in the modern context. The main objective is to gather community groups for discussions, seminars, dialogues and lectures with a clear focus on issues related with good governance, reconciliation and consensual politics. This forum enables local communities to discuss in-depth issues connected to individuals and social issues, and to find solutions with the consensus of the local communities in a participatory manner.

The main objectives of the Deshodaya Forums (Sarvodaya, 2009, p.4) are closely linked with humanitarian diplomacy and are as follows:

- Create space for the public sphere among local communities and to develop a culture of participatory decision-making to establish national unity and co-existence.
- Gather people from different age groups who are recognized or accepted by society to discuss the present context and to develop a philosophy for the future.
- Establish relationships through mutual respect and trust and to strengthen the network with other civil societies.
- To persuade and actively engage the local and urban community to form a formidable pro-people state to accelerate development.
- To influence political transformation through sustainable public participation and to form social transformation from grass-root to national levels.

Deshodaya Forums are composed of 50% Sarvodaya staff and the other 50% from the local community. Each district forum is expected to have 75-100 members. These District Deshodaya Forums are conscious of gender balance and ethnic, religious, age and designation-based representation of the district population.


3.2 The initiatives carried out by the Deshodaya Forums in establishing ethnic harmony and visible distinct features of humanitarian diplomacy tools

Deshodaya Forums launched a programme in 2010 with the theme "Heart to Heart" as an initial step to heal the wounds of the perpetrators as well as the war victims, and to establish ethnic harmony between the Sinhala majority and Tamil minority communities. This is an opportunity for both parties to forgive and forget past incidents and move forward with the aim of reconciliation. It is a difficult process since these communities' needs to be persuaded to act accordingly, and the humanitarian diplomacy tools enable the vulnerable groups to build trust and confidence to establish relationships. The Deshodaya Forums in order to strengthen ethnic harmony conducts multi-ethnic cultural exchange programmes where the Tamil minority is enabled to socialize in the Southern part of Sri Lanka and also the Sinhala majority vice versa. Although the local community have the right to access internal territories irrespective of minority or majority division it is important that they also become familiar and respect the cultural settings of one another.

The following initiatives by Deshadaya forums are related to HD and are ongoing activities. They are connected with humanitarian diplomacy.

1. Mediation. Having learned bitter lessons in the past, the present society requires a forum to mediate issues connected to the locality through a participatory approach. Handing over these to technically set-up administrative structures distance the local community from seeking redress. In this context Deshodaya Forums address this issue by connecting the local community through a strategic approach. These forums accommodate mediation, negotiations, advisory functions, settlement through mediation and arbitration. The staff of Sarvodaya is trained for this purpose. These forums also adopt methods such as facilitating, forming associations and developing policy debates.
2. Advocacy. Deshodaya Forums influence the local community based on awakening the nation theme, specifically focusing on strengthening the relationships between the Tamil minority and the Sinhala majority. The advocacy role empowers the local community to influence the prevailing order (IFRC, 2012, p.6) and these forums focus on issues connected with ethnic harmony at policy level.
3. Nonviolent resistance approach. Sarvodaya Movement as well as Deshodaya Forums in all activities do follow this path. In order to discipline the individuals, the best approach is to tap into the spiritual and cultural context. Next, is to approach social, political and organizational structures. These key aspects are channeled through various HD tools such as persuasion, mediation and negotiation skills.
4. Consensual decision making. Deshodaya Forums, in order to establish peaceful co-existence to strengthen ethnic harmony in the reconciliation process, attempt to persuade the local community to reach a win-win solution replacing the winner/loser culture. Reaching common consensus is a fundamental principle of Deshodaya Forums. The minority and majority mentality will also fade away in the future where one ethnic group is not at an advantage since decisions are arrived at having understood the specific situation carefully. It also has a rich essence of attentive listening, empathizing and accepting pluralistic ideals.
5. A strong justification for establishing much required software of persuasion. Sarvodaya has established an 'ethos' or as a credible institution based on their knowledge and expertise in the field of social development over fifty years. This enables them to persuade state actors and local communities as well as other stakeholders to work towards building ethnic harmony.

Humanitarian Diplomacy practices reflected through Deshodaya Forum



5. DATA ANALYSIS & INTERPRETATION

5.1 Finding of the Primary Data – Telephonic Interviews

During the study respondents spoke about the efforts taken by Deshodaya Forums in order to strengthen ethnic harmony. These programmes are as follows:

1. "Heart to Heart" programme conducted in the Northern & Eastern Province of Sri Lanka, which has been successfully conducted during the early stage of reconciliation.
2. Multi ethnic cultural exchange programme,which is ongoing.
3. Youth Peace Brigade. Although this is not directly affiliated to the Deshodaya Forums it strengthens capacity since the youth wing is represented by this sister organization of Sarvodaya Movement named Shanthi Sena. It includes taking initiatives in peace building, promoting democracy and governance by conducting peace dialogues, inter-religious dialogues, youth exchange programmes, youth camps, leadership training programmes, sports for peace programmes and pen pal programmes in order to build bridges among the different ethnic and religious communities in Sri Lanka.

Although humanitarian diplomacy tools are instilled and practiced, the term HD is a relatively new concept to 2/3rd of the sample population. The respondents perceived HD in the context of supporting the local community in establishing ethnic harmony but were unaware as to how it connects to developing ethnic harmony in the reconciliation process. The respondents reported that the local community is also unaware of the humanitarian diplomacy concept, and so it is equally important to familiarize and popularize this concept among the local community to maximize the benefits.

Five respondents discussed how Deshodaya Forums gather the local community to become an influential force to persuade decision makers. These staff members had local and international exposure and working experience with humanitarian organizations. Having explained the scope for HD the respondents were able to make sense of the concepts as well as the purpose of the study.

The majority view was that local actors involved in the reconciliation process have not handled the root causes for the ethnic conflicts in a proper manner and were focusing only on infrastructure developments, ignoring the fundamental element of the reconciliation process which is to establish trust and confidence among the communities to strengthen their relationship. The respondents revealed that fear psychosis and suspicious attitudes still prevail in society. In this context respondents were of the view that Deshodaya Forums are cultivating a new culture by mending these relationships to establish ethnic harmony, and as a credible institution the state actors and local community recognizes the services of Sarvodaya.

The respondents were aware of the main humanitarian principles since the Sarvodaya Movement is closely linked to Buddhist philosophy. These humanitarian principles are practiced in non-violent resistance as well as in consensual decision-making.

Responding to "how ethnic harmony is practiced through HD" six respondents revealed that mediation, negotiation and advocacy can be identified as HD tools. Another four respondents reported that the local community in the North is influenced through Deshodaya Forums to restore the lost connectivity and build strong relationships.

With regard to challenges, the study very clearly reveals that the respondents indicated little knowledge on HD and according to Deshodaya Officers, the local community has the same weakness. The following were revealed as the challenges in practicing HD tools to establish ethnic harmony.

1. The prevailing system does not support civil societies and NGOs to address these issues and the state actors and Sinhala majority fear that such initiatives will re-activate the LTTE movement. War Hero's Day is only commemorated by state actors but the family members of the LTTE cadres are prohibited to celebrate. Equal rights need to be practiced and Deshodaya Forums are persuading state actors as well as the Sinhala majority to revisit this as an immediate issue.

2. Deshodaya Forums have not framed the core message in a proper manner to suit the audience. The Heart to Heart programme was successful at a particular stage but twelve years after the war this issue needs to be reframed to suit the current context.
3. The reconciliation process is understood as establishing normalcy but not as a process. In this context the importance of building relationships between the Sinhala majority and Tamil minority are sidelined. The assistance of the opinion leaders plays a vital role in connecting the two different communities to build lost connections. Sarvodaya needs to collaborate with partners with similar interests as stakeholders to strengthen their influence. Isolated work weakens the strength of Sarvodaya since state actors tend to suppress such initiatives as the expectation is to establish normalcy.
4. The dependency mentality and the absence of a reforming mindset prevents the local communities from undertaking collective work towards establishing ethnic harmony. Local communities accept the actions and the decisions of the rulers without questioning and the existing subservient culture is a challenge to empowering local communities. In this context Deshodaya Forums needs to empower the local community to be equal partners and to overcome the master-servant relationship established between the ruler and the ruled.
5. Funding and resources for such initiatives are also lacking and it is difficult to sustain these activities.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS

The study recommends the following:

1. Capacity building among the Deshodaya Officials attached to Sarvodaya Movement and also the local community with a special focus on HD and HD tools is vital since the local community also requires similar training.
2. Promoting the advocacy initiative to attract and influence state actors and local communities to address issues of ethnic harmony as important factors in the reconciliation process. The opinion leaders play a vital role in establishing ethnic harmony since they are the most credible actors in the local context. Already twelve years have lapsed since ethnic conflict ended and the most important factor of mending, healing and establishing relationships needs to be handled in a manner that touches the hearts and minds of the local masses.
3. Strengthening resources by signing cooperation agreements with local humanitarian actors and jointly promoting advocacy programmes with community-based organizations. This will enable them to deliver the advocacy programmes in an innovative manner as well as ease the burden on funding issues. Stakeholder mapping will be a way out to overcome these challenges in future programmes. It will also lead to strengthening the influencing capacity on the part of the Sarvodaya and the state actors who will be compelled to address this issue.
4. Establishing a communication and advocacy strategy to attract policy makers. This will enable the framing of core issues in a timely manner.
5. Building a task force within the local community in all twenty-five districts through Deshodaya Forum to actively involve and persuade the local community in building ethnic harmony. This will also empower the local community to build strong personalities, make their presence felt and mould their attitudes and values to establish ethnic harmony.
6. To persuade and influence the state actors to offer civic education at secondary and tertiary levels so that the young generation cultivates a culture that adheres to the value system that will build a strong foundation for co-existence and mutual respect.

7. CONCLUSIONS

This study concludes that Deshodaya Forums attached to the Sarvodaya Movement needs to revisit its HD approach and HD tools in persuading decision makers and to contribute with a proper focus on establishing ethnic harmony in the country. However, this study is limited to the northern part of Sri Lanka. The capacities can be strengthened with networking and this will enable local nongovernmental actors to bargain with a powerful voice at a time when ethnic harmony in the reconciliation process needs to be addressed urgently. Finally, the younger generation needs to be moulded through formal and informal education to adhere to a democratic value system which upholds a strong justification for ethnic harmony.

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Catherine Raymond

Independent advisor in organizational development - MAP

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Optimiser l'impact des interventions d'Ixoqib'Miriam par le développement de sa valeur ajoutée et de ses capacités stratégiques d'influence et de résilience

Optimiser l'impact des interventions d'Ixoqib'Miriam par le développement de sa valeur ajoutée et de ses capacités stratégiques d'influence et de résilience

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RÉSUMÉ

Le milieu humanitaire connaît aujourd'hui une phase de transformation importante qui exige un recentrage sur l'éthique de l'action, dont l'une des caractéristiques majeures est la priorisation du développement des capacités d'influence et de résilience (Ryfman, 2016). Dans un milieu de plus en plus compétitif marqué par une multiplication des acteurs et par des attentes toujours plus grandes de la part des bailleurs de fonds, ces stratégies d'influence doivent être intégrées dans les plans de développement des organisations humanitaires elles-mêmes.

Se démarquer sur l'échiquier de l'écosystème humanitaire demande non seulement une expertise de pointe, mais aussi un large éventail de compétences organisationnelles telles que la capacité d'influence, de persuasion, de négociation, de *leadership* et de mobilisation des différents acteurs d'une communauté.

Quelles stratégies devraient être incluses dans un processus transformationnel de valorisation de la valeur ajoutée d'une organisation et de développement de ses compétences organisationnelles ? Comment articuler ces stratégies de manière à construire un modèle adapté aux besoins identifiés par les employées, partenaires, gestionnaires et participantes des projets ?

La présente recherche vise à modéliser un processus de transformation et de développement organisationnel adapté aux besoins de renforcement des compétences nécessaires pour augmenter l'impact des interventions d'I'AM, une ONG humanitaire guatémaltèque locale qui intervient auprès des femmes victimes de violence, et, par le fait même, l'impact des bailleurs de fonds dans la prévention, l'intervention et l'adaptation des populations vulnérables.

INTRODUCTION

Après plus de 35 ans de conflits armés internes, le Guatemala tente de guérir les blessures que ces affrontements ont causées, et de se reconstruire socialement. Toutefois, l'intensité et la durée de ces conflits ont permis à cette violence, surtout celle envers les filles et les femmes, de s'incruster dans la culture guatémaltèque, au point d'en paraître banale. À la fin des conflits, certaines initiatives de « reconstruction » ont été tentées, mais elles n'ont pu, jusqu'à maintenant, renverser la tendance toujours à la hausse des crimes violents envers les femmes au Guatemala.

l'AM, dans son approche globale de la fille et de la femme indigènes victimes de violence, offre des ateliers de valorisation et de développement des connaissances et des compétences, des formations de développement personnel et social incluant la cosmovision maya, ainsi que des bourses d'études pour soutenir les femmes dans leur cheminement vers l'autonomie financière. Une quinzaine d'intervenantes travaillent dans les bureaux d'l'AM à Guatemala Ciudad, mais elles sont en tout une centaine, réparties dans les communautés mayas, à appuyer les victimes de violence à travers cette organisation.

Contexte

Le milieu humanitaire connaît aujourd'hui une phase de transformation importante qui exige un recentrage sur l'éthique de l'action, dont l'une des caractéristiques majeures est la priorisation du développement des capacités d'influence et de résilience (Ryfman, 2016). Au niveau des organisations, la résilience est décrite comme étant « *une qualité, qui permet de s'adapter aux perturbations et comme un processus dynamique, qui induit une relation symbiotique au sein de l'organisation et entre cette dernière et son environnement* » (Vogus et Sutcliffe, 2007). Comme il n'est pas possible pour les organisations de prédire l'avenir, le renforcement de leur capacité de résilience organisationnelle est donc la clé de leur adaptation à l'environnement et de leur survie (Williams et Shepherd, 2016).

Dans son rapport « L'avenir de l'aide humanitaire – Les ONG en 2030 », l'*Inter-Agency Research and Analysis Network* émet certaines recommandations aux ONG, afin de s'assurer qu'elles contribuent efficacement à la diminution des souffrances humaines et au développement de la résilience des communautés. D'après ce rapport, les ONG doivent développer leurs capacités stratégiques et leur influence, ainsi que réfléchir à la valeur ajoutée qu'elles apportent et à la façon dont elles se positionneront dans l'écosystème humanitaire vis-à-vis des autres acteurs. Elles doivent également analyser le potentiel d'optimisation de leurs activités en se restructurant, en se recentrant ou en établissant des partenariats pour augmenter leur impact. C'est en se basant sur ce constat que la présente proposition de recherche a été développée.

Ce questionnement organisationnel et les négociations que présuppose un positionnement stratégique dans un environnement complexe d'acteurs, ainsi que la coordination indispensable entre différents intervenants nécessitent plusieurs habiletés diplomatiques telles que le *leadership*, la capacité d'influencer et de mobiliser, une communication interne et externe efficace, et le développement d'une vision stratégique.

l'AM existe depuis près de vingt ans et n'a jamais remis en cause ses façons de faire, ses objectifs, ni sa raison d'être. Dans un écosystème de plus en plus compétitif, elle ne fait pas le poids contre des ONG proactives et entreprenantes. Devant les récentes menaces de retrait à peine voilées de ses bailleurs de fonds, elle n'a plus le choix : elle doit se remettre en question. La résilience commence dès lors qu'un constat est établi. l'AM s'engagera donc dans un processus de changement.

Question de recherche

Quelles stratégies devraient être incluses dans un processus transformationnel de développement des capacités organisationnelles de pouvoir et d'influence, et comment articuler ces stratégies de manière à construire un modèle adapté aux besoins spécifiques d'l'AM, afin qu'elle optimise l'impact de ses interventions auprès des communautés vulnérables ?

Méthodologie

La recherche a commencé par l'analyse d'une revue de littérature portant sur les capacités organisationnelles nécessaires en intervention humanitaire, pour laquelle les rapports de l'IFRC, de l'IRIS, de l'*Inter-Agency Research and Analysis Network* et de l'UNISDR, ainsi que les recherches de Tadanori (2012), Mouton (2012) et Ryfman (2016) ont été utilisés afin d'appuyer le modèle à développer. Elle sera complétée par l'utilisation des travaux de Kotter (1995) et de Lewin (1947) en ce qui concerne les aspects stratégiques du processus transformationnel d'une organisation en tenant compte des facteurs liés à la résistance au changement.

De plus, trois outils de collecte de données ont été développés : l'évaluation à 360 degrés, pour permettre de qualifier la perception des intervenants de l'environnement internes et externes de l'organisation ; l'analyse FODA, pour connaître la vision des intervenants internes quant aux forces, faiblesses, menaces et opportunités de leur organisation ; enfin, la même matrice, qui a été utilisée pour identifier les possibilités de développement et les solutions envisageables. Ces outils ont été soumis à un prétest, afin de les valider auprès de certains intervenants.

La matrice FODA de développement a été distribuées à 13 employées permanentes de l'ONG. Le temps pour remplir la matrice n'était pas limité, et les questionnaires étaient anonymes.

L'évaluation 360 degrés consistait en 33 questions portant sur différentes compétences organisationnelles que les personnes interrogées devaient évaluer de 1 (très rarement) à 7 (toujours). Les questionnaires ont été distribués en personne aux différentes catégories de répondants (employées, partenaires et bailleurs de fonds, participantes aux programmes, administrateurs et gestionnaires). À la fin de l'exercice, 76 personnes avaient été sondées. Quelques formulaires ont été rejetés, pour un total de 67 questionnaires compilés puis analysés. La compilation a été réalisée de façon confidentielle, en tenant toutefois compte des différentes catégories de répondants, afin de permettre une lecture différenciée des résultats obtenus.

GRANDES ÉTAPES DU PROCESSUS D'OPTIMISATION D'IMPACT

Les étapes suivantes constituent la charpente de la stratégie d'optimisation de l'impact des interventions d'l'AM par le renforcement de ses capacités d'influence et le développement de sa valeur ajoutée. Bien que, dans le cadre de cette recherche, seules les deux premières étapes de ce processus seront traitées, il est intéressant de pouvoir projeter la démarche depuis une conception globale du processus d'optimisation.

- Identification des forces et faiblesses de l'organisation.
- Développement d'un processus de changement organisationnel.
- Identification d'un créneau à valeur ajoutée (proposition de valeur).
- Renforcement des capacités en fonction des objectifs souhaités.
- Campagnes de relations publiques et de plaidoyer (positionnement d'experts dans un champ d'action spécifique et développement de la reconnaissance de la part des gouvernements, des grandes agences et des pairs, et accroissement de la crédibilité et de la légitimité).
- Intégration de l'organisation dans la chaîne de valeur humanitaire et dans le continuum de services aux communautés vulnérables.


INTERPRÉTATION DES DONNÉES

Résultats de l'évaluation interne et externe de l'organisation


L'évaluation 360 degrés a permis d'identifier certaines faiblesses perçues au niveau des capacités diplomatiques de l'organisation. Les écarts entre l'évaluation des gestionnaires et des membres du conseil d'administration et celle des employées et des partenaires sont parfois importants, ce qui permet de conclure qu'il y a des divergences entre les attentes de ces groupes et la réalité perçue.

Évaluation du pouvoir d'influence perçu

On constate une perception de faible capacité de l'organisation à influencer de la part des partenaires (3,5) et les employées (4,5) et une perception inverse de la part des dirigeants (6 et 5,5).




Les gestionnaires (5,5) ont encore ici une perception plus positive des capacités de l'organisation que celle des autres groupes interrogés (µ 4,6).



La question touchant la capacité de rallier les autres à son point de vue a été l'une de celles obtenant la plus faible évaluation (µ 4,4/7). Les administrateurs de l'organisation ont noté 3,3, alors que les gestionnaires ont noté 4. Cette faiblesse au niveau de la capacité d'influence est donc bien connue des dirigeants.



Avec une moyenne de 4,6/7, cet aspect compte parmi les plus faibles de l'évaluation. Une organisation qui ne connaît pas ou qui connaît peu les influences externes qui peuvent agir sur son travail n'est pas en mesure d'évaluer avec justesse les enjeux reliés à ses interventions et les menaces de l'écosystème dans lequel elle évolue (Mintzberg, 1985).




Autre capacité indispensable en diplomatie humanitaire, la capacité de négocier et de résoudre des conflits est perçue comme déficiente de la part des administrateurs (3,5), des partenaires (4,3) et des employées (4,6).




Avec une moyenne de 4,5, l'aspect de la reconnaissance de l'expertise de l'organisation par les acteurs de son écosystème peut être mis en relation avec la faible capacité à développer son réseau ainsi que la faiblesse de sa capacité d'influence. Le positionnement de l'organisation peut également être « flou » et ne pas permettre aux intervenants externes d'avoir une idée précise de la mission de l'organisation.






Autre point critique révélé par cette évaluation : la perception de la part des partenaires (3,3) en ce qui a trait au partage de l'information et à la transparence. Cet aspect peut rapidement mener à une perte de confiance et donc au retrait des bailleurs de fonds. Bien que la confiance soit issue d'un processus de construction et déconstruction dynamique et variable dans le temps (Gurviez et Korchia, 2002), il semble que cette perception soit assez négative pour compromettre l'avenir de la collaboration. Les employées notent également faiblement cet aspect, ce qui peut être un signe précurseur d'un faible sentiment d'appartenance à l'organisation, d'une faible mobilisation et/ou d'un manque de motivation (McShane, Steen, Benabou, 2013).



Ici, ce sont les administrateurs qui notent la capacité d'adaptation et de résilience le plus faiblement (4). Il peut s'agir d'une perception de résistance au changement ou d'un différend en ce qui concerne les orientations prises par les administrateurs ou les gestionnaires de l'organisation.

Étant donné les nombreux écarts entre la perception des gestionnaires et celle des autres groupes interrogés, il apparaît clairement que ces premiers surestiment les capacités diplomatiques de leur organisation, de même que sa capacité à reconnaître ses forces et ses faiblesses. Ces écarts révèlent soit un important manque d'écoute et de recul de la part des gestionnaires, soit une faiblesse au niveau des compétences nécessaires afin de gérer et de développer une organisation.



Ici encore, l'écart entre la perception des gestionnaires (6,5), celle des partenaires (3,6) et celle des employées (4,5) est important. Il peut s'agir d'un manque de vision perçu ou alors d'une mauvaise communication des objectifs de développements futurs auprès de ces groupes.



En résumé

Les gestionnaires seront donc probablement les plus difficiles à convaincre que des changements importants s'imposent au niveau du positionnement stratégique de l'organisation et de l'importance des besoins en renforcement de capacités au niveau des habiletés diplomatiques d'influence et de vision organisationnelle. Les administrateurs devront agir de façon stratégique pour ne pas brusquer les gestionnaires en place tout en imposant un plan de développement et de positionnement organisationnel.

Bien que la gestion de l'information (rétention et diffusion) puisse faire partie d'une stratégie efficace pour l'accroissement du pouvoir et de l'influence, cet aspect semble ne pas être bien maîtrisé par la direction, puisque les partenaires bailleurs de fonds (3,33) et les employées (4,92) perçoivent un manque important à ce niveau, ce qui peut miner la confiance et l'engagement dans la mission de l'organisation.

Les partenaires expriment à plusieurs reprises leur perception de faiblesse en ce qui a trait, entre autres, à la vision d'avenir, à la capacité de négocier et de résoudre des conflits, et à la capacité d'influence. Ces perceptions de faib-

lesse ajoutées au manque de transparence perçu peuvent mettre en péril le financement des projets de l'organisation, et même la poursuite de ses opérations.

Les employées, de leur côté, pointent des faiblesses au niveau des capacités d'influence, de la vision, du positionnement stratégique, du partage de l'information et de la résolution de conflits. Il faudra donc tenir compte de ces résultats en plus de prévoir des mécanismes de réduction de la résistance aux changements – implication, consultation et validation (Bareil, 2004) – dans le modèle qui sera développé.



Les problématiques soulevées par le FODA concordent avec les constats de l'évaluation 360 degrés, et les solutions proposées répondent majoritairement aux besoins de l'organisation en matière de développement des capacités d'influence, de négociation, de positionnement stratégique et de réseautage avec l'écosystème en place.

La structure horizontale qu'a développée l'organisation peut engendrer plusieurs types de problématiques, dont trois sont présentes chez l'AM. La structure horizontale vise un plus grand sens des responsabilités et une augmentation de l'autonomie chez les employé(e)s. Toutefois, l'absence de direction formelle, de mécanismes de management et d'un *leader* clairement identifié génère un sentiment de confusion des rôles et donne lieu à des luttes pour l'obtention de plus de pouvoir dans l'organisation. Le partage de l'information et de l'expertise des employé(e)s est également restreint, puisqu'il s'agit de l'un des prérequis du pouvoir dans les structures horizontales. « *Une structure hiérarchique est petit à petit mise en place en fonction de l'expertise des employé(e)s. Nous observons que l'influence prend racine dans l'expertise des individus sur un sujet* » (Widrich, 2016).


Ainsi, aux faiblesses organisationnelles déjà identifiées dans l'évaluation 360 degrés s'ajoutent le manque d'organisation interne, la faible motivation de l'équipe et le manque de *leadership*. Le peu de crédibilité de l'organisation, la faible reconnaissance externe et la crainte de retrait des bailleurs de fonds sont également soulignés à plusieurs reprises.

RISQUES

Tout changement comporte sa part de risques. Voici une évaluation de ce qui pourrait toucher l'organisation dans le cadre de ce processus.

RISQUES	Probabilité (1 bas, 3 élevé)	Gravité (1 bas, 3 élevé)	Niveau de risque (1 bas, 3 élevé)	Stratégies de mitigation des risques
Résistance au changement.	3	2	2	Impliquer les gens touchés dès le début du processus et les consulter avant chaque nouvelle étape.
Démission de certaines personnes réfractaires au changement.	2	1	1	Mettre en place des mesures permettant l'expression des insatisfactions. Processus accéléré de sélection de personnel.
Démotivation des employées avant la mise en place des mesures.	2	2	2	Rapidement informer les employées afin de leur démontrer le travail en cours.
Retrait des bailleurs de fonds avant l'obtention de résultats.	1	3	2	Établir un plan d'action avec des objectifs à court, moyen et long terme afin de pouvoir constater des améliorations rapidement.
Refus d'inclure l'AM dans l'écosystème de la défense des droits des femmes de la part de certains intervenants.	1	1	1	Miser sur les alliances existantes pour faciliter l'inclusion dans les réseaux.

À la lumière des résultats des évaluations et de ces observations, il est possible de bâtir une stratégie de changement organisationnel en tenant compte de l'ensemble des facteurs identifiés précédemment.




PRINCIPALES ÉTAPES DU MODÈLE DÉVELOPPÉ

L'approche systémique utilisée prend en compte les relations entre les différents éléments impliqués, afin de faire évoluer les attitudes et les comportements en effectuant des changements dans le contexte et le fonctionnement de l'organisation.

Processus transformationnel selon Kotter, 1995, et Lewin, 1947

Comme le changement n'est possible que si l'individu surmonte la résistance et/ou la crainte causées par la transformation de son organisation (Bruyat, 2001), et que cette résistance trouve sa source autant dans

l'environnement culturel, social et économique que dans les perceptions individuelles, l'ensemble de la réflexion sera intégré dans un cadre conceptuel plus large, inspiré de la théorie du changement de Kotter et également sur la théorie cognitive du comportement de Lewin.



Composantes de l'attitude et théorie cognitive

À l'aide de la théorie psychosociale, il est possible de décortiquer la dynamique des individus entre eux et envers le changement. En effet, de cette manière, il est concevable d'expliquer la situation en évitant l'erreur attributionnelle fondamentale (Lee Ross, 1977), et en identifiant et en distinguant les variables de causalité externes et internes (Weiner, 1974, 1986) pouvant influencer les perceptions et les comportements.

Il est alors possible de combiner cette théorie avec la théorie cognitive (Vaidis, 2006), qui, elle, explique le comportement par les relations qui unissent les perceptions, les pensées et les sentiments, et de mettre en relation ces deux modèles.

Si la perception de l'environnement influence les pensées et les sentiments, l'inverse est aussi plausible. Les comportements, dictés par les perceptions, les pensées et les sentiments, peuvent être à l'origine de changements dans l'environnement. Afin de modifier les perceptions et les comportements, les interventions doivent tenir compte des individus et de leurs caractéristiques propres, et non pas seulement de l'environnement dans lequel ils évoluent.

Stratégie de développement du pouvoir et de l'influence

La communication est l'outil de base lorsqu'il est question de stratégie d'influence et, comme il est impossible de ne pas communiquer, mieux vaut connaître certaines techniques avant de se lancer. Les modes interactionnels sont inclus dans le processus au niveau de la stratégie d'influence et de pouvoir, puisqu'ils font partie des méthodes de base en négociation de toute nature. Adopter une position symétrique ou complémentaire peut faire toute la différence dans l'issue d'une négociation. Les sources possibles de pouvoir étant la compétence ou l'expertise, le réseau d'influence, l'information détenue, la maîtrise de l'environnement interne et externe (Crozier et Friedberg, 1981), l'influence ainsi que le pouvoir de facilitation (Fallery, 2016), la stratégie place ces éléments au centre du processus (bilan du pouvoir et de l'influence, et interventions nécessaires), afin d'assurer une intervention globale et d'en optimiser l'impact.

RECOMMANDATIONS ET CONCLUSION

Formations

À la suite des évaluations 360 degrés et FODA, il a été possible d'identifier des lacunes au niveau de certaines capacités de gestion, surtout au niveau des capacités diplomatiques (négociation, capacité d'influence, réseaux de contacts et communication). Des formations devraient être dispensées auprès des gestionnaires et des coordonnatrices de projets, afin de leur fournir les outils nécessaires pour participer à la stratégie « d'*empowerment* » de leur organisation.

Outils de communication interne et externe


Les bailleurs de fonds ont clairement identifié la transparence comme étant un point faible de l'organisation. Comme l'enjeu, ici, est le financement des activités, et donc la survie de l'organisation, il est primordial d'intervenir, afin d'améliorer cette perception négative. Un bulletin mensuel pourrait être rédigé une fois par mois pour permettre un meilleur partage des réalisations et de l'information sur les projets en cours. Ce bulletin pourrait également permettre à l'équipe en place de mieux comprendre la vision de son organisation et ses enjeux.

Représentations, campagne de relations publiques et plaidoyer

Le pouvoir est toujours une relation entre deux parties et ne s'établit que si les deux parties s'intègrent dans un ensemble organisé (Crozier, 1963). Ainsi, différentes interventions devront être faites, afin de permettre l'intégration d'l'AM dans les réseaux formels et informels de l'écosystème guatémaltèque de la défense des droits des femmes. Afin d'intégrer ces réseaux, l'AM pourrait d'abord demander à être introduite par une organisation avec laquelle elle travaille fréquemment, déjà très impliquée et reconnue au Guatemala.

Une stratégie de relations publiques pour supporter le processus de changement de perception est essentielle afin d'ancrer la nouvelle image chez les partenaires, les collaborateurs, les élus, les bailleurs de fonds et les autres institutions de l'écosystème.

L'objectif ultime de cette stratégie sera de positionner l'AM comme étant une organisation efficace et efficiente qui a su développer une expertise de grande valeur en ce qui a trait à la prévention et à l'intervention auprès des femmes indigènes. Les acteurs externes pourront mieux intégrer la nouvelle image et les nouvelles pratiques organisationnelles d'l'AM si la stratégie prévoit plusieurs types d'interventions et s'adresse à tous les intervenants touchés par ces changements.



Cette stratégie devra être assortie d'une campagne de plaidoyer, afin de positionner l'AM comme étant une organisation leader de la défense des droits des femmes et de viser directement la classe politique. Les interventions ne devraient pas dépasser le niveau de la mobilisation des partenaires pour ne pas qu'l'AM soit étiquetée comme étant opposée au pouvoir en place, mais plutôt comme une alliée potentielle. L'enjeu pourrait être de réclamer une campagne nationale de prévention de la violence « genrée », par exemple.

l'AM, comme bien d'autres ONG locales, fait face à de nombreux défis qui ébranlent l'ensemble de ses activités. La multiplication des acteurs et la compétition de plus en plus intense dans le milieu humanitaire l'obligent à remettre en question son fonctionnement, ses façons de faire et sa structure. Son positionnement stratégique, le développement de ses réseaux et l'accroissement de son influence sont au cœur des transformations indispensables au maintien de ses activités. La résilience nécessaire, surtout de la part de ses dirigeants et de ses intervenantes, sera déterminante dans le succès de cette stratégie d'optimisation de l'impact des interventions par la valorisation de la valeur ajoutée et par le développement du pouvoir et de l'influence.

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
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Annexe :

Échéancier





Åsa Sandberg

IFRC Head of country delegation DPRK
(at the time of writing: Head of Desk DPRK at the Swedish Red Cross)

Humanitarian Diplomacy February 2019

How successful is the Red Cross Red Crescent humanitarian diplomacy for the people of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea?

How successful is the Red Cross Red Crescent humanitarian diplomacy for the people of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea?

Tutor: Thiwankee Wickramasinghe

Date of submission: May 2019

Word count: 4,659

ACRONYMS

CBDRR	Community-Based Disaster Risk Reduction
CCST	Country Cluster Support Team
DPRK RCS	DPRK Red Cross Society
DREF	Disaster Relief Emergency Fund
GHI	Global Hunger Index
HD	Humanitarian Diplomacy
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICRP	Integrated Resilience Development Project
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
MICS	Multi Indicator Cluster Survey
NYC	New York City
RCRC	Red Cross Red Crescent
SRC	Swedish Red Cross
UN	United Nations
UNSC	UN Sanctions Committee
US	United States of America
WASH	Water, Sanitation & Health

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The humanitarian needs of the population in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) are alarmingly widespread according to several United Nations (UN) reports published during 2018 and 2019. The Red Cross Red Crescent (RCRC) Movement, consisting of the DPRK Red Cross Society (DPRK RCS), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) are all present in the country to ensure humanitarian needs are met. The DPRK RCS is operating primarily through locally implemented activities and a wide network of volunteers.

In 2006, as a repercussion for the nuclear tests by the DPRK state, the UN unanimously adopted Resolution 1718. Since then, a number of additional resolutions have been adopted against the DPRK aiming to put pressure on the country in ceasing its nuclear program. Even though the resolutions clearly state that humanitarian aid should be exempted, the political situation and interpretation of the sanctions by the UN Sanctions Committee (UNSC) and governments in general have negatively affected international humanitarian support into the country.

As Humanitarian Diplomacy (HD) actors, the IFRC and the Swedish Red Cross (SRC), along with other humanitarian agencies, in late 2018 took a joint action to speak up for the people of the DPRK with the ambition of reaching an approval of the IFRC exemption application to the UNSC.

Being involved in this action, the researcher's ambition is to look at how this HD action was planned, which were the key steps and factors for success during the process, if the objective for the approval of the IFRC application was reached, and if something could have been done differently. The methodology is based on secondary and primary sources, mainly on qualitative collection of information from a few key interviews. Overall, the research findings shed a positive light on the process itself with its primary objective being reached. However, it was found that there was no clear strategy or plan set up for the action, but the outcome was successful.

The conclusions suggest that the IFRC and RCRC National Societies would benefit from becoming more strategic and systematic in deciding upon and planning HD actions, allowing for future engagement to be even more effective and far reaching for the benefit of the most vulnerable.

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

A. The situation in the DPRK and the RED CROSS RED CRESCENT

Since the mid-1990s, the population in The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (hereafter the DPRK) has suffered from a protracted crisis. The crisis centres on chronic food insecurity, a lack of access to clean and safe water and sanitation, and lack of access to sufficient health care. According to the 2017 Global Hunger Index (GHI), which measures and tracks hunger worldwide, DPRK has a score of 28.2, classifying the situation as 'serious' (UN OCHA, 2018). This situation is exacerbated by recurring natural disasters and hazards. In 2019, it is estimated by the UN OCHA that approximately 10.3 million people are undernourished with one in five children being stunted (UN OCHA, 2019).

All people in DPRK have theoretically equal rights to access health care services free of charge. However, government allocations are insufficient to cover even the basic health needs of people. Health facilities, equipment, medicines or trained staff are lacking in many parts of the country, with obvious disparities in access to services between rural and urban areas. Humanitarian supply of medicine, IFRC being one the suppliers, is much needed but very limited.

Access to clean water is a factor closely linked to health. Large proportions of the country's population do not have access to a functional water supply or clean water, making searching for water in springs and ponds part of the daily routine. According to the UNICEF Multi-Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS 2018, p. 149) in 2017, only 61% of the population had access to safely managed drinking water services. The combination of insufficient access to clean water, appropriate storage of water, and poor hygiene and sanitation allows for waterborne diseases to spread. This in turn has consequences for an individual's nutritional uptake, which is a particular challenge for children in rural areas. The UNICEF survey shows that the under-five mortality rate is 15 out of 100, with one of the leading causes of death being diarrhoea. Correlations between a number of challenges makes vulnerabilities among the population all the more complex.

An additional challenge to DPRK communities across the country, and particularly in the Northern mountainous parts, are disasters such as flash floods and landslides that strike recurrently. This exposed situation increases the risk to life, the destruction of homes, livelihoods and agricultural lands. An increase in the frequency of heavy rains in recent years has contributed to recurrent floods, with major floods hitting the country every year from 2010 until today. To counteract the erosion of land due to high exposure to flooding, agroforestry operations of the DPRK Red Cross (DPRK RCS) seek to reforest hillsides and thus reduce land erosion in a gradual manner to protect livelihoods. The DPRK RCS also supports communities with other mitigation structures to protect villages and their fields, for example by constructing riverbank barriers and bridges.

The DPRK RCS is working through an integrated approach to counter vulnerabilities among the population and attack correlated issues from a number of angles. Since 2014, the DPRK RCS are running the Integrated Community Resilience Programme (ICRP) with support from the IFRC, comprising the components of CBDRR, WASH, Health, Shelter & Livelihood into one joint programme. The DPRK RCS was founded in 1946 and the IFRC started its operations in the DPRK in the mid-1990's (IFRC, 2019). The IFRC coordinates all international support to the DPRK RCS and supports the capacity strengthening of the national DPRK RCS.

Funding for IFRC operations is much dependent on the political context and developments in the geo-political area. As such, funding has proven to be quite unpredictable. The situation of humanitarian aid is much politicised in this context, and there are additional challenges related to the UN sanctions which have had a negative effect on RCRC, and other international actors', humanitarian programs.

Hyonhee Shin (2018) is one journalist who has written about this situation for humanitarian actors in her article *"As food crisis threatens, humanitarian aid for North Korea grinds to a halt"* for Reuters in August 2018 where she points to the fact that total funding for U.N. and NGO activities in North Korea has dropped from $117.8 million in 2012 to $17.1 million in 2018. The strenuous situation is signalled by the IFRC and other international actors to have unintended negative effects on the humanitarian support to the DPRK population during the last years. Issues cover aspects such as, but are not limited to, the following:

- Drop in overall humanitarian funding
- Lack of existing banking channel into the DPRK, causing all operations with outside support difficult to finance and risky to run
- Procurement processes more complicated:
  - Suppliers not willing to sell goods destined for the DPRK
  - Costs increase due to fewer suppliers available
  - Logistics companies sceptical to transport goods to the DPRK
  - Chinese authorities sceptical to grant customs approval
- Administration of procurement and exemption requests to the UN Sanctions Committee (UNSC) are very time-consuming and difficult.

OBJECTIVE & RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The **main objective** of this research paper is to map out and analyse the RCRC process and ambition to act on behalf of the people of the DPRK and their humanitarian situation by influencing the UN Sanctions Committee in 2018/2019 to allow life-saving humanitarian aid into the country. Findings will also provide the basis for recommendations and conclusions for the RCRC Movement Humanitarian Diplomacy (HD) work with the DPRK.

The paper is structured around a set of four main questions, with a set of sub-questions which formed the interviews. These questions are:

Question 1: What were the objectives set up for this HD action?

Question 2: What was the strategy and action plan?

Question 3: How did the action play out?

Question 4: What were the main achievements or key steps on the way and could some things have been done differently?

These questions guide this research and provide the basis for the information sought and experiences shared, which guides the final conclusions and recommendations.

METHODOLOGY

This paper is based on **secondary sources**, such as policies and guidelines of Humanitarian Diplomacy, mainly the IFRC policy on Humanitarian Diplomacy (HD) and other relevant documents. It also looks at UN resolutions against the DPRK and related documents or information.

However, most of the background and analysis is based on **primary sources** of information from personal involvement in this process and from interviews with some of those involved in the work of this HD action and government partners. The main stakeholders consulted in the research are RCRC Movement staff from the SRC and IFRC, as well as the Swedish government. As such, the following key persons have been interviewed: Richard Blewitt (Permanent Observer for International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in New York), Maude Fröberg (Communications & Advocacy Manager IFRC Beijing), Gwendolyn Pang (Head of Country Cluster Support Team, CCST, IFRC Beijing), staff at the Swedish MFA representation in NYC[1] and Margareta Wahlström in Stockholm (Chairwoman of SRC). These people represent, through their professional involvement, important aspects in the data collection as they were all instrumental in this action being researched.

[1] The interviewed person does not want to be presented by name.

The main research approach to gather data is through **qualitative collection of information** from five key interviews. Relevant individuals for this research were chosen based on the uncontrolled quota sampling method, representing a non-probability sampling which is based on the researcher's decision to choose relevant individuals for interview. Semi-structured and open-ended interview questions were asked to the interviewees to learn about their experiences during this process and important steps taken along the way, according to their own subjective perspectives. Applying this method allowed the respondents to reason on the topic and think freely about their answers. This opened up discussions and a good dialogue as all persons interviewed were glad to speak on the topic. One person wishes to be anonymous.

ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Ethical considerations for this paper are taken seriously and the interviewed persons have been informed about their contribution to the document and how their name or title will be presented. Everyone interviewed has done so voluntarily and had a chance to raise any comments about their contribution. Privacy or confidentiality is applied whenever needed.

LIMITATIONS

Limitations to this research are connected to the time aspect and availability of previous research and sources on this topic. The most crucial aspect of the information gathering is therefore through a few qualitative interviews with relevant people selected by the author of this document. The findings and analysis are purely based on the author's own involvement in this action and personal interpretation of the gathered data. Hence, the findings and recommendations are intended for a limited audience, primarily for individuals with an interest within the RCRC Movement.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Research literature is mainly related to the Humanitarian Diplomacy concept and the RCRC on the one hand, and the effects of the DPRK sanctions on humanitarian aid on the other. Existing literature on the topic of the humanitarian effects caused by the sanction's regime against DPRK is relatively limited. The main resources referred to consist of UN Security Council documentation, UN and IFRC resources, and media documentation on the topic.

a. THE CONCEPT OF HUMANITARIAN DIPLOMACY

Humanitarian Diplomacy is essentially a Red Cross concept which is **centred** on the activities and persuasion strategies performed by humanitarian agencies, defining the role of humanitarian actors engaged in humanitarian diplomacy as their responsibility rather than their choice. The ambition and dedication is to persuade decision-makers, opinion leaders and influencers to act, at all times, in the interest of vulnerable people. It implies the responsibility to speak up for those in most **need, whoever** and wherever in the world, based on the fundamental humanitarian principles.[2]

As formulated in the Humanitarian Diplomacy policy in 2009 by the IFRC:

> "The responsibility is a logical extension of the commitment of (Red Cross) National Societies and the International Federation to the fundamental principle of humanity – a commitment that is accepted worldwide as prevailing above all others because of its linkage to international humanitarian law, the Statutes of the Movement and the International Federation Constitution. An orga-

[2] Proclaimed in Vienna in 1965, the seven Fundamental Principles bond together the Red Cross and Red Crescent National Societies, the International Committee of the Red Cross and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. They guarantee the continuity of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and its humanitarian work.

> nization of this kind, with its unique potential to exert considerable influence on decision makers across the world, has a manifest responsibility to do so."

b. IFRC 4 SIGNPOSTS FOR ACTION

In relation to the responsibility to act on behalf of the most vulnerable, according to the IFRC's definition on Humanitarian Diplomacy, all HD actions should be based on the **Four Signposts for Action**, which implies:

- The responsibility to persuade
- Persuading with the appropriate diplomatic tools and actions
- Focusing on areas of knowledge and expertise
- Engaging at appropriate times with partners outside the Movement

c. The Sanctions Regime against the DPRK

Resolution S/RES/1718 was adopted on 14 October 2006 with imposed sanctions against the DPRK in response to its first nuclear test, thereby establishing the 1718 Sanctions Committee (UNSC). The purpose with the resolution is to prohibit the DPRK from conducting nuclear tests or launching ballistic missiles and impose an arms embargo, travel bans on specific persons and freeze on a number of assets. Since 2006, a number of additional resolutions have been adopted to further strengthen the control of goods and materials into the country and restrict the movement of certain individuals. After the latest listing of individuals in 2018, as many as 85 individuals and 75 entities are sanctioned (UN, 2018) under several resolutions imposed since 2006.[3]

The resolutions clarify that sanction measures adopted by the Security Council are not intended to have negative humanitarian consequences for the civilian population of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. They should not restrict food aid and humanitarian assistance that are not prohibited, as well as not obstruct the work of international and non-governmental organisations carrying out assistance and relief activities in the country for the benefit of the civilian population. Furthermore, the resolutions clearly state that the Sanctions Committee may exempt any activity from the measures imposed by these resolutions, if determined that such an exemption is necessary to facilitate the work of such organisations in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

In December 2017, Resolution 2397 (2017) was adopted, specifically pointing to the possibility to apply for humanitarian exemptions to the sanctions' resolutions against DPRK.

This is written in *paragraph 25 of resolution 2397:*

> "…. and this resolution, and the work of international and non-governmental organizations carrying out assistance and relief activities in the DPRK for the benefit of the civilian population of the DPRK, stresses the DPRK's primary responsibility and need to fully provide for the livelihood needs of people in the DPRK, and decides that the Committee may, on a case-by-case basis, exempt any activity from the measures imposed by these resolutions if the committee determines that such an exemption is necessary to facilitate the work of such organizations in the DPRK or for any other purpose consistent with the objectives of these resolutions;"

In addition, to clarify the approval process to apply for humanitarian exemptions, the UN Sanctions' committee published the *"Implementation Assistance Notice No. 7: Guidelines for Obtaining Exemptions to Deliver Humanitarian Assistance to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea"* on August 6, 2018, with the intention to inform about the application process.

[3] The Committee was established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) on 14 October 2006 to oversee the relevant sanctions measures relating to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Additional functions were entrusted to the Committee in resolutions 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017).

THE HD PROCESS AND RELEVANT EVENTS

The collection of data from the interviews presents a situation which proved to become very challenging for humanitarian actors during the Spring of 2018, intensifying during the Summer and Fall of the same year. The situation had become increasingly problematic in recent years, and especially during the latter half of 2017 with an intensified situation in the geo-political arena between the United States (US) and the DPRK. The negative effects this development now had on humanitarian funding and access to necessary goods for program implementation affected all international organisations operating in the DPRK. In mid-2018, the effects on the DPRK population were considered alarming and the Red Cross Movement, along with other actors, began to coordinate and raise their voices to collectively address the need for humanitarian support into the DPRK. During this period in 2018, the Swedish government held the position of Chair in the UN Security council and communicated a clear position for humanitarian exemptions to be respected. Critical aspects of the unintended effects of the sanctions were emphasised within the UN Security Council in various discussions and external events, according to the Swedish governments' own webpage (Swedish government, 2018). The Swedes kept pointing to the need to separate politics from humanitarian needs. Side by side with the Swedes, the US technical officials, the Netherlands representatives in NYC and the outgoing U.K. ambassador to DPRK were all involved and supportive of humanitarian exemptions being granted, according to Richard Blewitt.

Contrary to this attitude, the UNSC and some of its members started to pull harder strings on the sanctions against DPRK which in turn had further unintended consequences on humanitarian aid. It became more difficult to get a formal approval on humanitarian exemptions by the Sanction's committee and applications were put on hold rather than given approval. This situation appeared to coincide with the increased geo-political tensions. According to the interviewed, the UN Sanctions committee gave the impression of having very limited awareness and, perhaps, knowledge on how to address the humanitarian exemptions and securing the basic needs for the people of the DPRK.

While many organisations were heavily affected by the difficulties in approvals of their exemption requests, they started to raise their voices and share experiences with each other. In conjunction with the new UNICEF MICS report released in June 2018 and the overall constrained political situation, global media started to show a greater interest in DPRK and the humanitarian situation.

Looking at the Red Cross Movement during this period, the ICRC was granted an exemption during the Summer of 2018. In early August, the IFRC applied for an exemption with a list of items needed in the programs. There was no response by the UNSC for more than a month. Picking up on the situation from New York, Richard Blewitt, Permanent Observer for the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) to the United Nations, decided to approach the chair of the UNSC (the Netherlands) to ask for advice on how to be successful in the approval of the IFRC application. The response was to deliver an application with strong humanitarian language, and a process to rewrite the application started.

During October-December 2018, a number of meetings with technical staff from different countries (Russia, China, USA) in the Committee, were arranged by Mr Blewitt, as well as engagement in building partnerships with OCHA and UNICEF. Additionally, teleconferences were held with IFRC in Asia together with the NYC delegation and UN Sanction Committee technical advisors in order to help them understand the work of the RCRC. The IFRC-DPRK Office also organised field trips to project sites for ambassadors and the UN Resident Coordinator to allow them to understand and see how humanitarian imported materials was being used, and their critical value.

Parallel to the intense engagement and activity in NYC, the IFRC on a global level (Kuala Lumpur, Geneva and Pyongyang) had an ongoing dialogue internally to decide on the next steps and key messages to be developed. At this point, the Swedish Red Cross (SRC) became involved in activities due to Sweden's strong humanitarian support and the SRC commitment to this matter and long partnership with the DPRK Red Cross.

SRC became more actively involved in this intensified HD action after Summer 2018, when Chairwoman Margareta Wahlström decided to visit the country to gather firsthand insight into the present situation and DPRK RCS operations. Ms. Wahlström quickly realised that humanitarian actors, including the IFRC, were tied to their backs. The situation appeared unbearable and it was decided in conjunction with the IFRC to assign Margareta Wahlström as

a media spokesperson on the situation along with Richard Blewitt and the IFRC office in Pyongyang to more loudly raise awareness and speak up on the humanitarian consequences of the sanctions.

A crucial factor allowing rather wide media attention to this pressing issue was the professional IFRC communication staff, in this case Ms. Maude Fröberg, which ensured media coverage and messaging to happen and pushed influential decision-makers to act.[4]

With this background information, it appears that they key factor that started this intensified action, to pressure the UNSC for approval of the IFRC exemption, was the acknowledgment of the situation by IFRC management in the region in early 2018 as informed by Gwendolyn Pang in her replies on May 4, 2019. As the situation grew in intensity, activities were emphasised by Richard Blewitt's initiative to coordinate with IFRC in Asia, using his wide network in the NYC while also linking up with the SRC. Mr. Blewitt's action sparked off after a first NGO meeting on DPRK in October 2018 in NYC, and a way forward was initiated. Connecting this engagement in NYC with SRC's on-the ground experience from DPRK and good dialogue with the Swedish government, allowed for a strong and credible voice for the RCRC to speak up on this issue. SRC and Margareta Wahlström, along with Mr Blewitt, constituted reliable and trustworthy representatives for the RCRC Movement in relation to the UNSC, the media and the public.

Analysing the collected information from the key interviewees, this research aims to answer the four research questions and if the action did respond to the Four Signposts for Action by also referring to the objectives for a successful HD action set out in IFRC humanitarian policy.

Responding to the Four Signposts for action, the findings conclude that these were fully applied. The Red Cross did take its responsibility to persuade decision-makers to act, as stipulated in the policy, since the HD issue was raised, and a collaborative campaign was enforced within the RCRC movement. Appropriate diplomatic tools were applied through the discussions with relevant state-actors, meetings with influential interlocutors such as US state department advisors and other international organisations, along with participation in relevant meetings particularly in the USA. Media exposure was also applied as a tool in the process. In relation to knowledge and expertise on the topic, the RCRC holds a strong position through its presence in the DPRK. Partner engagement was a key strategy to this action, especially collaboration with other international organisations also present in the DPRK with representation in the US.

Looking at the level of success for this action, the IFRC Humanitarian policy specifies a number of objectives for *successful* humanitarian diplomacy. For this research, the following four objectives are reflected upon to measure if intended outcomes were achieved:

- *More frequent consideration by decision makers and opinion leaders of the humanitarian situation and interests of vulnerable people in the DPRK.*
- *Findings:* The UNSC approved the IFRC application and a number of other exemption applications after this action, which shows a commitment for humanitarian aid to be considered and exempted, hopefully leading to more frequent consideration in the future.
- *Greater access to and influence with decision makers.*
- *Findings:* The action and its activities allowed access to decision-makers, mainly in NYC, and mainly through IFRC contacts. The joint effort was supported with evidence and facts from SRC and IFRC Pyongyang which influenced important meetings. Sweden's representation was of valuable support, both in Stockholm and the US. As a consequence, the Red Cross gained further credibility and could mirror its important role in DPRK in the Swedish context.
- *Greater humanitarian access and space for National Societies and the International Federation.*
- *Findings:* The action allowed access to the necessary humanitarian exemptions needed and kept the humanitarian space open for DPRK RCS activities. IFRC & SRC, with local connection through DPRK RCS operations, provided evidence for Red Cross credibility and relevance in the DPRK context. This supposedly will be of high value to positively influence access and available space for the Red Cross in the future.

[4] Please find some articles at the IFRC website: https://www.ifrc.org/taxonomy/term/382

- *The facilitation of effective partnerships when responding to the needs of the vulnerable.*
- *Findings:* The whole process exemplified an action of well-functioning partnerships among the IFRC, SRC, the Swedish MFA, international organisations in DPRK and especially in the US. All partners stood behind a common goal to allow for humanitarian aid to reach the DPRK population. It proves valuable for the Red Cross to be one voice within a larger group speaking up for a common humanitarian goal.

Evaluating this HD process against the 4 Signposts for Action and objectives specified by IFRC for a successful HD action, the conclusion is that this was a well-grounded and successful action deriving out of the dedication and conviction to act on behalf of those most in need with an agenda built on knowledge and partnerships.

RECOMMENDATIONS & CONCLUSION

Based on the literature, interviews performed and mapping of experiences, the analysis epitomises in a few **recommendations** based on this qualitative and limited research.

- Keep the humanitarian principles close to heart in the HD process and leave politics out. Initiatives should keep focus on the needs on the ground in dialogue with the concerned people through the context specific knowledge of the RCRC based on community-based work and volunteer structures.
- The most important local opinion leader for the RCRC Movement in the DPRK is the DPRK RCS, its volunteers and its connection with local communities and authorities both on national and local levels. Always build HD actions on the needs expressed by these local actors and keep them closely involved in the process to ensure knowledge and expertise from the field is ensured.
- Generally, more effective and efficient HD actions would most probably be achieved if strategically agreed upon and planned for, both within IFRC and SRC, in coordination with other Movement partners and external actors when relevant.
- Quicker HD action and stronger coordination within the RCRC movement could be achieved if context analysis and needs are captured into an established reporting and responding structure within the IFRC, which would early on involve relevant Partner National Societies in the process. Capturing HD situations early allows for quick response and flexible action.
- Suggestion to establish a HD network and assign focal points within the IFRC and relevant and interested Partner National Societies.
- Ensure strategic partnerships are established and strengthened for the DPRK with actors outside the RCRC Movement, both international organisations and state representatives in Pyongyang, within relevant countries, and important decision-making hubs such as NYC.
- Use media even more strategically and collectively within the RCRC movement to spread information and put pressure on decision-makers while ensuring experienced HD communication staff are involved.

The main **conclusions** are centred on a few key factors that allowed this action to be successful.

Hence, the key success factors are found to be:

- Strong support for the Action by at least one Security Council member (i.e. primarily Sweden in this case, but also the Netherlands and United Kingdom were instrumental).
- RCRC management dedication and involvement on different levels, both in-country, regionally and globally (this case NYC).
- The right people were involved at the right place with the right competencies and capacity to act.
- RCRC staff with well-established networks and knowledge of important key interlocutors had the capacity to influence decision-makers and be supported by UNSC interlocutors (Swedish government).

- Professional and experienced IFRC communications and HD staff held strong capacity and skills to influence decision-makers through the press and media.
- Effective and well-working collaboration between the IFRC & SRC, in conjunction with the Swedish government was a key for success, all with the same objective in mind.
- Although without a clear action plan, this HD process allowed for speedy action and decision-making, through a flexible and agile approach.
- The aspect of good timing of the process based on evidence from real-life and credible insights on the situation for people in the DPRK.

Coming back to the research questions, the specific objective set by those involved was to put pressure on the UNSC for the approval of the IFRC exemption application and thereby ensuring humanitarian aid into the DPRK. A wider objective was to influence the UNSC to approve other organisations' applications and thereby allow wider life-saving assistance into the country. These objectives were achieved as many international organisations, including the IFRC, got their applications approved in late 2018 and early 2019. IFRC's application was granted on January 31, 2019, as listed on the UNSC website (UNSC, 2019).[5]

However, according to the findings, there was no clear strategy initially set up or clear action plan in place at the beginning of the action. It appeared rather to be a process built on experienced persons in the right place and their actions. Finding out if something could have been done differently was not possible as there was no clear strategy in place to begin with and to evaluate against.

One final word from this research is that commitment and dedication by a few competent and engaged people can achieve a lot, by working together and supporting each other along the way.

[5] UNSC, 2019, listed here: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718/exemptions-measures/humanitarian-exemption-requests.

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Interviews

Gwendolyn Pang, Director IFRC East Asia Delegation Beijing (2019) via email, May 4 & 5.

Margareta Wahlström, SRC Chair, Stockholm (2019) Personal interview on May 2.

Maude Fröberg, IFRC Communications and Advocacy Manager, East Asia Delegation Beijing (2019), telephone interview on April 30.

Richard Blewitt, IFRC Permanent observer for IFRC to the UN (2019) telephone interview on May 2.

Swedish MFA representation in NYC – telephone interview on May 2, 2019.



Prisca Waluza Chisala

Director of Programmes, Malawi Red Cross Society

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Overcoming barriers to successful integration of humanitarian diplomacy in Malawi Red Cross society and key recommendations

Overcoming barriers to successful integration of humanitarian diplomacy in Malawi Red Cross society and key recommendations

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

DoDMA	Department of Disaster Management Affairs
GoM	Government of Malawi
HD	Humanitarian Diplomacy
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
MRCS	Malawi Red Cross Society
NCHS	National Community Health Strategy
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
MoH	Ministry of Health
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals

ABSTRACT

Humanitarian Diplomacy (HD) focuses on engaging with decision makers and opinion leaders to act in the best interest of vulnerable populations and with full respect for humanitarian principles. Humanitarian Diplomacy has been one of the strategic pillars of focus for Malawi Red Cross Society since 2015 as stipulated in its 2015 to 2019 strategic plan. Although Humanitarian Diplomacy has been one of the key strategic areas of focus for the National Society, the concept has not been well mainstreamed across all MRCS programmes. Therefore, the current research seeks to improve Malawi Red Cross Society's Humanitarian Diplomacy by establishing barriers to successful integration of HD in MRCS to inform practical recommendations for effective HD.

Key findings from the study conducted indicate that MRCS is a relevant HD actor. However, work needs to be done to address barriers to successful MRCS HD work which include limited HD knowledge and skills among MRCS staff and volunteer to support systematic HD work, HD not yet institutionalised due to being introduced as a project and treated as optional by other projects, inadequate funding to support systematic HD activities, and illiterate levels of volunteers delaying uptake of new concepts, among others.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Malawi Red Cross Society (MRCS) is a member of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the largest humanitarian actor. MRCS has vast experience operating at different levels locally and globally in emergency response and resilience building interventions but also implements other thematic activities such as Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR), Livelihoods, WASH, first aid and health.

"Humanitarian Diplomacy involves persuading decision makers and opinion leaders to act, at all times, in the interests of vulnerable people, and with full respect for fundamental humanitarian principles" (IFRC 2012, p. 6). In order to persuade decision makers to act in the interest of vulnerable persons within the country, humanitarian action in Malawi including Malawi Red Cross Society have attempted to create a conducive policy environment using three strategies of public advocacy, private diplomacy and promotion of humanitarian values.

The current research explored opportunities for Malawi Red Cross Society to strengthen its Humanitarian Diplomacy actions by establishing barriers to effective MRCS HD work and suggesting possible solutions to the identified gaps. The study employed simple combined data collection methods in which both primary and secondary data was collected using qualitative and quantitative methods. Thus desk review and interviews were conducted using a semi structured questionnaire. Malawi Red Cross Society staff members as well as representatives from relevant government departments were interviewed in the study. Both desk review and interviews focused on finding out whether MRCS is doing enough to influence decision makers to act in the best interest of vulnerable populations and with full respect of the seven Red Cross and Red Crescent fundamental principles. Inadequate HD skills among volunteers and staff, limited application of HD across MRCS projects, and inadequate funding allocation for systematic HD were identified among barriers to effective HD by MRCS.

Apart from establishing barriers to effective HD work for MRCS, the study also investigated the existence and application of humanitarian actions and tools by the National Society. The findings revealed the need for MRCS to be vigilant in enhancing institutionalisation of community engagement and accountability measures to ensure evidence based advocacy and humanitarian diplomacy. MRCS will have to ensure communities and local leaders are at the centre stage of its programming through participatory assessments on community vulnerabilities, needs and capacities as well as disease surveillance. Duty bearers will also have to be held accountable, meaning that the establishment of feedback and accountability systems in communities would be ideal.

Key findings from the study recommend institutionalising HD in MRCS, thus HD should in the new strategic plan from 2020 be reflected as an approach and not necessarily as a project, intensifying awareness raising on HD within and outside MRCS, building capacity of MRCS staff and volunteers in HD, and increasing resource allocation for HD. MRCS should also engage with government leaders at central and local levels as well as other stakeholders (e.g. NGOs) in background talks as well as open dialogue.

1. INTRODUCTION

Malawi is one of the poorest countries, ranking 171 out of 189 on the 2018 human development index.[1] Malawi has a population of 17 million people, about 84% of whom live in rural areas. The country has one of the world's lowest income levels per person (in terms of gross national income per capita), at about US$250 per person (World Bank, 2018), and the majority of residents live below the international poverty line. The majority of health services are offered by Ministry of Health facilities, and most services at public hospitals and clinics are free for patients. However, the other direct and indirect costs of injury care transportation, lost income, and other expenses make injuries costly to individuals and families and, by extension, to the country as a whole (World Development Indicators 2016).

The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement is the world's largest volunteer-based humanitarian network. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) is the umbrella organisation of the National Societies, of which Malawi Red Cross Society (MRCS) is a member. Malawi Red Cross Society is Malawi's largest humanitarian organisation, established by ACT 51 of Parliament in 1966 as an auxiliary to the Government of Malawi.[2] The national society is a volunteer member organisation, which has 33 divisions (Administrative Structures) and a network of more than 76,000 members. It is present in all the 28 districts in Malawi. MRCS is an active member of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent. A democratically elected committee manages each division. At the national level, the Secretary General heads Malawi Red Cross Society and reports to the national executive committee (governing board) that in turn is answerable to the council. The council comprises representatives from all the 33 divisions across the country.

MRCS is an independent, volunteer based and non-profit humanitarian organisation that delivers humanitarian services and support to the most vulnerable people in Malawi. Its programming, based on the 2015-2019 strategic plan focuses on health programming (HIV/AIDS, WASH, Community Health, Blood Donor Recruitment, First Aid Education) and Disaster Management (Disaster Risk Reduction and Response Operations). The work of the MRCS is based on the seven fundamental principles which are also principles of the global Red Cross Movement namely humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity and universality. The auxiliary role of MRCS to public authorities gives it an upper hand to easily get in touch with public authorities to advance the agendas of vulnerable populations.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Humanitarian Diplomacy and Red Cross work

IFRC defines Humanitarian Diplomacy as a means for persuading decision makers and opinion leaders to act, at all times, in the interests of vulnerable people and with full respect for fundamental humanitarian principles (IFRC, 2006). The ICRC adds that HD includes: making the voices of the victims of armed conflicts heard; negotiating humanitarian agreements with international or national players; acting as a neutral intermediary between them; and helping to ensure respect for humanitarian law. Notably, HD is not primarily geared towards the promotion of peace; it is solely focused on humanitarian objectives (Haroff-Tavel 2006; McHugh & Bessler 2006). Notably, one of the main HD objectives is to secure greater humanitarian access and space, although HD can also be used for other purposes, such as securing humanitarian assistance (e.g. mobilising resources) and for 'protection' of the rights of vulnerable persons (Mancini-Griffoli & Picot 2004). Notably, HD activities are often classified into: 1) creating a policy environment which promotes humanitarian values and principles, 2) quiet or discreet diplomacy, and 3) public advocacy.

The adoption in 2009 of the IFRC's humanitarian diplomacy policy and its Strategy 2020 by the General Assembly confirmed that humanitarian diplomacy should occupy a central role in National Societies' activities. This was the result of the recognition during the last decade that external trends in the humanitarian environment were placing increasing challenges on National Societies and their secretariat in meeting humanitarian needs.

[1] Human Development Index available at: https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/specific-country-data#/countries/MWI

[2] Laws of Malawi, 1966. Malawi Red Cross Society Act. Available at: https://www.malawilii.org/akn/mw/act/1966/51/eng%402014-12-31

The decision to engage in humanitarian diplomacy is not a choice, but a responsibility. It is a responsibility that flows from the privileged access enjoyed by National Societies as auxiliaries to the public authorities in the humanitarian field. It flows from the independence of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, from the breadth of its humanitarian activities across the globe, its community base with tens of millions of volunteers and the observer status at the United Nations General Assembly enjoyed by the International Federation and the ICRC.

2.2 MRCS in Humanitarian Diplomacy

There is limited literature on HD work by Malawi Red Cross Society giving justification of the need for more research work around MRCS HD actions to bridge the existing literature gap. Humanitarian Diplomacy has been one of MRCS strategic pillars of focus since 2015 as stipulated in its 2015 to 2019 strategic plan. The process of institutionalising HD in MRCS was technically supported by the Danish Red Cross Society. By integrating HD in the strategic plan, MRCS sought to move beyond pure service delivery and start addressing the root causes of problems in a more structured and determined manner (MRCS Strategic Plan 2015). MRCS also aimed at aligning itself to the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, as Humanitarian Diplomacy forms an integral part of Strategy 2020. Although Humanitarian Diplomacy has been one of the key strategic areas of focus for the National Society, the concept has not been well mainstreamed across all MRCS programmes. For instance, out of 10 of MRCS projects, only 3 have a clear and deliberate set of interventions specifically focusing on Humanitarian Diplomacy (MRCS Annual Report 2018).

The MRCS 2018 Annual Report documented key HD activities for MRCS. Some of the key HD activities being carried out by MRCS include: actively building and maintaining relationships and engaging with government structures and other stakeholders at a local, regional, and national level; increasing MRCS participation in relevant working groups; thematic forums; and building capacity and training volunteers and staff members at all levels in the principles of humanitarian diplomacy. Furthermore, no formal research has been done to establish barriers to successful implementation of Humanitarian Diplomacy in Malawi Red Cross Society to inform evidence based Humanitarian Diplomacy actions. Therefore, the current research seeks to improve Malawi Red Cross Society Humanitarian Diplomacy by establishing barriers to successful integration of HD in MRCS to inform practical recommendations for effective HD. No literature was found on barriers to successful implementation of HD by MRCS.

2.3 MRCS and Disaster Management and Community Health Issues in Malawi

Malawi is a disaster-prone nation with common and prevalent disasters being floods, drought, strong winds and disease outbreaks. These disasters pose great socio-economic losses at varying levels to many vulnerable people. The notable losses incurred include damage to infrastructure, crop and livestock, deforestation, disruption of the economic system and livelihoods in communities, and loss of lives. With over half of the population living under the national poverty standards, often in poorly constructed houses, many communities lack the capacity to withstand and cope with hazards, which makes them vulnerable to disasters.

In recent years, the country has experienced aggressive climate change risks, rapid urbanisation & population growth. A lack of alternatives to wood fuel requires a more holistic approach to disaster management. MRCS, as a key Humanitarian Diplomacy actor, will continue working with Red Cross Action Teams as first responders and building capacity of all volunteers in all districts in disaster management to improve the response activities for vulnerable populations. This is in line with the 2019-2024 Sendai Framework of Action priority number two, “Strengthening disaster risk governance to manage disaster risk.”

However, in a setting where disasters are predicted to become even more frequent, focus must also be put on reducing vulnerability by enabling communities to prepare for and strengthen their capacities to cope (Muttarak & Lutz, 2014). The development of early warning early action systems will therefore be a priority for MRCS from 2019 moving forward. Resilience building through climate change adaptation activities will also become increasingly important, in line with strategies for managing disasters in urban settings. MRCS will continue to strengthen its ability to reduce risk, take early action, and respond to crises by enhancing strong local response and preparedness capacity among vulnerable communities. The society aims to respond quickly and effectively to every emergency, anywhere

in the country. MRCS will also act on behalf of vulnerable populations by mobilising resources for the needed humanitarian actions.

Equitable access to health care services, the prevalence of communicable diseases and emergence of non-communicable diseases poses a challenge to health care service delivery in the country (GoM, 2017). There is an increase in mortality and morbidity especially of expectant mothers and under five children due to long distances of travel required to access health facilities, lack of access to safe water and sanitation facilities including inadequate community based health care services. A critical shortage of blood has also contributed to maternal and under-five mortality. A lot of preventable deaths and illnesses take place due to a lack of knowledge and skills in providing emergency health care services by the general public. MRCS recognizes the limited capacity of existing efforts to reach vulnerable populations with health care services and key messages on disease prevention as a threat to SDGs achievement. Therefore, through its auxiliary role to the government on humanitarian services, the MRCS in this strategic plan will strive to support achieving the global health milestones put forward by the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

Malawi has not had a stand-alone community health program. Recognising the importance of community health, the Ministry of Health (MoH) has developed the country's first National Community Health Strategy (NCHS) for the period of 2017-2022. MRCS, as an auxiliary to the public authorities, has an opportunity to take a leading role in advocating the National Community Health Strategy 2017-2022 (GoM, 2017) in partnership with Ministry of Health (MoH) as the National Society's line ministry through humanitarian diplomacy, mostly in hard to reach areas. It can do this by in particular advocating for strong community engagement to ensure inclusion of community health priorities in village action plans, as stated in the strategy and promoting social accountability on community health through Humanitarian Diplomacy.

RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

3.1 Main Objectives

This study aims at contributing towards effective Humanitarian Diplomacy by MCRS with reference to the 7 Red Cross and Red Crescent Fundamental principles. Specifically, the study seeks to generate current best practices and barriers to effective Humanitarian Diplomacy in MCRS. The information generated will help provide practical recommendations on HD actions in MRCS and support evidence-based Humanitarian Diplomacy programming, thereby helping to improve MRCS's role in Humanitarian Diplomacy. The generated recommendations and best practices will inform successful integration of Humanitarian Diplomacy in MRCS programming and will be shared within the NS as well as with other National Societies who might want to learn from the research findings to improve their HD interventions.

3.2 Research questions

The study aims to answer the following research questions:

- What are the current key strategies by MRCS to promote Humanitarian Diplomacy?
- What structures and factors offer MRCS an opportunity for effective Humanitarian Diplomacy?
- What are the gaps in the current MRCS Humanitarian Diplomacy Programming?
- What key actions can enhance effective Humanitarian Diplomacy for MRCS?

METHODOLOGY

The current research used combined methods of data collection which involved desk review and interviews to generate secondary and primary data respectively. Secondary data was collected from literature and online publications while primary data was collected through interviews using a semi-structured questionnaire. Both desk review and the interviews conducted focused on establishing whether MRCS is doing enough on Humanitarian Diplomacy, to establish how MRCS can effectively address barriers to effective Humanitarian Diplomacy.

The interview questionnaire was shared with all study participants (MRCS staff members as well as MRCS stakeholders) through email. Both quantitative and qualitative information was collected. Frequencies and percentages of the responses were generated from the quantitative data using Statistical Package for Social Scientists (SPSS). Qualitative data such as knowledge, attitudes and practices of the respondents on MRSC Humanitarian Diplomacy actions was generated.

The study also assessed different Humanitarian Diplomacy tools and channels to enhance Humanitarian Diplomacy. For instance, existing capacities and gaps in practical skills for Humanitarian Diplomacy.

Through the interviews and literature review, Humanitarian Diplomacy actions and tools that can be applied were tested, for example persuading decision makers and opinion leaders to integrate community engagement in Disaster Management and community health programs, social accountability sessions with duty bearers and communities, and awareness campaigns on humanitarian work.

4.1 Description of study population.

Primary data collection was collected through conducting interviews with various levels of MRCS staff that are involved in Humanitarian Diplomacy work. A total of 15 people were interviewed. Two MRCS heads of department (Health and Disaster Management), four District Coordinators, four Project Managers and a MRCS Humanitarian Specialist were interviewed. Two staff members from the Ministry of Health and the Department of Disaster Management (Director and Operations level from each institution) were also interviewed. The district coordinators and relevant government ministries were asked to fill electronic copies of the questionnaire whilst those based in headquarters were given hard copies of the questionnaire.

4.2 Limitations of the study

A limited time frame and financial constraints were the key limitations to the current study. For instance, the research could not engage research assistants to help conduct face to face interviews, which could have generated more discussions and insights to the subject matter of concern. With adequate finances and time, the research could have interviewed more people, including MRCS stakeholders from the NGO sector, and could also have organised focus group discussions as an additional data collection tool for validation purposes of the generated data. However, the findings from the conducted interviews can still be relied upon to inform recommendations for effective Humanitarian Diplomacy for MRCS.

FINDINGS

5.1 Characteristics of study respondents

The study interviewed a total of 15 respondents, 11 from MRCS and 4 from the Ministry of Health and the Department of Disaster Management. Thus 27% of the study population were MRCS relevant stakeholders while 73% were MRCS staff based at the head office as well as in the districts.

5.2 Perception of respondents on relevance of MRCS in HD

All respondents (both MRCS staff and government representatives) reported that they felt MRCS is a relevant actor in Humanitarian Diplomacy because of its existence as an auxiliary arm to public authorities. They further indicated that MRCS works are guided by the fundamental principles i.e. humanity, neutrality, impartiality, universality, unity, independence, voluntary. They emphasized that MRCS work is non-discriminatory and is based on needs of human beings. It was therefore learnt from the participants that MRCS has a role to play in ensuring that a conducive environment is created through the policies and action plans which will enable vulnerable groups to realise their rights.

5.3 Current key strategies by MRCS to promote Humanitarian Diplomacy

MRCS is currently using a number of strategies to promote Humanitarian Diplomacy which includes:

Raising awareness: MRCS takes a great role in keeping the right holders informed of the services entitled to them and how they can be supported. Readmission policy is one example that has helped young mothers to get hold of policy implementers and allow young mothers to go back to school (Kadzamila, 2001).

Advocacy or interface meetings: Through this strategy, MRCS brings to the attention of the office bearers the humanitarian needs of the affected or at risk communities to facilitate engagement of the two parties. For instance, MRCS identifies (through volunteers) and documents issues from rights holders, and identifies the relevant duty bearers to provide with information or a response, and brings them to the community for an interaction.

Capacity building: MRCS provides different trainings to rights holders to build their capacity and eventually empower them to demand their needful services.

Resource support to duty bearers: Through its ongoing projects in different areas, MRCS provides different services to the community as a response to their felt needs, such as supporting the mobile court which has helped to advance justice to survivors of gender based violence.

Advancing change through role modelling: In order to open eyes of community -evel duty bearers on different issues, MRCS has used role modelling as an evidence based strategy. This strategy has been used in the promotion of girls education whereby women from the same area, sharing a similar background with the right holders have been brought to speak to their peers. Some local leaders who have done commendable work have also been used as role models to bring about change. This strategy has helped local level duty bearers to act in the best interest of the right holders.

5.4 Adequacy of MRCS work in Humanitarian Diplomacy

Although all respondents indicated that MRCS is a relevant Humanitarian Diplomacy actor, differences were noted on their perceptions in terms of adequacy of MRCS HD work. Interestingly the majority of MRCS stakeholders (Fig. 1) indicated that MRCS is doing adequate Humanitarian Diplomacy work whilst the majority of MRCS staff members indicated that although MRCS is a relevant actor in HD, it is at the moment not yet doing adequate Humanitarian Diplomacy work. They cited the following as being reasons for inadequate HD work by MRCS: HD currently not mainstreamed across all MRCS projects (systematically applied in a few projects e.g. 3/10); HD not yet institutionalised, meaning that it is applied as an option especially in projects; inadequate funding for HD activities; and that there are

limited number of staff and volunteers with skills to promote systematic Humanitarian Diplomacy. 'The approach was introduced as a project therefore limited to few staff and geographical area' reported Cecilia Banda MRCS District Coordinator for Chikwawa district on 17th December 2019.




Figure 1: Adequacy of MRCS work in Humanitarian Diplomacy

5.5 Gaps in current MRCS HD programming

The study inquires into existing gaps in current MRCS work. Although respondents described MRCS as a key factor in Humanitarian Diplomacy. The following gaps were noted as barriers to successful MRCS HD work: limited HD knowledge and skills among MRCS staff and volunteers to support systematic HD work; HD not yet institutionalised hence treated as an option by other projects; illiterate levels of volunteers delaying uptake of new concepts; and inadequate funding to support systematic HD work

5.6 MRCS opportune factors for effective Humanitarian Diplomacy

The study investigated the potential for better and effective Humanitarian Diplomacy actions by MRCS. Study respondents indicated that MRCS has the potential to do better in its Humanitarian Diplomacy actions and cited the existence of different structures as one of the key attributing factors as seen in Figure 2 and explained in detail below.

MRCS works through its volunteers who are all over the country, and are hence a part of the community. As such it feels and suffers similar problems to the community. As a member of a different community and district, and national based technical and operational structures, MRCS is well positioned to link the right holders and duty bearers at different levels.

Through its holistic implementation approach of different projects, MRCS has a vast knowledge of diverse thinking in the community. This helps it to identify right holders' capacity gaps that hinder them in tapping the much needed ability to demand their felt needs.

The wide coverage of the National Society puts it at an advantage in tapping vast knowledge from different communities, and the same knowledge, shared with different duty bearers, helps to act to the best interest of the communities and right holders.

By virtue of being auxiliary to public authorities, MRCS has easy access to public authorities to advocate for the interests of vulnerable populations. MRCS also uses result oriented actions that serve in the best interest of vulnerable populations to influence decisions and persuade others to follow the way MRCS is doing things in the humanitarian

field. For instance, whenever a disaster strikes, MRCS is seen as the first responder supporting the affected populations.




Figure 2: Responses to MRCS potential factors to effective HD

5.7 MRCS strategic approach to Humanitarian Diplomacy

In the current MRCS strategic plan for 2015-2019, Humanitarian Diplomacy is reflected as a standalone pillar, hence treated as an option for new projects. Currently HD is very well reflected in 3 out of 10 MRCS projects (2018 MRCS Annual Report) and yet the same plan advocates for the provision of healthy lives among vulnerable populations. In order to fully institutionalise Humanitarian Diplomacy, there is a need to enforce mainstreaming of the approach across all MRCS projects. MRCS will therefore have to consider having HD as one of its key approaches to programming when reviewing or developing its new strategic planning from 2020 onwards. Through recent discussions involving HD relevant managers and the senior leadership, it has been agreed that as we develop the strategic plan to run from 2020, addressing health inequalities and enhancing disaster preparedness and response activities will be among top priority areas of focus for MRCS through actual service provision as well as continuous dialogue with relevant stakeholders implementing such programs in line with relevant national policy frameworks. Social accountability mechanisms such as feedback and accountability systems will have to be considered.

Furthermore, MRCS should be at the forefront in evidence-based advocacy and humanitarian diplomacy in the implementation of various Health and Social Services. MRCS will have to ensure communities and local leaders are at the centre stage of its programming through participatory assessments on community vulnerabilities, needs and capacities as well as disease surveillance. In its auxiliary role and ease of access to public authorities, MRCS can use the generated evidence from assessments conducted to help speak for the vulnerable populations to influence public authorities to act in the best interest of the vulnerable population, informed by the generated and presented facts.

5.8 Key actions that can enhance effective Humanitarian Diplomacy for Malawi Red Cross Society

In order to help improve Humanitarian Diplomacy programming for MRCS, the research investigated recommended key actions for MRCS. Below is a list of recommended actions needed for MRCS to eliminate barriers to effective Humanitarian Diplomacy:

- Humanitarian Diplomacy should be considered a key approach across all MRCS projects and should not be treated as an option. Thus HD has to be mainstreamed in all MRCS programmes
- MRCS Community Engagement and Accountability should be promoted to ensure evidence based advocacy for vulnerable populations

- MRCS projects to consider budget allocations for effective step by step HD
- Consider HD Skills development through training of staff and volunteers. Since MRCS works through a pool of its volunteers who are existent country wide, MRCS should consider training divisions in HD and have HD focal persons in each division to oversee the rolling out of HD activities
- HD to be taken as an approach in engaging partners and stakeholders in their respective plans and action
- Inclusion of HD in M&E tools to act as a reminder to all staff and volunteers
- MRCS should intensify HD awareness raising at all levels by taking HD actions and strategies to its volunteers, senior leaders as well as operational-level members of staff

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

The current research has demonstrated best practices and gaps in Humanitarian Diplomacy actions for Malawi Red Cross Society. The research has demonstrated that MRCS is perceived as a relevant Humanitarian Diplomacy actor by its members of staff as well as its relevant government stakeholders. The study has further revealed that MRCS HD work is guided by 7 fundamental principles based on the humanitarian needs of affected populations without discriminating them against their ethnic background, age, race, physical ability etc. Although seen as a relevant HD actor, the study also revealed gaps in HD which need to be addressed by MRCS for its effective Humanitarian Diplomacy actions:

- The study recommends that the new MRCS strategic plan should consider reflecting HD as a key approach to MRCS programming and not as a standalone pillar to ensure HD is mainstreamed across all MRCS projects and not as an option , as it is at the moment.
- MRCS should promote evidence-based advocacy by strengthening Community Engagement Accountability systems and procedures.
- Capacity building for MRCS staff and volunteers in HD
- HD Budgetary allocation policy
- Intensify HD awareness at all levels of MRCS staffing

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
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Raoul Hodgson

Research Officer, Protection Irregular Migration and Asylum, UK Civil Service
(at the time of writing: Project Coordinator, Family Reunion Integration Service, British Red Cross)

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Acting in the Shadows of Political Turmoil: Analysing the humanitarian diplomacy of the Venezuelan Red Cross and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, regarding health aid in Venezuela

Acting in the Shadows of Political Turmoil: Analysing the humanitarian diplomacy of the Venezuelan Red Cross and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, regarding health aid in Venezuela

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This paper investigates Humanitarian Diplomacy conducted by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and the Venezuelan Red Cross (VRC) within Venezuela, which suffers severe socio-economic and political problems. In February 2019, the advocacy of both organisations expanded as Venezuela's political crisis worsened and opposition attempts at aid deliveries resulted in blockades and violence.

Following an introduction and literature review, the situation which the VRC and IFRC faced in Venezuela at the time of advocacy, is considered. The paper then examines how the VRC and IFRC developed a common strategy with regards to public communications and private negotiations. Their aims were to justify their opposition to politicised aid, to highlight the positive work done by the Red Cross and its volunteers, to encourage support for aid to be distributed on humanitarian grounds, and for Venezuela's government and opposition to trust the IFRC to deliver health aid from overseas to support hospitals and the VRC's network of health facilities and services.

The paper then looks at the key aspects of the IFRC and VRC's approach to implementing public communications and private negotiations, including the ways in which they enhanced the persuasiveness of their arguments regarding humanitarian aid when communicating with decision-makers, opinion-influencers and the general public. It also considers how they facilitated an agreement with both the government and opposition that would respect the Red Cross's Fundamental Principles (especially humanity, independence, neutrality and impartiality).

Finally, the paper considers the outcome of advocacy. Whilst the government and opposition ultimately agreed with the VRC and IFRC bringing in and delivering health aid in March 2019, the struggle with preventing the politicisation of aid means that current assistance remains insufficient. Furthermore, a more proactive and coordinated approach to advocacy between the Movement's branches could arguably have facilitated an earlier positive outcome.

INTRODUCTION

This paper focuses on Humanitarian Diplomacy undertaken by the Venezuelan Red Cross (VRC) and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) in Venezuela. Humanitarian Diplomacy is, according to the IFRC (2009a, 2), "persuading decision-makers and opinion leaders to act, at all times, in the interests of vulnerable people, and with full respect for fundamental humanitarian principles". For the IFRC, 'humanitarian' references the Fundamental Principle of humanity, whilst 'diplomacy' includes advocacy, negotiation, public awareness, and coordination which seeks enhanced influence with decision-makers (IFRC 2009b, 3-9).

Alongside the IFRC and VRC, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) engages in aid provision and advocacy in Venezuela. However, as these are conducted separately (Medina 2019), based upon the ICRC's separate mandate within the Seville Agreement (Council of Delegates 1997), this paper focuses on the VRC and IFRC's advocacy, which resulted in Mr Nicolás Maduro (who currently controls the government) and Mr Juan Guaidó (leader of the opposition-controlled National Assembly) agreeing to let the IFRC and VRC deliver and distribute health aid from overseas, in March 2019 (IFRC 2019a).

The Venezuelan crisis was researched by the author during a Master's Degree. Following President Hugo Chavez's death in 2013, and the decline in global oil prices in 2014, Venezuela's socio-economic situation deteriorated (Melimopoulos 2019). Hyperinflation, alongside food and medicine shortages, have caused widespread malnutrition, disease and poverty (Ibid.). Venezuela also suffers political turmoil. Challenges to Maduro's rule escalated following his disputed 2018 re-election and 2019 inauguration, with Guaidó now proclaiming himself President (Daniels 2019). The UN reports thousands have died due to political unrest (Cumming-Bruce 2019).

The crisis has regional, and global significance. More than four million Venezuelans fled the country as of 2019, an increase from the 695,000 who left up to 2015 (UNHCR 2019). Colombia alone hosts over one million Venezuelan refugees. This creates economic challenges for neighbouring countries and social problems such as anti-Venezuelan xenophobia (VOA News 2019). Meanwhile, international actors are increasingly attentive to the crisis, with numerous countries and organisations supporting either Maduro or Guaidó.

In this environment, the IFRC and VRC persuaded Maduro (and Guaidó), to approve them bringing in and distributing health aid. Given the Government's consistent rejection of the existence of a humanitarian crisis, whilst the opposition sought to deliver aid on their own terms, this was a major about-face. This case study demonstrates the role humanitarian organisations can play during political conflicts, to sway policy-makers and their challengers to agree on proposals which alleviate suffering even as they reject cooperation elsewhere. Additionally, it demonstrates how the Red Cross can advocate in contentious situations, whilst respecting the Fundamental Principles (ICRC 2019).

This project addresses:

- What strategy did the VRC and IFRC adopt to gain an audience with, and persuade, Venezuela's government and opposition to accept their proposals?
- Was the desired outcome achieved?
- What findings can inform future Red Cross advocacy?

Interviews were conducted with: Mr Luis Farias, Director of Communications for the VRC (on 27 November 2019); Mr Tommaso Della Longa, Senior Communications Advisor to the IFRC President (on 28 November 2019); and Ms Diana Medina, Communications Manager for the IFRC Americas Regional Office (on 2 December 2019). All three were involved in advocacy work. The paper also considers Red Cross policies, protocols, advice and strategies. Furthermore, statements and reports from the Red Cross and other non-governmental actors (such as the UN) are referenced. Media and academic sources contextualise the IFRC and VRC's diplomacy.

Literature Review

The Red Cross's growing focus on Humanitarian Diplomacy reflects a trend amongst humanitarian organisations in the Twenty-First Century. Globalisation and technological developments, multilateralism in global politics, and new areas of diplomatic activity, have created a "fragmented" diplomatic sphere (Régnier 2011, 1214). Whereas conven-

tional diplomacy considers state negotiations to achieve national interests (Harroff-Tavel 2006, 4), Humanitarian Diplomacy has "broader humanitarian goals" (De Lauri 2018) and can be implemented by humanitarian organisations at the local, national and international level (Régnier 2011, 1212-1213).

Many challenges regarding Humanitarian Diplomacy were observed in this paper's case study. Humanitarian action often considers ideals and universal principles, but negotiation is characterised by pragmatism and compromise (De Lauri 2018). Furthermore, whilst many humanitarian organisations gain legitimacy from neutrality (particularly members of the Red Cross Movement), they might need to build partnerships with parties engaged in conflict. Furthermore, Mr Antonio De Lauri (2018) highlighted the need for scholarship to investigate how humanitarian actors should operate in political environments characterised by disagreement and politicisation of access to aid (Ibid.). The VRC and IFRC's advocacy is thus informative, given that they worked in such an environment.

In 2009, the IFRC published its Humanitarian Diplomacy Policy, the application of which can be seen in the IFRC and VRC's advocacy. The policy aims to better influence decision-makers, enhancing consideration of the vulnerable and strengthening humanitarian access and space (IFRC 2009a, 1). The 'vulnerable' are to be determined within the pertinent context (IFRC 2009a, 3-9). The Explanatory Memorandum further elaborates the policy, ensuring consistent implementation. For instance, it addresses how to balance the Fundamental Principles of humanity, neutrality and independence. Humanity is the ultimate principle, with the principles of neutrality and independence serving as guides. Neutrality does not 'excuse' passivity, but rather guides diplomacy (IFRC 2009b, 9-11).

The IFRC provides multiple Humanitarian Diplomacy resources. It offers guidance for advocacy campaigns (IFRC 2019c), and the Protocol Handbook as a 'diplomatic toolkit' on building relationships (IFRC 2010a), which is supplemented by advice on conducting meetings (IFRC 2019d). Finally, Humanitarian Diplomacy is referenced within Strategy 2020. National societies should implement Humanitarian Diplomacy as an aspect of their auxiliary role, whilst the IFRC's duty to support capacity-building and the auxiliary role of National Societies, extends to advocacy (IFRC 2010b, 11–21).

Context Surrounding Advocacy:

The VRC provides humanitarian services as an auxiliary to the government. They have particular expertise in health services, running eight hospitals and 33 outpatient clinics (IFRC 2019b). Meanwhile, the IFRC's activities in Venezuela are limited by a lack of status agreement, but it has assisted the VRC throughout the crisis (Medina 2019). The IFRC supports the VRC's capacity-building, guiding projects regarding Disaster Risk Reduction, food security and migration (IFRC 2019b; Medina 2019). For four years, it has periodically sent a delegate from the Americas Regional Office, to observe and provide guidance to the VRC (Medina 2019). Without a status agreement, the IFRC largely worked through the VRC (Ibid.). Whilst the IFRC had provided some aid to Venezuela, this was very limited compared to the situation following advocacy (Della Longa 2019).

Before 2019, the IFRC provided the VRC with technical advice and concept notes on the resources, expertise and logistics with which they could support the VRC (Medina 2019). Meanwhile, the VRC had informal discussions with the government. In March 2018 the VRC, with advice from the IFRC, published a letter informing Maduro of how the global Movement could provide increased health assistance, to alleviate Venezuela's problems. However, this and subsequent discussions between the VRC and government figures, did not result in change. One possible reason was the VRC President, Mr Mario Villarroel, being perceived as supporting the opposition (Ibid.), highlighting the consequences of National Society neutrality being questioned. Furthermore, coordination of advocacy between the IFRC and VRC was, according to Medina, less extensive prior to 2019 (Ibid.). Thus, the IFRC's influence and resources were arguably not fully leveraged to enhance the VRC's position. Finally, the government was already cooperating with the ICRC and may not have understood that the VRC is a fully separate organisation, thus seeing less need to engage with them (Ibid.).

The VRC and IFRC's advocacy expanded in early 2019. Maduro's legitimacy was increasingly challenged, with the security situation deteriorating and the opposition openly seeking military support (Melimopoulos 2019). Furthermore, international organisations and world powers increasingly engaged in this political crisis. For instance, Russia and China support Maduro, whilst the Organisation of American States and the USA recognise Guaidó as the President.

Political polarisation domestically, regionally and internationally, has politicised aid (Della Longa 2019). Maduro's government, perhaps concerned about maintaining political authority and legitimacy, has consistently denied a humanitarian crisis, and resisted pressure to accept more international aid (BBC 2019a; Farias 2019). Thus, aid deliveries were not meeting actual needs (Goodman 2019). Meanwhile, the opposition treats aid as an opportunity to challenge Maduro (Pozzebon 2019). Such politicisation hampers global responses to provide neutral humanitarian aid (Della Longa 2019). Meanwhile, some countries provide aid directly to favoured sides, with the USA offering aid to Guaidó and Russia sending aid to Maduro (Goodman 2019; Kurmanaev and Herrero 2019). Overall, the Red Cross has been one of the few organisations providing aid independently. The government respects the VRC's status as a local institution, cooperates with the ICRC, and allows the IFRC to send delegates and support the VRC (Medina 2019).

Aid's politicisation came to the forefront of global news, and Red Cross concerns, when the opposition announced plans to deliver US-linked aid through Brazil and Colombia. This resulted in violence in February 2019, as security forces blockaded the aid at border points (Kurmanaev and Herrero 2019). This crisis not only indicated how politicised aid faced limitations in assisting Venezuelans, but the Red Cross's refusal to be involved in the delivery led to criticism (Farias 2019; Pozzebon 2019). Furthermore, photos of people wearing Red Cross emblems attempting to deliver aid created confusion (Medina 2019). The VRC and IFRC became concerned that the Movement's legitimacy and reputation was being undermined, with the security of VRC volunteers potentially at risk. Meanwhile, their ability to support vulnerable Venezuelans remained compromised by a lack of resources (Della Longa 2019; Farias 2019).

Thus, whilst the VRC and IFRC had sought to increase aid provision for years, in the leadup to (and following) the blockade they enhanced advocacy activity and coordination. The aim was approval for independent, and impartial, entry and delivery of aid from overseas (Farias 2019). However, with Venezuela's political and socio-economic situation declining from as early as 2014, the author wonders if such increased collaboration could have occurred prior to 2019.

Deciding Upon a Strategy:

After the blockade crisis, the VRC and IFRC enhanced cooperation on advocacy (Farias 2019; Medina 2019), to meet the Humanitarian Diplomacy objective of persuading decision-makers to consider the needs of the vulnerable (IFRC 2009b). The IFRC would publicly support the VRC, affirm their work and directly participate in private negotiations (Della Longa 2019). These discussions occurred in parallel to the ICRC's work in Venezuela, which focused on International Humanitarian Law, as per the ICRC's mandate, alongside providing health equipment to hospitals (Della Longa 2019; Medina 2019).

Successful Humanitarian Diplomacy requires clear outcomes (IFRC 2019c). The VRC and IFRC focused on health aid, an area of expertise for the VRC and thus a topic on which advocacy would be more persuasive (Medina 2019). The VRC and IFRC sought an operational framework that would enable the IFRC to deliver health aid from overseas, and for teams to have safe and unhindered access to deliver this aid impartially to hospitals and through the VRC's network of services. Such aid would include medicines, equipment, water and sanitation resources (Medina 2019). Other aims were discouraging the politicisation of aid and defending the work and values of the IFRC and VRC (Della Longa 2019; Farias 2019).

Successfully engaging authorities often requires multiple methods (Cousins et al. 2015, 25). The VRC and IFRC's advocacy strategy included, firstly, a public communications campaign, to highlight the problems caused by politicised aid, to educate the general public and opinion-influencers such as the media, and even decision-makers, on the Movement's principles and values, and to highlight the Red Cross's work in Venezuela to counter negative perceptions (Della Longa 2019; Medina 2019).

Secondly, the IFRC and VRC would pursue 'quiet' diplomacy with key stakeholders, justifying their legitimacy to negotiate through the VRC's auxiliary role and the IFRC's responsibility to support National Societies (IFRC 2010b, 21-32). The targeted stakeholders were Maduro's administration and Guaido's opposition, particularly the leaders themselves, due to the high-level nature of the crisis necessitating their agreement and influence. Demonstrating risk assessment, the VRC and IFRC determined that engaging with only one group was insufficient. The practical ability to bring in and deliver aid neutrally and impartially required government approval. Meanwhile, due to neutrality and concerns about the impact of political disputes on aid delivery, the VRC and IFRC would also engage the opposition

(Farias 2019). The narrow focus on these stakeholders would prevent dilution of messages and principles by other parties. With both parties publicly refusing to cooperate, confidentiality would be maintained (Della Longa 2019).

Implementing Humanitarian Diplomacy:

Public advocacy coordination was led by the VRC's Head of Communications, the Communications Lead in the Americas Regional Office, and two Communications staffers in Geneva (including the IFRC President's Spokesperson) (Della Longa 2019). The aims were to promote the Fundamental Principles, justify opposition to politicised aid and highlight the work of VRC volunteers (Farias 2019). The IFRC President, Mr Francesco Rocca, issued a press conference during his first visit to Venezuela, in February 2019, following the opposition's announcement that they would attempt to deliver aid. Rocca called for principled humanitarian action and highlighted the Movement's activity in Venezuela (IFRC 2019e). This press conference was supported by press releases and off the record discussions between VRC and IFRC representatives and the media. Following the blockade crisis, the VRC and IFRC continued calling for aid to be delivered on a purely humanitarian basis (Farias 2019).

Social media was used to engage the general public. For instance, a tweet from the IFRC's global and Americas accounts, following publication of photos of people at the blockade wearing the Red Cross logo, explained why this logo should not be used without permission. This became one of the organisation's most popular tweets in five years, highlighting social media's efficacy (Medina 2019). Additionally, the IFRC published stories where VRC volunteers discussed day-to-day experiences (Della Longa 2019). Personal stories can elicit sympathy as "[facts] wrapped in an emotion" (Maxwell and Dickman 2007, 5).

The IFRC and VRC developed key messages and reactive lines to address media questions. When asked about negotiations, they simply answered that the IFRC supported the VRC (Della Longa 2019; Medina 2019). They understood the domestic context, whereby both parties were concerned about publicising discussions, after publicly rejecting each other's views and authority. Humanitarian Diplomats should consider the potential embarrassment caused by groups deviating from publicly-held positions (Ross and Nisbett 2011). Media attention was instead utilised, through press releases and social media, to teach the Fundamental Principles and explain the Red Cross's push for independent aid entry and delivery (Medina 2019). This indicates timely utilisation of media to convey key messages.

Regarding negotiations, the VRC reached out to the government and opposition following the opposition's announcement of attempted aid deliveries, to indicate the IFRC could provide humanitarian support. This facilitated Rocca's visit, the initial aim of which was to meet and endorse VRC volunteers and leadership, and promote neutral, independent and impartial aid (IFRC 2019f). Rocca's presence demonstrated the support the VRC had from global partners (Della Longa 2019), and facilitated meetings, alongside Villarroel, with Maduro and Guaidó. The VRC and IFRC thus understood 'power politics', whereby one seeks discussions with high-level decision-makers when their cooperation is essential (Stachowiak 2014). Maduro's newfound willingness to negotiate was perhaps influenced by increasing political challenges and the fallout from the controversial blockade. Meanwhile, the opposition were possibly influenced by the inability to deliver aid themselves (Medina 2019). The IFRC and VRC's push for direct negotiations during and following the blockade crisis thus reflects the 'policy window' pathway (Stachowiak 2014). External changes created an opportunity to persuade both factions to consider the VRC and IFRC's proposal.

Due to the high-level nature of the crisis and discussions, the Americas Regional Office Director, the Head of the IFRC Andean Country Cluster, and the IFRC President and Secretary-General, as well as Villarroel, co-developed a negotiation strategy, including proposals and requests. Technical advice and background information came from VRC and IFRC colleagues (Medina 2019). Both Rocca and Villarroel attended high-level meetings with Maduro and Guaidó. The IFRC reaffirmed the VRC's work and encouraged an agreement that respected the Movement's neutrality, independence and impartiality. The VRC, meanwhile, described their activities and needs (Della Longa 2019). These meetings resulted in a one-off approval for an initial assignment of health aid. Further meetings during Rocca's second visit sought an operational framework (Ibid.). Between Rocca's visits, VRC and IFRC representatives continued dialogue with the leaders and delegated figures, including the Ministers of Health, Foreign Affairs and Homeland Affairs (Medina 2019). Parallel discussions with Maduro and Guaidó accommodated their refusal to acknowledge each other's authority (Farias 2019). Engagement with both parties was justified by pragmatism and principles (Medina 2019). Regardless of political claims, the Red Cross needed government approval to bring in aid, whilst neutrality and the importance of discouraging politicised aid necessitated engaging the opposition. Thus, the IFRC and VRC reframed

the humanitarian aid issue as a common problem requiring cooperation. By offering a solution that satisfied both parties' interests, demands for significant concessions, which might hamper negotiations (Fisher et al. 2011), were avoided.

The VRC and IFRC's approach to negotiating with polarised factions included pre-emptively analysing the speeches of both parties, to avoid controversial language. For instance, the phrase 'humanitarian crisis' was one the opposition utilised and which the government rejected (Farias 2019). Instead, the VRC and IFRC referenced the Venezuelan peoples' 'high necessities'. They also avoided saying 'technical assistance', language utilised by Maduro but criticised by the Opposition (Ibid.). The Communications team issued key messages every three days on what public communications should and should not say, and drafted speeches (Ibid.). Even whilst avoiding specific phrases, the VRC and IFRC emphasised the health problems affecting the vulnerable. This appealed to both factions' assertions that they represented, and were responsible for, Venezuelans. Furthermore, avoiding controversial language focuses negotiations on problems, not positions, which facilitates agreement (Fisher et al. 2011).

Consideration of areas of expertise is mentioned within the Humanitarian Diplomacy Policy (IFRC 2009a, 2-4). The focus on health aid correlated to the VRC's resources and activity in this area. Health was separated from discussions about politics and the economy. The negotiators focused on objective statements, such as Venezuela being one of 27 countries struggling to contain Dengue fever (Medina 2019). During negotiations, the VRC and IFRC utilised the 'but why' technique (Community Toolbox 2008), highlighting how health problems were caused by insufficient resources and services, including medicines, community education, and electricity for medical facilities. They then noted how current assistance could be expanded with overseas aid (Medina 2019). This demonstrates how evidence and solution-focused messaging enhances persuasiveness (IFRC 2012, 8). Additionally, mentioning the VRC's direct experience of problems when delivering assistance, highlights how Logos (rational persuasion) and Ethos (credibility) can overlap to strengthen an argument (Ibid.). Specific details regarding the amount of people requiring aid, or the amount of resources that would be provided, were not mentioned. This emphasised that the priority was reaching an agreement, creating a safe space for discussion (Della Longa 2019). It also reflects understanding of 'selective discourse': focusing on specific details may have created disagreement, reducing prospects for cooperation.

Additionally, individual negotiators played a key role. Alongside following protocol regarding addressing leaders and dignitaries (IFRC 2010a), Rocca was clear and direct in discussions, providing specific examples of problems such as power cuts in hospitals and medicine shortages (Della Longa 2019). By emphasising the work of volunteers, and the Red Cross's desire to assist Venezuelans, he generated positive perceptions of the IFRC and VRC. Rocca also avoided complex technical language, which risks confusing an audience. Instead, when justifying the request to bring in and deliver aid independently, he provided practical examples of the Fundamental Principles. Neutrality and impartiality meant providing aid regardless of affiliation, and independence meant aid would be delivered and provided through Red Cross channels (Ibid.). This highlights how soft skills, and adapting arguments for specific audiences enhance persuasiveness. Furthermore, Rocca's status as a volunteer generated trust; he would not make personal gain and was in a similar position to VRC volunteers (Ibid.).

Trust was also enhanced through transparency, a key aspect of Strategy 2020 (IFRC 2010b, 21-32). The VRC and IFRC provided information on current services in Venezuela, and how they could be expanded (Della Longa 2019). There was also guidance on the differences, and relationship, between the VRC and IFRC. Finally, the Movement's global responsibilities were explained as necessitating any agreement to be consistent with its universal principles (Farias 2019). The VRC and IFRC invited visits to Red Cross hospitals and suggested that neutral councils supervise aid distribution (Medina 2019; Della Longa 2019). These assurances reduced fears of aid unduly benefitting one faction's political interests (Della Longa 2019), addressing a potential objection to their proposal.

Whilst the Red Cross sometimes collaborates with external partners to implement Humanitarian Diplomacy, the VRC and IFRC did not do this in Venezuela. This was to prevent tensions between target audiences and other organisations from influencing perceptions of, and relations with, the VRC and IFRC (Della Longa 2019). However, talks were held with key civil society representatives, including the Catholic Church's envoy to Venezuela and various NGOs, to explain the insistence upon delivering aid independently (Ibid.). Such talks encouraged organisations with health expertise, such as the Association of Doctors in Caracas, to publicly support the Red Cross (Farias 2019).

In negotiations, humanitarian organisations may be accountable to a "wider international system of values, principles and legal standards" (Mancini-Griffoli and Picot 2004, 35). For the Red Cross, the Fundamental Principles are the

basis for legitimacy and the unique auxiliary role accorded to National Societies. Furthermore, these principles guide IFRC and National Society advocacy. Humanity is the fundamental principle and objective; the other principles, particularly neutrality and independence, guide diplomacy to fulfil this ultimate principle (IFRC 2009b 9-11). Thus, the IFRC and VRC insisted that humanity, neutrality and independence, which were a 'package', necessitated unhindered, open and safe access to provide aid based on need (Della Longa 2019). Any requests which conflicted with principles and policy were rejected with a clear explanation. For example, the IFRC and VRC rejected Maduro's initial request that aid deliveries not be publicised, as publicising deliveries demonstrates impartiality and neutrality in crises. They also refused to disclose donors, or allow the government to determine who receives aid, based on humanity, impartiality and independence (and donor trust). The Movement rejected government systems (such as the *Carnet de la Patria*) for aid distribution or supporting the Opposition's aid activities (Della Longa 2019). Instead, the Red Cross emphasised they would indiscriminately alleviate suffering, without the problems caused by politicised aid (Medina 2019).

Humanitarian Diplomacy benefits from leveraging knowledge about stakeholder interests. The VRC and IFRC noted not only the human impact of the health crisis, but that both parties suffered fallout from the issue of aid. Maduro faced increasing domestic and global criticism, and the opposition's widely-publicised attempts to deliver aid had failed. The VRC and IFRC linked these problems to politicising aid and emphasised that both parties could entrust the Movement to provide expanded support. Such would alleviate a problem causing challenges for both sides, without compromising political claims (Farias 2019). This highlights the value of framing proposals as "mutually enticing opportunities" when parties suffer from a stalemate (Mancini-Griffoli and Picot 2004, 77).

The Outcome of Advocacy:

Rocca's second visit was in March 2019, after both parties indicated interest in enhancing the VRC and IFRC's role in Venezuela (Della Longa 2019). After this second round of meetings, Rocca announced at a press conference in March 2019 that following parallel talks, the IFRC and VRC would deliver and distribute health aid from overseas, aiming to initially support 650,000 people (IFRC 2019a; BBC 2019b). As insisting upon written agreements can slow progress when rapid action is necessary (Mancini-Griffoli and Picot 2004, 137-149), the VRC and IFRC proceeded upon verbal acceptance. An operational framework was later established, which gave the IFRC the remit to work in water and sanitation, to bring in resources such as medicines, health equipment, sanitary kits and power generators, and to engage in community-level work (Medina 2019). Follow-up meetings confirmed legal and regulatory requirements, such as Spanish instructions for medicines (Della Longa 2019). Vulnerability analysis informed a global appeal for 50 million Swiss Francs. Logistics were also confirmed, whilst the IFRC worked with the WHO to ensure medicines and equipment met their standards (Ibid.). Maduro also agreed to the IFRC's request for a status agreement, which when implemented will enhance the IFRC's presence (Medina 2019).

The first delivery, in April 2019, and following deliveries were publicised by the VRC and IFRC (IFRC 2019g; Reuters 2019). The communications teams developed reactive lines to answer certain questions (including those regarding political figures). Answers focused on the Movement's achievements and the importance of aid based on humanitarian principles (Farias 2019; Medina 2019).

Overall, the VRC and IFRC achieved the outcome of expanded health aid deliveries, and more than 100 tonnes of humanitarian aid have reached Venezuela (Petit 2019). Interview subjects emphasised how the Red Cross succeeded, where few had, to get both factions to agree on aid. This is a rare instance of both an international organisation distributing aid independently in Venezuela, and cooperation between the government and opposition (Della Longa 2019; Farias 2019). The achievement sets a positive precedent for cooperation on Venezuela's humanitarian issues.

A key lesson from the VRC and IFRC's Humanitarian Diplomacy, is a focus on the Fundamental Principles to guide statements and conduct. Avoiding engagement in political disputes helped build trust with government and opposition figures. The Movement's values were clearly explained, facilitating an outcome which avoided compromises that could harm the Movement's reputation. Additionally, the IFRC and VRC's cooperation was crucial, with the IFRC promoting the VRC's activities. Both organisations, despite occasional disagreements, maintained a united front in public advocacy and private negotiations (Medina 2019). Their emphasis upon the VRC's health expertise, also enhanced the legitimacy of their arguments.

However, there were some limitations regarding the VRC and IFRC's Humanitarian Diplomacy. For one, the ICRC had developed relations with the government whilst working on their separate agreement. The VRC did not receive much guidance, technical assistance or support from the ICRC compared to the IFRC, and thus had a weaker negotiating position with Maduro before 2019 (Medina 2019). Whilst the ICRC does have a separate mandate, and approach to Humanitarian Diplomacy (Harroff-Tavel 2006), this highlights the importance of enhanced advocacy coordination between the ICRC, IFRC and National Societies, particularly when the ICRC has an influential position.

Secondly, as previously noted, the VRC and IFRC's coordination on Humanitarian Diplomacy was less extensive prior to 2019 (Medina 2019). Given that Venezuela's humanitarian problems were present from as early as 2014, the IFRC and VRC could have arguably expanded cooperation on advocacy at an earlier time, to alleviate suffering. Finally, that the VRC's relations with the government were strained prior to 2019, due to perceptions surrounding Villarroel's political beliefs, emphasises that National Society figures must avoid language or conduct that could undermine perceived neutrality.

As of now, only six percent of the 50 million Swiss Francs appeal has been obtained, which is arguably linked to continued politicising of aid for Venezuela, discouraging donations. In comparison, the 2019 Bahamas appeal following Hurricane Dorian is overfunded. The Red Cross's achievement of humanitarian objectives is impaired when aid is perceived as a political act (Della Longa 2019). Current aid provision is insufficient for the estimated 13 million Venezuelans needing support (Petit 2019). The VRC and IFRC's continued advocacy for Venezuelans demonstrates how Humanitarian Diplomacy requires persistence (IFRC 2009b).

CONCLUSION

In a situation of political conflict, the IFRC and VRC's success in getting Venezuela's government and opposition to agree to independent health aid highlights Humanitarian Diplomacy's value. Despite aid being politicised, by domestic and global actors, these organisations navigated through controversy and criticism, to achieve objectives which support the vulnerable.

This case study highlights several key lessons for when political disputes affect the provision of humanitarian aid. Firstly, proactive and consistent collaboration is vital for successful Humanitarian Diplomacy. Enhanced collaboration between the IFRC and VRC achieved a breakthrough, although this arguably could have started earlier to alleviate suffering. Furthermore, this case study suggests the ICRC should support National Society advocacy where appropriate.

Also, public communications can complement private negotiations, publicising the Movement's achievements and their values, and countering negative perceptions amongst opinion-influencers and the general public, as well as decision-makers. Furthermore, adapting to political changes and circumstances benefits humanitarian aims. The VRC and IFRC responded to the blockade crisis by making a stronger push for discussions and analysed political language to avoid controversy.

As demonstrated by the IFRC and VRC's health focus, the IFRC and National Societies should emphasise advocacy based upon the latter's strengths. Meanwhile, transparency and communication regarding the Movement's current activities, and how proposals support such activities, creates trust. Humanitarian Diplomacy also benefits when key figures engaged in negotiations, supported by evidence, can follow protocol and policy whilst also building a strong rapport.

When the Movement engages in Humanitarian Diplomacy, conduct and outcomes should not impair the Fundamental Principles. This damages integrity and reputation, with consequences for work across the world. But as the VRC and IFRC demonstrated, principles such as neutrality should not discourage advocacy, but guide it towards the ultimate objective of supporting the vulnerable.

Despite successful advocacy, the VRC and IFRC's struggle to receive sufficient donations means current aid is inadequate, with Rocca recently requesting more support at the UN (Petit 2019). Furthermore, humanitarian aid cannot cure Venezuela's political problems. Thus, the Movement's advocacy on behalf of Venezuelans continues within an uncertain political environment for the foreseeable future.

In a world where political conflicts challenge humanitarian assistance, the Red Cross must navigate disputes with care, attention, and expertise. Whilst Humanitarian Diplomacy may not change political reality, that it helped the VRC and IFRC to achieve a breakthrough is a positive step. Humanitarian Diplomacy has proved how it can help the Movement fulfil its fundamental mission in the Twenty-First Century.

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Sandra Duong

External Relations Manager, Swedish Red Cross

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Call for humanitarian diplomacy action in the Triple Nexus

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Tutor: Javier Ormeno

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ABSTRACT

The concept of the humanitarian-development-peace nexus, commonly referred to as the triple nexus, calls for new ways of working in bridging prevention, response and development across the mandates of humanitarian, development and peace actors. This paper examines the policy frameworks of the EU and identifies potential risks that the triple nexus poses to the humanitarian space and humanitarian actors' ability to carry out principle-based humanitarian work. The paper proposes a humanitarian diplomacy action to reduce the risks of the triple nexus on Red Cross Red Crescent humanitarian action and space. It concludes that careful analysis is needed to understand the underlying objectives of the EU and other donors in operationalising the triple nexus as there are significant risks that humanitarian and development assistance will become more closely instrumentalised for political and security priorities. Meanwhile, Red Cross Red Crescent National Societies with their experiences and role as auxiliaries to public authorities in the humanitarian field, should seize the opportunity to influence future policies and funding programmes so that humanitarian space is safeguarded throughout the nexus continuum.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The objective of the humanitarian-development-peace nexus, commonly referred to as the triple nexus, is to address the root causes of conflicts. The triple nexus stresses the need to work towards collective outcomes that reduce needs, risks and vulnerabilities over multiple years. The triple nexus differs from previous approaches by emphasising change of aid structures and working methods. These shifts will have profound implications for what, how, and with whom humanitarian action is carried out.

The EU and its member states make up the world's biggest donors. They set precedence in how to formalise and implement the triple nexus which will have operational consequences for humanitarian actors. The EU has long championed a resilience agenda and since 2018, the nexus expanded to include security and peacebuilding elements. The Integrated Approach is a foreign policy priority and in practice, efforts to better link humanitarian and development needs are being operationalised in parallel to those aimed at more closely linking security and development in countries with geopolitical interests. Recent years have seen unprecedented changes in the EU funding landscape that emphasise security and domestic politics within EU development assistance, with instruments such as the EU Trust Fund for Africa and the EU Turkey Facility, that have increasing emphasis on controlling irregular migration as an objective.

The purpose of this paper is to examine what risks the triple nexus poses to the humanitarian space. It proposes a humanitarian diplomacy strategy to reduce the risks of the triple nexus on Red Cross and Red Crescent humanitarian action and space. The goal of the humanitarian diplomacy strategy is to**: influence and persuade the EU and its member states to safeguard the humanitarian mandate and action from being undermined in triple nexus policies, strategies and implementation.** The strategy is structured around the IFRC Humanitarian Diplomacy Policy (2009) which refers to four signposts for action.

Even though there is little empirical evidence of direct risks generated by the triple nexus, the overhanging risks can have severe impacts on humanitarian organisations' ability to carry out the principle-based approach. The triple nexus challenges the humanitarian imperative to provide assistance based on needs alone and operates in accordance with impartiality, neutrality and independence. In other words, the humanitarian pillar risks becoming subsumed to broader political or even security agendas. Against the operational experience and role of Red Cross and Red Crescent National Societies, this paper argues that National Societies are relevant nexus actors and should conduct humanitarian diplomacy to ensure that policies and funding programmes reflect humanitarian ideals and principles. National Societies should remember that the Fundamental Principles are at work at all times, throughout the nexus continuum and that nexus programming must be localised and context-driven. As the ones being directly affected by a crisis, as well as the ones responding at the frontline, their understanding of the problems and relevant solutions should inform programming and funding modalities much more than they currently do in order to ensure durable impacts.

1. INTRODUCTION

The humanitarian-development-peace nexus, also called the triple nexus, proposes a triple-win solution to address the most complex and protracted crises in the world. The triple nexus aims to strengthen coherence between humanitarian, development and peace efforts to effectively reduce people's needs, risks and vulnerabilities, support prevention efforts and thus shift from delivering humanitarian assistance to ending need (OECD, 2019). While its intention is valid and even necessary to reach sustainable solutions to fragility and protracted crises, donors and actors struggle to implement the triple nexus in practice. The current European Commission is committed to translating the triple nexus policy into action. It can therefore be expected that the triple nexus will be operationalised in the EU's policies and there is a significant risk that the EU's development assistance will become more closely linked with the EU's political, economic and security interests in the upcoming Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027.

The Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (hereafter the Movement) are partners to the Commission and implementers of their funding. The Movement can play a crucial role in how triple nexus policies and funding programmes are formulated and implemented on the ground while ensuring that the humanitarian space is safeguarded.

The purpose of this research is to

- **examine what risk the triple nexus poses to the humanitarian space**
- **propose a humanitarian diplomacy strategy to reduce the risks of the triple nexus on Red Cross and Red Crescent humanitarian action and space**

The methodology of this research is desk based and uses secondary research. Substantial information gathering and comparative analysis has been done to address the purpose statements. Online data collection has been carried out from policy related information (European Commission's existing policy, development and humanitarian strategies and plans), previous research, and humanitarian diplomacy related information such as reports, position papers, articles, campaigns, seminars or others by humanitarian agencies.

In chapter two, the paper starts with a background to the triple nexus and presents the relevant policy framework of the EU's external action. It then examines the potential risks that the triple nexus poses to humanitarian actors. Chapter three outlines recommendations for a humanitarian diplomacy strategy for Red Cross and Red Crescent National Societies that has the objective to influence and persuade the EU and its member states to safeguard the humanitarian mandate and action from being undermined in triple nexus policies, strategies and implementation. Finally, in chapter four the paper provides some conclusions on this research.

2. TRIPLE NEXUS AND HUMANITARIAN SPACE

The triple nexus was triggered by the extensive increase of violent conflicts. Today's humanitarian crises are increasingly complex and the average crisis lasts more than nine years. Nearly 90% of humanitarian aid is allocated towards protracted crises (Friesen et.al., 2020; OECD, 2019). Addressing conflict situations became distinct in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development which embodies the pronouncement that *"there can be no sustainable development without peace and no peace without sustainable development"* (UN, 2015). The 2016 World Humanitarian Summit recognised the need for a different way of working, anchored in political will, to prevent and end conflict, save lives, meet humanitarian needs and reduce risk and vulnerability. At the summit, commitments were made to the Grand Bargain which envisioned a transition from delivering aid to ending need (UNGA, 2016; UNOCHA, 2016).

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 'DAC Recommendation on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus' (2019) reflects commitments from the Grand Bargain, Sustainable Development Goals and other global frameworks. The recommendation provides a comprehensive framework to operationalise the triple nexus and is instrumental in reducing the humanitarian caseload and prioritising *"prevention always, development wherever possible, humanitarian action when necessary"*. The recommendations mainly focus on:

- Improve **coordination**, strengthen coherence and complementarity between actors
- Work towards **collective outcomes** within respective mandates

- **Better programming** through e.g. bridging prevention, response, and development; people-centred approaches; conflict sensitivity; risk focus; strengthen local capacities, etc.
- Improve **financing** across the nexus

2.1 Triple nexus in EU policy framework

The EU's policy formulations on the nexus approach agree with the overall objectives and are much in line with the OECD DAC recommendation. However it is also greatly characterised by its own political priorities. The European Commission's political guidelines 2019-2024 (n.d.) assert the promotion of a stronger Europe in the world through global leadership and a more active role, which is reflected in its 'Strategic Approach to Resilience' (EC, 2017). It aims to increase the impact of EU external action and sustain progress towards EU development, humanitarian, foreign and security policy objectives.

The Commissioner for Crisis Management, who is also responsible for humanitarian aid, is leading the Commission's collective work on developing an 'integrated approach' to conflicts and crises that better address urgent relief and longer-term solutions (EC, 2019a). The integrated approach was introduced in the Global Strategy for the EU's Foreign and Security Policy (2016) and will foster human security through a multi-dimensional (diplomatic, security, defence, financial, trade, humanitarian aid, development cooperation), multi-phased (prevention, response, recovery), multi-level (local, national, regional and global) and multilateral approach. It is important to note that the Global Strategy was developed when security, terrorism and migration were high on the European agenda and called for an expansion of the integrated approach to conflicts and crises. The strategy proclaims EU investment in state resilience, as well as in the resilience of individuals and societies but with a focus on refugees, migrants and countries of origin and transit (VOICE, 2019, p.19).

In a shift towards making the EU's development policy more flexible and aligned with the strategic priorities of the EU, the new Multi Financial Framework 2021-2027 merges 12 former financing instruments into one, called the 'Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument' (NDCI). The 'Rapid Response' pillar covers three financial envelopes for 'strengthening resilience. Better link humanitarian aid and development cooperation'; 'Provide stability and conflict prevention in situations of crisis'; and 'Early action to address the EU's foreign policy needs and priorities' (EC, 2018). NDICI does not only focus on addressing poverty and development goals but is widened to promote the EU's own competitiveness and economic, migration and security policy interests outside the EU. The new instrument risks undermining principles and priorities for global development (Concord Sverige, n.d.). However, at least 92% of the funding under NDICI must fulfil the OECD DAC requirements (EC, 2018).

Furthermore, the current Commission was introduced as a geopolitical commission (EC, 2019b). The geopolitical dimension is described in the Global Strategy wherein the EU should give priority to supporting resilience in surrounding regions, with the motivation: "*Fragility beyond our borders threatens all our vital interests. By contrast, resilience – the ability of states and societies to reform, thus withstanding and recovering from internal and external crises – benefits us*" (EU, 2016, p.23). Building more resilient neighbours is part of the response to protect the EU and its Member States against the structural risks and challenges that drive vulnerabilities in the EU's partner countries (EC, 2017, p.15). Similar Europe-centric interest is repeated in the current Commission's political guidelines 2019-2024 (n.d.): "*peace, security and development are all mutually dependent. We need an integrated and comprehensive approach to our security*". The EU's role in peacebuilding is evidently diplomatic and through a political process it aims to "*develop a political culture of acting sooner in response to the risk of violent conflict*". It states explicitly that the EU will engage more systematically on the security dimension of conflicts and upon prospects of stabilisation, and will seek to bridge gaps in their response between an end of violence and long-term recovery, approaching this with a security and development dimension to the engagement (EU, 2016, p.30).

It is important to note that the latest council conclusions on the Integrated Approach to External Conflicts and Crises (22 January 2018) underlines the importance of adherence to International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and the EU's role in promoting respect for IHL and the protection of civilians in all conflict situations. The Council also recalls that EU humanitarian aid is guided by humanitarian principles and is provided solely on the basis of the needs of the affected populations and beyond any political, strategic, military, economic or other objectives. The Council stresses that EU humanitarian aid is not a crisis management instrument and should not be used for fulfilling any other objectives

than humanitarian ones. The paragraphs on humanitarian assistance have not been as clearly reflected or even referred to in the previous documents.

2.2 Risks to the humanitarian space

Even though international humanitarian assistance has increased over recent years, the humanitarian system is still underfunded and overstretched to meet growing humanitarian needs. Meanwhile, the majority of funding is concentrated on only a few complex crises, whereas in 2017, five crises received 58% of international humanitarian assistance (Knox, 2018). While the gap in humanitarian funding remains, it can be expected that future funds will be allocated towards triple nexus programming. The need to sustain external funding challenges humanitarian organisations in rethinking their strategies conceptually to fit the demands and commitments of donors.

The triple nexus could pose risks to the humanitarian space by political agendas dictating or obstructing the principled approach. Members from humanitarian non-governmental organisations (NGO) are concerned that working under collective outcomes could undermine humanitarian actors' ability to work based on needs. "*While on paper, humanitarian objectives and principles are to be sacrosanct in the EU's Integrated Approach, the reality on the ground is that NGOs are increasingly seeing that political and security interests can seem to dominate*" (VOICE, 2018, p.22). The triple nexus is triggered by a perception that aid is failing to address the root causes of conflicts. While this may be true, it does not constitute a gap in the humanitarian response but rather a gap and absence of development and political action in conflict settings. Humanitarians being the only ones present, often find themselves alone in addressing needs, ranging from immediate to chronic, and in an endless provision of basic services, thus replacing public institutions. Arguably, humanitarian action as an endeavour solely intended to support human beings cannot be so easily aligned with policies intended to transform political, social and economic injustices. The consequences of triple nexus could include the loss of the humanitarian mission's added value as a distinct way to address human suffering because the long-term needs of a system do not necessarily align with the immediate needs of people (Castellarnau and Stoianova, 2018; ICVA and PHAP, 2018)

In particular, bridging humanitarian and development realms cannot only suggest a focus on a way out of a crisis. The push for coherence across the nexus might overlook the critical role of humanitarians in emergency response to acute needs (Castellarnau and Stoianova, 2018). Nexus engagement is believed to bring humanitarian actors closer to host governments and/or geopolitical priorities of donors, enforcing tensions between *"what people need (i.e. the concern of humanitarians) and what the government wants (i.e. the driver for development frameworks)"* (Knox, 2018, p.241). Oxfam provides an illustrative example from the Sahel:

> *"state perspectives are increasingly prioritized over an in-depth understanding of, and efforts to address, drivers of fragility and local grievances. This risks undermining the independence of aid and its effectiveness. In some places (such as the Lake Chad Basin and Mali), national security forces secure areas to enable the implementation of development interventions. Often, security agents themselves are responsible for human rights abuses. Inequalities and grievances are further exacerbated by counter-terrorism laws that restrict movement and livelihood opportunities, undermining communities' survival strategies. Development actors are then perceived as being linked to the state, and their ability to contribute to more equitable governance is undermined. The focus on security and stopping irregular migration means that in some cases assistance is not going to the poorest people, but is focused on areas where people are more likely to join violent groups or attempt to migrate to Europe."* (2019, p.19)

Instrumentalization of humanitarian aid in terms of what types of services are being delivered to one side of the crisis, or to areas of more geo-political importance, have consequences for the legitimacy of the humanitarian mission, especially when humanitarian coverage is already declining in areas outside government control. In situations of conflict both government and non-state armed groups are increasingly denying access or using bureaucracy to hinder access (Knox, 2018).

For humanitarians, the peace element poses major challenges. Firstly, there is no clear definition of the peace component and the EU tends to use the terms 'conflict prevention', 'peacebuilding', 'security' and 'stabilisation' interchangeably. Different actors' interpretation of peace, and thus understanding of the triple nexus, creates gaps in the operationalisation of the nexus. Peace is defined according to the respective interests and agendas of actors

involved, leading to a wide spectrum of actions e.g. integrating conflict sensitivity, 'do no harm', supporting social cohesion, peace processes and high-level political diplomacy, peacekeeping missions and stabilisation. It is suggested that humanitarian actors should forcefully reject the nexus, due to concerns for being perceived as associated with the state's strategy or other political or security agendas. Whether an actual or perceived association this could create confusion on the ground and harm relationships with local actors. This could compromise their neutrality and independence and have operational consequences on for example, access to affected populations or safety of humanitarian workers (Alcayna, 2019; Friesen et.al., 2020; ICVA and PHAP, 2018; Oxfam, 2019).

Counter-terrorism and sanctions regimes, such as EU restrictive measures is a tool to achieve foreign policy objectives, obligations that are incumbent upon States, but believed to subject aid agencies to instrumentalization for achieving political and security objectives. EU restrictive measures apply to humanitarian organisations through legislation at various levels, including funding agreements. Restrictions prohibit unqualified provision of services, assistance, materials or funds to natural persons, groups or entities detected in EU sanctions list, including local implementing partners, contractors and down to the level of final beneficiary (EC, 2019c). EU restrictive measures could impede principled humanitarian assistance to all sides of a conflict and could potentially violate the rules of IHL (ICRC, 2015). The due diligence obligation in terms of screening or vetting beneficiaries, contractors or associates against a sanctions list could be perceived as endorsement of such lists by humanitarian organisations, thus questioning the organisation's neutrality, independence and impartiality. Maintaining the principled approach is especially important against the backdrop of declining respect for IHL whereas obstruction of humanitarian delivery and attacks on humanitarian and medical personnel and facilities is growing (EU, 2019). Peter Maurer, President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), argues that principled humanitarian action is not a matter of abstract principles, it is about pragmatic solutions inspired by the humanitarian principles that have been shaped by practice over decades. At the same time, Mauer recognises that preserving space for "shared humanity" and shared responsibility for humanitarian space that can resist politicisation of humanitarian action is challenging in a time of widespread polarisation, extremism and isolation (Mauer, 2014).

Irrespective of longevity, depth or type of action, the humanitarian principles and 'do no harm' are equally important and need to be upheld throughout the nexus continuum by all stakeholders involved. Protracted conflict is not a legal term in IHL and IHL does not differentiate between relief, early recovery and development. Humanitarian action therefore transcends these concepts to protect the lives and dignity of people (ICRC, 2016). Funding instruments of donors on the other hand are delivered in silos which limits humanitarian space in terms of ensuring adequate resources to meet humanitarian needs, and in terms of enabling principled humanitarian action beyond the immediate emergency phase. For example, EU restrictive measures which impede on how humanitarian services are delivered, are an exemption in EU humanitarian aid but not in its development cooperation, thus hampering humanitarian organisations' ability to directly engage in the mid-latter spectrum of the nexus. There is a rhetorical gap between donors' policy commitments and actual funding behaviour. Donors in general remain too risk-averse and their funding instruments hinder the integrated approach, even though it globally has been recognised that nexus work requires multi-year and flexible funding (Alcayna, 2019; Parker and Redvers, 2019).

3. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A HUMANITARIAN DIPLOMACY STRATEGY

The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement is the world's largest humanitarian network with 192 Red Cross and Red Crescent (RC/RC) National Societies working to act before, during and after crises to meet the needs and improve the lives of vulnerable people. The work of the Movement is guided by the humanitarian ideals reflected in its Fundamental Principles and values.[1] National Societies have an unique opportunity to influence and work with decision-makers through their auxiliary role with public authorities in the humanitarian field in times of both war and peace, as enshrined in the statutes of the Movement and recognised on the basis of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The auxiliary role helps to define the relationship between a government and a National Society and provides opportunities for dialogue at all levels as well as a set of agreed responsibilities and activities defined by a government

[1] Humanity, Impartiality, Neutrality, Independence, Voluntary Service, Unity, Universality.

and a National Society together. These activities vary from country to country but are generally an important part of the domestic response to humanitarian needs. While independent organisations, their auxiliary status means that National Societies have a duty to consider requests from their public authorities to carry out humanitarian activities in line with their mandate and the Fundamental Principles or the statutes of the Movement (IFRC, 2015).

Humanitarian diplomacy is therefore an integral part of the work of the Movement as well as a responsibility of National Societies derived from their humanitarian commitment and auxiliary role. This chapter outlines recommendations for a humanitarian diplomacy strategy to reduce the impact of the triple nexus on RC/RC humanitarian action and space. The recommendations are aligned with the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) Humanitarian Diplomacy Policy (2009) which refers to four signposts for action.

3,1 Signpost 1 - Responsibility to persuade

The goal of humanitarian diplomacy strategy is to: **Influence and persuade the EU and its member states to safeguard the humanitarian mandate and action from being undermined in triple nexus policies, strategies and implementation.**

RC/RC National Societies should promote the humanitarian imperative in the triple nexus and ensure priority for humanitarian assistance to affected populations above development, political or security interests. The strategy should be grounded on evidence-based information and National Societies should speak from their rich experiences and harvest the collective strength from the entire Movement in addressing protracted crises. While there are many strong examples and important messages that can be used, this paper presents four suggestions for key messages:

- ***Humanity first, respect for humanitarian principles always***

Humanitarian aid must be provided solely on the basis of the needs of the affected population and falls beyond the scope of political, strategic, military, or economic pressures, as stated in the 2007 European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid. All humanitarian actions under a Nexus approach should be strictly grounded in the humanitarian principles, irrespective of the longevity, depth or type of action. The EU should further ensure respect and adherence to international human rights law and IHL where applicable. Promoting respect for IHL by all stakeholders in a conflict setting key to ensuring protection of civilians and civilian objects, delivery of humanitarian assistance to those in need, as well as protecting humanitarian workers (RCEU Office and ICRC, 2018). In line with council conclusions on humanitarian assistance and international humanitarian law, as adopted on 25 November 2019, the EU and its Member States will be held accountable for their commitments to the implementation and further strengthening of IHL and the humanitarian principles, in close cooperation with their respective National Red Cross Societies.

- ***Red Cross and Red Crescent National Societies can contribute to strengthening the link between humanitarian and development***

RC/RC National Societies are well positioned to participate in consultations with the EU and its Member States. A localised response to the needs and priorities of affected populations is a relevant response. RC/RC National Societies have vast experience of responding to humanitarian and development needs before, during and after crises, and are well anchored in local communities. Through structured engagement with RC/RC National Societies, they are able to provide contextualised and evidence-based contributions to the decision-making, implementation, monitoring and realisation of nexus programmes.

- ***Ensuring a people-centred approach to nexus***

People, especially those living with vulnerabilities and in remote and fragile communities, are worst affected by crises. The EU's and its member states' support to nexus implementation should therefore focus on the sole purpose of addressing local needs, reduce vulnerabilities and risks and contribute to resilience. They should ensure that the development element will have a direct or indirect impact for those most in need. Assisting the poorest and most vulnerable people must be central in order to deliver on the promise of the Sustainable Development Agenda 'reach the furthest behind first' (Oxfam, 2019). In line with the OECD DAC Recommendation (2019), good programming within the nexus needs to to consider gender, diversity, inclusion and participation by affected populations.

- ***Ensuring that humanitarian aid is delivered through separate funding instrument***

In order for humanitarian assistance to remain needs-based, principled and unconditional, humanitarian aid needs to remain channelled through an unbiased framework and distinct from political objectives of the EU's external action and internal interests e.g. separated from development and peace-building funding instruments. In line with the Grand Bargain, the EU and its member states should duly enforce commitments made towards maximising support to people in need and improving the effectiveness and efficiency of humanitarian action. Commitments include more support and funding tools for local and national responders, including RC/RC National Societies, increased predictable and flexible multi-year funding in situations of protracted crisis, and increased un-earmarked support (IASC, n.d.).

3.2 Signpost 2 - Appropriate diplomatic tools and actions

The second step involves selecting the target audience and types of action to be taken, and at what time. It is important to ensure a coordinated approach between different National Societies and with the Red Cross EU office, IFRC and ICRC.

Regarding the **target audience**, the EU and its member states make up the world's biggest donors to humanitarian and development cooperation. They set precedence in how to formalise and implement the triple nexus in practice which will have operational consequences for humanitarian actors. The current Commission came into office in December 2019. The mandate period of the Commission 2020-2024 will demonstrate an external action that is more concerned with upholding the EU's values and political, economic, development and security interests, promoting the EU as a leader in the world, and bridging crisis prevention/stabilisation, humanitarian assistance and development. It is therefore important that RC/RC National Societies make efforts to influence the shaping of the EU's external action in its policies, strategies and implementation plans for humanitarian and development assistance, in order to ensure the safeguarding of humanitarian space. National Societies should conduct humanitarian diplomacy activities towards representatives and servants of the European Commission and Parliament in Brussels as well as in countries with EU delegations and ECHO field offices. Moreover, National Societies based in an EU member state should exercise its auxiliary role towards decision makers and inform them about the risks to the humanitarian assistance and actors that the triple nexus poses, as well as persuade them to ensure that the humanitarian space is respected in triple nexus operationalisation. This would not only have an impact on EU regulations but also the domestic frameworks of EU member states. The target audience of humanitarian diplomacy activities include representatives from:

- **European Commission:** President, vice-President, Commissioners and civil servants from Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO), Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO) and Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG-NEAR)
- **European Parliament:** Chairs, parliamentarians from Committees of the European Parliament
- **Member States**: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, public agencies for international assistance

Although not an exhaustive list of **activities,** it is recommended that National Societies engage in three parallel channels. The first is through bilateral dialogue with high-level representatives based on trust-building, information-sharing, and deepened partnership. It is important to build a position around evidence-based information.

The second channel is to actively participate in formal consultations and processes around EU strategy development, development and humanitarian programmes, conferences and seminars, etc. These fora would also involve a wider audience that can likewise be influenced or support the humanitarian diplomacy strategy. They provide a platform for National Societies to be visible and demonstrate credibility on speaking about humanitarian policies and assistance.

3.3 Signpost 3 - Focusing on areas of knowledge and expertise

It is necessary that the humanitarian diplomacy strategy is built around an evidence-based approach to demonstrate credibility. National Societies represent first line responders through its local presence in communities before,

during and after a crisis who address short and long-term needs and development objectives. They are already working in a nexus approach by responding to emergencies, reducing vulnerabilities and building resilience of individuals and communities, and fostering a culture of peace around the world. The work is always carried out with a people-centred approach since they themselves and their volunteers emanate from the communities. The resilience building is therefore owned and driven by affected communities with the well-being, dignity and safety of people being the key priority (IFRC, n.d.).

Due to their expertise and on-the-ground experience, RC/RC National Societies are key in making sure that the humanitarian space is respected by the EU and member states, especially as National Societies are partners and implementers of the EU's humanitarian and development programmes. RC/RC National Societies should capitalize on the entire Movement's wide network of expertise and relations – spanning from people in need, to state and non-state actors, donors, and other humanitarian, development and peace actors – to pursue humanitarian diplomacy at different levels to ensure that the principled humanitarian action is respected and safeguarded by all stakeholders. In line with the key messages, it is important to underline that the Fundamental Principles are at work at all times throughout the nexus continuum. National Societies play a key role in ensuring that nexus programming is characterised by criteria for being localised and context-driven. As the ones being directly affected by a crisis, as well as the ones responding at the frontline, their understanding of the problems and relevant solutions should inform programming and funding modalities much more than they currently do in order to ensure durable impacts. Local National Societies and affected communities seldom work with distinctions between humanitarianism and development. Yet, their presence and actions before, during and after crises increase the probability that short- and long-term needs and objectives can be addressed (Alcayna, 2019).

3.4 Signpost 4 - Engaging with partners outside the Movement

National Societies should be encouraged to discuss and coordinate with other humanitarian, development and peace actors. The entire humanitarian sector should speak jointly about safeguarding of humanitarian space but also reach common understanding with development and peace actors on the operationalisation of triple nexus and respect for humanitarian principles and preservation of the humanitarian space.

CONCLUSIONS

This paper has outlined some of the main processes inspiring the triple nexus concept. The OECD DAC recommendation is the only comprehensive framework to operationalising the triple nexus. While the recommendations are laudable, they present the triple nexus as a mere technical problem when in fact, the nexus remains a conceptual, political and institutional challenge. The nexus has been criticised for being a headquarters product that is overly simplistic and disconnected from the realities facing practitioners on the ground (Friesen, et.al., 2020). It is perceived as attempting to "feed three birds with one seed" and is built on incoherent and general assumptions. The triple nexus discourse needs a common vernacular and a common understanding of problems, definitions and scope both between sectors and within sectors (ICVA and PHAP, 2018).

Little empirical evidence of either expected results or negative consequences of triple nexus has been found. Still, with the lack of clear causal links between the OECD DAC recommendations and within the focus of the EU, the potential harm on the legitimacy of humanitarian action cannot be overlooked. The triple nexus calls for risk awareness before engaging in nexus programming in a way that contradicts the humanitarian principles. More analysis is needed, and future studies should examine the risks and opportunities from the direct perspectives of RC/RC National societies, other local actors and affected populations in protracted crises.

In the context of protracted crises, it is critical that the nexus allows for humanitarian and development activities to coexist without compromising the humanitarian principles and humanitarian organisations' ability to ensure safe access to affected populations (RCEU Office and ICRC, 2018). Here, it is important to remember that the Fundamental Principles are at work at all times, throughout the nexus continuum. Jean Pictet writes in his commentary of the Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross that the principles which make up the doctrine of the Red Cross and Red Crescent are universal, permanent and indifferent to waves of popular opinions and ideologies of the moment. Pictet warns that "*politicization undoubtedly constitutes the greatest danger now confronting the Red Cross*" (1979, p.36). Independence is a critical tool for the work of National Societies, to guarantee neutrality as well as allowing them to gain the trust and confidence of, and access to, vulnerable communities. Instead, in the context of political tensions, violence and isolation, National Societies must champion shared humanity and promote respect and a willingness to work together to find solutions to community problems (IFRC, n.d.). National Societies play a key role in ensuring that nexus programming respects principled humanitarian action and that it is characterised by criteria for being localised and context-driven. As those directly affected by a crisis, as well as those responding at the frontline, their understanding of the problems and relevant solutions should inform programming and funding modalities much more than they currently do in order to ensure durable impacts. As argued in this paper, National Societies and the wider Movement should seize the opportunity to influence the EU's future policies and funding programmes so that humanitarian space is safeguarded.

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Hannah Bird

Freelance tutor

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Citizen Diplomats: Exploring the links between community organising and humanitarian diplomacy in campaigning on refugee resettlement in the UK

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This paper explores whether there is any middle ground between the generally top-down approaches to local involvement taken by organisations involved in humanitarian diplomacy, and often chaotic and short-term grassroots citizen actions. It assesses the potential for a genuinely locally-rooted but organised form of citizen diplomacy, which is able to achieve sustained advocacy successes on humanitarian issues beyond those directly experienced in a particular community. Greater achievements in this area would open new avenues to achieve change globally, with the potential to involve far more people in sustained long-term advocacy.

The key to such middle ground may lie in the concept and methods of community organising. While communities have organised and conducted advocacy for centuries, the modern understanding of this term comes from Saul Alinsky's work in the US of the 1930s, his seminal texts, and how others have taken up and adapted his approach. This concept of community organising may provide the means by which organisations engaged in humanitarian diplomacy can connect with more spontaneous and chaotic forms of "citizen" activity, building embedded local roots and relationships across and among those in a community, rather than only top-down relationships with national or international organisations, enabling organised advocacy on global causes that can have a sustained influence on power holders at all levels.

The analysis is divided into three chapters. Chapter One explores the concept of humanitarian diplomacy in the Red Cross and Red Crescent ("RCRC") Movement and in large NGOs, how it operates at a local level, and its limitations. Chapter Two presents the background and leading theory in community organising, and the broad learnings that humanitarian diplomats can draw from it. Chapter Three introduces potential learnings through a case study of community organising charity Citizens UK's advocacy work on refugee resettlement.

The key finding is that there is much potential for linkages between humanitarian diplomats and community organisers, with the case study demonstrating that locally-rooted organisations and individuals can be successfully engaged on global humanitarian issues and can make useful contributions to humanitarian diplomacy strategies. The recommendation is for mutual learning and discussion between the humanitarian diplomats of the Red Cross and Red Crescent ("RCRC") Movement and large NGOs, and community organising groups such as Citizens UK. This could lead to the creation of hybrid locally-rooted humanitarian-community groups composed of individual trained "citizen diplomats", noting that current debates on localisation within the humanitarian sector provide a conducive context.

INTRODUCTION

The term "diplomacy" has long been associated with an elite activity confined to the activities of governments and their formally educated public servants. The concept of "humanitarian diplomacy" widens the field in recognising that advocacy by the RCRC Movement and NGOs to further their work aiding the vulnerable is a form of diplomacy, utilising many of the same methods as state diplomats. However, although this work appears more closely connected to the issues faced by ordinary people, it is still generally remote from them, taking place at UN meetings and international summits.

While diplomacy and its humanitarian dimension retain an elite image, recent decades have witnessed the rise of "citizen" activity, such as citizen journalism and crowdfunding. The term "citizen diplomacy" is also already in use, with the US-based Center for Citizen Diplomacy defining it as 'the concept that every global citizen has the right, even the responsibility, to engage across cultural differences and create shared understanding through person-to-person interactions' (Center for Citizen Diplomacy, 2019). This paper uses the term "citizen" in its broadest sense of world citizens, rather than those of any particular country.

However, these citizen activities face three limitations. Firstly, there are limits on inclusivity, as many initiatives designed to involve ordinary people and/or beneficiaries of humanitarian action are often driven from the centre by large organisations staffed by the formally educated and socially privileged. Inclusion is often more about involvement in service-delivery rather than advocacy; or is limited to holding focus groups to give ordinary people a "voice." The second limitation concerns genuinely grassroots movements created and led by those facing or witnessing humanitarian crises. While these are sometimes more socially inclusive, they risk becoming chaotic and burning out as they are taken in competing directions, and of being co-opted by those most powerful locally, particularly as they generally lack clearly defined principles and missions. The third limitation is that citizen activities are often viewed as confined to issues directly impacting on a particular community, so that the people living in a deprived borough of London are unwilling or unable to undertake advocacy activities in support of global causes.

To explore the possibility of overcoming these limitations, the case study chosen is that of Citizens UK, a charity both creating and supporting community organising in an increasing number of UK cities. Alongside its work on local issues, its members have conducted advocacy on refugee resettlement for the last two decades. This element of their work is examined to determine how the community organising approach could add a new dimension to humanitarian diplomacy as understood by the RCRC Movement and large NGOs. Due to time and word count constraints, the case study is explored only broadly, and a more focused case study would be a useful future development.

The research has been undertaken through analysis of secondary sources, exploring key concepts and methods through academic articles, and conducting media searches on Citizens UK's refugee resettlement work. Primary material from the organisation's website has also been examined. In addition, three semi-structured telephone/Zoom interviews were conducted with current and former Citizens UK organisers who have been heavily involved in refugee resettlement work (see Interviews section at the end of this paper). There was insufficient time to interview community leaders and local members who participated in advocacy work, but this would be useful to deepen the analysis.

CHAPTER ONE: HUMANITARIAN DIPLOMACY – AN ELITE ACTIVITY?

Attempts to influence power holders to act on humanitarian issues have no doubt existed since the emergence of human communities. However, the concept of humanitarian diplomacy is generally said to have emerged with Henri Dunant and his founding of the RCRC Movement. His work in the 1860s, persuading governments to sign up to the Geneva Conventions, shows that 'right from the start he was involved in service delivery and in advocacy' (IFRC, 2012). Such advocacy is a central tool of humanitarian diplomats, alongside others such as negotiating, drafting formal agreements, and gathering evidence. While other humanitarian actors are now knowledgeable and heavily involved in such actions, the Movement's definition remains widely adopted.

The IFRC defines humanitarian diplomacy as 'persuading decision makers and opinion leaders to act, at all times, in the interests of vulnerable people, and with full respect for fundamental humanitarian principles' (IFRC, 2009). The 'fundamental humanitarian principles' of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence are key. They distinguish humanitarian diplomacy as understood by the Movement and most large NGOs from its use to define humanitarian activities and campaigns by nation states.

The potential for state co-option of the concept may render the most controversial and challenging principle of neutrality increasingly prized as a marker of the truly 'humanitarian', while the principle also causes confusion outside of the Movement and makes relations with other actors problematic at times (IFRC, 2009). Although the Movement views neutrality as a means of achieving humanitarian outcomes rather than an end in itself (IFRC, 2009), misunderstandings about the concept may be a factor making engagement at grassroots citizen level challenging, where political, partial, and biased viewpoints can be difficult to manage. Similarly, National Societies' status as auxiliaries of public authorities (IFRC, n.d.) may also distance the Movement's humanitarian diplomacy activities from the grassroots level.

However, as a membership network, the Movement does have a local and citizen dimension in that many of its service delivery activities and elements of its advocacy are carried out by local volunteers. National Societies also partner with other organisations at national and local levels, including NGOs and businesses. Nevertheless, its approach still appears distinct from citizen-driven service delivery and advocacy in that it is generally highly organised, top-down and conducted through "volunteers" rather than "members."

This is not to say that the Movement does not aim to involve ordinary citizens or local communities in activities contributing to humanitarian diplomacy. Its Protocol Handbook notes that 'communities are not targets but the starting points for action in support of the most vulnerable' (2010, p.66) and recommends investment at community level and strengthening of 'human capital.' Nevertheless, there appear to be limitations in depth of grassroots engagement and activity, particularly in that much of the language used is framed as top-down, about "giving voices" to communities and the "vulnerable". The *Practising Humanitarian Diplomacy Handbook* seems to frame activity at local levels as focused on building relations with local authorities (2012, p.28), and makes no mention of scope for local actors to engage in international or global causes. There is reference to 'grassroots advocacy', but this is explained through a definition in another NGO publication (as examined below). Therefore, there does not seem to be a conscious strategy around incorporating the concept of a "citizen diplomat" in the Movement's understanding of humanitarian diplomacy.

The Movement's aim to include more people and intended beneficiaries is now widespread among humanitarian organisations. It is exemplified in the 2016 "Grand Bargain", in which a group of donors and large NGOs committed to 'making principled humanitarian action as local as possible and as international as necessary' (2016, p.5), envisaging a 'participation revolution' to 'include people receiving aid in making the decisions which affect their lives' (2016, p.10). However, the framing still fits a top-down approach, about partnership and inclusion, rather than the grassroots as leaders or drivers of their participation.

It is important to note, however, that there are some more innovative approaches to the grassroots by large NGOs, such as that outlined in the *Grassroots Advocacy Handbook* developed by the Cambodian local branches of three large NGOs (and referred to by the IFRC on grassroots advocacy). This resource is aimed at local communities and envisages leading their own advocacy, working to build networks across and between local communities (PACT Cambodia et al, 2006). This approach is much closer to community organising, but it is not systemised or theorised in the same

way, and it appears somewhat disconnected from the work of the Movement or large NGOs. In this context, relationships between the two approaches are more likely to emerge as top-down partnerships, with community action confined to local issues.

Despite the lack of grassroots involvement in the international and global work of many large NGOs, there are some interesting examples of how local communities can work successfully on issues that do not directly affect them. Gill, Fisher, and Hynes have explored the concept of "glocalisation" to define connections between global and local scales. Their study of the 25-year campaign by a group of local activists that eventually succeeded in the closure of an immigration detention centre shows how local people acted on a global issue that had manifested itself locally, and how they attracted wider support and grew through connections with national and international groups (Gill et al, 2019). These activists could be viewed as "citizen diplomats." However, without the long-term structural underpinning provided by community organising approaches, it appears that such locally-driven success stories on global issues are uncommon, and their successes are not communicated sufficiently widely.

There are other more widespread forms of local activity that could be viewed as citizen diplomacy. These are often referred to as "new social movements" ("NSMs"). Koca views the UK's various Refugee Welcome groups as a form of NSM with their focus on identity and promoting the rights of marginalised groups, rather than traditional social class-based local campaigning (2016). Such movements are able to transcend boundaries, forming transnational and international networks (ibid.). These networks can be seen in the widespread citizen activity across Europe in response to the 2015 "refugee crisis." However, NSMs present difficulties for more established humanitarian diplomacy actors in that they generally lack clear campaigning goals, suffer from lack of unity, and may have very temporary impacts. Furthermore, Koca's work does not explore the background to Refugee Welcome groups. Their relative longevity and successes are partly due to their deliberate and focused creation by community organisers from Citizens UK, and as such they are not wholly spontaneous locally-driven groups (as explained in Chapter Three). In fact, Refugee Welcome groups demonstrate the potential bridge between traditional humanitarian diplomacy and local "citizen diplomats" that can be built through community organising, and particularly through Citizens UK's adoption of Alinsky's approach, explored in Chapter Two.

CHAPTER TWO: COMMUNITY ORGANISING – POTENTIAL LINKAGES

Community organising is different from community development and capacity building as understood by many large NGOs. It has a longer heritage and is more concerned with what could be viewed as humanitarian diplomacy activities, such as advocacy and building networks of stakeholders, than service delivery. In their study of international community organising, Beck and Purcell define it as an approach that establishes organisations of organisations, which 'build power in order to achieve changes in policy and practice within institutions that have an impact on the community' (2013, p.1). It is the community itself that drives these activities, rather than acting as a complement to a larger national organisation that gives them a "voice" in its activities.

As Beck and Purcell note, community organising in a theoretical sense first emerged with the Alinsky model in the United States, based on Saul Alinsky's practices from the 1930s to the 1970s (ibid.). Alinsky's 1972 book *Rules for Radicals* served as a guide, and he founded the International Areas Foundation, spreading his methods internationally. Citizens UK is a member of that organisation and explicitly bases its approach on Alinsky's work. Therefore, it is important to outline Alinsky's views on local power and influence.

Alinsky took a very pragmatic approach to engaging people within a community, noting that individual self-interest was key, being less concerned with ideological positions of individuals and organisations than with 'how they could add to the creating of a power organisation based on people power' (Beck and Purcell, 2013, p.2). The aim was to create networks with 'stocks of social capital' (ibid., p.7), whereby an individual or organisation would support a particular action to build alliances that they could subsequently draw on in support of their own causes, thus building alliances of 'aggregated self-interest' (ibid.). This differs from "giving voice" to the "vulnerable" or the local community in recognising local individuals and organisations as possessors of social capital that they may deploy in support of others as well as themselves.

Furthermore, Alinsky did not shy away from notions of power and conflict. Bunyan contrasts this with community development models and their 'hollowed out' concepts of "partnership" and "empowerment" that have removed any radical edge in their shift to managerialism' (2010, p.125). Alinsky argued against diluted terms, putting conflict at the heart of actions he helped instigate. He argued that 'all issues must be polarised if action is to follow' (Alinsky, 1972, p.133) and that divisive tactics should be used to turn opponents into enemies, motivating action and dispelling doubts or apathy (ibid., p.25). This aspect of his approach poses difficulties for the neutrality principle in humanitarian diplomacy, and would require adapting.

While Alinsky embraced conflict, he also embraced compromise as a 'key and beautiful word…always present in the pragmatics of operation' (ibid., p.59). Therefore, although he did not advocate neutrality towards targets or opponents of an action, he was much more concerned with ends rather than means (ibid., p.25). This allowed engagement with opponents where useful and the formation of alliances, creating broad bases that have resulted in its labelling as "broad based community organising" (as explained by Bunyan, 2010).

An important difference from community development and from many humanitarian diplomacy strategies is that Alinsky's approach not only uses existing community leaders, but also identifies potential new leaders and 'consistently and systematically' develops them (Beck et. al., 2013, p.13). Alinsky refers to the education of an organiser as requiring 'frequent long conferences…dealing with quite a range of issues' (1972, p.64), as opposed to one-off capacity building workshops. This is an aspect of community organising that could be viewed as more top-down in that skilled or professional community organisers train newcomers. However, Alinsky's aim seemed to be enabling new leaders to drive their own actions over time.

The final key aspect of Alinsky's approach with potential relevance for humanitarian diplomats concerns the breadth of community and of potential issues. On issues, he emphasised those within people's personal experience, avoiding generalities such as the notion of the good life or general morals, rather focusing on specifics such as 'this immorality or this slum landlord' (1972, p.96). This focus on issues within people's experience could be viewed as limiting the potential for humanitarian diplomats to learn from the Alinsky approach. However, the strategy of using personal experience could be developed in a different direction (as explained in Citizens UK's approach below). Furthermore, Alinsky did not place tight geographical boundaries on his concept of community, instead noting that 'the word "community" means community of interests, not physical community' (ibid., p.120).

Thus, some aspects of Alinsky's community organising approach provide useful considerations for humanitarian diplomats wishing to engage ordinary people in more meaningful ways and on more issues. However, there are problematic aspects, most notably around notions of neutrality, conflict, and polarisation. However, Citizens UK's adaptation provides a moderated version of his approach that is more compatible with humanitarian diplomacy principles and methods.

Citizens UK has grown organically out of several city-based organisations up to its present incarnation as a registered charity with a London HQ, reaching its thirtieth birthday in 2018. Its roots lie in the Citizens Organising Foundation created in Bristol in 1988, joining with various London community organisations in 2000, and continuing to expand to other parts of the UK (Citizens UK, 2017). Like Alinsky, it builds an organisation of organisations, with local faith-based organisations, charities, schools, and others forming chapters, creating a 'broad based alliance of civil society institutions to build power' (Citizens UK, 2018). Similarly, it does not avoid the concept of power, defining community organising as 'returning power to people' (Citizens UK, n.d.). However, like Alinsky, it also takes a pragmatic approach and is not wedded to a particular ideology. In an interview, organiser Bekele Woyecha noted it places 'people before programme' with an emphasis on relationships and 'making sure everyone knows each other'. Compromise is also crucial, with Woyecha commenting that it is about 'gathering people of different political persuasions and of none'. This allows for the creation of what organiser Pete Brierly described in an interview as a permanent structure to seek change and remain campaigning.

A further key aspect derived from Alinsky is the continued training and development of local leaders, starting in 1989 and growing to the current system of national residential training events and shorter local training days (Citizens UK, 2018), with a "guild" of 45 highly skilled organisers (Citizens UK, 2017). Again, rather than relying only on existing community leaders, Organiser X pointed out in an interview how it has also trained people who have not previously done community organising.

Citizens UK also emphasises local issues and those national issues directly impacting communities and connecting with people's self-interest, campaigning on matters such as low wages and local road safety. However, its approach is broader in scope than that of Alinsky, in that such local issues may be used to connect with people and to 'test relationships…so you know you can work together', as Woyecha noted in an interview. Unlike a pure transposing of Alinsky into a British context, Citizens UK has moved beyond the purely local and national with its significant work on refugee issues, which could be viewed as demonstrating the potential of "glocalisation". This expansion beyond the purely local is one way in which Citizens UK's approach could be viewed as an adaptation of community organising with greater relevance for humanitarian diplomats.

Another key adaptation is its avoidance of conflict and polarisation, as exemplified in its far less confrontational tactics. While Alinsky and his followers often threatened (though less often carried out) actions such as sit-ins and major disruptions of businesses, Citizens UK holds peaceful, non-confrontational demonstrations and negotiations. This has led Folkes to describe its approach as 'institution-based apolitical politics' (Folkes, 2018), meaning it does not alienate power holders that humanitarian diplomats would engage with in private diplomacy. In the interview, Organiser X referred to the use of Freedom of Information Requests and work with law firms – tactics associated with the campaigns of large NGOs.

Finally, while Alinsky's 1972 book cites numerous examples of his leading and organising local actions, Citizens UK is perhaps more explicit about its management of many of the actions taken under its banner, with its controlled and scripted campaigns as Folkes explores in her article (ibid., 2018). In the interview Woyecha described scripting as natural, pointing out that world leaders are scripted. Such management and control may render this approach to community organising more relevant to humanitarian diplomacy as the actions led by local leaders may be devised and managed as part of a wider strategy, helping avoid potential risks to other diplomatic channels.

Citizens UK is best viewed as an adaptation and moderation of Alinsky's approach to community organising. It has retained the foundation in building local relationships and developing local leaders, creating organic structures that can be mobilised across multiple issues. However, it has adapted traditional community organising by showing that local actors are interested in and successful on issues beyond their immediate self-interest and can act on global humanitarian issues. Its local structures can be used for the building of side-to-side and bottom-up relationships, which appear to be generally omitted from humanitarian diplomacy approaches as explored in Chapter One. While pure Alinsky tactics would not suit the RCRC Movement's or many large NGOs' humanitarian diplomacy strategies, Citizens UK's apolitical, non-confrontational, and more managed approach allow these organisations to learn from community organisers to build a more organic, inclusive, and long-term local dimension to their work. This may enable engagement of "citizen diplomats", while avoiding the unpredictability and risks posed by unmanaged citizen actions or groups.

If humanitarian diplomats are to consider this approach, it is necessary to explore whether it successfully meets its local goals, and whether those goals can impact national and global humanitarian issues. When asked her view of the importance of local actions, in an interview Organiser X referred to local actions as 'structure tests', showing how many people are engaged and could turn out nationally on an issue, and thus speaking to power holders beyond the local level. Chapter Three explores Citizens UK's work on refugee resettlement to ascertain how effective such 'structure tests' may be.

CHAPTER THREE – REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT AT THE GRASSROOTS

Refugee resettlement presents an example of how managed community organising, rather than more spontaneous eruptions of citizen activity, can engage the grassroots on global issues. The European "refugee crisis" of 2015 gave added impetus to Citizens UK's work on refugee issues and a greater number of grassroots individuals and organisations with which to build relationships. In recent years, its focus has been on bringing refugees and asylum seekers from camps in Europe and the Middle East to the UK. Many of the examples that follow relate to work on unaccompanied child asylum seekers and the organisation's Safe Passage campaign, which played a major role in securing safe routes for children under the EU's Dublin III Regulation and under the "Dubs Amendment" (named after Labour

peer Lord Dubs who championed the cause in Parliament). In addition to Safe Passage, there are examples from campaigning for expansion in the resettlement of vulnerable Syrian refugees under the government's Vulnerable Persons Resettlement Scheme.

At first glance, Citizens UK's work in this area appears high-level and national, with frequent involvement of national politicians such as Lord Dubs, and celebrities, such as those who signed its February 2017 open letter to the government calling for extension of the Dubs Scheme (resettling unaccompanied child asylum seekers without family ties in the UK) (Safe Passage, 2017). Furthermore, the Safe Passage campaign became an independent charity in March 2019 (Safe Passage, 2019), and may currently function more as a traditional NGO with a particularly parliamentary focus.

However, the roots of this work lie in a group of volunteers drawn from community organisations and faith leaders belonging to Citizens UK who travelled to Calais in 2015 to explore how they could meaningfully help (Safe Passage, n.d.). Unlike many other groups making that journey, these volunteers were trained and focused, screening over 250 cases of refugees with potential legal claims to asylum in the UK (Citizens UK, n.d. b). In addition to its managed grassroots beginnings, the following elements of Citizens UK's work on resettlement demonstrate its combination of managed but organically developed local actions.

Refugee Welcome Groups

These groups were locally-led while also showing Citizens UK's management in that they were largely created by experienced organisers, with Bekele Woyecha one of those undertaking this task. In the interview, he described how they worked closely with global citizen campaigning platform Avaaz, reaching out to those with an interest and at times using "cold calling", thus using organic roots and encouraging them to grow from the bottom up. He also explained they were provided with specific Refugee Welcome training. This would allow for greater management of actions.

These groups were later invited to join a Refugees Welcome Board and access further support from professional community organisers (Citizens UK, n.d. c). To do so they had to sign up to the Board's goals and create a locally tailored Refugee Welcome Plan (ibid.), hence allowing Citizens UK control of the overall direction of their work. In the interview, Organiser X pointed out how they could work together through a Facebook page for local co-chairs and encourage turnout for national actions: 'We could get 1000 people outside Parliament with a week's notice for the Restart the Rescue action'. They could be likened to RCRC local branches, but the significant difference is that they are not volunteers; rather they are more fluid local networks, with greater autonomy to shape locally-tailored actions.

Replicated Local Actions

Rather than all actions being devised at HQ level, the involvement of diverse organisations led to ideas for locally-driven actions, but which could subsequently be replicated and adapted by other local groups. An example is the sukkot events, developed through involvement of synagogues and local Jewish leaders. These events involved the creation and celebration of traditional huts (in which Jewish people are supposed to dwell during the weeklong Sukkot festival in the autumn) in locations such as community centres, and the inviting of local council leaders and sympathetic groups such as student organisations. Woyecha noted in the interview how the invitations to local politicians were managed by approaching them in advance and ensuring they knew the nature of the event they were attending, thus avoiding risk of damage to relationships.

The sukkot events led to several local successes, such as Barnet becoming the first Conservative-led borough to pledge to take more child refugees (Liberal Judaism, 2018), while the Leicester sukkot resulted in a council pledge to support at least five child refugees for the subsequent ten years (Liberal Judaism, 2018b). Such pledges were used to demonstrate to the national government that there was local council willingness on resettlement.

Compromise and Cooperation

In both the pragmatic Alinsky tradition and Citizens UK's adaptation, working with power holders formed part of its strategy. Organiser X referred to examples of Citizens UK actions involving 'offering things' to win local council support. For example, in July 2016 Redbridge Citizens held an event at a local church encouraging people to sign up as

foster carers for refugee children, resulting in eighteen people putting their names forward (Citizens UK, 2016). This action was a practical step to offer the council support if they agreed to take more children. Such actions formed part of the Safe Passage campaign strategy to show that councils were willing and able to take in greater numbers than the government had envisaged.

Local Involvement in Attracting Influential People

While various actions on resettlement attracted the support of the nationally famous, it is worth noting that national public figures may have local links and that these are more likely to lead to longer-term involvement. An example is actor Peter Capaldi, who became involved with Citizens UK's work on refugee sponsorship in Muswell Hill (North London), and even sponsored refugee families himself (Woyecha, 2019). As Woyecha pointed out in an interview, 'the big folk can come on board due to local people', even though this aspect of their involvement may be less visible. Large NGOs may benefit from greater awareness of this, and it is a further reason to develop broader and deeper grassroots networks.

Adapting to New Causes

Citizens UK and its local groups have applied Alinsky's approach of creating networks of relationships that can adapt for new causes. This approach is distinct from partnership models of many large NGOs, whereby agreements to work with local actors are often limited to specific issues and timeframes, meaning that new partnerships and agreements are necessary for future cooperation. In contrast, the Refugee Welcome groups have taken on the newer Sponsor Refugees campaign, in which they are organising locally to sponsor refugee families under the government's scheme and campaigning for its expansion.

Organiser X referred to the currently 'much more hostile climate around immigration and asylum', in which the government favours its own sponsorship and resettlement schemes rather than responding to unplanned arrivals of asylum seekers. Organiser X noted that groups are 'picking up what's happening and where they can succeed'. While this turning of attention to new issues could be viewed as acknowledgement of failure to push other aspects of resettlement further, it could equally be viewed as a strength of the deep sustained local roots resulting from managed community organising, whereby relationships exist that can be tapped into on new issues. In Woyecha's words 'relationships are everything'.

Having explored various aspects of Citizens UK's work on refugee resettlement, several potential advantages are apparent when compared with the more limited grassroots involvement in many humanitarian diplomacy strategies. The main benefit of their combination of national management with organic local roots is the ability and scope for local groups to build their own relationships across communities, which have shown themselves to be long-term and adaptable to changes in the national and global climate. Furthermore, the authentic local involvement from a range of actors and groups has shown the national government that there is a commitment to refugee resettlement across the UK and that it is not an issue to ignore. This local involvement contributed to successes in extending the Dubs Scheme beyond its original end date and to government pledges to increase numbers of resettled refugee families.

There are of course areas for further consideration and development. One is the extent to which local groups are representative of their communities, and to which Citizens UK's work on refugee resettlement demonstrates that diverse grassroots communities can become engaged on global issues that have no immediate direct impact on them. Organiser X explained that Citizens UK's work in this area attracted people who had not previously been involved in refugee campaigns, and the creation of Refugee Welcome groups included those more recently motivated by the events of 2015. However, further research on the demographics of those involved would be useful.

An additional area for development is greater monitoring and evaluation ("M&E") activities to ascertain factors leading to successes. Organiser X said that anecdotally it seems the Refugee Welcome groups with greater Citizens UK involvement were more successful, which would show the effectiveness of managed community organising. However, the availability of more M&E resources would be useful. This is an area where community organisers could learn from humanitarian diplomats in the RCRC Movement and large NGO,s as such organisations have been able to use their larger resources to develop M&E. Therefore, the potential linkages between community organising and humanitarian diplomacy are not only one way.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This paper set out to explore whether the managed community organising of Citizens UK, rooted in the Alinsky approach, can provide a middle ground between top-down approaches to local involvement of much RCRC Movement and NGO humanitarian diplomacy, and more genuinely grassroots forms of citizen activity that are prone to chaos. Citizens UK's work on refugee resettlement suggests that linkages can be built between humanitarian diplomats and community organisers. Such linkages could create organised, focused, but authentically local "citizen diplomats" who are motivated by issues beyond their immediate self-interest and localities. Furthermore, recognition of the local level may well increase due to the current context of the Covid-19 pandemic, which, as Woyecha pointed out, has shown the importance of local relationships on which many have relied.

The case study explored here is introductory, but it points to potential for a form of humanitarian diplomacy jointly led and developed by a central organisation working with grassroots organisations and including more diverse groups and individuals. Such potential could be developed through mutual learning between those involved in humanitarian diplomacy in the RCRC Movement and large NGOs, and community organisers. This paper recommends mutual learning as it may lead to the creation of hybrid locally-rooted humanitarian-community groups comprised of individual trained citizen diplomats. Current debates in the humanitarian sector provide a conducive climate for such mutual learning as some humanitarian thinkers and organisations are suggesting developments such as the 'network humanitarianism' of Paul Currion (The New Humanitarian, 2020), and proposals of Aid Reimagined founder Arbie Baguios for 'organisers without borders' and citizens' assemblies to challenge the aid industry (The New Humanitarian, 2020b).

The future development of this paper envisages further learning about Citizens UK's work and other community organising models. It has a longer-term aim of connecting with innovative humanitarian thinkers to contribute to the realisation of proposals leading to more locally-rooted and inclusive humanitarian diplomacy. This is not only because inclusivity and wider humanitarian education are a good in themselves, but because the initial exploration in this paper suggests that such an approach could bring significant benefits to humanitarian diplomacy activities in a variety of contexts.

INTERVIEWS

Interviews were carried out with the following three current/former Citizens UK community organisers:

- Organiser X (Community Organiser, wished to remain anonymous) – by telephone on 20 October 2020
- Pete Brierly (Lead Organiser for London Citizens) – by telephone on 26 October 2020
- Bekele Woyecha (previous Citizens UK Community Organiser and Senior Project Manager, now Director of UK Welcomes Refugees) – by Zoom on 11 November 2020 and follow-up by telephone on 21 December 2020

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Lilian Sherrie

Shelter and NFI Cluster Co-coordinator, South Sudan

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A call for humanitarian action: Case of rohingya refugees' relocation to Bhasan Char island

A call for humanitarian action: Case of rohingya refugees' relocation to Bhasan Char island



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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Since 2017, Bangladesh has hosted about one million Rohingya Muslim refugees fleeing military clampdowns, discrimination, statelessness and targeted violence in Rakhine State, Myanmar (UN OCHA 2019). Until December 2020 when the government executed a relocation plan, Rohingya refugees have been accommodated in 34 congested camps of Teknaf and Ukhiya Upazilas of Cox's Bazar district.

This qualitative study thus intends to collect and analyse information around the triggers for the Bangladesh government's decision to relocate Rohingya refugees to Bhasan Char Island, identify humanitarian concerns surrounding the island and examine the existing gap in the ongoing response for humanitarian action. Based on the findings, the study will conduct a stakeholder mapping to draw recommendations for key humanitarian actors.

This study relied solely on secondary sources. Evidence collected suggests that the government's plan to relocate Rohingya refugees to Bhasan Char Island was need-based given the prevailing congestion within the camps and in an effort to alleviate poverty of the Rohingya refugees by providing proper shelter, ensuring basic facilities and skills development. There were many reported cases of crimes related to prostitution, drug and human trafficking and tensions between refugees and the host community over sharing of limited resources, as well as the negative socioeconomic and environmental impact emanating from refugee activities that were just beyond government's toleration.

Bhasan Char Island on the other hand has posed protection and safety concerns due to its fragility, history, location and perceptions from different actors which have greatly impacted the humanitarian response. Whereas a few local NGOs have responded amidst funding challenges, UN agencies and many international organisations' decision to respond on the island is still caught between mandate and credibility.

This study through a stakeholder mapping and analysis therefore proposes humanitarian actions for key actors, with the main focus on UN agencies and non-governmental organisations, that can be adopted to ensure that Rohingya refugees continue to receive humanitarian assistance to live a dignified life. The actions proposed are based on the actor's mandate, comparative advantage, capacity and level of influence to address the identified gaps while ensuring that the humanitarian principles of Humanity, Neutrality, Impartiality, Operational independence, Beneficiary Participation and Do No Harm are upheld.

CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND

1.0 Introduction

UNOCHA (2019) notes that since August 2017, about one million Rohingya Muslim refugees have lived in the bamboo and 'tarpaulin' congested camps of Cox's Bazar district after fleeing military clampdowns, discrimination, statelessness and targeted violence in Rakhine State, Myanmar that forced them into Bangladesh. The congestion and lack of basic facilities in the 34 camps of Teknaf and Ukhiya Upazilas forced the government of Bangladesh in 2015 to announce relocation plans of Rohingya refugees to Bhasan Char Island, a decision not welcomed by humanitarian workers and rights activists (Human Rights Watch 2020).

In December 2020, the Bangladesh government autonomously executed the relocation plan and by the end of February 2021, over 10,000 Rohingya Refugees had been transferred to the remote island of Bhasan Char (Islam 2021). This decision has had serious implications on humanitarian assistance including the relationship between the Bangladesh government and aid agencies.

Against this backdrop, this study seeks to explore and understand the triggers for and the humanitarian concerns surrounding the Rohingya refugee relocation to Bhasan Char Island. It also investigates the current response, gaps or challenges experienced by different stakeholders and draws recommendations for humanitarian action.

1.1 Rationale for this Study

This study intends to collect and analyse information around the Bangladesh government's decision to relocate Rohingya refugees to Bhasan Char Island, the ongoing response and the gap for humanitarian action.

This study may act as a future reference tool for humanitarian agencies or diplomats responding to similar issues. It will also contribute to the growing body of knowledge in this field. Importantly, this research paper is in fulfilment of the award of a diploma in Humanitarian Diplomacy (Malta University/IFRC).

The audience for this paper includes the Bangladesh government and its citizens, policy makers, the UN and humanitarian agencies, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent (ICRC) Movement, donors, media, humanitarian diplomats and other refugee-hosting countries.

1.2 Research Objectives

This paper answers the following questions;

- What triggered the relocation of Rohingya Refugees to, and what major humanitarian concerns have been associated with, Bhasan Char Island?
- What is the current response by various stakeholders in Bhasan Char Island?
- What actions can be employed by humanitarian agencies to address the identified concerns of Rohingya refugees in the Bhasan Char Island?

CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY

2.1 Research Design

A qualitative case study methodology is adopted for this study. Case studies are often a good choice in that they keep your project focused and manageable when you don't have the time or resources to do large-scale research (McCombes 2019).

2.2 Data Collection Methods and Sources

Whereas this research intended to include responses from the government, humanitarian staff working with the Rohingya refugees and the media, which would have been of much value for comparative in-depth analysis, given the duration of the study coupled with the Covid-19 restrictions on travel, it was impossible for the researcher to conduct face-to-face interviews. Besides, humanitarian workers known to the researcher who would have provided primary data were inaccessible due to a change of job, contacts or even both.

This study therefore relied on secondary data derived from related online publications by the media, the UN, the government and non-governmental organisations, human rights agencies, academic studies and journals.

2.3 Data Analysis

An in-depth qualitative content analysis was applied to summarise, interpret and report information gathered from secondary sources.

CHAPTER THREE: PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS

3.0 Introduction

This section presents findings of the study from analysis of data collected from different secondary sources addressing the research objectives.

3.1 Triggers for the Relocation of Rohingya Refugees to Bhasan Char Island

Undoubtedly, densely populated Bangladesh has, since 2017, demonstrated commendable generosity in hosting nearly a million Rohingya refugees (UNOCHA 2019). The plan to relocate the Rohingya refugees to Bhasan Char Island by the Bangladesh government first emerged in 2015 under its Ashraya Initiative and 2017 marked the turning point following the exodus of more than 700,000 refugees into the country (Banerjee 2020). The Bangladesh government announced its intention to 'temporarily' move 100,000 Rohingyas to Bhasan Char Island until they could be repatriated; a plan executed in December 2020.

Lopez (2021) notes that the main reason advanced by the Bangladesh government for the relocation plan was to decongest the camps and alleviate poverty of the Rohingya refugees by providing proper shelter, ensuring basic facilities and skills development. Furthermore, the increasing crimes within the camps evidenced by daily shootings – as a result of refugee involvement in drug and human trafficking – and increased prostitution posed a security threat to the local population and painted a bad image of the country (Babu 2020).

In the UNDP Assessment report (2018: 65-69) and the Joint Response Plan (JRP) (2021: 16), the government also maintains that Rohingya concentration in Cox's Bazar camps has had negative socio-economic environmental impacts related to loss of forest cover, water contamination and loss of natural setting of the terrain, all attributed to refugee activities.

The JRP (2021) report also notes that the growing tensions between the host community and refugees linked to humanitarian aid's exclusive targeting, rising labour competition, price fluctuations, and damage to infrastructure and natural resources was a push factor for the government's decision. Islam (2021) puts it that it was a political decision of the government and Dhaka's obligation to protect the interests of the civilians irrespective of the needs of refugees and to decide where to host refugees, in a statement that '*the Rohingya can stay but on Bangladesh's terms*'.

Ibrahim (2020) further notes that the protracted refugee situation and the COVID-19 pandemic restrictions on social distancing and decongesting crowded areas was the last spark to the already ongoing plan. When Dhaka announced its first COVID-19 protocols, refugee camps were flagged as a 'Covid-19 red zone' and ensuring protection of the camps was the number one priority. In a move to decongest the camps, a choice left for the Rohingya refugees was either forcing them to choose between taking a boat out of Bangladesh or relocating to the remote island (Hossain 2020).

All in all, this relocation plan has been labelled 'successful' by the Bangladesh government which has maintained its stance that the decision was voluntary, though some Rohingya refugees, humanitarian agencies, rights activists and media think otherwise. The latter accuse the government of having implemented this decision against the will of the Rohingya refugees and with no stakeholder involvement (Hossain 2020).

3.2 Bhasan Char Island: The Humanitarian Concerns



An aerial view of Bhasan Char Island

Bhasan Char, or "Floating" Island, first emerged 20 years ago as a sandbar in the Bay of Bengal. UN News (2020) describes it as unstable yet extremely vulnerable to environmental catastrophes, hence it is deemed too frail to provide the suitable environment for the development of a stable, self-sufficient community in the long term. Further, cited by Hossain (2020), geological experts warn that it takes at least 30 to 40 years for a silt island to become stable enough for human habitation. Hossain (2020) notes that the island is isolated, limiting access to and delivery of humanitarian assistance.

Islam (2020) writes that construction work on the silt island was rushed to completion in less than 18 months, which raises questions around the quality and durability of the buildings. He further points out that there seems to be an inadequate number of cyclone shelters for 100,000 people, and the flood-protection embankment is 12 feet shorter than the recommended height, which raises safety concerns.

Worse still, the government until today has not yet clearly outlined plans for educational facilities for the Rohingya children (Human Rights Watch 2019). Evidence related to deprivation of some services including money transfers and refugee identification status is mentioned by Chickera (2021). Furthermore, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) (2021) reports that the island lacks doctors and medical supplies and, moreover, refugees have to use salty and contaminated water that has exposed them to skin diseases like eczema and scabies.

Human Rights Watch (2020) further notes that some refugees were forcefully separated from their family members, a decision that has negatively affected their mental health, evidenced in January 2021 when a number of refugees staged 14 days of hunger strike demanding to be reunited with their relatives. Bangladesh authorities in reprisal beat refugees including children to forcefully silence them and portray Bhasan Char as a safe location.

Beech (2020) in the New York Times notes that humanitarian agencies and media houses have for long decried limited access to the Island by the Bangladesh government until April 2021 when 18 UN member delegations were granted access. Hossain (2020) in a BBC news article also notes that an attempt by BBC reporters to visit the island in October 2020 was blocked by the Bangladesh government. Schlein (2020) has further argued that the government of Bangladesh did not involve or consult with humanitarian agencies over the relocation decision, including sharing information on the overall relocation operation.

Human Rights Watch (2020) further reports that upon arrival on the island refugees have been subjected to many movement restrictions, including going to the coast and fishing. Arif (2021: 855-872) in the *International Journal on Minority and Group Rights* warns that actions by the Bangladesh government to restrict refugees' movement and freedoms, including undermining livelihood systems, economic and educational opportunities contravenes Article 26 of the 1951 Convention and Protocol Relation to the Status of Refugees.

Ellis-Petersen and Rahman (2020) report about the recent emerging sexual abuses of refugee women and girls by police and naval personnel at Bhasan Char Island. The Bangladesh Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commissioner has denied these allegations. Besides, the relocation of the refugees to the island raises protection concerns related to human-trafficking with desperate Rohingya who may be lured into illegal migration to Malaysia (Hossain 2020).

The above accusations by the media, rights groups and humanitarian workers were not received positively by the Bangladesh government. In retaliation, the latter has accused the staff of international aid agencies of harbouring selfish interests with the aim of failing the relocation plan. The Bangladesh Foreign Minister in his statement notes:

> "They work in Cox's Bazar camps, relax at their hotels and enjoy the beauty of the resort and sandy beach. Out of the fear of losing this luxurious life in Bhasan Char, I report that the staff of those international organizations are opposing the relocation process" (Kamruzzaman, 2020).

The same report stresses a Bangladeshi military Inter-Service Public Relation attack on Human Rights Watch for reporting refugees as being forcibly sent and detained at Bhasan Char Island. All the above point to a straining relationship between Bangladesh and key stakeholders in the Rohingya refugee crisis which, if left unattended, is likely to negatively impact on the lives and rights of the Rohingya refugees.

3.3 Current Humanitarian Response in the Bhasan Char Island

Chaudhury (2021) recently reported that there are approximately 14,000 Rohingya refugees residing at the Bhasan Char Island and different actors have responded to the refugee needs amidst a number of challenges.

State Actors

According to the Sendai Framework 2015-2030, States have the overall responsibility to prevent and reduce disasters. In the case of Rohingya refugees in Bhasan Char Island, the Bangladeshi government has overseen the construction of concrete housing structures, flood defence embankments, cyclone shelters, prefabricated food and storage warehouses, roads, a solar power grid, telecommunications towers, deep tube wells and rainwater harvesting ponds, a biogas plant and waste management facilities (Cowper-Smith, 2020). The 2020 Joint Response Plan also notes that the government has constructed police and fire stations, a hospital and designated office premises for

responsible ministries in charge of Rohingya refugees including accommodation facilities for the UN and humanitarian staff.

While the Bangladesh government has tried to make Bhasan Char Island habitable for the Rohingya refugees, it decries its limited capacity to provide the basic services required for the latter to live a dignified life. In a statement the Bangladesh Foreign Minister urged the UN to start its operations on Bhasan Char with the statement: "*It would be a huge task for government to manage 100,000 refugees on the island*" (Sumon 2021).

Local NGOs

Palma (2021) reports in The Daily Star that initially, after the relocation of the first batch of Rohingyas in early December 2020, 22 NGOs volunteered to go to Bhasan Char and provide humanitarian assistance. Later, 20 more joined them operating from their own funds. Sumon (2021) confirms the existence of 34 non-profit groups currently working on the island to provide humanitarian support to the refugees. Moreover, a Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) interview (2021) reaffirms that only very basic primary healthcare is being provided by local NGOs.

Local NGOs just like the government decry the lack of capacity to deliver the needed services due to limited funding following donor concerns that humanitarian principles were not being followed in the relocation project (Ahasan 2020). The report further notes that Caritas Bangladesh, the largest and most prominent in the pool of the local NGOs that had initially signed up, warned of the likelihood of pulling out from Bhasan Char Island due to lack of funds from donors, which may see many other NGOs follow suit. In the same manner, Pulse Bangladesh, said in a statement that "*it will be tough for us to continue humanitarian support for a long period",* expressing fear of local NGO capacity to continue if UN agencies do not start operations on the island soon (Bhuiyan, 2020).

International NGOs

In an interview (2021), MSF mentions that it is establishing referral networks to ensure continued care to twenty former patients suffering from chronic illnesses, who require continuous follow-up and medication. In the same interview, it is noted that there are some international NGOs operating in Basan Char (low scale) who prefer anonymity;

"We are concerned that even our minimal humanitarian participation could be misinterpreted, including by Rohingyas that we are supporting the Bhasan Char project" (Ahasan 2020).

Ahasan (2020) further points out that many NGOs are split between mandates and credibility. He adds that, whereas it is the organisation's mandate to alleviate suffering of those affected, they also do not want their participation to be misinterpreted by rights groups as a move to support the government denying the refugee rights. For example, UNHCR is stuck between its continued demand for access that may be misinterpreted as a move to legitimise the controversial resettlement.

The JRP (2020) further notes that even for NGOs willing to start operations on the island, funding is a major issue with donors refusing to support the operation without independent technical and protection assessments to ensure that the island is safe for refugees.

UN Agencies

In the United Nations Press statement (2020), ever since the Bangladesh government announced the Bhasan Char project, the UN has offered to engage in constructive consultations aimed at better understanding the plan, the most critical policy, processes and operational issues. The UN affirms that technical assessment of the island would be the determinant for whether it can engage operationally with the government's Bhasan Char project or not. Luckily, in April 2021, the government approved a UN delegation to visit the island. However, a report on the findings is yet to be shared (Bhuiyan, 2021). The World Food Programme also shares similar views (Ahasan 2020).

The UN plans to launch the 2021 JRP that brings together the efforts of the government of Bangladesh, 134 UN agencies and NGO partners to target almost 1.4 million people this year. It is hoped that the event will highlight the most immediate needs and ongoing humanitarian response in the Rohingya refugee crisis (UNHCR News 2021). In fact,

Prof Imtiaz has advised that the UN is not against relocation, but there is a communication gap between the government and the UN (Palma 2021).

Bangladesh Red Cross

Lumpur (2021) writes that the Bangladesh Red Crescent (BRCS) has worked with authorities to deliver food packages, hygiene items, sanitation and health services to thousands of people on the island for 3 months. Just like other humanitarian agencies, BRCS and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) also appealed for international support to maintain humanitarian services on the island (IFRC News 2021). It has also appealed to the Bangladesh Government, humanitarian agencies and international donors to do everything possible to ensure that Rohingya refugees live with dignity, wherever they are located, including Bhasan Char. A BRCS delegation that visited the island on 8 December 2020 distributed hygiene kits, dignity kits, sleeping mats, blankets, and water jerry cans amongst Rohingya families on the island and pledged to provide all manner of uninterrupted services, including health, education, medicine, hygiene, and livelihood. The BRCS also set up an office on the island to take part in the rehabilitation of Rohingya refugees (TBS report, 2021).

Human Rights Groups

Rights groups continue to demand the UN and media's unrestricted access to the island and Rohingya refugees (Dhaka Tribune, 2021). Five human rights organisations (Amnesty International, Refugees International, Robert F Kennedy Human Rights, Fortify Rights, and ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR)) in a letter to the Bangladesh Foreign Secretary (on September 21) requested that the government facilitate and provide timely access to Bhasan Char for UN protection and technical teams to review the sustainability and environmental conditions of the island.

Private Sector

The private sector is already a major contributor to humanitarian action in Bhasan Char Island. They have opened small shops and are optimistic about the upcoming business opportunity (Molla 2021). Molla adds that there are currently 63 shops (mobile servicing, barber, poultry shops and a separate kitchen market) in Bhasan Char Bazar. Shop owners are, however, fearful that if Rohingyas get involved in business, they may be pushed out. The government has assured them of protection, barring Rohingyas from engaging in any business.

Amidst humanitarian concerns, it is important to recognise that Bhasan Char Island is now a home to over 10,000 Rohingya refugees. There is therefore an urgent call to ensure that they continue to access basic services, and that their rights and freedoms are protected.

3.4 Suggested Humanitarian Diplomatic Actions by Key Stakeholders to address the concerns of Rohingya Refugees in the Bhasan Char Island

The word 'stakeholder' has assumed a prominent place in public and nonprofit management theory and practice in the last 20 years. The term refers to persons, groups or organisations that must somehow be taken into account by leaders, managers, campaigners and front-line staff.

Lamb stressed that for humanitarian diplomacy to be successful, it is important to make a proper stakeholder analysis: to see who you are working with, who the interested parties are, who they represent, what their policies are, what they are like personally, and what is the best way of influencing them to come to a common understanding. This is done through a stakeholder mapping and analysis (IFDT 2017). It is also helpful to analyse actor characteristics, including their structure, motivations, capacity, constituency, perceptions and socio-cultural influences to guide you in identifying who to work with and their resources (Frontline Negotiation Manual).

While a full analysis of all stakeholders and decision makers in this case is not possible, Annex 1 provides an overview of some recommendations for actors not treated in this section. This section draws recommendations that can be adopted by key actors (UN agencies and Non-Governmental Organisations) to ensure that Rohingya refugees have access to basic humanitarian assistance, their rights and freedoms are upheld and are able to live a dignified life.

These two main actors have been prioritised based on their capacity, power to influence and level of importance in the Bangladesh context.

A. United Nations Agencies

United Nations Bangladesh, also known as the UN Country Team (UNCT), is made up of 23 UN agencies, funds and programs, convened under the UN Resident Coordinator. The UNCT is the UN's highest-level inter-agency coordination and decision-making body in Bangladesh. UNCT is in position to drive activities at the country-level and influence in formulating common positions on strategic issues, ensuring coherence in action and advocacy, in close coordination and cooperation with the Government of Bangladesh and the broader development community.

Additionally, UNCT has a comparative advantage over other stakeholders due to its very nature and mandate. The UN for example, is mandated to resolve conflicts through peaceful negotiations and its role in ensuring humanitarian access is enshrined in the General Assembly resolution 46/182. This therefore means that demanding humanitarian access to Bhasan Char Island is legitimate. UNHCR is also mandated to lead and coordinate international action to protect refugees and to resolve refugee problems worldwide. Based on this, UN agencies are better placed to engage the Bangladesh government, to negotiate and advocate for unrestricted humanitarian access as well as demand the respect of Rohingya refugees' rights and freedoms.

Moreover, UN agencies in Bangladesh oversee a number of technical working groups. The Strategic Executive Group (SEG) in Dhaka is co-chaired by the UN Resident Coordinator, UNHCR Representative and IOM Chief of Mission. At the field level in Cox's Bazar, the UN chairs the Inter-Sector Coordination Group (ISCG) which brings together the heads of all UN Agencies and members of the international and national NGOs working in the response, as well as donor community representatives. UN agencies can thus use these different platforms to discuss pertinent issues surrounding Rohingya refugee relocation to Bashan Char Island. Moreover, such platforms can be used to engage donors on the direction of response.

Furthermore, UN agencies provide significant resources and technical capacity in the refugee response. The UN is a funder to both local and international NGOs through a partnership approach. Given that there are NGOs willing to extend operations in the Bhasan Char Island, UN agencies can assess their capacity and preparedness and support their activities to learn from, adapt and develop innovative approaches in consultation with government and other stakeholders on how to scale up humanitarian assistance on the island to ensure that Rohingya refugees access basic services wherever they settle.

The UN can also engage in 'quiet' negotiations with the Bangladesh government to ensure that decisions related to Rohingya refugee relocation are clearly detailed, consultation-based and right-respecting. The UN can also advocate for participation of Rohingya refugees in all decisions that affect them, including voluntary relocation with informed consent. Moreover, UN agencies can continue to remind the state actors to respect refugee laws on migration (international and national laws) and advocate for immediate unification of Rohingya Refugees in Bhashan Char Island with their families. In addition, the UN can support and facilitate the development of domestic frameworks that protect the rights of refugees living in Bangladesh.

B. Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs)

Both local and international NGOs in Bangladesh have played a key role in delivering humanitarian assistance to Rohingya refugees since 2017. They are involved as responders, advocates and sometimes mediators between the refugees and the host community. NGOs have contextual knowledge, financial resources and technical capacities to deliver timely humanitarian assistance. Just like UN agencies, they are mobilised under the NGO Platform which aims to bring together local, national and international NGOs to enhance coordination, advocacy and partnerships to build and preserve humanitarian space for their role in the response. The NGO Platform Coordinator is fully engaged in decision-making and agenda setting within the coordination bodies that guide the Rohingya humanitarian response at all levels where they can play a pivotal role in influencing decisions on policy recommendations.

International NGOs have substantial experiential, technical, and resource capacity, and can play active roles as funders and partners of local NGOs to continue delivering services to refugees confined in the 'hard to reach' Bhasan Char Island.

NGOs can coordinate with UN agencies to provide technical advisory services to the government on innovative approaches of ensuring humanitarian access to aid by refugees and convince their donors/development partners to provide additional financial resources to support new activities on Bhasan Char Island.

NGOs have a good working relationship with the government and therefore can play a lead role to engage with the government on behalf of other stakeholders to negotiate for reforms in the relocation process, including seeking informed consent from the Rohingya refugees prior to relocation. Besides, NGOs' activities are regulated by the government under the NGO Bureau and are required to adapt based on direction from the government.

Furthermore, NGOs possess relevant experience working with local communities on social and economic issues, and are always among the first to help meet the immediate needs of refugees. They have established networks and coalitions (including the NGO Coordination and Support Cell and the Cox's Bazar Civil Society Forum (CCNF)), which have helped establish common positions and increased their visibility. The CCNF has been particularly vocal, advocating on issues such as greater localisation of the response (CCNF, 2017) and can use the same approach to advocate for major reforms in the Bhasan Char relocation plan.

One push factor for the Rohingya relocation to Bhasan Char Island is linked to tensions between the refugees and the host community. NGOs over the years have won the trust of the two groups as compared to any other stakeholders and can act as mediators to address and mitigate probable conflict. They have been instrumental in designing and implementing social cohesion activities aimed at harmonious living.

Given their position and technical expertise, NGOs can work with and support Bangladesh's government to develop a domestic policy framework of representation of Rohingya refugees in issues that affect them, protecting their human rights. They can also advocate for and participate in the safety and protection assessment of Bhasan Char Island to confirm livability.

NGOs can play a pivotal role in documenting evidence related to the human rights injustices and humanitarian concerns surrounding the relocation of Rohingya refugees to Bhasan Char Island, and draft a recommendation paper for discussion or dialogue aimed at resolving identified key issues. Moreover, they have established monitoring systems to capture and report human rights violations against the Rohingya refugees. The gender and protection clusters are good examples that can take a special role in identifying and responding to protection issues.

Through their donors and the annual Joint Response Plan, NGOs can lobby for funding to meet both short, medium and long-term humanitarian needs of the Rohingya refugees on Bhasan Char Island. Further, they can facilitate and encourage the private sector to open up businesses in the Bhasan Char Island as a way of facilitating unlimited humanitarian access to assistance by the refugees.

Given their local knowledge and experience, NGOs can identify and implement innovative models to facilitate access to humanitarian services by the Rohingya refugees confined on the island in adherence with the 'Do No Harm' principle.

Last but not least, BRCRC can continue to play an auxiliary role of providing essential space for dialogue between government and key stakeholders to end the ongoing feud surrounding the relocation process. Moreover, Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies have a recognised mandate (obligations and responsibilities) as auxiliaries to governments to assist, advise and advocate for Disaster Risk Reduction strategies under the Sendai Framework. They are also involved in preparedness, monitoring, appeals for funding and coordinating principled responses.

CONCLUSIONS

The above humanitarian recommendations should be carefully implemented, guided by the key humanitarian principles of: Humanity, Neutrality, Impartiality, Operational Independence, Beneficiary Participation and Do No Harm. However, the outcomes of the intervention depend on the technical capacity of the stakeholders, willingness to work together, flexibility and adaptability between the Bangladesh government and humanitarian actors, contextual factors as well as political will.

Nevertheless, given the recent milestone by the UN delegation visit to Bhasan Char Island, there is hope that a round table discussion is not only possible but also inevitable in forging a way forward. However, the Bangladesh government should stick to its commitment of 'temporary relocation' and also work with other stakeholders to find a permanent solution to the Rohingya refugee crisis without infringing on their rights and freedoms. Besides, humanitarian actors need to exercise a level of flexibility and innovation, ensuring that decisions are made in the best interests of those affected.

ANNEXURE

Annex 1: Stakeholder mapping and analysis in the Bhasan Char Island - Rohingya refugee response

Stakeholder	Focus Areas
Rohingya Refugees	• Advocate for their participation in decisions that affect them • Demand for reunification with family members • Advocate for access to basic facilities and rights • Report human injustices
Development Actors	• Continue fundraising efforts for humanitarian actors to respond to the most critical humanitarian needs • Use diplomatic approaches including persuasive threats against the Bangladesh government from the controversial plan • Assist Bangladesh to transition from its present short-term approaches to a more sustainable, medium-term refugee management policy • Engage with the Myanmar government to end the ongoing political conflict that hampers the planned repatriation plans • Halt the funding process until the Bangladesh government commits to implement and address humanitarian actions
Private Sector	• Local businesses can use their materials and resources to help people affected by the crisis • Provide markets within the Bhasan Char Island for ease of access to assistance • Facilitate social cohesion activities
Host population	• Empathise with the Rohingya refugees and continue to harbour them • Participate in programmes designed by the humanitarian agencies that lead to social cohesion and advocate for peaceful coexistence • Provide employment opportunities to the Rohingya refugees to enable them to have a source of livelihood
Association of South-East Asian Nations	• Support the proposal to encourage refugee participation and consultation in decisions that affect them • Advocate for unlimited humanitarian access for the representatives of the refugees • Provide international cooperation, technical and financial assistance • Immediately address the concerns of trafficking of Rohingya refugees to countries such as Malaysia • Lead the process of negotiating with Myanmar to end conflict including enforcing the plan to repatriate the Rohingya once the country is politically stable
Media	• Advocate for unlimited access • Advocate for independent, press freedom and unbiased reporting • Capture, document and publicise any forms of injustices against the Rohingya refugees to attract international intervention • Work with all the stakeholders to ensure that information collected is verified before publishing • Provide platforms including television, radio, social media for advocacy to influence the negotiation process

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Amal Emam

Regional Youth and Volunteering Coordinator for International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent in Middle East and North Africa and the National Manger of Youth and Volunteering Development at the Egyptian Red Crescent

Humanitarian Diplomacy February 2021

Volunteers as humanitarian diplomats

Volunteers as humanitarian diplomats



Photo credit: Egyptian Red Crescent

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Being a Humanitarian Diplomat is not always a choice; it is a role that humanitarian actors are sometimes obliged to play during their field operations.

Therefore, Humanitarian Diplomacy (HD) knowledge, skills, and tools must be introduced to all levels of the humanitarian organization. Not only should leaders or managers of humanitarian organizations follow such training, but field implementers, including volunteers, should also be an integral target group of this training, in order to implement the most effective humanitarian response possible.

The role of volunteers as Humanitarian Diplomats during Egyptian Red Crescent (ERC) operations was identified through five case studies, which demonstrated the use of various skills in different situations for the success of field operations. These findings were complemented by the results of a survey with 100 ERC volunteers, which drew the attention to the importance of developing HD training modules for volunteers.

The results of this research suggest that HD can be successfully integrated into some of the already ongoing volunteer training programmes in the Red Cross and Red Crescent (RCRC) National Societies (NS) if the NS's management recognizes the importance of such integration and supports it, as it came during the interviews with representatives from ERC Senior Management team.

A road map for preparing RC volunteers for their role as Humanitarian Diplomats has been suggested, with the possibility of introducing it in different languages to serve a larger number of RC/RC staff and volunteers.

INTRODUCTION

Volunteers are the backbone of the entire Red Cross and Red Crescent (RCRC) Movement; they are the main actors on the ground and front liners in all operations. It was estimated by IFRC that for every employee there are 20 volunteers participating in humanitarian activities (IFRC, 2001, p.7).

Many volunteers act as humanitarian diplomats without consciously recognizing that. They do not recognize that they negotiate in their work on behalf of vulnerable people, and influence changes at both community and national levels (IFRC, 2013).They find themselves required to negotiate, dialogue, and advocate.

They are typically required to complete a series of training courses organised by their National Societies (NSs) in order to acquire the basic knowledge and skills necessary to perform well in the field and provide professional services to beneficiaries, but they are rarely empowered or equipped with HD skills, which are critical in some operations and play an important role not only in the operation itself, but also in the safety and security of the volunteers.

This research will focus on the role that volunteers play in HD and will summarise the requirements to play it. It will begin with the purpose and significance of this research. Next, chapter 3 will introduce a review of the literature on the role of volunteers as humanitarian diplomats, while chapter 4 will introduce the methodology applied. Then, a number of collected case studies and interviews, as well as survey results, will be presented in the "Data Review" chapter. The findings presented will then be analysed and discussed in the "Discussion" chapter with subsection about the relationship between HD and the Safer Access Framework. Finally, the way forward, lessons learned, and recommendations will be presented.

2. PURPOSE AND SIGNIFICANCE

The aim of this research is to identify the role of volunteers as Humanitarian Diplomats within the ERC, to shed light on the importance of training RCRC volunteers on HD – particularly frontline volunteers – and to assess its added value in terms of operations, beneficiary access, and volunteer safety and security. Also, it will create a road map for preparing volunteers for their role as Humanitarian Diplomats.

3. LITERATURE REVIEW

IFRC HD Policy defines humanitarian diplomacy as "persuading decision makers and opinion leaders to act, at all times, in the interests of vulnerable people, and with full respect for fundamental humanitarian principles" (IFRC, 2009, p.2).

In humanitarian action, diplomacy can be practised on the highest government levels, but, at the same time, depends on local volunteers who are interacting with community leaders, (Hewko, 2015).

Hence, the volunteer, by virtue of being a humanitarian and not a diplomat, is faced with regular situations that require the use of diplomatic tools (Clark, 2018). These diplomatic tools (dialogue, negotiation, advocacy, and persuasion) are applied to overcome the greatest challenges to humanitarian effectiveness, namely security, access, and coordination (Minear & Smith, 2007). Therefore, engaging volunteers with the appropriate skill sets to implement HD effectively is vital.

According to IFRC HD policy, each NS has to make use of the appropriate diplomatic tools and actions, by encouraging people with skills in advocacy, negotiation, communication and other diplomatic experience or knowledge to bring their skills to NSs, including their volunteers and staff.

4. METHODOLOGY

The data for this research is collected via:

1. Direct interviews to explore the role that volunteers play as Humanitarian Diplomats, as well as their responses in relation to HD skills and approaches
    a. Five case studies gathered from interviews with ERC volunteer team leaders from the following teams:
        - North Sinai operations (a conflict zone in Egypt)
        - Emergency Action Teams
        - Livelihood and Assessment team (Migration Services team)
        - Community Health team
        - Fundraising team
    b. Three interviews with senior ERC management team members
        - Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of ERC
        - Head of ERC Emergency Operations Center (EOC)
        - Head of Projects and Programs
3. A survey was conducted for ERC frontline volunteers to determine their HD training needs, and where they see their role in HD
4. Data analysis for the abovementioned survey

5. DATA REVIEW:

5.1 Review of Case Studies

The following case studies demonstrate various challenging situations that ERC volunteers faced and how their interpersonal skills changed the response. This will be further analysed and discussed in the "*Discussion*" chapter.

Case Study 1	
Source/team	Mr. A. Samir, volunteer in North Sinai operation team
Method	Phone interview
Date	1 May 2021
Brief description	In 2018, the psychosocial support team was on their way to Al Rawda village in North Sinai Governorate, which had witnessed a massive deadly attack on its main mosque during Friday prayers, that resulted in the loss of most of the village's men and left the victims' children and wives in deep psychological trauma. Although this was not the first time ERC teams take that route to visit the village, and although ERC always coordinates with all concerned parties prior to any deployment in this conflict area, in the middle of the journey two armed vehicles affiliated with non-state armed groups attacked ERC convoy and forced it to stop, ordering everyone to exit the vehicles and lie down on the ground, accusing ERC of being an arm of the government in that area and threatening the entire team. Mr. A. Samir asked everyone in his team to calm down and not respond, then he politely requested permission to speak. When he was given the opportunity to speak, he approached the man who appeared to be the leader and explained to him that ERC has no political interests and only provides humanitarian aid to vulnerable people. He confirmed this further by displaying aid items in ERC vehicles, as well as some photos on his phone for ERC humanitarian activities in North Saini. As a result, the leader of the armed group was convinced that ERC personnel had nothing to do with the conflict and allowed them to board one vehicle and return to their base unharmed, while they boarded the other ERC vehicle. The most important thing is that all members of the ERC team arrived safely, as Mr. A. Samir concluded.

Case Study 2	
Source /team	Dr. TA, Former volunteer leader of Emergency Action teams (EAT) at ERC
Method	Face to face interview
Date	30 April 2021
Brief description	Hundreds of opposition protestors were detained in a big mosque in Cairo's downtown in 2013 and were attacked with tear gas, in order to force them to go out of the mosque. The protestors announced on social media that they have many people who have been severely affected by the tear gas, including people with acute respiratory symptoms. EATs were immediately dispatched to the location, but upon arrival, security forces denied them access to the mosque. "*It was a really frustrating situation, because EAT members were torn between their humanitarian mandate towards the trapped people, especially after knowing that their lives are endangered, and their obligation to follow the orders of security forces and act according to the local law as mandated,*" said TA. The team leader decided to take two complementary approaches. The first was to immediately report to ERC Secretary General, requesting that he re-start the conversation with the responsible person in the Ministry of Interiors to clarify the rule and mandate of ERC EAT during that situation. The second approach was to initiate a direct dialogue with the commander of the field security forces. Dr. TA recalled that during this discussion, he noticed that the security chief, as well as many of his officers and soldiers were suffering from itching and redness in their eyes. Dr. TA offered to treat the security chief and his soldiers, confirming their neutrality. The security chief agreed, and Dr. TA then led the team to assist the injured officers and soldiers, who began to report back to their leader that they were feeling much better. As a result, the security chief granted ERC teams access to the mosque where the protestors were detained. As Dr. TA concluded, they were the only medical service providers who entered the building.

Case Study 3	
Source /team	Mr. A. Abdallah, Volunteer, Livelihood, and Assessment team (Migration Services team)
Method	Online Zoom meeting
Date	25 April 2021
Brief description	During an assessment for an ERC livelihood project in one of the migrant communities in 2017, the team identified that a primary problem was the host community's lack of acceptance of these migrants that noticeably delayed the implementation of the planned activities for this target group. A strategy was developed to improve migrants' acceptance in this community. On the ground, ERC community volunteers carried out a campaign targeted primarily at religious leaders (such as Mosque Imams) to explain to them the vulnerability of the migrants, and to gain their support in influencing the host community. The religious leaders were persuaded by the situation and approach and began to advocate in their heavily attended Friday speeches in the mosques and religious gatherings. As a result of this campaign and collaboration, acceptance and inclusion of migrants was noticeably improved which further facilitated the conduction of the project.

Case Study 4	
Source /team	Ms. O. Shadier, Volunteer Leader, Community Health team
Method	Face to face interview
Date	27 April 2021
Brief description	The COVID-19 pandemic has dominated most ERC activities over the last year. A comprehensive community-centred response plan was developed, including health awareness campaigns, disinfection activities, and basic health care service provision. The main challenge in implementing it was the difficulty in accessing the isolated areas due to the lockdown. ERC operated according to a unique approach on the community level by organising a nationwide online volunteer recruitment campaign that was the first of its kind in the entire region (Volunteer in Every Street), with the goal of recruiting a large number of community volunteers from all districts, then providing them with a set of online training packages, to allow them to serve as ERC spontaneous volunteers during the pandemic and have their locations pinned on the volunteer interactive map. These volunteers were then tasked with communicating with community leaders and opinion shapers in their respective communities in order to work together to highlight the severity of the pandemic, spread awareness messages among their relatives and neighbourhoods, assist sick patients, combat rumours and serve as ERC focal points in these areas if any information is required or intervention is planned. All of this was beneficial to public authorities, particularly in remote and difficult-to-reach areas.



Figure No. 1, Distribution of community volunteers over the interactive map "Volunteer in Every Street"[1]

[1] See: http://www.egyptianrc.org, https://www.facebook.com/youthandvolunteeringerc/photos/a.912759955513906/3550186255104583/ and https://

Case Study 5	
Source /team	Ms. Merna Ibrahim, Volunteer leader, Fundraising team
Method	Online Zoom Meeting
Date	20 May 2021
Brief description	Heavy hostilities and attacks occurred in the Gaza Strip in Palestine over this month, resulting in hundreds of deaths and injuries, as well as the destruction of infrastructure. Immediately, ERC volunteers felt obliged to assist the affected Palestinian population. ERC launched a fundraising campaign for Palestine. However, the Egyptian community initially viewed this campaign with scepticism due to the closure of the only direct route through which humanitarian aid can be delivered to Palestine (Rafah crossing) at that time. ERC initiated a high level communication with authorities to follow up on the crossing's opening, while tens of ERC volunteers ran an important social media campaign to clarify the mandate of ERC, the Fundamental Principles of the RC/RC Movement (most notably Humanity and Universality, which facilitates communication and cooperation between ERC and Palestinian Red Crescent Society (PRCS)), confirming the need to have all donations well prepared in advance so that once the Rafah crossing is open they are transferred to PRCS on time. Volunteers shared their news, along with videos of previous ERC and PRCS support and collaboration, as well as virtually sharing TV interviews with ERC management and celebrity endorsements of ERC activities, all of which helped to build public trust in ERC donation campaigns for Palestine, and dispel any initial doubts about the purpose or intention of these donations. They also shared PRCS's social media posts in which they acknowledged ERC's efforts and support which was extremely beneficial.



Figure No. 2, Tamer Hosny, a well-known Arab singer, participating in the packing of humanitarian aid for Palestine at ERC headquarters (ERC website)

www.youtube.com/watch?v=wGB7yHsR-Oo

5.2 Review of interviews with Senior ERC Management Team members:

- Face to face meeting with Dr. Ramy Al Nazer, CEO of ERC, held on May 22, 2021

  Volunteers are the main actors of all ERC activities, and ERC is very lucky to have a network of thousands of volunteers spread all over the country, derived by humanitarian motive, and ready to support and act whenever and wherever needed. ERC volunteers conducted activities in difficult to reach areas including Sinai, Upper Egypt, and Sudan, and they are now present in Gaza to assist with the humanitarian crisis there. This means they are skilled, competent, and well-equipped. The ERC management team is constantly reviewing the volunteers' training curricula and is always ready to include any component that would improve their performance during operations, and HD – if ERC has competent trainers – would of course be an integral part of ERC volunteers' training.

- A phone interview was conducted with Mr. Lotfy Gheith, Head of ERC operations room, on May 23, 2021

  Obviously, all ERC field operations rely on the efforts and support of volunteers. In many cases, they can readily approach the intervention location since they have been trained on safer access. However, in other cases, they meet obstacles for which they have not been trained. This emphasises the significance of HD training for volunteers to acquire skills that will enable them to deal with any challenges that arise during the operation.

- Dr. Ahmed Ragaay, Head of ERC projects and programmes department, interviewed via zoom on May 24, 2021.

  ERC projects' success is largely determined by how far they reach into the community. Although ERC works with authorities, communication at the community level is largely dependent on the skills of ERC volunteers; they are the ones who assist in identifying community leaders and conducting advocacy; most of them do so naturally, but it would be beneficial if it were done in a systematic way.

5.3 Review of the Survey Results:

A survey was conducted with 100 ERC frontline volunteers, chosen randomly from different teams from all ERC branches, to assess their existing understanding of HD, identify if they were involved in HD process in the course of ERC activities, and determine what skills they utilised in such situations, as well as what kind of training helped them respond more effectively, in order to assess their HD training needs.

The following are the results of the survey:

QUESTION NUMBER 1: Have you ever been introduced to the term "Humanitarian Diplomacy"?




Figure No. 3, Survey Q1 results

QUESTION NUMBER 2: Have you ever had to persuade/negotiate with authorities during ERC operations, or advocate for the needs of the most vulnerable?




Figure No. 4, Survey Q2 results

QUESTION NUMBER 3: If you answered yes to Q2, list the major skills you used to deal successfully with such situations (you may list multiple skills).




Figure No. 5, Survey Q3 results

QUESTION NUMBER 4: What ERC training did you attend that better equipped and prepared you to deal with difficult/ unexpected situations (more than one training can be chosen)?




Figure No. 6, Survey Q4 results

6. DISCUSSION

The operational theatre of humanitarian action is the best place to observe HD as a function. The tools of humanitarian diplomatic function are employed in ad hoc situations (e.g. ensuring local access and acceptance, negotiating terms with local partners and communities) (Clark, 2018).

Every RCRC practitioner, volunteer, member, or staff can find themselves in a situation to engage in HD as a means to ensure support is given to those in need. However, in many situations, volunteers apply a HD approach without fully understanding it. So, success in these situations is dependent on the personal traits of the volunteer in charge. This hypothesis was supported by interviews with the leaders of ERC volunteers.

Despite the fact that the situation in Case 1 was managed by a volunteer who was only a team member and not the leader at the time, his personal skills made him the best person to deal with a very dangerous situation, being able to manage his stress successfully, planning his argument using preemptive arguments with the militia leader, asserting the fact that ERC teams have no interest in the conflict nor affiliation with police or army, and using proper tools for his argument as part of the persuasion such as photos to prove what he was saying. This helped him save his teams' lives. This case demonstrated how the effective use of certain skills such as timely situational analysis, good negotiation, and communication contributed to saving the teams' lives.

Although the ERC team was denied access to the beneficiaries in Case 2, the team leader was very clever in using his observation skills and building his argument with his communication skills, by being open to the police leader's decision, using preemptive argument and persuasion skills through demonstrating examples of the services provided by EAT and demonstrating their impartiality and neutrality. Treating the police leader and his soldiers was a good step toward gaining his trust and then gaining access to the injured people inside the mosque. This case demonstrated a true example of a successful negotiation in a conflict situation using appropriate language and competent communication and negotiation skills.

In Case 3, we can see a different approach, led by ERC management and implemented on the ground by volunteers, in dealing with the initial refusal and exclusion of migrants by the host community (the primary target). Volunteers

were able to analyse the context and determine the best language to use with the host community (in this case it was religious language). They identified the appropriate community leaders who can best shape community opinion (secondary target) and managed to persuade them – primarily through pathos, or emotion – to accept and include migrants within the host community. The second step was a public advocacy campaign conducted in collaboration with these religious leaders, which successfully changed public perception of migrant acceptance and social inclusion. This step was critical for ERC before beginning to implement its livelihood projects for migrants. It is obvious that ERC volunteers developed a coherent strategy based on a thorough understanding of the context based upon their intrinsic skills that could be better formulated with a formal HD training.

Case 4 demonstrated the critical role that volunteers can play in their communities as Humanitarian Diplomats, primarily in advocating for their communities' rights, coordinating with local authorities, identifying key stakeholders, and developing negotiation strategies. In this case, ERC implemented a public advocacy approach, which began with a massive recruitment campaign, then relied on newly recruited volunteers to advocate for ERC activities in their networks. This used a rational persuasion approach in raising public awareness by utilising communication and negotiation skills, as well as various persuasion strategies.

The newly recruited community volunteers were able to positively influence public perception and aid in the preservation of health and lives in their community, while also acting as focal points and informal spokespersons of ERC in the affected, hard to reach areas.

In Case 5, where the situation was complicated on both the political and public fronts, the main challenge was doubts expressed by some social media users about ERC's ability to truly direct donations to the desired destination (Palestine). The approach used in this case was public advocacy, which was designed by the youth department and carried out by ERC volunteers, with the goal of fostering ERC credibility and demonstrating the organisation's close relationship with PRCS. The history of ERC channelling humanitarian aid to Palestine via the Rafah crossing was used as evidence to dispel doubts and further confirm ERC's credibility, as well as to build trust in its capacity and accountability. This campaign was extremely successful in influencing the attitudes, opinions, and practices of social media users. This effort was accompanied by quiet advocacy and diplomacy coordination with the governmental authorities to facilitate ERC access to the Rafah crossing once it had opened, as well as direct communication with PRCS to organise humanitarian aid delivery. Both the larger public campaign and the quiet diplomacy approach contributed to the public's perception of ERC as a credible and trustworthy organisation.

Such case studies demonstrate the effectiveness of HD in action. Volunteers have demonstrated that they carry out quiet diplomacy, public advocacy, mobilise resources, and assist the most vulnerable people in the community. Taking note of the case study participants' diversity (different teams), they revealed that multiple conversations were taking place on several levels during the response. They negotiated with state and non-state armed groups, dialogued with opinion leaders, advocated with officials as well as the public, and persuaded community leaders to allow them to conduct community-based interventions.

According to the Centre for HD (D. Griffolli & A. Picot, 2004), "Most humanitarian workers negotiate in some way every day but few have thought to recognize this as a conscious skill and so seek to refine and develop it across their organization". Interviews with members of the ERC Senior Management team revealed that ERC management not only values the role of ERC volunteers, but they are also willing to invest in developing volunteers' HD skills in order to achieve better results during various operations.

The role of ERC as Humanitarian Diplomats presented in the case studies was further supported by the volunteers' responses to Q2 in the survey, where 74% stated that they were in situations where they were required to persuade or directly negotiate with authorities and advocate for the services provided by ERC and to address the needs of the most vulnerable population. This finding can be supported by Hazel Smith's note in her text on HD: "humanitarians engage in diplomacy often without understanding that this is what they are doing" (Clark, 2018).

However, when asked in Q1 in the survey if they were familiar with the term HD, 82% of the volunteers said they were not. This data supports the argument that the field of HD is poorly understood or represented to volunteers, one reason could be a lack of HD training in Arabic language, which makes it difficult for many of them to follow any training on the subject.

Despite the fact that none of the surveyed volunteers had previously received formal HD training, it was clear from the survey responses to Question 3 that volunteers in difficult situations employ a set of skills that are among the HD skills, such as communication skills, negotiation skills, public speaking, and assertiveness. These skills were most likely acquired during volunteers' basic training courses in ERC. Thus, combining all of these skills into a single training module will be extremely effective in preparing them as Humanitarian Diplomats.

ERC volunteers identified the ongoing training courses that benefited them the most and provided them with personal skills such as Safer Access Framework (SAF), Youth as Agents of Behavioral Change (YABC), International Humanitarian Law (IHL), and Psychosocial support (PSS). This could be used as a starting point to integrate HD modules into these already established trainings, resulting in better equipped volunteers rather than depending on their personalities.

Humanitarian Diplomacy (HD) and Safer Access Framework (SAF)

The SAF is comprised of eight sections containing actions and measures, that, if taken by a NS, according to context-specific priorities, will increase its acceptance, security and access to people and communities in need. The Framework is underpinned by the Safer Access Cycle – access, perception, acceptance, and security – and was developed by ICRC together with over 50 NS, based on their experiences and input.[2]

While all ERC volunteers lacked any formal training in HD, ERC frontline volunteers are thoroughly briefed on SAF before being deployed to operations. According to the survey results, SAF was at the top of the list of trainings that assisted volunteers in dealing with difficult situations, safely accessing operation areas, and overcoming technical challenges that may impede their access.

As a result, it is very relevant and critical to incorporate HD skills into the briefing sessions of SAF, so that volunteers are aware of the required skills they can utilise in different situations.

The Way Forward

Three types of trainings were found while reviewing the available HD training opportunities that IFRC FedNet provides for volunteers:

In-person training (mainly on the advocacy skills around disaster law and policy)

HD training module (2 hour) introduces the fundamentals of HD

Online diploma course (12 week course), by Diplo in partnership with IFRC. It provides the fundamentals of understanding and practising HD.

These courses are mainly offered in English, and none of them are available in Arabic. A few NSs are investing in HD training opportunities for their volunteers. The Norwegian RC HD focal point (Kaja Hediar, official email, June 2021), stated that they have a three-hour HD training especially tailored to provide volunteers (particularly activity leaders) with knowledge on how HD fits into what the RCRC does, and tools to conduct local HD work.

[2] https://saferaccess.icrc.org/

Suggested Road Map for preparing volunteers as Humanitarian Diplomats:

OBJECTIVE

To provide volunteers with HD-related knowledge and skills.

TRAINING CONTENT:

A – Stand-alone training:

With the hybrid approach, the recommended training programme includes two components: an e-Learning course on an online platform (e.g. IFRC learning platform), followed by 1-2 days of physical training.

Part one: e-Learning course

The e-learning course will be a resource that is both creative and cost-effective. It will contain reading material as well as multimedia files (PowerPoint presentations and videos) and discussion boards where participants and instructors can exchange ideas.

- Module 1: Introduction to HD
- Module 2: The auxiliary role of the RCRC NS
- Module 3: Communication skills needed for humanitarian diplomate
- Module 4: HD strategy and mapping of stakeholders
- Module 5: Use of media/social media

Part two: Face to face workshop:

Following the e-Learning course, participants should be able to put their HD skills to the test through role plays, case studies, and desktop scenarios. It is suggested that a physical training workshop be held to cover the following modules:

- Module 1: Persuasion
- Module 2: Quiet diplomacy
- Module 3: Public advocacy
- Module 4: Negotiation
- Module 5: Public speaking

B- An integrated training:

A HD training module that requires 2-3 hours can be integrated into already established trainings, such as:

- SAF
- IHL
- YABC
- PSS
- Community based health and first aid
- Community engagement and accountability
- Vulnerability & Capacity Assessment

The **shorter module** can include the following topics:

- HD introduction
- Communication skills required for HD
- HD in action (Case studies)

7. LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- Volunteers occasionally play the role of humanitarian diplomats during their NS' humanitarian missions.
- It is critical to bring NS leadership's attention to the role of volunteers as humanitarian diplomats and obtain their agreement to include HD training as one of the basic components of the volunteers training package.
- HD training can be very beneficial if integrated into ongoing training such as SAF, YABC, IHL, and other training as each NS deems appropriate.
- IFRC should strengthen the capacity of NSs aiming to train their volunteers on HD by organising ToT and providing technical assistance as needed.
- The suggested road map for HD volunteers training is recommended to be discussed further by RCRC movement components.
- IFRC is recommended to collaborate with ICRC to create a HD training module that can be integrated into SAF.
- IFRC & Diplo are recommended to provide the HD diploma course in Arabic to benefit Arab RCRC NS volunteers.

8. CONCLUSION

Pursuing HD on behalf of vulnerable people is widely regarded as a responsibility rather than a choice within the RCRC Movement. This responsibility is carried out by millions of volunteers who bring the needs and interests of vulnerable people to the attention of decision-makers and opinion leaders.

A key observation in the study was that despite a lack of familiarity, specific training, and mandate, and irrespective of geographic location, type of operation or status, all the case study participants practised HD because they saw it as mission critical. In this research, the evidence is conclusive that volunteers serve as humanitarian diplomats.

Therefore, NSs should consider HD training as an activity that provides its volunteers with the necessary skills and approaches to play their role as humanitarian diplomats.

Recognizing that not all NSs will have the means to employ relevant staff in this area (IFRC, 2009), the RCRC movement is strongly encouraged to continue collaborating in the development of various HD resources and capacity building projects, such as trainings, guides, and manuals tailored to frontline volunteers, as well as the creation of an information sharing network for RCRC volunteers on HD.

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Catherine Gearing

National Consultant Disaster Recovery
Social Recovery Reference Group

Humanitarian Diplomacy September 2021

Enhancing the community services sector to participate in planning and leading disaster recovery through Local Emergency Management Committees (LEMC's)

Enhancing the community services sector to participate in planning and leading disaster recovery through Local Emergency Management Committees (LEMC's)

Tutor: Alexandra Lamb

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The current Local Emergency Management arrangements in New South Wales (NSW) Australia are not currently structured to meet the needs of communities recovering from disasters. The 2019/20 bushfires that devastated much of NSW and the recovery efforts that followed have highlighted that there is a gap in recovery planning and a lack of participation from community organisations in the emergency management arrangements. The *Perspectives from the frontline, VCOSS Bushfire Recovery Report* (Anderson, 2020, p.15) states that "Community service organisations need a seat at the recovery table. Their local knowledge, connection to community and ongoing presence in the region mean community sector organisations should be central partners in recovery planning". Community service organisations have a significant amount of local knowledge and importantly are often connected with, and providing services to, those most vulnerable in the community. The Local Emergency Management Committee (LEMC) currently has limited expertise within the current membership structure and this is an existing gap in capability.

The research undertaken has collected primary and secondary data to assess and describe the importance of community service organisations' contribution in the local emergency management arrangements. It has outlined the stakeholder engagement method and the humanitarian diplomacy approach to be undertaken.

Through the undertaken research, the evidence has indicated that the best approach to be taken should not look solely at a singular membership model to influence and lead recovery planning but instead develop a subcommittee to more accurately capture and reflect the diversity in communities. Having a wider community representation participate in subcommittees also enables for a stronger voice in recovery planning, advocacy and in having multiple organisations endorse the approach.

The approach outlined for this to be achieved would include:

- Confidential diplomacy targeting with key government stakeholders
- Mobilising partner organisations in the Disaster Welfare and recovery sector
- Public influence activities with government, the emergency management sector and community service organisations conference presentations and discussion groups.

This approach would need to be undertaken at a local, regional, state and national level to gain broad support and influence change through legislation and through an attitude shift in the emergency sector. Community service organisations are key players in their communities and there is an opportunity for their skills and knowledge to be recognised to enable them to also be a key player in recovery. By undertaking and achieving the establishment of an additional LEMC subcommittee more enhanced planning can be undertaken to minimise the risk and disaster impacts on the most vulnerable people.

BACKGROUND

Over the past 2 years the Emergency Management sector in New South Wales has seen significant changes.

The 2019-2020 Australian bushfires were unprecedented. The fires started in Australia's hottest and driest year on record. As stated in the Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements Report (Government of Australia, 2020), "over 24 million hectares were burnt. Many Australians were impacted, directly or indirectly, by the fires. Tragically, 33 people died and extensive smoke coverage across much of eastern Australia may have caused many more deaths. Over 3,000 homes were destroyed. Estimates of the national financial impacts are over $10 billion."

These fires have been a catalyst for change in the emergency management sector.

The NSW government established a new government agency, Resilience NSW (ResNSW), to lead emergency management prevention through to recovery in reaction to the impact and needs identified in the fires. It is the first time the state has invested significantly in the resilience and recovery space. The agency is 5 times bigger in staffing than the previous Office of Emergency Management and has more remit and responsibility. The agency has also established 5 regional offices. This presents an opportunity to have a more significant local presence that can have influence at the regional and local levels.

At a similar time, the National Recovery and Resilience Agency (NRRA) was established at the commonwealth level in response to the Royal Commission findings. This was an amalgamation of a number of agencies including Emergency Management Australia, the National Drought and North Queensland Flood Response and Recovery Agency, as well as the disaster risk reduction and recovery functions from the Department of Home Affairs and the Rural Financial Counselling Program.

The 2019/2020 bushfires and Royal Commission have highlighted the need for enhanced community participation and the importance of developing local recovery plans. As outlined in the State Emergency Management and Rescue Act (New South Wales State Government, 1989) "a Local Emergency Management Committee is responsible for the preparation and review of plans in relation to the prevention of, preparation for, response to and recovery from emergencies in the local government area for which it is constituted." So, whilst the committee members do have functional or operational roles, the role of the LEMC is not to be activated or respond to disaster but for the sole purpose of undertaking emergency management planning.

In an interview on 5 November 2021 with an Australian Recovery Consultant, she explained that historically the Local Emergency Management Plan is limited in scope and does not outline the roles, responsibilities, tasks and complex needs of recovery. She also explained that the membership is limited to the agencies with a response focus, rather than the community lens that is needed in recovery.

According to the State Emergency Management and Rescue Act (Government of Australia, 1989) the LEMC consists of the following;

- the General Manager of the council of the relevant local government area, who is to be the Chairperson of the Committee
- a senior representative of each emergency services organisation operating in the relevant local government area
- a representative of each organisation that—
  - provides services in a functional area or areas in the relevant local government area
  - the council of that area determines from time to time is to be represented on the Committee
- the Local Emergency Operations Controller for the relevant local government area

Currently there is no one on the local committee representing the local community services sector. The only agency that would potentially be able to provide a linkage into the sector would be Department of Communities and Justice as they are the agency responsible for the Disaster Welfare Functional Area, but due to cuts in funding and outsourc-

ing of services, the agency is no longer able to be present at all the LEMCs and instead intermittently attends the Regional Emergency Management Committee (REMC).

METHODOLOGY

The research methodology includes the use of primary and secondary data. The primary data sources have been semi structured interviews with key stakeholders to understand the current context in a changing environment. This has been staff at Resilience NSW, National Resilience Network, Australian Red Cross and the Mountains Community Resource Network. The secondary data sources have been through relevant literature, including legislative planning documents, Royal Commission findings, and research on community led recovery practices.

RATIONAL

The following evidence has been gathered to highlight the need and rationale to develop a strong argument to present.

The National Recovery Principles (Social Recovery Reference Group 2018)

The Australian National Recovery principles are an evidence-based set of principles agreed by all the state and territory jurisdictions. The principles are intended to be utilised to guide the approach, planning and decision making in recovery. Three of the six principles are relevant to the rationale of having the community services sector involved in recovery planning. These include using community led approaches, communicating with all and recognising and building capacity. Outlined using community-led approaches it highlights that "recovery should channel effort through pre-identified and existing community assets, including local knowledge, existing community strengths and resilience".

The principle of communicating with all outlines that "successful recovery requires a planned, coordinated and adaptive approach, between community and partner agencies". This enables the community services sector to be aware of the plans and to support some of the most vulnerable in the community through vital and lifesaving communication channels.

The principle of recognising and building capacity outlines that "successful recovery recognises, supports and builds on individual, community and organisational capacity and resilience." The community services sector is often well established and linked into the community so they are able to utilise these connections to enhance emergency management knowledge, community preparedness and help build local resilience.

Plan of Action (International Conference of the RCRC 1999)

Goal 2.1 of the plan of action states that to enable "Effective response in disaster situations through improved national and international preparedness 1. States will: (a) establish or update national disaster preparedness plans which incorporate linkages, where necessary, to international systems of disaster response and have clearly defined and agreed roles and responsibilities for National Societies, including representation on appropriate national policy and coordination bodies."

This agreed statement was adopted by Australia and could also be used to demonstrate the commitment to have the Red Cross involved in emergency management coordination mechanisms including the LEMCs.

The State Emergency Management Plan (New South Wales State Government 2018)

The State Emergency Management Plan (EMPLAN) under the section titled "Community and Stakeholder Engagement" clearly highlights the importance of community participation in planning to enhance understanding and minimise people's exposure to potential risk.

> 139 The community is a vital part of the New South Wales emergency management arrangements. Agencies preparing plans under the EMPLAN will engage with the community and stakeholders, promote community understanding of the hazards they face, seek their input into the development of plans, especially at the local level, and involve communities and stakeholders where appropriate in exercising these plans.
>
> 140 This engagement enhances resilience, reduces exposure to hazards through mitigation, maximises community preparation to act effectively in the face of emergencies, and therefore allows the emergency management arrangements to target their efforts at the places, times and populations most vulnerable to a disaster.

In an interview on 5 November 2021 with an Australian Recovery Consultant, the consultant explained that there is no existing mechanism to undertake this consultation and engagement with the community services sector. The membership often lacks the expertise, experience, confidence or connections to do this. As a majority of the work being undertaken by the members is not considered their core work and often a task that falls to them for compliance purposes, they do not have the time to undertake a thorough consultation process with the broader community services sector.

The Royal Commission into Natural Disaster Arrangements (Government of Australia 2020)

A Royal Commission was undertaken following the significant and destructive bushfires of 2019/2020. These highlighted many of the concerns with the current systems and practices in the recovery sector. These include:

- "21.40 All levels of government should establish standing recovery plans before a disaster." It was identified through interviews that there was a significant lack of local and regional recovery plans and this impacted the ability of government and agencies to support locally led recovery. Systems and structures were unclear and it took additional time to formalise the recovery committees and arrangements. These are all tasks that are outlined in the local recovery plans. During an interview with the Australian Recovery Consultant, she explained that the LEMCs have not had a statewide template to follow, which is how local emergency management planning is done across the state. "In the past once the fire was out or flood waters receded recovery was left to the council and local organisations to clean up with limited support, funding or guidance on how to do it well. These arrangements were not formalised or in plans, so many people's needs fell through the gaps."
- "22.47 State and territory governments and local governments should consider how best to integrate self-mobilised community responses in formal recovery arrangements. This could include easy to understand and accessible guidance on establishing a self-mobilised community response." Due to not having local recovery plans there were no mechanisms or arrangements in place to mobilise, engage and understand community needs, social disaster impacts, local capacity and vulnerable community cohorts.

Australian Disaster Resilience Community Recovery Handbook

The AIDR Community Recovery Handbook identifies that:

> "Recovery planning should occur well in advance of any emergency and concurrently with planning for response…Recovery is best achieved when the affected community can exercise a high degree of self-determination and to contribute actively to the planning and implementation of recovery activities…Community and social service organisations and groups have unique knowledge of and insights into the strengths and vulnerabilities of their communities and can provide advice and information on recovery needs…Planning for the recovery of affected communities requires participation by the various agencies, organisations and the community in the development of recovery plans. Pre-event planning is necessary for each operational level—local, regional and state/territory—and post-event planning also includes both strategic and operational plans."

The statements captured are based on evidence and best practice learning from previous disaster events in Australia.

The interviews and research undertaken highlighted the following strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats to the proposed approach of having the community sector participate in the Local Emergency Management planning.

Table 1: SWOT Analysis for community sector participation on LEMCs

Strengths	**Weakness**
– A more inclusive representation of the community in the local emergency management committee will enable the plans to more accurately represent the needs of the community. – Ability for the community services sector to understand and share more broadly the emergency management arrangements. – This approach has been developed and undertaken in some LEMCs e.g Blue Mountains and Queanbeyan.	– Ability of all local government areas to maintain subcommittees momentum in locations where disasters are less prevalent. – Expectation of funding support to maintain participation. – Cultural barriers for some LEMCs that are historically response agency focused, have a 'command and control' agency structure and find the community services sector to be too unstructured.
Opportunities	**Threats**
– Opportunity to enhance the whole emergency management cycle including in emergency preparedness, response and recovery planning through localised community knowledge and expertise. – Ability to gather data more quickly during an emergency through the community services sector's connections. – Opportunity for the community services sector to participate and enhance community preparedness, especially with the most vulnerable in the community. – Opportunity to utilise the membership to quickly establish a recovery committee after a disaster.	– The community services sector representatives may share sensitive or non-public information. – The resilience and recovery subcommittee not aligning or coordinating their activities and working separately from the LEMC.

These findings and the interviews undertaken highlighted that community services sector participation in recovery is vital to ensure that communities' needs are met and future resilience is built through enhanced local understanding and pre-recovery planning.

Through interviews undertaken on 2 December 2021 with Sarah Anderson, and Ben Brungs from Resilience NSW on 6 December 2021, it was highlighted that the best approach would be to establish an additional subcommittee to report into the LEMC due to the following reasons:

- More enhanced community representation capturing the diversity of the community services sector e.g disability, homelessness, youth, seniors and ageing, Aboriginal Affairs, domestic violence, volunteer, charity organisations etc.
- A more influential community voice rather than reliance on one representative
- Ability to share tasks and responsibilities across multiple people and organisations
- Ability to undertake disaster preparedness and community resilience building
- A pre-established committee to be activated as a community recovery committee following an emergency.
- Ability to gather disaster impacts and broader community needs following an emergency.

HUMANITARIAN DIPLOMACY APPROACHES

The approach to undertake this humanitarian diplomacy would need to be multifaceted and target different levels within both government and non government organisations to seek a commitment to establish a local Resilience and Recovery (R&R) subcommittee in every Local Emergency Management Committee. Only including it in state based legislative documents will not necessarily enable all local committees to embed the new approach.

The decision makers at the local level are the LEMC members and the decision makers at the state level are the State Emergency Management Committee (SEMC) members for legislation. Strategy 3 at the national level would be to seek opinion leaders or decision shapers.

Strategy 1 - The local approach

The newly established Resilience NSW Regional Directors would be utilised to engage with LEMCs to seek commitment and endorsement to establish the Resilience and Recovery subcommittees. This will require initially meeting with the LEMC chairperson who is generally a local council representative as well as the Local Emergency Management Officer (LEMO) to discuss the proposal and seek support before presenting this to the broader LEMC membership.

To seek their endorsement this proposal should present the evidence included in the research as well as highlight the key benefits for the LEMC members. These would include:

- Assistance with developing a local recovery plan – this is a significant undertaking and a key responsibility of the group, currently not being done across the state
- Community impact and needs data during an emergency – this is consistently challenging to get during an emergency and is a key part of the local council's role
- Functional recovery committees pre-established – recovery committees need to be set up following an emergency by having committees already established. This would save time and build on working relationships already formed

In order to achieve coverage across the state in a timely and effective manner, and as Resilience NSW has a new regional presence through regional directors this approach would likely have the most significant impact. Utilising the regional structure would enable discussions and advocacy at the local level.

This would require a commitment from the Resilience NSW Commissioner through approaching and engaging with the Resilience NSW Executive Director for Local Coordination and Service Delivery. To seek his endorsement this proposal should present the evidence and highlight the key benefits outlined in the research. The localised approach would enable the model to be tested and evidence gathered to highlight the benefits for a state wide roll out and inclusion into legislation.

Strategy 2 - The state approach

In the interviews undertaken with Resilience NSW and NRRA representatives it was unanimously agreed that the most effective way for legislation change to occur is through evidence of how the approach works successfully. By undertaking the local approach, evidence could be gathered to enhance a case for inclusion in legislation.

Another way to gather support and enhance the diplomacy strategy would be through seeking support from existing key partner organisations that are well established, reputable, well respected and play a vital role in recovery across the state at local, regional, statewide levels. These organisations include the Red Cross, Salvation Army, the Disaster Chaplains and Anglicare. Whilst these partner organisations have a role in the NSW Welfare Service Functional Area Supporting Plan (New South Wales State Government 2018) to support in Evacuation Centres, no formal arrangements have been developed in recovery. Yet the agencies are involved in government coordinated recovery services including community outreach, attending community meetings, in recovery centres and in recovery committees. The establishment of the local R&R committees would be beneficial to these partner organisations as an opportunity to

engage their volunteers to connect at the local level, provide a voice for their local community in recovery planning, develop relationships, build local knowledge, skills and capacity that will assist following an emergency.

By approaching these agencies, they could be advocates for the campaign and help influence and drive the agenda at both the local level and also strategically at the state level through their leadership.

Strategy 3 – The national approach

During the interview with an Australian Recovery Consultant, the consultant explained that the NRRA are undertaking a regional recovery exercise (drill) program being run across the country. A key focus of these exercises is to enhance the community services sector's participation in disaster drills.

This is a practical way to show the LEMCs the benefits of incorporating the community services sector in recovery exercises and would highlight the need for the community services sector to also be involved in recovery planning. It would support building the community services sector's ethos or credibility in the disaster recovery sector, highlighting their expertise and values.

The national approach would also involve utilising key emergency management and community services sector conferences and engaging in discussion groups to highlight the need and gain momentum for the campaign.

Stakeholder analysis

A stakeholder analysis would need to be undertaken in each location to understand who the key stakeholders are, at what level they are working, their area of responsibility, interest in the issue and where they might stand in relation to achieving the desired outcome. This has not been done extensively and would likely be varied in each local area due to differing personalities and local priorities. The assessment is based on information gathered during the interviews.

Table 2: Stakeholder analysis

Geographic Area	Organisation	Area of responsi-bility	Interest in the issue	Assessment Ally/opponent/ mixed
Local	Local Emergency Management Committee (LEMC)	Local emergency management planning for pre-paredness, re-sponse and recov-ery.	High, due to the emergency man-agement responsi-bilities in recovery planning.	Opponent
Local	Council	Expectation to support their community in recovery.	High, due to the key local role they have.	Mixed, based on size of council and available resources.
Local	Community services	Expectation to continue to provide services, information and assistance to vulnerable clients with potentially additional more complex post disaster needs.	High, due to the vulnerable people they work with and the potential that their clients are impacted.	Mixed, based on locations but predominantly ally based on feedback from previous emergencies.
Regional	Regional Emergency Management Committee (REMC)	Regional emergency management planning for preparedness, response and recovery.	Moderate, with a focus on regional geographic, not local but has influence with the LEMCs.	Neutral

Local, regional, state, national	Red Cross (recognised and creditable in disaster recovery in NSW)	Recovery Organisation that provides significant support to communities in recovery	High, due to responsibilities in recovery	Ally
Local, regional, state, national	Salvation Army (recognised and creditable in disaster recovery in NSW)	Recovery NGO that provides significant support to communities in recovery	High, due to responsibilities in recovery	Ally
Local, regional, state, national	Anglicare (recognised and creditable in disaster recovery in NSW)	Recovery NGO that provides significant support to communities in recovery	High, due to responsibilities in recovery	Ally
Local, regional, state, national	Disaster Chaplains (recognised and creditable in disaster recovery in NSW)	Recovery Organisation that provides significant support to communities in recovery	High, due to responsibilities in recovery	Ally
State	State Emergency Management Committee (SEMC)	State emergency management planning for preparedness, response and recovery.	Low, often prioritise the combat (fire, flood, police) agencies work and have limited interest or understanding of the community services sector.	Neutral
National	National Recovery and Resilience Agency (NRRA)	A new agency working in the space, traditionally a national agency but now has local staff and creating a role for themselves.	High due to the opportunity to utilise the network whilst they establish themselves locally.	Ally

Proposed Action

The proposed action would be a combination of confidential diplomacy, mobilising partners and public influence with key sectoral organisations.

Confidential diplomacy with key government stakeholders

When undertaking discussions with key government stakeholders, assessing and understanding the key barriers is important to assess what persuasion approaches are needed. The interviews undertaken have highlighted that attitude change would be a barrier for implementing and accepting a broader representation on committees.

In an interview on 8 December 2021, Kris Newton, Mountains Community Resource Network, explained that the current members "don't get what we do". She explained that as an invited guest to the LEMC she feels like she's "hitting her head against a brick wall". She feels like attitude change will be vital, alongside acknowledgement of the community services sector's knowledge in disaster management. Diana Bernardi from the Australian Red Cross stated in an interview on 8 December 2021 that she feels that changes are starting to happen and that the Covid pandemic highlighted that the traditional membership now recognises that the community services sector does have knowledge and skills that they don't.

Using ethos and logos persuasion techniques would be valuable in influencing and seeking change.

Some of the framing techniques that would be valuable in conversations would be through having pre-emptive arguments developed to mitigate some of the group's hesitation, highlighting opportunities to overcome the concerned barriers. Typecasting could also be a framing technique, due to the need for attitudes to change about the community services sector being too unstructured, unpredictable and lacking 'command and control' working structures. This is highlighted in my interview on 8 December 2021 with Kris Newton, Mountains Community Resource Network, who stated that "We come from different working environments and because we don't have stripes on our sleeve (chevrons) or wear a uniform they see us as tree hugging hippies". Breaking some of the typecasting would help with building relationships for a more inclusive membership. Explaining the shared aspirations would be another technique to bring together the groups and showing ways that the membership could work together to help effectively plan for emergencies. Having new people involved in recovery would bring together a different skill set needed to help plan more effectively for disaster events.

Mobilising partner organisations in the Disaster Welfare and recovery sector

Highlighting the shared aspirations would be a useful framing technique, as key community partner organisations understand the benefits and need to be involved. In my interview on December 8 2021 with Diana Bernardi from the Red Cross, she stated that it would be really valuable for the Red Cross to be involved in the R&R subcommittees across the state. She explained that it had been raised by the Red Cross in the past, but she feels that with the other 3 partners also supporting the campaign and in the current covid recovery environment, with a new agency involved the timing would be better to advocate for it now.

Public influence with key sectoral organisations

According to interviews undertaken as part of the research a public awareness campaign would not be a suitable option for this humanitarian diplomacy as it would be unlikely to gather the momentum needed to bring around change. Instead, influencing through the sector would enable pressure and momentum through evidence based and best practice models.

A way to inform the emergency management and community services sectors would be through presenting findings at relevant high profile and well attended conferences and key discussion groups to highlight where successful models have been tested. Using stories, metaphors and connotations would be a useful framing technique here to appeal to the audience's emotional side and broaden the interest to a wide audience to gain more traction.

Table 2: Summary of proposed humanitarian diplomacy engagement

Strategy	HD Form	Purpose	Target Audience	Activity	Lead and time-frame
1 – Local	Confidential diplomacy using logos or rational persuasion.	Seek support for regional teams to undertake piloting of the local R&R subcommittee model. Also to be an opinion leader for the SEMC membership.	Resilience NSW Executive Director for Local Coordination and Service Delivery. A key decision shaper.	Private meeting	Project Advocate Q1* 2022
1 – Local	Confidential diplomacy using ethos and logos persuasion techniques.	To seek support for the campaign and pursue opinion leaders.	Regional Emergency Management Officers (REMO's)	Private meetings with REMO's	Regional teams Q2 2022

1 – Local	Confidential diplomacy using logos persuasion techniques.	To seek REMC support for the campaign and let them know of the local engagement being undertaken with LEMCs	REMC's, potential decision shapers.	Attend and present to the REMC	Regional teams Q2 2022
1 – Local	Confidential diplomacy using ethos and logos persuasion techniques.	To seek support for the campaign and request an opportunity to present at LEMCs.	LEMC Chairperson and LEMO, both decision shapers and makers.	Private meetings with LEMC and LEMO	Regional teams Q2 & Q3 2022
1 – Local	Confidential diplomacy using ethos and logos persuasion techniques.	Seek endorsement to establish a local R&R subcommittee and have the chairperson on the LEMC.	LEMC, a decision maker.	Attend and present to the LEMC	Regional teams Q2 & Q3 2022
2 – State	Confidential diplomacy using logos persuasion techniques.	Seek support from recovery not for profit organisations to become an opinion leader and decision shaper.	Red Cross, Anglicare, Salvation Army and Disaster Chaplains	Meet individually to discuss agencies' support for the HD strategy.	Regional teams Q2 2022
2 – State	Confidential diplomacy using logos techniques.	Seek support from key members prior to the SEMC.	SEMC members, including State Emergency Recovery Controller, Dept of Communities and Justice, State Emergency Services and Rural Fire Service.	Private meeting to brief and seek support.	Project Advocate and Res-NSW Executive Director for Local Coordination and Service Delivery. Q3 2022
2 – State	Confidential diplomacy using logos persuasion techniques.	Seek SEMC endorsement to establish a R&R subcommittee reporting into the LEMC and a permanent membership role.	SEMC	Present and seek endorsement from the SEMC	ResNSW Executive Director for Local Coordination and Service Delivery. Q4 2022

3 - National	Confidential diplomacy using logos persuasion techniques.	Included in the 2022 NRRA regional recovery exercise, design a community services sector scenario to highlight the importance and value of having an inclusive and broader membership base.	National Recovery and Resilience Agency	Private meeting and design support for developing a recovery scenario including the community services sector.	Project Advocate Q1 2022
3 – National	Public influence using logos and pathos persuasion techniques.	Persuade emergency sector leaders of the importance of including the community services sector in local decision making through LEMCs.	Emergency Management and community services sector leadership	Present at conferences where key emergency sector decision makers will be attending.	Project Advocate and Res-NSW Executive Director for Local Coordination and Service Delivery. All 2022

*Q1, Q2, Q3, and Q4 represent the 4 quarters of the year.

CONCLUSION

The timing is ideal to undertake this work due to the establishment of new agencies, the finding from the Royal Commission which highlighted governmental shortfalls and the community services sector being needed in both the bushfires and now in COVID recovery but having limited ability to influence recovery planning.

Interviews highlighted the need for a subcommittee to be established, with a broader community services sector membership with recognised linkages to the LEMC. Achieving this outcome will enable the community services sector to have a voice in recovery planning, which will result in a more empowered and resilient community for future disasters.

INTERVIEWS

Interviews were carried out through video conferencing with the following:

- Sarah Anderson, Resilience NSW – 2 November 2021
- Jeremy Hillman, Resilience NSW - 2 November 2021
- Ben Brungs, Resilience NSW - 2 November 2021
- Australian Recovery Consultant - 5 December 2021
- Diana Bernadi, Australian Red Cross – 8 December 2021
- Kris Newton, Mountains Community Resource Centre - 8 December 2021

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Pheobe Shikuku

Regional Disaster Risk Reduction & Forecast based Financing Advisor at International Federation of the Red Cross & Red Crescent Societies – Africa Regional Office

Humanitarian Diplomacy February 2022

Supporting the integration of anticipatory action into existing disaster management systems through humanitarian diplomacy: Case for Eastern Africa

Supporting the integration of anticipatory action into existing disaster management systems through humanitarian diplomacy: Case for Eastern Africa

Tutor: Sahar Okhovat

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The increase of extreme disasters linked to the changing climate will be a major challenge for the decades to come. Climate change poses serious threats and challenges to the economies and livelihoods of millions of people in the Eastern Africa Region. It has exacerbated existing risks such as water stress, the spread of pests and infectious diseases, and food security. Governments and key humanitarian stakeholders need to prepare for the future of climate changes. This requires a systematic shift from response towards Anticipatory Humanitarian Action (AHA) within the disaster risk management (DRM) cycle which demands that governments include AHA in their plans and budget, to support AHA in the DRM cycle.

This research is based on extensive examination in order to understand existing Humanitarian Diplomacy (HD) tools and approaches being used in Kenya and Ethiopia to champion the integration of AHA into DRM systems. The research explores various initiatives in Kenya and Ethiopia and how the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (RCRC), UN Agencies such as World Food Programme (WFP) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) are employing HD in their engagement. The research considers the extent to which these HD tools and approaches can be replicated and used by other actors and highlights their advantages and disadvantages. The research concludes by sharing the lessons learnt, making recommendations on such initiatives for the future, including proposing the use of a mix of HD tools, clear understanding of the preferred approaches by decision makers, and the need for a commitment of resources to support continuous engagement of stakeholders in the process.

1. INTRODUCTION

a. Background

Eastern Africa, and in particular parts of Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya, are experiencing the driest conditions and hottest temperatures compared with the rest of Africa (UNEP, 2022). The analysis of past climate records for the region has clearly shown relatively rapid and high magnitude environmental shifts throughout the region characterised by changing rainfall and temperature patterns (IPCC, 2012; IPCC, 2014). Climate change poses a serious threat and many challenges to the economies and livelihoods of millions of people in the Eastern Africa Region. It exacerbates existing risks such as water stress, the spread of pests and infectious diseases, and food security (WDR, 2020). It is further expected that in the future climate variability in this region will impact on the functioning of the ecosystem and the preparedness of communities for future climate change (Merchant, 2021).

The choice of topic was informed by the need to support communities to prepare for future climate changes and the growing need for and interest in a systematic shift from response towards Anticipatory Humanitarian Action (AHA) within the disaster risk management (DRM) cycle. Moreso, with an increasing number of extreme weather events – both slow onset and rapid onset disasters – more people are affected by its impacts. Humanitarian funding is further dwindling as the growing number of disasters compete for attention. There is also growing evidence that acting early saves lives and costs less. The thorn in the flesh, however, is that humanitarian organisations are only available in a project location for a maximum of between two and five years, which then demands for governments to include AHA in their plans and budget to support AHA in the DRM cycle beyond the lifetime of such projects. This can only happen if AHA is captured in the mainstream plans of the government, with sufficient financial and human resources allocated to it. This research is based on extensive examination to understand existing Humanitarian Diplomacy (HD) tools and approaches being used in Kenya and Ethiopia to champion the integration of AHA into DRM systems. The research explores various initiatives in Kenya and Ethiopia and how the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (RCRC), UN Agencies such as World Food Programme (WFP) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) are employing HD in their engagement. The research considers the extent to which these HD tools and approaches can be replicated and used by other actors and highlights their advantages and disadvantages. The research concludes by sharing the lessons learnt, making recommendations on such initiatives in future.

b. Purpose and Significance

AHA provides a basis for stakeholders to use Early Warning (EW) information to trigger a set of planned and pre-financed measures taken when a disaster is imminent, prior to a shock or before acute impacts are felt, taking advantage of advances in weather and climate forecasting (Coughlan De Perez et al., 2015). AHA has gained momentum and is being scaled up in the region by the RCRC, Regional Economic Commissions (RECs), and United Nations (UN) bodies such as WFP and Food Agricultural Organization (FAO). AHA allows a region to harness the collective intelligence and wisdom of collaborating stakeholders and communities to deal with strategic risks and leverage emerging opportunities for meeting development goals. It further ensures well-coordinated, cost effective, sustainable, data-informed , dignified interventions and impactful disaster preparedness, as well as response and resilience building at the local, national and regional levels in Eastern Africa.

This research focuses on how actors such as the RCRC, WFP, FAO of the UN and IGAD are working towards supporting the integration of AHA into the existing DRM systems through various tools and approaches of HD, which is understood as:

> "...persuading decision makers and opinion leaders to act, at all times, in the interests of vulnerable people, and with full respect for fundamental humanitarian principles." (IFRC 2012)

The research will specifically examine the HD tools and approaches being used and or which need to be taken to influence key decision makers and advocate for the integration of AHA into the existing DRM systems in Eastern Africa.

The main objectives of the research include:

- To review the efforts in place in Kenya and Ethiopia to support the integration of AHA into existing DRM systems
- To Investigate and understand the tools and approaches being used by actors to support the integration of AHA into existing DRM systems
- To share lessons learnt and recommendations with other stakeholders working to influence policy and decision makers to support the integration of AHA into the DRM systems

To achieve the above objectives, the research answers the following questions:

Question 1: What efforts are being put in place in Eastern Africa (Kenya and Ethiopia) to support the integration of AHA into the existing DRM systems?

Question 2: What are the tools and approaches being used by stakeholders to support the integration of AHA into DRM systems?

Question 3: What are the lessons learnt from the engagement in HD actions and the recommendations to stakeholders in similar future engagement?

The intended audience of this research paper includes the specialised agencies of governments of the Eastern Africa Region, specifically the DRM agencies, parliamentary committees, treasuries and local governments, DRM actors in non-governmental organisations, academia and AHA actors and implementers.

2. METHODOLOGY

a. Research Design

To collect evidence for this research piece, the researcher relied on primary and secondary data. The primary research method involved the administration of questionnaires and conducting of interviews (both online and face to face) with research subjects.

The interviews were conducted face to face and online using a structured questionnaire. The people interviewed face to face (during the Global Dialogue Platform (GPDRR) in Bali, Indonesia included the climate research manager of the Kenya Red Cross Society (KRCS), a DRM expert of IGAD and a PhD researcher from the University of Reading, United Kingdom. An online interview via Microsoft teams was conducted for the Forecast based Financing (FbF) Project Manager of Ethiopia Red Cross Society (ERCS). Due to time constraints, the WFP Project Manager, Eastern Africa Bureau filled in the questionnaire by herself. Follow up calls for clarifications were made where needed. The secondary research involved the collection, analysis, and synthesis of existing research. This involved the reading of research journals, reports, and articles on integration of AHA in DRM systems and the tools and approaches pursued to facilitate the successful integration of AHA into DRM systems.

Some of the challenges experienced by the researcher included competing work priorities among the selected interviewers due to ongoing food insecurity early action and response in Eastern Africa. This made the FAO colleague unavailable for the interview.

The interview questions in the structured questionnaire focused on three main parts as follows.

- Understanding of the efforts of the stakeholders in Kenya and Ethiopia to support the integration of AHA into existing DRM systems in their countries
- Understanding of the various HD tools and approaches being utilised by the stakeholders at various levels to influence decision makers on the selected HD action
- Lessons learnt from the use of the various HD tools and approaches in the HD action, including recommendations to other stakeholder on similar future initiatives

b. Analysis of qualitative data

An analysis was made through the material obtained from both primary and secondary sources. The researcher analysed the information provided and recorded deductive information from which an informed analysis was made. Qualitative data analysis was employed to draw out information that is consistent among various sources for the purposes of this research.

3. LITERATURE REVIEW

Climate change is increasing the frequency and magnitude of storms, floods, and drought globally and within the Eastern Africa Region (IPCC, 2012; IPCC, 2014). To successfully manage these interlocking problems and avert cascading humanitarian disasters, traditional humanitarian response systems need to evolve from repetitive crisis response to forward-looking risk management (Bashar, 2006; UNISDR, 2006). Further, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (SFDRR) sets out the need to increase the coverage of Early Warning Systems (EWS) and access to Disaster Risk Information for early action (UNISDR, 2006). One of the most promising and innovative approaches to managing climate-related risks and preventing them from turning into disasters is AHA (Cabot Venton, 2017; FAO, 2018). This approach involves the use of seasonal and weather forecasts by government and other stakeholders to trigger early action and pre-position financing days, weeks and sometimes even months before an extreme weather event hits vulnerable populations, mitigating its impacts on lives and livelihoods (Coughlan De Perez et al., 2015).

Climate induced emergencies can no longer be considered as a surprise to the concerned actors. In effect, such events have become increasingly predictable (Wilkinson et al., 2018). Intrinsically, more can be done to anticipate, mitigate and prevent the impacts of climate induced events on the region's most vulnerable people (WDR, 2020). Capabilities in weather and climate forecasting, early warning, vulnerability assessments, disaster preparedness and climate risk financing have been honed over decades. The uptake of AHA approaches is growing and is being scaled up (Wilkinson et al., 2018). Several initiatives such as Forecast based Action by the Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (FbA by DREF) of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), the START Network's crisis anticipation window, FAO's Early Warning, Early Action (EWEA) systems and the new Risk Informed Early Action Partnership Initiative (REAP) aim to reach more than one billion people across developing countries with improved EWS and EA initiatives through collaboration amongst actors (Emma et al., 2020; REAP Secretariat, 2020). However, what has been dangerously delayed is the integration of AHA into existing DRM systems (policies, frameworks, and laws) to support decision making and implementation of anticipatory actions ahead of both climate and non-climate related humanitarian crises (Wilkinson et al., 2020).

Several AHA stakeholders and actors have combined efforts to support the integration of AHA into existing DRM systems through various modalities including HD, depending on their contexts and level of operation. Several HD tools and approaches have been employed to support this course of action. They include: alliance building/advocacy in partnerships such as the Anticipatory Action Task Force (AATF); public advocacy through the development of policy briefs (AATF, 2021) and statements (Anticipation Hub, 2022; G7, 2022) to governments including donor governments; Quiet advocacy (Mwangi et al., 2020) through bilateral engagements with key government decision makers and agencies done through round table meetings and action research (REAP, 2021), such as REAP 1st State of Play research piece which compiles and analyses information on effective practices, challenges and the progress to illustrate the effectiveness of EWEA. Other forms of HD tools identified from the literature review include enhancing the evidence base through the development of case studies from pilot initiatives such as The Towards Forecast based Preparedness Action (ForPac) project in Kitui County (Mwangi et al., 2020). The evidence base will help in the advocacy process through the recommendation of enablers and providing potential entry points for the intended HD action; commissioning cost-benefit analyses of acting early (Clarke & Vargas Hill, 2013; REAP 2021; Cabot Ventot et al., 2018), stakeholder engagement (Mwangi et al., 2020) through participatory workshops and needs-based training to support clear understanding of the AHA approach and need for integration; and lobbying (WDR, 2020) through steering groups and recommendations for reports.

Despite the efforts highlighted in the various literature, integration of AHA into existing DRM systems remains a challenge. It is therefore crucial to ensure that AHA is integrated into government and stakeholders' plans and budgets to support effective scaled up and long-term sustainability of anticipatory action (Wilkinson et al., 2020). This will indeed guarantee that aid systems can ensure at risk and most vulnerable communities receive humanitarian aid (social safety nets, delivery of cash, early warning information etc.) in advance, to protect their lives and livelihoods from the deteriorating impacts of both climate and non-climate induced disaster (Mwangi et al., 2020); reach more people with fewer financial and human resources (Cabot Venton et al., 2018; Cabot Venton, 2018; UNICEF/WFP, 2015) and empower communities to effectively anticipate, prepare for, and recover from climate shocks (WDR, 2020).

This paper seeks to address this gap and explores the HD tools and approaches needed to influence crucial decision makers to support the integration of AHA into existing DRM systems in Eastern Africa.

4. ANALYSIS OF THE FINDINGS

AHA Context in Eastern Africa

The interviews (face to face & online) conducted, questionnaires administered, and secondary research identified the following actors as the main implementers of AHA in Kenya and Ethiopia: WFP, FAO, START Network and RCRC. The WFP is implementing AHA for drought in Northern Kenya and Southern Ethiopia using WFP's context analysis and distributing AHA cash transfers with the main goal of helping to reduce drought impacts on livelihoods and food security posed by several consecutive failed rainfall seasons.

The RCRC in Ethiopia and Uganda are implementing AHA for floods (in flood risk zones – Nzoia & Tana River in Kenya and Amibara, Itana and Dubti areas in Ethiopia) and drought (Kitui County, Kenya and Southern Ethiopia) with the main aim of strengthening Disaster Preparedness and building community resilience in the long run. The IGAD is supporting Ethiopia and Kenya in their AHA efforts through setting up Early Warning Systems for drought and floods, with the main aim of supporting timely and efficient decision making among the AHA actors through their climate information products.

Secondary research has shown that FAO is implementing AHA in the Somali Region of Ethiopia and the arid and semi-arid lands in Kenya with the main goal of mitigating and easing the impacts of drought, and supporting investment into resilience building efforts in the pastoral communities.

Several actors are present in the Eastern Africa Region to support AHA and this has increased the uptake and upscaling of AHA in the region focusing on various hazards including but not limited to drought, floods, and human diseases such as cholera.

Framing the Issue

The main goal of engagement in this HD action as identified by the stakeholders interviewed in this research was to support the shift from reactive attitudes to proactive planning and preparedness for disasters by government agencies responsible for DRM. The stakeholders identified this as an opportunity to:

- Advance decision making and early action by communities & support stakeholders to alleviate the full impact of the disasters on the communities hence reducing the cost of response and economic losses
- Support resource mobilisation and allocation for communities and individual organisations to support EWEA in the region

Beneficiaries

The intended beneficiaries of the Anticipatory Humanitarian Action as identified by various stakeholders interviewed included:

Beneficiary	How they will benefit
DRM Agencies of Government e.g. National Disaster Operation Centre of Kenya (NDOC) and National Disaster Risk Management Commission (NDRMC) of Ethiopia	Simplified DRM work in terms of coordination, execution and planning as financial and human resources will be easily allocated
National Treasury	Efficient planning and decision making on resource allocation
Communities	Timely and efficient early actions prior to disasters
Individual organisations e.g., ERCS, KRCS, IGAD	Data ready, smoother engagement with stakeholders and strengthened preparedness due to financial allocation
National Meteorological and Hydrological Departments of Kenya and Ethiopia	Financial support to produce needs-based climate information and increased consumption of products
Donors	Reduced allocation to response operations; availability of resources for resilience building

Partnerships

To support such HD action, various partnerships and collaborations have been undertaken by the interviewed stakeholders. The main partnerships are with the following groups of people:

Decision Makers

- Parliamentary Committees on Disaster Management of Kenya & Ethiopia

Targets of Humanitarian Diplomacy

- National Disaster Operation of Kenya (NDOC)
- National Disaster Risk Management Commission (NDRMC)
- Treasury of Kenya & Ethiopia

Stakeholders Engaged to Support Humanitarian Diplomacy.

- Kenya Meteorological Department
- National Meteorological Agency – Ethiopia
- Water Resource Authority – Kenya & Ethiopia
- At-risk and most vulnerable communities including diverse groups who have been engaged in AHA to support with their Disaster Preparedness and Resilience Building – Communities along the Nzoia and Tana River Basin of Kenya and Amibara, Itana and Dubti in Ethiopia
- Regional bodies such as the Regional Centre for Mapping of Resources for Development (RCMRD) and IGAD
- Donors such as Italian, German, American and Japanese governments, among others
- Local universities in Kenya and government
- Non-governmental organisations e.g. START Network

Humanitarian Diplomacy

A combination of Humanitarian Diplomacy tools and approaches are used by the stakeholders interviewed (DRM Expert, Climate Change Manager, FbF project manager & Impact based Forecasting (IBF) Advisor at University of Reading) to support the HD course identified. The stakeholders who have over 7 years of experience in DRM and

more than 3 years in AHA exhibit a clear understanding of the DRM cycle and the AHA concept. The following were the main tools used:

- **Quiet Diplomacy –** This approach was used mainly with decision makers, targets of humanitarian diplomacy and some of the stakeholders who were targeted for persuasion such as donors, government agencies and regional bodies.
- **Public Diplomacy –** This approach was used with stakeholders who were identified to be persuaded to support the HD action.

Quiet Diplomacy

Quiet Diplomacy for this HD action consisted of capacity building and training and lobbying.

Capacity Building & Training:

Internally: ERCS, KRCS, IGAD & WFP have conducted capacity strengthening through presentations and demonstrations of the system suggested for their staff in the various units such as Disaster Management, logistics, finance and the Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability, and learning (MEAL) to support with the understanding of the AHA concepts and the integration of the various teams. This has supported the breaking of silos, buy-in from the Senior Management Team and supported the integration of AHA into the DRM systems at the institution level.

Externally: The interviewed stakeholders have also conducted capacity strengthening – presentation, demonstrations, break out groups etc. – for their targeted audience including the DRM agencies, NMHS, treasury, academia, and communities among others. This has been done through needs-based retreats, training and workshops at various levels to share the AHA concepts and processes, share good practices, gaps, challenges, and suggested solutions. Technical support has also been provided to NDOC of Kenya and NDRMC of Ethiopia to support the continued capacity building and integration of AHA into their DRM systems.

Lobbying

Internally: Within the RCRC, the FbF teams have engaged in lobbying with the Disaster Management teams that are responsible for review of the DRM systems and overall operations for buy-in and support in the implementation of AHA. In IGAD, the DRM expert has been intentional with the involvement of the different teams e.g. Climate Team, Food Security monitoring and operations in the various EWEA initiatives for their understanding and buy in and eventually sustainability of the initiative. The AHA teams from all the organisations interviewed have also used lobbying with their Senior Management Teams to support buy-in, approval and go ahead for external lobbying and advocacy on the HD action. Direct lobbying i.e. one on one engagement with selected Senior Management Team members for them to understand the goal, objective and intended outcome of the HD action being pursued prior to the meeting has also been undertaken.

Externally: The organisations interviewed use lobbying as an HD approach through the Technical Working Groups, and directly with the main partners including the National Disaster Operation Centre (NDOC) of Kenya, National Disaster Risk Management Commission (NDRMC) of Ethiopia and the National Treasury. A representative of the NDOC of Kenya to the TWG is also actively championing the inclusion of AHA into the DRM systems of Kenya based on his understanding of the benefits of AHA to communities in Kenya.

Lobbying is also done through direct engagement (i.e. small private meetings, one on one engagements, phone calls and informal meetings) with the targeted stakeholders. For instance, the KRCS, because of the close working relationship between the operations team and NDOC, has been able to get a platform to lobby for the inclusion of AHA in the NDOC Disaster Preparedness work.

Public Diplomacy

Public diplomacy consisted of alliance building, publications, dialogues and media engagement.

Alliance Building

Internally: The stakeholders interviewed indicated that they engage the different technical teams through internal round table discussions and brainstorming meetings. This is done to identify the various capacities available at the institutional level to support the efforts on integration of AHA into DRM systems. For example in IGAD, The DRM unit invited the climate teams, crop monitoring teams, drought monitoring teams, among others, to discuss how to engage with the various DRM teams of their member states.

Externally: The KRCS, ERCS and IGAD have supported the setting up of Technical Working Groups on AHA in Kenya, Ethiopia and Eastern Africa respectively to support stakeholder engagement around various elements of DRM including AHA. The Technical Working Group has supported the identification of challenges, gaps and provides solutions to support the integration of AHA into the DRM systems. It further ensured a multi-stakeholder and multi-sectoral approach to issues being discussed. The KRCS and ERCS, also organised simulation exercises for their Floods Early Action Protocols (EAP) in Busia County Kenya and in Gambela region in Barrow basin to engage the stakeholders for them to practically understand how the EAP works, share their perspective on coordination, communication and provide feedback on the effectiveness and practicality of the selected early actions. This step-by-step engagement of actors has generated the needed appetite and provided a bigger picture perspective to the discussions to support and champion for integration of AHA into DRM systems.

Publications: This has involved the development of case studies presenting evidence of impact, ideally from multiple contexts and documentation of AHA experiences both quantitative and qualitative as proof of the concept on the added value of AHA in DRM. The University of Reading in partnership with local universities in Kenya and Ethiopia is supporting practice oriented research that has provided evidence on why the integration of AHA in DRM systems is important. Further academia in collaboration with AHA actors, donors and CSOs have developed policy briefs to call for action from key decision makers, as well as engaged in advocacy activities through various partnerships.

Dialogues: The TWG in Kenya and Ethiopia organised National Dialogues to discuss the progress on AHA, the benefits that can be seen so far, and the gaps and challenges that need to be addressed moving forward, including how AHA can be integrated into the DRM systems of the 2 countries. This was done through a round table and brainstorming workshop session, presentation of progress made including in regional platforms and demonstrations. Further webinars on topical issues lead by different speakers and experts have been organised and the targeted stakeholders invited to attend. The webinars support dissecting critical issues around AHA and provide the needed clarification to decision makers and influencers.

Media Engagement: All the stakeholders interviewed indicated using various media engagements including TV, radio, and social media platforms, especially twitter. KRCS and IGAD through their twitter pages have publicly advocated for the importance of the integration of AHA into DRM systems. The twitter posts share the different pictorial activities, blog posts and opinion pieces on AHA. These activities are geared towards influencing the various government agencies involved in DRM to champion the inclusion of AHA into DRM systems. IGAD has also utilised international media to share its work on AHA, e.g. during the desert locust invasion in the Horn of Africa and East Africa.

Course of Action

Various activities accompanied the selected HD tools and approaches. They included:

Activity	Timeline	Whom
Stakeholder Mapping & Engagement (one on one & TWG)	Continuous	All stakeholders
Capacity building	ASAP & Continuous	RCRC, WFP, NDOC, NDRMC
Selection of HD Team	ASAP	RCRC, WFP, NDOC, NDRMC

Engagement of NDOC of Kenya & NDRMC of Ethiopia	Phased approach based on progress of goal	RCRC, IGAD
Building of evidence base for AHA & Communication using various platforms	Continuous	All stakeholders
Consultation with communities & targeted beneficiaries	Continuous	RCRC, WFP, FAO & CSOs
Engagement of Treasury	Continuous	HD Team
Drafting of policy briefs & statements to key decision makers	Continuous	HD Team with support from other stakeholders.

Outcomes & Impacts

National

- AHA integrated existing DRM systems. This would move AHA from short term projects into part of a systematic and operational approach for implementing DRM.
- Support the strengthening of the existing EWS structures. This will support early action at the local, national and regional levels.
- Strengthened coordination and institutional preparedness. This will support effective and impactful disaster preparedness.
- Reduced costs of response providing sufficient funding for development projects.

Local

- Shift from a reactive to a proactive attitude.. This will support resilience building and reduce losses from disasters.

Regional

- Increased capacity strengthening of member states on EWEA reducing costs of humanitarian response.
- Increased partnerships and funding support to AHA for member states from donors and other stakeholders.

Evaluating HD Action & Results Achieved

The following approaches are being used to evaluate the HD action and results achieved:

- Development of a Theory of Change with clear indicators that can be monitored and evaluated.
- Continuous monitoring and reflection of the goal and objectives developed for the proposed HD actions. Stakeholders have developed a clear MEAL framework on this.
- Admission of surveys and research to analyse the progress on addressing the gaps & challenges identified to support the integration of AHA into DRM systems. This also included the development of case studies and other documentation as part of the case for support.
- Feedback from the TWGs and communities (including of practice) at the national and regional levels on any changes because of the various advocacy approaches taken.
- Shift in government commitments and strategy. This will include financial and human capacity commitments on AHA.

Strength & Weakness of Selected HD Tools & Approaches

Strengths

- Supported multi-stakeholder engagement at the local, national and regional levels. This has supported the breaking of silos as well as brought in a variety of expertise and experience on AHA from various contexts.
- Increased public involvement in key government processes through the various public diplomacy approaches.
- Supported stronger coordination providing conducive working environment and fostering good working relationships.
- Informed targeting of stakeholders with different experiences and expertise boosting the HD action.

Weaknesses

- Needs dedicated financial and human resources for continued engagement with the stakeholders on the HD action.
- Requires sufficient time for stakeholder mapping, identification, and engagement.
- Face to face engagement is needed in some of the HD tools which has become difficult with the COVID-19 pandemic.

5. LESSON LEARNT & RECOMMENDATIONS

Lesson Learnt

Major lessons have been learnt by the interviewed stakeholders as they utilise Humanitarian Diplomacy to influence decision makers and key stakeholders to support the selected HD action. Firstly, the engagement of the key decision makers as early as possible in the HD process is crucial for ownership and sustainability of the process. Secondly, alliance building and continuous engagement among stakeholders is crucial for Humanitarian Diplomacy. It ensures that the various efforts by stakeholders build upon existing government efforts rather than create parallel systems. Thirdly, various HD tools will need to be employed in the process to leverage the opportunities available with the decision makers. Lastly, the HD process is a step-by-step engagement which takes time, therefore patience is a key requirement for the success of the process.

Recommendations

The following are the recommendations coming forth from this research: Various HD tools and approaches are needed to be used to engage the various groups of partners (decision makers, targets of Humanitarian Diplomacy and stakeholders engaged to support the HD action) to attain the HD goals and objectives in the different phases of engagement. It is also recommended that the stakeholders have a clear understanding of the preferred approaches of decision makers and targets for Humanitarian Diplomacy to ensure that the best HD tools are selected for engagement. Lastly, to support the continuous engagement of stakeholders in the HD process, dedicated financial and human resources are necessary, which should be facilitated by the various stakeholders engaged in the process.

6. CONCLUSIONS

This research has provided an overview and evaluation of Humanitarian Diplomacy in Ethiopia and Kenya. It has confirmed that there is indeed a place for Humanitarian Diplomacy to support integration of AHA into the existing DRM systems in Eastern Africa. It has also considered the likely impacts and outcomes of Humanitarian Diplomacy action for the Eastern Africa Region should AHA be integrated into the existing DRM systems.

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Fritz Pinnow

studying M.Sc. Development Studies at the SOAS University of London
(at the time of writing: volunteer with the German Red Cross (Medical Task force 19 within the Disaster Response Unit) as a Paramedic)

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Future opportunities for effective disaster resilience in Honduras with humanitarian diplomacy as a primary tool

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ABBREVIATIONS:

CEM	Regional Strategic Monitoring Center
COPECO	Permanent Contingency Committee
C-19	Covid 19
GRC	German Red Cross
HD	Humanitarian Diplomacy
HRC	Honduran Red Cross
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent
JOH	Juan Orlando Hernandez
NP	National Police
NRU	National Response Units
PN	Partido Nacional
PRD	Partnership and Resource Development Unit
WASH	Water, sanitation and hygiene
RCRC	Red Cross & Red Crescent

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This research paper aims to present a humanitarian diplomacy strategy to be executed by the Honduran Red Cross (HRC) in order to persuade the newly elected Honduran Government to relocate national spending and responsibilities to the disaster preparedness and response efforts in Honduras in favor of the HRC. The proposed strategy is based on a summary of the national response to Eta and Iota in Honduras and an in-depth analysis of the relevant stakeholders and vulnerabilities within Honduran society related to disaster response. Secondary sources used to underline statements are mostly reports drafted by the IFRC, and regarding civil and national topics articles from independent and reliable networks have been included. As primary sources, Mr. Aly has commented on the IFRC's Central American Cluster models' role during Eta and Iota and Mr. Escalante has commented on the "Mirrored Approach" and its efficiency during Eta and Iota. At the center of the strategy are the opportunities arising through the newly elected government's political orientation and situation, and specifically including arguments to prove effective in negotiation, alongside the effects of different advocacy dynamics.

1. DISASTER RESPONSE OPERATION TO THE TROPICAL STORM ETA & HURRICANE IOTA

a. Consequences to Eta & Iota landfall

On October 31 2020, hurricane Eta would evolve into a tropical storm in the eastern Caribbean Sea and would intensify into a Category 4 hurricane, making landfall in the northeast of Nicaragua on November 3 2020. From there it would weaken to a tropical storm and slowly move through Honduras and reach Guatemala the next day.[1] Eta would not reach Honduras with the predicted intensity, but the fact that it would pass through a region very rich in rivers and rural settlements, in addition to being accompanied by heavy rainfalls of up to 1,000 millimeters, would make its impact lethal to the already vulnerable population (GEOGLAM, 2020). About 1% of the population of Honduras lived inside the path of a wind speed zone of 60-120 km/h, and 11% live inside the wind speed zone below 60 km/h (IFRC, 2020, p. 8).

As can be seen in Annex 1, Eta nearly missed the city of San Pedro Sula and caused massive floods in the Sula Valley to the east of the city, further moving to the northern department of Atlántida which caused floods along the coast. The destruction of the infrastructure connecting San Pedro Sula to the northern coast would lead to food and water shortages.

On November 10, Iota had originated as a tropical storm in the east Caribbean and would make landfall as a category 5 hurricane on November 16 in Nicaragua and the Gracias a Dios region of Honduras. Iota would cause flash flooding and river flooding, deadly landslides and cutting off access to most of the remote regions which had already suffered through massive infrastructural damage from Eta.

The heavy rainfalls would additionally cause heavy flooding in the rather remote departments of Colón and Olancho. The central and southern departments, including Francisco Morazán, where the capital Tegucigalpa is located have been affected by the strong winds, but have not encountered significant flooding.[2]

b. Response:

Two days earlier, in preparation for the incoming storm, the Honduran Red Cross (HRC) had activated and dispatched over 150 specialized volunteers, positioning them strategically in anticipation of the incoming storm (IFRC, 2020, p. 3).

On November 5, as soon as Eta would make landfall as a tropical storm, the HRC would deploy the Response Units to Sula Valley and El Paraiso and Olancho departments which had been most affected (Bugnion de Moreta & Alfonsi, 2021). The main priorities would be monitoring river levels, high-risk areas and providing evacuation, rescue, and pre-hospital care alongside psychological support services to the affected people. Should a region be threatened by potential landslides or floodings the inhabitants would be evacuated and relocated to temporary shelters (Bugnion de Moreta & Alfonsi, 2021).

c. International assistance & the "mirrored approach"

The HRC would field test an operational approach known as the "Mirrored Approach", which would prove extremely effective in the coordination between national and international operations. Essentially the Mirrored Approach is a restructuring of the organizational capacities of the HRC in order to "mirror" the international capacities it would engage with.[3] "Every international element engaging with the HRC would have an exact national counterpart. There is a necessity for this because the technical knowledge and experience of foreign specialists do not necessarily make them proficient in utilizing this knowledge in the Honduran context. Therefore, they need a national counterpart which can provide the Honduran context to the technical execution of an operation."[4] Mr. Escalante would add, "At the same time, the HRC would learn about the culture and different approaches of the international delegations, [...] additional to being introduced to different technologies." The international support was also structured very clearly

[1] See Annex 1
[2] See Annex 1
[3] Interview: Gerardo Escalante Hernandez
[4] Interview: Gerardo Escalante Hernandez

in order to prevent overlapping responsibilities and causing disorder or misunderstanding. "The German Red Cross would provide an active implementation of Water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH), the Spanish Red Cross would support actively in communication efforts and the Canadian Red Cross would dedicate itself to health and construct a temporary field hospital."[5]

To relieve the pressure of the HRC coordinating and allocating international support, the IFRC Cluster of Central America would facilitate communication between the three affected nations and their RCRC National Societies and the IFRC regional headquarters in Panama.[6]

Due to strong preparatory efforts, the HRC was able to quickly engage in the disaster response efforts. It is important to mention that the HRC volunteers and specialized crews would be the first to engage the affected communities (Bugnion de Moreta & Alfonsi, 2021). However, problems with the equipment have been reported. One specialized disaster response volunteer Ms. Lourdes Alvarado reports that in some operations the motors attached to the boats could not generate sufficient thrust to move against the current of rivers and prevent the teams from engaging the affected upstream settlements. In one case the crew from the squad leader Nery Ordoñez was permitted the use of a specialized vessel borrowed from the Comisión Permanente de Contingencias (COPECO), which is a governmental institution designed to coordinate disaster relief efforts. Upon arrival at the affected settlement, the crew was attacked by the inhabitants physically and verbally and were forced to turn back. The catalyst, in this case, was the discontent towards governmental institutions and the markings on the vessel identifying it as part of COPECO. The National Response Unit (NRU) removed the markings and replaced them with visible RCRC markings. Upon arrival with the new markings, the NRU was welcomed cheerfully and granted access to the vulnerable population on all levels.

d. International funding network & procurement

On the same day that Eta made landfall the Honduran Government requested international humanitarian assistance destined to facilitate an effective response to the disasters. The IFRC drafted the first emergency appeal to Hurricane Eta for 20 million Swiss Francs, tailored to the needs in Central America on November 8, based on the Situational reports in the field (IFRC, 2020a, p. 1).

The Partnership and Resource Development Unit (PRD) would collect the different situational assessments and communicate about the necessities in the different operations. From this thorough initial assessment by the PRD department, an emergency appeal was generated which also includes a response strategy and the funding necessities to accomplish the intended goal. Foreign support would, however, be bound to a wide array of different conditions which are referred to as "Earmarks". Whilst engaging in on-the-ground assessments to identify the necessities on the ground the IFRC needs to negotiate with donors about the allocation of their funds. This can delay access to vital funding during the highly dynamic and time-sensitive disaster response operation. "Sometimes the negotiations are a bit hard [...]", Ms. Leon from the PRD department would comment. "Our personnel in the field would have to draft three proposals while doing assessments in the field during this highly dynamic situation", Ms. Blanco, a consultant to the PRD department, would add.

e. Criticism:

Due to social media, reports about incidents travel very fast and public perception is highly volatile. Especially targeted by the public discourse would be COPECO, which would generate major reputational damage during the response to Eta and Iota. Support from El Salvador, provided to the city of San Pedro Sula would be improperly stored and sustained massive water damage. Pictures from the warehouse[7] went viral, deteriorating the already heavily damaged trust in the government and its institutions. Additionally, COPECO would use its equipment to facilitate the arrival of politicians to affected communities in order to produce video and photo content aiming to boost popularity and electoral advantages. This occurrence has been repeatedly confirmed by HRC and COPECO volunteers, who chose to remain nameless in this paper.

[5] Interview: Nelson Aly
[6] Interview: Nelson Aly
[7] See Annex 2

2. HONDURAS AS A HUMANITARIAN ENVIRONMENT

a. Actors and Vulnerabilities within Honduran society

Honduras has a complex constellation of actors relevant to Humanitarian Diplomatic (HD) advances, which is why the stakeholder analysis is one of the central aspects when designing and engaging an HD strategy. With regard to disaster preparedness and response operations in particular, collaboration is vital and inevitable.

Firstly, the Government of Honduras, to which the HRC National Society is auxiliary, is massively important when assessing an HD strategy. The long track record of corruption by the previous administration has incubated a strong distrust and dislike by the public. During its 12-year term, the Partido Nacional (PN) has strategically replaced the management and leadership within most governmental institutions nurturing an environment of corruption subject to relentless impunity (CESPAD 2021). The newly established administration originated as a leftist movement "LIBRE", which has been voted into office for the first time, after a long period of being in the opposition to the traditional parties "Liberal" and the PN.

The military as the executive of the government, however, has a rather inglorious past. Death squads of the cold war era, generations of corrupt leadership and the 2009 military coup have deeply scarred its relationship with the public (Salomon, 2012). However, different branches are also perceived in different ways, depending on how they engage with the public. The Military Police, as an example, is strongly disliked due to their direct engagement with civilians regarding civil security matters such as roadblocks and mostly replacing the police in highly dangerous contexts. The Marine Infantry (Infantería Marina), due to their versatile capabilities are often deployed as an auxiliary force to NGO operations and through this rather positive social engagement have a better reputation than any of the other branches. The Airforce and Navy also actively participate in disaster response and have been seen quite often in the Covid-19 response, however their limited direct contact with civilians does not reflect a reputation in either way.

The *National Police* (NP) have lost much of their esteem through the evidential inability to police the violence in the nation. They are not as relevant for disaster preparedness or response operations but are central to Honduran society.

Most relevant for this particular research paper is the Comisión Permanente de Contingencias (COPECO), which has been created under the jurisdiction of the government in order to coordinate public and private disaster relief efforts. As a governmental institution, the reputation of the government reflects directly on the reputation of the institution. As one of the executive institutions of Honduras, they are funded exclusively by the government and have access to military infrastructure and funding to expand their own.

The media landscape in Honduras plays a very significant role within its society. By far the channel through which media is consumed most is television (USAID, 2019). Secondly, the Honduran population consumes media through social media networks., mostly through Facebook, then YouTube and Instagram (Enamorado, 2022). Regarding HD strategies, this is extremely relevant because Facebook and Instagram are known to host many platforms pursuing so-called "Yellow Journalism", which emphasizes sensationalism over facts. This development has evolved more radically on social media platforms due to the high density of channels, strong competition and decreasing average attention span. This has led many to follow a strategy in which "sensation sells" and low budgets cannot commit to thorough investigations.

These social media platforms also allow opinion leaders to cast their opinions to their base and shape public opinion (Enamorado, 2022). Some represent a political agenda and can be extremely important during gaining, restoring or maintaining a reputation

Within Honduras, organized crime is a dominant force to the point that its splintered factions can be classified as non-state armed groups. The narcotics trafficking business has spread throughout the country, led by centralized organizations, namely cartels, which are part of a large international trafficking network. Most cartels in Honduras have opted for a rather clandestine nature of their operations in rural and remote parts of Honduras. They deeply impact Honduran society and have been at war with the military for decades. Due to the dominance of the cartels the departments of Colón, Olancho and Gracias a Dios, have been heavily neglected by governmental institutions (Previ-

de, 2021). Consequently, civil infrastructure and housing are strongly underdeveloped in these regions, and national parks are being used for smuggling.

In the urban areas armed, small and decentralized gangs claim regions within cities and dominate them. These groups originate from the Mara Salvatrucha and unlike cartels are small, openly violent, decentralized gangs, mostly involved in micro-trafficking and extortion practices. The largest gangs known in Honduras would be the M-13 and Barrio 18, which make most of their revenues through extortion, by imposing an "Impuesto de Guerra"[8] (war tax), throughout the urban regions they control. The violence is mostly randomized, and its extent has made San Pedro Sula the "Murder Capital of the World" in 2012 (Romo & Thompson, 2013). They have been known to attack police and military units openly and violently. Also, the decentralized nature of these small gangs creates a lot of infighting and street shootings along the "invisible borders"[9] during territorial disputes. Within the large cities, such as San Pedro Sula and Tegucigalpa the Maras are such a present and dominant force that they can be considered an array of many organized non-state armed groups. The military or rival gangs would openly engage in urban combat in an effort to reclaim territory. The civilians, exposed to this violence, are highly vulnerable and the situation would not permit their vulnerabilities to be assessed by governmental institutions.

It is imperative to also consider the vulnerable societies within the Honduran society as relevant actors. In Honduras, the population can be mostly divided into rural and urban populations. Many rural settlements would make their living by harvesting coffee, cotton, tobacco and bananas, alongside cattle production (GEOGLAM, 2020). Most farmers, however, farm on land which is not their own and gain low, insufficient salaries. An alternative to farming would be the participation in narcotics trafficking efforts, transporting contraband through the rural regions. This is most common in Olancho, Colón and the Gracias a Dios region (Previde, 2021). However, low income, low educational standards and few other opportunities have caused a significant rural depopulation. The infrastructure within the rural areas is also extremely underdeveloped and therefore mostly immobilizes the communities living there.

Many of the younger generation have decided to try their luck in the cities. However, the urban population is mostly subject to the same absence of opportunities. The urban population is largely split, with a very large number with low income, a practically non-existent middle class and a very small elite with a disproportionately large income. At the top of the elite class in Honduras are 5 families (Dudley & Meledéz, 2016). The urban environment is constantly growing with new illegally constructed districts appearing on the outskirts of cities. These illegal constructions are highly unstable and mostly located on terrain not safe for construction. In case of heavy rainfall and/or disasters these homes are highly vulnerable to flooding, landslides or heavy winds.

Similarly to other nations in Central America, Honduras has a significant number of Afro-descendent communities, mostly located on the northern coast. These communities are heavily neglected. Most communities live from fishing and other natural resources. The Garifuna, situated in the northeast of Atlántida speak their own language and have a long history of battling for territories and natural resources with government institutions and foreign investors.

Honduras is also home to seven different indigenous populations: the Chorti, Lenca, Miskito, Nahua, Pech, Tawahka and Tolupán. These populations are spread throughout 15 of the 18 departments of Honduras and make up around 10% of the Honduran general population (Quartucci, 2021). They are subject to similar struggles as the two afro-descendent populations, however they are culturally very different and have settled rather in the mountainous regions of Honduras. Only the Miskitos populate the northeastern coast of the department's Gracias a Dios and parts of Colón. This is highly relevant, because these two departments, and especially the coast, are rather desolate regions dominated by narcotics trafficking, also referred to as the Narco-highway. This means these regions are subject to a very complex conflict between a variety of actors.

Droughts in the rural areas and the absence of opportunities in the urban regions leave people stranded in extreme poverty (IFRC, 2022, p. 2). Additionally, the violence in the urban areas, catalyzed through this poverty would lead many people to migrate (Ibid, p. 9). Additionally, poverty would restrict the ability for everyone to receive direct access to health (Ibid, p. 8) in many regions. The survival situation many populations are subject to makes environmental education and the sustainable use of natural resources seem obsolete to many societies and counteracts environmental crisis prevention (Ibid, p. 6).

[8] A weekly or monthly payment which would exclude individuals or businesses from harm by the gangs

[9] The areas where two territories controlled by different gangs overlap.

b. Factors influencing Humanitarian Diplomacy in Honduras

The current government is made up of mostly far left-leaning personalities with a tendency to leftist idealism. The leftist movements in Latin America, also described as the "Pink Tide", would also incorporate nationalist and populist elements and aspire to strong diversity in order to establish themselves more effectively throughout the political landscape and gain competitive advantages (Levitsky & Roberts, 2018). Populism has proven an effective antidote to initial skepticism, however it usually incurs promises of positive change which generate high expectations. In the case of Xiomara, her election has polarized the nation, but first steps combating the corruption of the former administration have left her opposition silent as for now.

c. Opportunities arising for the RCRC Movement in Honduras

Currently, President Xiomara Castro is forced to provide fast and strong positive results, needing to prove herself to the public, because the party does not have a track record to fall back on. Additionally, these goals need to be achieved in order to alleviate the criticism of the opposition, claiming Xiomara would execute the will of her husband, former president Manuel Zelaya.

The HRC has proven itself extremely effective engaging in the response to Eta and Iota and have since enhanced their reputation massively. Also on an international level, the HRC has provided the mirrored approach a new mechanism to integrate international support more effectively.

3. HUMANITARIAN DIPLOMACY STRATEGY ENHANCING DISASTER RESILIENCE

a. Strategic approach to disaster preparedness and response operations

The summary of the disaster response operation to Eta and Iota provides a clear reference and evidence of the HRC's capabilities and competence. Additionally, the stakeholder analysis and assessment of vulnerabilities provide the framework on which to base and structure arguments.

The key message and proposal in the case of disaster preparedness will be to commit more national funding, resources, military infrastructure and expertise to disaster preparedness efforts of the HRC, especially regarding the standardization of, and further research into, the Mirrored Approach. This funding should enhance the quantity and quality of training opportunities for specialized disaster response units. Additionally, regarding disaster response, the proposal would include substantial national fund allocation to the HRC and make the HRC the primary executive disaster response unit of Honduras, and standardize and refine the Mirrored Approach.

The addressees in this case would be the Honduran Government, namely the Minister of Development and Social inclusion José Carlos Cardona, the Minister of Health José Manuel Matheu, Commander of the Marine Infantry Pablo Antonio Rodríguez Sauceda and the Leader of COPECO Ramon Sóto. These represent the core of the decision and policymakers within the Honduran government and relevant institutions with the authority to allocate national funds.

The negotiations should take place in "closed-door" meetings due to the delicacy of the topic itself and the arguments brought up during the discussions. Conducting the negotiations on behalf of the RCRC movement should be the President of the HRC Jose Juan Castro, Head of the Central American Cluster Delegation Nelson Aly Rodriguez, Disaster Management Coordinator of Central America Gerardo Escalante Hernandez and Coordinator and Legal Advocacy Specialist Sophie Teyssier. These individuals are adequately suited to negotiate this proposal due to various factors: Firstly, they have high credibility stemming from years of expertise regarding disaster resilience efforts and as Red Cross officials with an impeccable track record of representing RCRC movements values. Additionally, the presence of RCRC leadership signals respectability and seriousness to the negotiation, as well as respect towards the governmental delegates.[10] Mr. Castro and Mr. Aly, apart from being high-ranking and experienced RCRC personnel are

[10] Credibility and professionality can be transmitted by dedicating a high ranking official to a negotiation

additionally Honduran nationals which provides them with a deeper understanding and credibility regarding Honduran national matters, and trust regarding their interests in addressing the vulnerabilities of the Honduran public. Mr. Escalante provides impeccable expertise regarding the prior disaster response to Eta and Iota and can comment on the actual disaster response dynamics within the Honduran society.

This strategy pursues evidence-based and solution-focused messages and arguments to achieve persuasion. The response to Eta and Iota has brought evidence to the surface which on the one side highlights HRC's ability to execute a highly effective disaster response operation and on the other side the inability of COPECO to work as an executive operator in the field due to massive reputational damage caused by prior corruption incidents. It is imperative that the arguments regarding public distrust in governmental institutions are framed adequately, explaining that the reputational damage incurred has been caused by the prior administration. Additionally, it is important to refer to the shared aspirations the RCRC movement has with the Honduran public, which entails supporting the vulnerable populations of Honduras.

The dominant argument supporting this particular proposal refers to the humanitarian principles the RCRC movement has committed to and not deviated from since. Specifically, the adherence to the principles of neutrality and impartiality have allowed the HRC to enter every region of Honduras and address vulnerable societies. Governmental institutions have struggled in the past to enter regions dominated by organized crime and this has led to negligence of said regions.[11] Public distrust and the dominance of organized crime in rural and urban regions have been a very large obstacle for governmental institutions providing aid in Honduras. Enhancing the capabilities of the HRC through funding would be in the interest of vulnerable societies. To enhance the reputation of the Honduran government is one of the main goals of the new administration, however this takes time which the threat of disasters does not provide. Predictions for the upcoming "hurricane season" of 2022 are above normal, with 3-6 hurricanes expected this year (NOAA, 2022). This prediction provides this negotiation with a necessary timeframe, pushing the severity of the subject. The HRC would especially utilize the newly appointed funds in order to substantiate the effort to standardize and enhance the "Mirrored Approach". This would necessitate a large dedication of time and funding but could essentially revolutionize disaster response operations around the world. Through this additional fund allocation, the HRC would be able to research and improve the Mirrored Approach, allowing implementation, standardization and even academization throughout other national societies in the world. The Mirrored Approach additionally demonstrates the RCRC movement's international capabilities. The HRC can rely on the IFRC's Central American Cluster network and the IFRC's office in Panama covering all of the Americas. This network allows quick global acquisition of funds and distribution of information. The IFRC Cluster of Central America also has the ability to address vulnerabilities and respond beyond borders, to which neither vulnerabilities nor disasters are confined.

Another argument supporting the proposal to amplify HRC disaster response and preparedness capabilities comes from the vulnerabilities of Honduran society itself. Regarding the earlier identified populist elements within the program of the newly elected administration and the vocal and highly critical opposition, it is extremely important to demonstrate and provide positive results, as well as not to incur negative developments, which would support the narrative of the opposition. As a result, vulnerabilities are currently being identified and long-term strategies are established by governmental institutions. However, disasters can rapidly demolish long-term operations and drive up the number of vulnerable populations. This would make an effective allocation of national funds toward disaster preparedness and response mechanisms more of a logical investment to reduce the impact disasters would have on long-term operations and societal vulnerabilities.

Especially regarding disaster response, the proposal entails not only allocating more national funds to the HRC but also increasing its responsibilities in the operation as the primary executive of the operation. The HRC is the only organization in Honduras with the capability to respond adequately as an executive in a national disaster response operation, with the means to enter every region of Honduras regardless of its current situation. The HRC would therefore also replace all executive responsibilities of COPECO, absorbing its infrastructural inventory. However, COPECO should remain of vital importance regarding the coordination of disaster response operations, especially regarding the distribution of information, as it has done during the response to Eta and Iota. A byproduct of this redistribution of responsibilities would be that the government and its institutions would not be held accountable, incurring additional reputational damage for any setback during a disaster response operation. This means that the administration would

[11] Interview: Gerardo Escalante Hernandez

redistribute not only responsibilities but also the accompanying risk. Due to the high experience level of the HRC, the additional risk would not be as high, however, with the growing risk the HRC will have to expand public outreach and communication departments to counteract the larger threat of reputational damage.

Even though negotiation is at the center of the strategy, advocacy is strongly merged within and provides a welcome assistance to persuasion during the negotiation. In this case, we can distinguish between active and passive advocacy. Active advocacy supporting the proposed strategy is the promotion of effective measures combating vulnerabilities in social media campaigns or television channels. One example would be the joint effort to reduce risk during the Semana Santa tourism spike, with the HRC displaying proficiency and availability, not only towards other national organizations but also to the public. Passive advocacy supporting this proposal would also be the recurring evidence of governmental institutions' inability to enter vulnerable zones, due to the dominance of organized crime. One example would be the recent assassination of three police officers in de department of Colón after an increase in policing initiatives (La Prensa, 2022).

b. Risks involved & Recommendations

Naturally with an increase in funding dependencies can be formed. Therefore, the newly allocated funds should not cover fixed costs of administrative needs, but rather be allocated to training efforts and an increase in quality and quantity of equipment. This is important, in order to maintain independence, especially from the highly volatile political landscape and developments in Honduras.

The redistribution of responsibilities must be clear and outlined in a written manner in order to mitigate misunderstandings, leading to the possible absence or overlapping of professional components during operations.

Collaboration and training with military entities must be evaluated extensively and reputational risks assessed. Reputation and credibility are at the core of the HRC's effectiveness and operational safety. A threat to either, must be met with swift and effective outreach programs addressing the problem at the core.


4. APPLICABILITY TO CENTRAL THE CENTRAL AMERICAN CLUSTER MODEL OF THE IFRC

During the disaster response to Eta & Iota, the HRC has demonstrated that RCRC National Societies can become the dominant executive unit during disaster response operations. The Mirrored Approach has proven immensely effective and has the potential to be standardized throughout Central America.[12] The example of Honduras can be applied to other nations of Central America, due to similarities in culture, vulnerabilities, and challenges. "A standardization of the mirrored approach would have the ability to harmonize international and national disaster response capabilities throughout Central America.", Mr. Aly would comment on the applicability and standardization of the Mirrored Approach within the Central American cluster. A professional disintegration of the "mirrored approach" into localizable and standardizable elements could allow an effective adaptation for other National Societies, providing them with the opportunity to respond to disasters more effectively around the world and hence generate stronger national & international disaster resilience.

[12] Interview: Nelson Aly

ANNEXES


Annex 1: Central America: Hurricanes Eta and Iota Source: OCHA



Annex 2: Screenshot of an Instagram post which went viral throughout all channels within social media. Source: Instagram (@elombligodeamerica)



Annex 3 Most used source of information, by SES, Age group and Sex, Source: USAID 2019



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