The battle against opium production in Afghanistan with special emphasis on the US efforts



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DECLARATION

I HEREBY DECLARE THAT THIS DISSERTATION IS MY OWN ORIGINAL WORK.

(SIGNATURE)

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The List of Acronyms:

AC	The Afghanistan Compact
AEF	Afghan Eradication Force
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANDS	Afghanistan National Development Strategy
ANP	Afghan National Police
ASNF	Afghan Special Narcotics Force
CEODD	Research and Monitoring Centre on Drugs and Crime, Bogota
CJTF	Criminal Justice Task Force
CN	Counter Narcotics
CNP	Counter Narcotics Police
CNTF	Counter Narcotics Trust Fund
CRS	US Congressional Research Service
DA	United States Department of Agriculture
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
DE	Department of Economics, Sweden
DEA	United States Drug Enforcement Administration
DfID	UK Department for International Development
DOD	US Department of Defence
DOJ	US Department of Justice
DOS	US Department of State
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GIROA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
GPI	Good Performers Initiative
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IED	Improvised Explosive Device

IIED	International Institute for Environment and Development
INL	US Department of State's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
JCMB	Joint Co-ordination and Monitoring Board
MAIL	Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock
MCN	Ministry of Counter-Narcotics
MOI	Ministry of Interior
mt	metric ton
NDCS	National Drugs Control Strategy
NIU	Narcotics Investigation Unit
OPCW	Organization for Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
PEP	Poppy Elimination Program
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Office in Afghanistan
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WFP	World Food Program

Map of Afghanistan



Flag of Afghanistan



Source: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/maps/maptemplate_af.html

Introduction

"Drugs are not only a threat to the economy and security of the country, but, have a direct link to terrorism, disgraces Afghanistan on the international level, spreads into the afghan families like cancer and gradually destroys the lives of Afghan people. In those parts of the country where they cultivate poppy, most of the people have been addicted and are gradually losing their lives..."

The President of Afghanistan, Hamed Karzai, October 22, 2009

Afghanistan supplies over 90% of world's demand for opium and heroin, generating close to US$ 3 billion annually. The dissertation examines quality of counter-narcotics strategies and interventions aimed at reduction and/or elimination of illicit opium poppy cultivation and production implemented by the key stakeholders (the Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the United Kingdom, the United Nations, and the United States), and presents main findings and recommendations.

Despite multitude of efforts and US$ billions spent on counter-narcotics interventions and a wide development agenda implemented since the US-led invasion and toppling of the Taliban government in 2001, the annual production records continual growth. In 2009 alone Afghanistan produced 6,900mt exceeding world demand which stands at approximately 5,000mt. It is estimated that a total gross revenues from narcotics account to third of GDP, and with over 80% of Afghans active in agriculture, many are dependent on drug economy directly or indirectly. Until recently it was believed that opium cultivation is associated with poverty. The trends presented in 2008 UNODC report indicate cultivation shift to wealthier areas of the country, connection with the growing insecurity, insurgencies, terrorist networks, and anti-government elements.

After toppling of the Taliban government in 2001, the international community rushed in with hefty checks without adequate knowledge of culture, tradition, and customary practices of Afghan society, focusing on delivering fast and visible results. The narcotics problem went unnoticed by many. It was not until 2005 that the US recognized the magnitude of problems rooted in the narcotics industry. The Afghan Government was faster to recognize the problem as evidenced in Article 7 of the Constitution: "The state prevents all types of terrorist activities, production and consumption of intoxicants (muskirat), production and smuggling of narcotics[1]". In 2003 the Afghan Government developed the first CN strategy and adopted the Law on Counter Narcotics. The counter narcotics strategies of other key stakeholders followed shortly afterwards.

The unique situation in Afghanistan, decades of insecurity, high poverty level, depleted human resources, social and economic conditions, political polarization, and other surrounding factors prevent from replicating a model from elsewhere. Legalization for medicinal purposes done in Turkey, India, and France is rejected by the Afghan Government, but it also does not represent a viable option due to market saturation. The decades long US fight against narcotics trade and organized crime in Columbia is not giving results and potential model to replicate, and while it took about 20 years to Afghanistan's neighbor Pakistan to become ''poppy-free country'' the recent trends show re-emergence of poppy cultivation in the FATA areas along the south-east of Afghanistan.

None of the current CN strategies is giving results. The US Government is conducting long overdue revision of its five-pillar strategy, the UNODC continues to monitor the trends based on estimates and anecdotal evidence, the British focus primarily in the south, while the GIRoA lacks strong leadership and capacity to integrate all parts of the puzzle. None of the strategies promotes evidence-based framework responsive to the realities on the ground, and the circulation of another round of isolated strategies is likely to be repeated.

[1] The Constitution of Afghanistan, 2003, p.3

It will take decades to reduce and/or eliminate production levels. Without diversified and sustainable income opportunities coupled with social dimension, security, good governance, nourishment of country's own potential, and reconnection into the regional and global markets, Afghanistan will remain world's lead opium and heroin supplier with strong narcotics industry and the most corrupt country in the world.

I. Afghanistan Fact-Sheet

Full name:	Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
Location:	Southern Asia (North and West of Pakistan, East of Iran)
Total area:	653,230 sq km (41st in the World)
Capital:	Kabul
President:	Hamid Karzai (second mandate as of Fall 2009)
Administrative divisions:	34 provinces (398 districts; 30,000 villages)
Independence:	19 August 1919 (from UK control over Afghan foreign affairs)
Constitution:	New constitution drafted 14 December 2003-4 January 2004; Signed 16 January 2004; Ratified 26 January 2004
Legal system:	Based on mixed civil and Sharia law (has not accepted compulsory International Court of Justice jurisdiction)
Population:	28.396 million (July 2009 est.) Country comparison to the world: 43 Next census planned for 2010
Ethnic groups:	Pashtun 42%, Tajik 27%, Hazara 9%, Uzbek 9%, Aimak 4%, Turkmen 3%, Baloch 2%, other 4%
Religions:	Sunni Muslim 80%, Shia Muslim 19%, Other 1%
Age structure:	0-14 years: 44.5% (male 7,664,670/female 7,300,446) 15-64 years: 53% (male 9,147,846/female 8,679,800) 65 years and over: 2.4% (male 394,572/female 422,603) (2009 est.)
Median age:	Total: 17.6 years (2009 est.)
Life expectancy:	44 years (men), 44 years (women) (UN)
Population growth rate:	2.629% (2009 est.), Country comparison to the world: 28
Birth rate:	45.46 births/1,000 population (2009 est.), Country comparison to the world: 4
Death rate:	19.18 deaths/1,000 population (July 2009 est.), Country comparison to the world: 8
Infant mortality rate:	Total: 151.95 deaths/1,000 live births (Country comparison to the world: 3)
Main languages:	Pashto, Dari (Persian)
Monetary unit:	1 Afghani = 100 puls
GDP (official exchange rate):	$13.32 billion (2009 est.)
GDP real growth rate:	3.4% (2009 est.)
GDP per capita (PPP):	$800 (2009 est.) (UNODC estimate: $425/year)
Labour force:	15 million (2004 est.)
Labour force by occupation:	Agriculture: 80% Industry: 10% Services: 10% (2004 est.)
Unemployment rate:	40% (2008 est.)
Population below poverty rate:	53% (2003)
Inflation rate (consumer prices):	26.8% (2008 est.); 13% (2007 est.)
Agriculture – products:	Opium, wheat, fruits, nuts; wool, mutton, sheepskins, lambskins
Industries:	Small scale production of textiles, soap, furniture, shoes, fertilizer, cement; hand-woven carpets; natural gas, coal, copper
Geography note:	Landlocked, the Hindu Kush mountains that run northeast to southwest divide the northern provinces from the rest of the country, the highest peaks are in the northern Vakhan (Wakhan Corridor)
Total land boundaries (*no coastline)*:	5,529 km (Border countries: China 76km, Iran 936km, Pakistan 2,430km, Tajikistan 1,206km, Turkmenistan 744km, Uzbekistan 137km)
Climate:	Arid to semiarid, cold winters, and hot summers
Terrain:	Mostly rugged mountains, plains in north and southwest
Elevation extremes:	Lowest point: Amu Darya 258m Highest point: Nowshak 7,485m
Natural resources:	Natural gas, petroleum, coal, copper, chromite, talc, barites, sulphur, lead, zinc, iron ore, salt, precious and semiprecious stones

Land use:	Arable land: 12.13% Permanent crops: 0.21% Other: 87.66% (2005)
Irrigated land:	27,200 sq km (2003)
Total renewable water resources:	65 cu km (1997)
Freshwater withdrawal (domestic/industrial/agricultural)	Total: 23.26 cu km/yr (Domestic: 2%, Industrial: 0%, Agricultural: 98%) Per capita: 779 cu m/yr (2000)
Natural hazards:	Damaging earthquakes occur in Hindu Kush mountains, flooding, droughts
Environment-current issues:	Limited natural fresh water resources, inadequate supplies of potable water, soil degradation, overgrazing, deforestation (much of remaining forests are being cut down for fuel and building materials), desertification, air and water pollution
Environment – international agreements:	Party to: Biodiversity, Climate change, Desertification, Endangered Species, Environmental Modification, Marine Dumping, Ozone Layer Protection Signed but not ratified: Hazardous Wastes, Law of the Sea, Marine Life Conservation

II. Background

General

The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is located in South-central Asia connecting the Middle East, South, and Central Asia, and borders with Iran in the south and west, Pakistan in the south and east, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan in the north, and China in the far northeast.



Source: http://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/asia/af.htm

It is constituted of 34 primary administrative divisions - provinces, 398 districts and over 30,000 villages. In accordance with the Afghan Constitution, each province is governed by the Provincial Governor[2] appointed by the President who continues to have full authority over appointments. This will continue until a change to the constitution takes place to allow for democratic election of the governors.

[2] Since the fall of Taliban, the first female provincial governor was appointed in 2005, Ms. Habiba Surabi (Bamyan province)

Recent History

The country intersects a key network of trade routes, "The Silk Road," connecting East, South, and Western Asia (from Japan to the Mediterranean) and has always attracted interests of many great powers (the British, the Russians, and other).

The recorded history of Afghanistan goes back to 330 BC with the rise of Alexander the Great but the first Afghan state was not established until October of 1747. Afghanistan has been in a continuous state of war and foreign occupations, but of particular interest of this dissertation is the post-US-led invasion period. Before moving forward, it is important to highlight the recent historical context[3] - the Soviet invasion (1979-1989), Civil war (1989-1994), forming of Taliban movement and Taliban rule (1996-2001), and September 11, 2001 ("9/11'') – a series of suicide terrorist attacks on the US soil preceding the US-led invasion. The primary aim of US-led efforts, including the military campaign called "Operation Enduring Freedom," was to topple the Taliban government and terrorist group Al Qaida that the US found responsible for ''9/11'' terrorist attacks. The invasion saw support from the Northern Alliance of Afghanistan[4] and succeeded in toppling the Taliban government. The US military campaign was not authorized by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), however, the UNSC authorized establishment of an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) composed of NATO troops. With the toppling of the Taliban government, and establishment of the Afghan transitional government, the International Community was committed to rebuilt war-torn country pledging over US$ 44 billion in foreign assistance since 2001.

International Community – Pledges

The efforts to deal with the opium economy started immediately after the toppling of the Taliban government in 2001. The UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1387 singed on

[3] Complete historical time line is available from wikipedia at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afghanistan)

[4] The **Northern Alliance** was a military-political umbrella organization created by the Islamic State of Afghanistan in 1996. The organization united various Afghan groups fighting against each other to fight the Taliban instead (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northern_Alliance)

14 November 2001 stipulates that the new Government *"should respect Afghanistan's international obligations, including by cooperating fully in international efforts to combat terrorism and illicit drug trafficking within and from Afghanistan"* (UN Document: S/RES/1387.2001. p.2). The first international conference, the Boon Conference marks the beginning of the international involvement in the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan and reflects the UNSCR 1387 held in December 2001. Under the UN auspices, the Afghan representatives met to form the initial plan on governing their country, the Bonn Agreement, setting the stage for inauguration of the six-month Afghan Interim Authority followed by a two-year Afghan Transitional Authority. The Bonn Agreement envisioned the NATO-led ISAF, and the conference recognized the importance of countering narcotics to the overall success in development of Afghanistan. Following the joint appeal for Afghanistan in Geneva in March 2002, the illicit drugs were recognized as the cross-cutting priority that should be included in the work of all agencies working in Afghanistan.

It was not until 7 December 2004 that Hamid Karzai was sworn in as the President of Afghanistan (his re-election in 2009 was accompanied with serious election-fraud accusations).

The first pledges amounting to US$ 4.5 billion were presented at the **Tokyo Conference** held in January 2002, followed with the **Berlin Conference** in April 2004 that pledged US$ 8.2 billion, and the **London Conference** in February 2006 when donors pledged US$ 10.5 billion. The third international conference, the **Paris Conference** held in June 2008 after the establishment of the GIRoA, pledged over US$ 21 billion placing focus on agriculture, irrigation and energy sectors. It is interesting that the countering narcotics issue was not on the official agenda of any conference. Apparently, in the case of Paris conference, the issue was discussed behind ''the closed doors'' during the week preceding the conference.

Nevertheless, the London and Paris Conference recognized counter-narcotics as a cross-cutting priority and resulted in signing of The Afghanistan Compact which defines the principles of the cooperation for 2006-2011 around the three pillars: security, governance,

rule of law and human rights, and economic and social development. The commitment to monitor implementation of the Compact, improved aid effectiveness, transparency and accountability was also made through the Joint Co-ordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) - the primary coordinating and monitoring mechanism agreed and established between the GIRoA and the International Community.

The UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) plays a leading role in ensuring the attainment of the Afghanistan Compact and monitoring of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) implementation - the Millennium Development Goals' based plan for 2008-2013. The Afghan Ministry of Finance plays leading role in gathering information on the international assistance.

Despite substantial foreign assistance, and commitment of the international community, the task proved to be more challenging than anticipated. Eight years later, limited accomplishments have been made while ordinary Afghans who are in dire need for improved standard of living are still waiting to see the benefits of billions of dollars spent. The international community continues to fail in maintaining public support - one of the essential ingredients in bringing about peace, stability and development to Afghanistan.

Country Indicators and Socio-economic Environment

Understanding the country's context - political, social and economic environment, including culture, tradition and customary practices - in providing assistance to the GIRoA and its people, is prerogative not only for formulating a well targeted strategy and benchmarks, but also to ensure that any progress made is adequately captured and communicated. This turned out to be a cumbersome task given lack of reliable data, systems, and inaccessibility of some parts of the country due to insecurity. The findings are in most cases based on anecdotal evidence. The lack of reliable and accurate data is also evident in data discrepancies and inconsistencies found in various sources.

For example, the population census in Afghanistan has not been done in decades. The last census initiated in 1979, when the total Afghan population was estimated at around 13 million, was never completed due to the Soviet invasion. As a result of invasion, population migrated and high number of refugees fled primarily to Pakistan and/or Iran - the UN estimates that about 2.7 million refugees still reside in Pakistan and Iran. A 2009 UN population size estimate amounts to 28 million, same as the one released on the CIA World Fact book *(Note: previous year, the released estimate was around 33 million*[5]*).* The Afghanistan's Central Statistics Organization (CSO), tasked with rebuilding reliable statistical system in the country, released different set of data indicating that the population is around 23.9 million. The population census planned for 2010 is uncertain and until its completion reliance on estimates is the only option. Despite lack of adequate and reliable statistical systems in the country, international community jointly or individually continue to extrapolate data and present estimated socio-economic indicators on country's development in the attempt to provide some insight into the progress made.

Afghanistan is low income country, highly corrupted, and among the poorest in the world. Approximately 80% of the population relies on agricultural activities *(Note: Afghanistan has about 12% of arable land).* In 2007, on the UN Human Development Index, with the value of 0.352 Afghanistan was ranked 181st out of 182 countries (UNDP.2009.). On the Human Poverty Index, with the value of 59.8%, Afghanistan is ranked 135th out of 135 countries. The Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (CPI) for 2009, with the value at 1.3 Afghanistan is ranked 179th out of 180 countries. Compared to CPI 2008 value at 1.5 when Afghanistan was ranked 176th out of 180 countries, and CPI 2007 with the value at 1.8 the country was ranked 172nd out of 179 countries. A recently published research, conducted by UNODC between autumn 2008 and autumn 2009, titled "Corruption in Afghanistan,'' indicated that the Afghans paid out in bribes approximately US$ 2.5 billion during 2009,

[5] https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html

about one-quarter of the GDP. Taking into the account estimated 2009 opium revenue at US$ 2.8 billion, the outlook of Afghanistan to become country with the good governance and rule of law seems impossible. According to UNICEF data, the country suffers from extremely low literacy rate estimated at 28%, low life expectancy rate at birth estimated to be 44 years, and exceptionally high maternal and infant mortality rates. It is estimated that approximately 20% of Afghan children die before they turn their fifth birthday, while about 1,600 women out of every 100,000 Afghan mothers die while giving birth or because of related complications (*Note: average rate in developing countries is 450 and in developed countries 9*). The literacy rates are also among the lowest in the world as per UNICEF 2002-2007 data - literacy rates for youth (15-24 years) is estimated at 49% for male and 18% for female. The gender gap evident in literacy rates expands to all other areas of Afghan society. For centuries, women and girls have been deprived of basic rights either by governments or family (father, husband, and brother), due to customary practices and interpretation of teachings of Kuran. The worst period was during the Taliban rule when women were deprived their right on education and employment outside of home. They were not allowed to leave the house without a male escort, many have died while giving birth not being allowed to seek medical assistance from a male doctor, and were and still are forced to completely cover themselves (including eyes). If a woman's morality was in question, some of the punishments included public stoning, still active in some parts of Afghanistan. The gender equality is on a development agenda of many donors, including the GIRoA, but little has been done. Some changes are evident in urban areas, primarily in Kabul (the capital of Afghanistan), through women's right to employment and education outside of home, but other practices such as veiling of women, separate spaces for men and women, girls at the age of 9 being married to men 50 years old and older, and other, still continue. It is believed that the remote and rural areas, particularly those in the south and east still continue with severe customary practices witnessed during the Taliban rule. It will take years to witness practicing of the new

customary practices, respectful of human rights and equality of men and women as stipulated in the Constitution of Afghanistan.

In 2008, The Asia Foundation (TAF) conducted its 4th country wide survey on public opinion and perceptions covering all 34 provinces in Afghanistan. The survey indicated growing pessimism over the past couple of years related to country's direction and the highest problems identified were security, unemployment, access to basic infrastructure (water, power, and roads), lack of education for women, and corruption among government officials.

Illicit activities - protection and patronage

The history shows that the cultivation of opium poppy and illicit drug production has been active in Afghanistan for centuries, but it saw a dramatic increase during the Soviet invasion and emergence of anti-Soviet resistance, the Mujahedeen. The money generated from drugs, served to pay for arms, ammunition, soldiers' salaries, fuel, food, and other items. It further continued to rise and became one of the principal sources of funding for the Taliban, anti-government elements and terrorist groups, the insurgents and various criminal groups in Afghanistan and beyond.

"*The best quality opium, generally obtained from well-irrigated land, has a dark brown color and sticky texture. It is called tor,* ***the substance which lubricates the finances of all the Afghan warlords, but particularly the Taliban***." (Rashid A., 2002, p.117).

The illicit trade and drug economy, coupled with instability continue to fuel insurgencies, corruption at all levels (all government levels, police, judiciary, etc.), informal power structures, and organized crime all of which have a regional dimension exceeding borders of Afghanistan and spilling over into Pakistan and Iran. The trends on opium poppy cultivation presented in the following chapter indicate that primary cultivators remain in the insecure south of Afghanistan and along the border with Pakistan, including Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) known as the principal routes for organized crime and terrorist groups. This supports the thesis that the opium poppy cultivation cannot be dealt with

without addressing the insecurity and insurgencies, but with carefully balanced provision of revitalizing social and economic aspects of the society.


As Afghanistan supplies over 90% of world's demand of illicit drugs and fuels insurgencies, the survey conducted by the Asia Foundation addressed issues related to respondents' support of opium poppy cultivation. Its findings confirmed changing attitudes and polarization in opinions between different regions in the country. Over 82% of respondents in the north-west and central Afghanistan, the most secure areas, are against opium poppy cultivation, while the popular support in the south-east of Afghanistan, the home to biggest producers is increasing. This confirms the assumption that a stable and secure Afghanistan is a critical pre-condition for opium reduction and/or elimination, but only if coupled with the socio-economic programs that offer alternative to illicit poppy.

The north of Afghanistan became poppy-free but still suffers from organized crime - illicit trade, trafficking routes, and illegal taxation. The known route called *hawala system* refers to informal financial mechanisms used to transfer money in and out of Afghanistan. The safest route is south-north axis and further across the border. The *hawala* system is important for the economy but it is misused for money laundering and directly supported by the protection and patronage system. The drug traffickers concealed and tightened their operations moving them deeper into the society and into the government structures at central, provincial, and district levels.

The disarming and reintegrating militia and warlords under the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) initiative saw several phases since 2001 during which many warlords have assumed government positions. The Governor of Badakhshan province who was promoted to the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs stated "*Many of these policemen and commanders are former warlords who have disarmed and reintegrated into government*

jobs, and are now using their position to facilitate the drug trade and get rich" (MacDonald, Page 95).

Mark Shaw in his analysis of drug trafficking, organized crime and related networks in post-Taliban Afghanistan, offers and interesting pyramid that he believes captures the functioning of protection and patronage in Afghanistan (Shaw, Ch 7, p. 200).



The corruption, protection and patronage, is evident in re-elected President Hamid Karzai's struggle in the fall of 2009 to appoint the Cabinet members with nominees continually being rejected by the MPs (Members of the Parliament). Initially, for the Minister of Counter-narcotics former Minister of CN, General Khodaidad, was nominated to re-assume the position. However, the new candidate followed shortly afterwards - Zarar Ahmed Moqbel, former Minister of Interior, accused of corruption and incompetence.

On 27 December 2009 General Khodaidad said for the Moby Group (Moby Media Updates[6]) that rooting out corrupt officials is nearly impossible adding: "*We can catch small (traffickers) everyday. It is very difficult to identify ... big drug dealers. They are not involved themselves but they are ... behind it, they are behind the network*." Asked who these big players were, Khodaidad said: "*They are inside the government, they are outside of Afghanistan ... they are behind these networks.*"

Before discussing current CN strategies of the GIRoA and key international stakeholders (UN, UK, and US), an overview of trends on opium poppy cultivation and production in Afghanistan and globally, as generated and reported by the UNODC, will be presented. The data support recent finding that cultivation is not directly associated with poverty but with the level of insecurity. Home to the biggest opium producers is insecure south-east, along the Pakistan's FATA - one of the main smuggling and trafficking routes faced with reemerged opium cultivation.

[6] Moby Group: http://www.mobygroup.com

III. Opium Poppy Cultivation and Production Trends

Illicit drugs cultivation, production, and trafficking represent a transnational problem that penetrates countries around the globe and stimulates crime and health/social problems. Given complexity of the problems pertaining to illicit narcotics and transnational dimension, the UNODC has recently partnered with the World Health Organization (WHO) and begun joint programmatic work to address drug treatment quality and capacity around the globe. The approach responds to health and social dimensions and contributes to a balanced approach to which UN is committed - equal attention on issues evolving around supply and demand/consumption of the illicit drugs.

Since 2007 the world cultivation of opium poppy is declining, what is primarily due to steady decline in cultivation of opium poppy in Afghanistan which still remains world's top source country. It supplies over 90% of the world's demand/consumption of illicit drugs. It is estimated that the annual average world demand for opium stands at approximately 5,000 tons. According to the UNODC Afghanistan Opium Survey 2009, Afghanistan alone produced approximately 6,900 tons, exceeding world demand by about 2,000 tons. Further overview and analysis of illicit opium statistics and trends globally and in Afghanistan, as generated and reported by UNODC, are presented in the following section.

Global Trends on Illicit Drugs Cultivation and Production

Control of illicit drugs cultivation, production, and trade has been on the global agenda for over a century, but in early 20th century it begun to receive a coordinated international attention in a form of a series of treaties passed over several decades. The treaties among

which in particular the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and the 1988 Convention against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, represent a core of the international drug control system with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) as the protector of the treaties, and the United Nations as the lead agency on drug control.

In 1998, at a special session of the General Assembly, the Member States agreed to devote a special attention to control of illicit drugs aiming to attain substantial results in controlling supply and demand by 2008. This was to be achieved by giving equal attention to demand and supply, and on the basis of regular annual assessments of global drug trends. Since then, the UNODC conducts regular annual surveys and analysis as mandated by the UN and its Member States by analyzing data gathered through the annual reports questionnaire (ARQ).

The ability of gathering quality data has proven to be difficult, in particular on demand and consumption. The UN system acknowledged multiple data limitations in obtaining accurate and reliable data and remains committed in further improving data collection, reporting, and analysis. This commitment is already underway and will include the intergovernmental expert consultations to review current data collection tools, and propose a revised set of survey instruments for consideration by the **Commission on Narcotics Drugs** in March 2010.

The World Drug Report for 2009 produced by the UNODC shows a steady world reduction in opium poppy cultivation primarily due to decline in Afghanistan, the lead source-country. The data on traditional opium-using-countries in South-East Asia indicate that the consumption (demand) of this drug is also declining. For the first time since the regular data gathering and analysis, the 2009 report on global supply and demand presents data ranges rather than point estimates in cases where the level of confidence is insufficient to support point estimates.

The UNODC indicates that the total global area under opium poppy cultivation in 2008 decreased to 189,000 ha, showing 16% decrease over previous year. This decrease is largely due to a significant decrease of poppy cultivation in Afghanistan that continued in 2009, with further decrease estimated at 22% compared to 2008 level. However, even though the area under poppy cultivation has decreased by 22% over the last year, the opium yield was high as it increased by 15% per hectare. In 2008 weighted average opium yield stood at 48.8 kg/ha while in 2009 it has gone up to 56.1 kg/ha.

Below presented is an overview of leading countries in cultivation and production of illicit opium poppy and opium production between 2001 and 2008.

Global illicit cultivation of opium poppy in hectares (ha) – lead cultivators[7] *(an overview covering period from 1994 to 2008 is presented in the Annex document)**:***

Country/Year	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
SOUTH-WEST ASIA								
Afghanistan	7,606	74,100	80,000	131,000	104,000	165,000	193,000	157,000
Pakistan	213	622	2,500	1,500	2,438	1,545	1,701	1,909
SOUTH-EAST ASIA								
Lao PDR	17,255	14,000	12,000	6,600	1,800	2,500	1,500	1,600
Myanmar	105,000	81,400	62,200	44,200	32,800	21,500	27,700	28,500
LATIN AMERICA								
Colombia	4,300	4,135	4,026	3,950	1,950	1,023	714	394
Mexico	4,400	2,700	4,800	3,500	3,300	5,000	6,900	n.a.

Global illicit production of opium in metric tons (mt):

Country/Year	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
SOUTH-WEST ASIA								
Afghanistan	185	3,400	3,600	4,200	4,100	6,100	8,200	7,700
Pakistan	5	5	52	40	36	39	43	48
SOUTH-EAST ASIA								
Lao PDR	134	112	120	43	14	20	9	10
Myanmar	1,097	828	810	370	312	315	460	410
LATIN AMERICA								

[7] [7] UNODC World Drug Report for 2009 (*(data available in the Report cover years from 1994 to 2008)*

Colombia	80	52	50	49	24	13	14	10
Mexico	91	58	101	73	71	108	149	n.a.

As the above data reported in the World Drug Report for 2009 show, Afghanistan is the highest opium poppy cultivator and producer since 2003. In 2008, area under opium poppy cultivation was estimated at 157,000 ha and production at 7,700 mt (range 6,330 to 9,308 mt). Approximately 60% of opium produced was converted into morphine and heroin and the remaining 40% exported as opium.

As the cultivation and production in Afghanistan was increasing, it was declining in Myanmar. The opposite trend was recorded in relation to opium prices. The cultivation and production in Afghanistan was increasing while the prices were declining. The opposite occurred in Myanmar evidencing market adjustment resulting from supply and demand shifts. Farm-gate prices in Afghanistan and Myanmar are also considerably different. In 2004, farmers in both countries received approximately US$ 150/kg of dry opium. Since then, the prices in Afghanistan halved while they doubled in Myanmar.

The following sections present the facts, data, and trends pertaining to illicit opium poppy cultivation and opium production in Afghanistan (data collection methodology is provided in the Annex).

Fact Sheet[8] – Afghanistan Opium Survey

	2007	2008	2009	2008 change	2009 change
Net opium poppy cultivation (after eradication)	193,000 ha (177,000-209,000 ha)	157,000 ha (130,000-190,000 ha)	123,000 ha	-19%	-22%
In percent of agricultural land[9]	2.5%	2.1%	1.6%		
Number of poppy free[10] provinces (out of 34)	13	18	20	+38%	+11%
Eradication	19,047 ha	5,480 ha	5,351 ha	-71%	-2%
Weighted average opium yield	42.5 kg/ha	48.8 kg/ha	56.1 kg/ha	+15%	+15%
Potential production of opium	8,200 mt (7,530-8,960 mt)	7,700 mt (6,330-9,308 mt)	6,900 mt	-6%	-10%
Number of households involved in opium cultivation	509,000 (437,000-653,000)	366,500 (315,000-470,000)	245,200	-28%	Not applicable
Number of persons involved in opium cultivation	3.3 million	2.4 million	1.6 million	-28%	Not applicable
In percent of total population[11]	13.7%	9.8%	6.4%		
Average farm-gate price (weighted by production) of fresh opium at harvest time[12]	US$ 86/kg	US$ 70/kg	US$ 48/kg	-19%	-31%
Average farm-gate price (weighted by production) of dry opium at harvest time	US$ 122/kg	US$ 95/kg	US$ 64/kg	-22%	-34%
Current GDP	US$ 8.2 billion	US$ 10.2 billion	US$ 10.7 billion		+5%
Total farm-gate value of opium production	US$ 1 billion (0.912-1.088)	US$ 730 million (601-885)	US$ 438 million	-27%	-40%
In percent of GDP[13]	12%	7%	4%		
Potential export value of opium, morphine, and heroin (border areas of neighbouring countries)	US$ 4 billion (3.5-4.5 billion)	US$ 3.4 billion (2.7-4.3 billion)	NA		
Indicative gross income from opium per ha/year	US$ 5,200	US$ 4,662	US$ 3,562	-10%	-24%
Indicative gross income from wheat per ha/year	US$ 546	US$ 1,625	US$ 1,101	+198%	-32%


The Afghan Opium Survey 2009 released on 2 September 2009 shows that the opium poppy cultivation decreased by 22%, opium production by 10% and the prices are at a 10-year low. The number of poppy-free provinces has increased from 18 to 20, and more drugs are being seized thanks to more robust counter-narcotics operations by Afghan and NATO forces.

After years of continual increase, it appears that some progress is taking place. As UNODC Executive Director Antonio Maria Costa stated in the Opium Survey 2009 *"Does this biennium represent a market correction, or a downward trend? It is too early to tell, but*

[8] The information is derived from the Afghanistan Opium Survey 2008 and 2009 (UNODC 2008b, p.1 and UNODC 2009b, p.9)
[9] The area available for agriculture has been updated by UNODC based on Landsat 7 ETM images (2008: 76,235km2; 2009:77,217km2)
[10] Poppy free provinces are those which are estimated to have less than 100ha of opium cultivation.
[11] Population 24.1 million in Afghan year 1385 (April 2006-March 2007) and 24.5 million in Afghan year 1386 (April 2007-March 2008); source: Afghan Government, Central Statistical Office (CSO). In 2009, population number is revised to 25.5 mil per CSO.
[12] In 2008, the fresh and dry opium prices at harvest time were based on farmer responses collected through the Annual Opium Survey, which was conducted slightly before the opium harvest. In 2009, prices were derived from the opium price monitoring system and refer to the month when opium harvest actually took place in different regions of the country.
[13] GDP Afghan year 1385 (April 2006 to March 2007), revised figure, and GDP for Afghan year 1386 (April 2007 to March 2008 preliminary estimates); GDP in constant Afghanis amounted 16.2% in 1386, up from 11.2% in 1385; source: GIRoA, CSO; The inflation (Change in the Consumer Price Index) amounted to 16.9% in 2007 and 27.1% over the 1st two quarters of 2008 (Source: IMF International Financial Statistics, October 2008). Foreign exchange rate of the Afghan currency remained practically unchanged (2006: Afghanis 49.93; 2007: Afghanis 49.96; 1st two quarters of 2008; Afghanis 49.65 for US$ 1).

progress very much depends on improved security. Like never before, the fates of counter-narcotics and counter-insurgency are inextricably linked" (UNODC, 2009b, p.8)


The biggest producers of opium and poppy cultivation remain provinces in the south and east of Afghanistan which are also associated with the high security risk.



Regional distribution of opium poppy cultivation (ha), 2007-2009 (UNODC, 2009b, p.11)

Region	2007 (ha)	2008 (ha)	2009 (ha)	Change 2007 to 2008	Change 2008 to 2009	2007 as % of total	2008 as % of total	2009 as % of total
Southern	133,546	132,760	103,014	-0.59%	-22.41%	69.20%	84.42%	83.69%
Northern	4,882	766	0	-84.31%	-100.00%	2.53%	0.49%	0.00%
Western	28,619	22,066	18,800	-22.90%	-14.80%	14.83%	14.03%	15.27%
North-eastern	4,853	200	557	-95.88%	178.50%	2.51%	0.13%	0.45%
Eastern	20,581	1,151	593	-94.41%	-48.48%	10.66%	0.73%	0.48%
Central	500	310	132	-38.00%	-57.42%	0.26%	0.20%	0.11%
Total[14]:	**192,981**	**157,253**	**123,096**	**-18.51%**	**-21.72%**	**100.00%**	**100.00%**	**100.00%**


[14] UNODC Afghanistan Opium Survey reports round totals; totals presented here are actual



Main opium cultivating provinces in Afghanistan (ha) (UNODC 2009b, p.11)

Province	2007 (ha)	2008 (ha)	2009 (ha)	Change 2008 to 2009
Hilmand	102,770	103,590	69,833	-32.59%
Kandahar	16,615	14,623	19,811	35.48%
Farah	14,865	15,010	12,405	-17.36%
Uruzgan	9,204	9,939	9,224	-7.19%
Badghis	4,219	587	5,411	821.81%
Day Kundi	3,346	2,273	3,002	32.07%
Nimroz	6,507	6,203	428	-93.10%
Rest of the country	43,020	7,888	2,982	-62.20%
Total[15]:	**200,546**	**160,113**	**123,096**	-23.12%
Total per UNODC:	*193,000*	*157,000*	*123,000*	-21.66%

[15] Actual totals – it appears that the UNODC report contains mistakes in calculating totals as shown in the table




Historical Overview


It the light of the turbulent history that Afghanistan endured over the past two decades, from the Soviet invasion to Taliban rule, and 2001 US-led invasion, below graph presents data from 1987 to 2009. It is apparent that the drug related activities saw an increase under the Taliban rule that continued at the higher rate after 2001. The highest level of opium production ever recorded was in 2007 with 8,200 metric tons. The export value of 2007 production of opiates is estimated at US$ 4 billion (over 50% of GDP) and exceeding the total foreign development assistance. The UNODC estimates that approximately 14.3% of Afghan population was involved in opium cultivation in 2007.

Opium production in Afghanistan, 1987-2009[16]


[16] Data Source: UNODC




Opium cultivation and production in Afghanistan, 1994-2009[17]



[17] Data Source: UNODC





As shown above, the total opium production saw continual growth since 2001 reaching the highest level in 2007 with the production at 8,200mt. In 2008, when compared to 2007, a decrease of 6% is recorded at 7,700mt. The opium poppy cultivation is on decline since 2007 when the highest area under poppy cultivation (193,000 ha) was recorded. Following two years also saw decreases: 19% decrease in 2008 (from 193,000 ha to 157,000 ha), and 22% decrease in 2009 (from 157,000 ha to 123,000 ha). This is the first decline in poppy cultivation since 2001 US-led invasion. The debate on what are the key drivers of this

reduction revolves around poor weather conditions coupled with increased security, CN activities, better governance and political will among Afghan Governors, strong public information campaign, and increase in development assistance providing alternative agricultural and income generating activities.

The opium poppy is favorable crop for Afghanistan's landscape as it can grow throughout the year. The crop has higher drought resistance when compared to other crops, especially to wheat. It may be sown in autumn or spring, depending on weather conditions. In Afghanistan, the planting season usually falls between September and December, and harvesting takes place between April and July (the six-month cycle). The cycle is conveniently spread throughout the year, spreading the workload, and allowing farmers to attend to other types of work. Growing opium poppy is very labor intensive type of crop that requires careful thinning and weeding in its early stages and expert lancing at harvest time when the plant reaches full development to ensure maximum yield.



http://www.a1b2c3.com/drugs/opi006.htm

It is estimated that one hectare of poppy requires approximately six times the number of person days of work compared to wheat, and the labor force must be extremely skilled and experienced to ensure maximum yield. For example, the yield will be reduced if the capsule is cut before it fully matures, if it is scored too deeply the resin will oxidize in the capsule, and lastly if it is not scored deeply enough the flow of resin is restricted.

When observing historical trends and data, the lowest (close to zero) cultivation was recorded in 2001. This is due to a total ban on poppy cultivation declared by Mullah Omar[18], Afghan Taliban leader in power from 1996 to 2001. Different speculations evolve on reasons for the ban, some of which are that it was motivated by religious concerns, others argue that it was to win international recognition or aid, while some suggest that it was rather a strategic move to boost the price of opium which declined after the record 1999 harvest before US involvement in 2001. The result of such ban was that the poppy cultivation plunged by 98%, while world prices plummeted (went up) creating hefty profits. However, many poppy growing farmers felt disastrous results from the ban as the poppy growing was their only source of income. A nationwide famine was created and many illegal labourers went to Iran and/or Pakistan. Many farmers still owed opium gum to the traffickers, and their debts were converted into cash but at the new opium price which was five to ten times higher than the rate at which they borrowed. Many wonder if Mullah Omar would continue to enforce the ban in 2001, but that question will never be answered due to 2001 US-led invasion right before the planting season.

Opium Prices in Afghanistan

According to the "2009 World Drug Report" produced by UNODC, the farm-gate prices of dry opium notably varied between 2002 and 2008 with a continual decrease since 2003. In the past three years alone, a significant decrease was recorded. In 2009 the average farm-gate price decreased by 33%, from US$ 95/kg to US$ 64/kg in 2008. The average price recorded in 2007 was estimated at US$ 122/kg and the 2009 year prices are the lowest since 2001.

Regional farm-gate prices of dry opium at harvest time (US$/kg), 2008-2009[19]

Region	Average Dry Opium Price (US$/kg) 2008	Average Dry Opium Price (US$/kg) 2009	Change (%)

[18]Mullah Omar, Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohammed_Omar

[19] UNODC Afghanistan Opium Survey 2009

Central	171	160*	-6%
Eastern	105	90	-14%
North-eastern	85	75	-12%
Northern	97	64	-34%
Southern	70	62	-11%
Western	103	72	-30%
National average price weighted by production**	**95**	**64**	**-33%**

*Prices for the Central region were taken from the annual village survey as there is no monthly opium price monitoring in the Central region

**In 2008, the dry opium prices at harvest time were based on farmers responses collected through the Annual Opium Survey, which was conducted slightly before the opium harvest. In 2009 prices at harvest time were derived from the opium price monitoring system and refer to the month when opium harvest actually took place in the different regions of the country.


As a result of market adjustments, opium prices in Afghanistan decreased with an increase in opium yields. With increased supply of dry opium, and lower farm-gate prices, it is reasonable to assume that the opium poppy was no longer such lucrative and attractive crop for the Afghan farmers. Their gross income decreased by 24% to US$ 3,562/hectare, lowest since 2004. On the contrary, the wheat prices were increasing presenting an opportunity for the Afghan government, farmers, and international community in their attempt to fight the opium poppy cultivation and production.

Below table provides comparison of gross income from opium and wheat between 2003 and 2009.

Gross income from opium and wheat (US$/ha), 2003-2009

Year	Income in US$/ha		Ratio
	Opium	Wheat	Opium/Wheat Income
2003	12,700	470	27:1
2004	4,600	390	12:1
2005	5,400	550	10:1
2006	4,600	530	9:1
2007	5,200	546	10:1
2008	4,662	1,625	3:1
2009	3,562	1,101	3:1

In prices of the reporting year, not adjusted for inflation. Income from poppy stalks and seeds and from wheat straw is not considered in this calculation.



The price monitoring is critical in designing stimulus packages and incentives for Afghan farmers to move away from the illicit crop cultivation towards formal and licit economy. UNODC through its Annual Opium Survey researched principal reasons for farmers to cultivate opium poppy. One of the top reasons indicated by respondents was the high sale of price opium (53% of responses in January 2009, and 61% in September 2009). Second reason was poverty alleviation (32% of responses in January 2009, and 11% in September 2009), followed with high demand for opium, easy way to earn money, high income from little land, and possibility of getting loan.

As previously noted, and presented in the data generated by UNODC, the poppy-free areas or those that have substantially decreased opium poppy cultivation and production, are primarily found in the south-west and north of Afghanistan. Incentives that contributed to elimination and/or reduction as indicated by the respondents were the high sale of wheat, the recognition that opium growing and production is against teachings of Islam, and the weather or drought (UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Winter Rapid Assessment, January 2009, page 10). Very few indicated that elimination and/or reduction has occurred due to the pressure exercised by the Government and/or low income from poppy. Despite some successes recorded in the past two

years, increased poppy-free provinces and decreased area under opium poppy cultivation, the statistics on opium yields give a pessimistic outlook.

III. The counter-narcotics strategies

The UN Security Council Resolution 1378 signed on 14 November 2001 stipulates that the new Government *"should respect Afghanistan's international obligations, including by cooperating fully in international efforts to combat terrorism and illicit drug trafficking within and from Afghanistan"*

(UN Document: S/RES/1378. 2001. p.2).

The chapter discusses the key stakeholders' CN strategies implemented since the 2001 US-led toppling of the Taliban, and their major pitfalls in the design and implementation. The key stakeholders covered are: the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), the United Kingdom (UK), the United Nations (UN), and the United States (US).

Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan - National Drugs Control Strategy

The Constitution of Afghanistan, the Article 7: *"The state prevents all types of terrorist activities, cultivation and smuggling of narcotic drugs and production and consumption of intoxicants"*

(NDCS, 2006, p.3)

Following the Boon Conference aimed at peace and stability and recognition of threat posed by the production and trafficking of narcotics, the Transitional Administration signed the Kabul Declaration on Good Neighbourly Relations with the Governments of China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan *"Sharing also a determination to defeat terrorism, extremism, and narco-trafficking"* (UN Document: S/RES/1453.2002.p.1)

A series of presidential decrees on banning cultivation, production, drug abuse and trafficking, and *fatwa* issued by the National Council of Ulema declaring poppy cultivation contrary to the Islamic *sharia*, preceded revision of the Constitution, establishment of the legislative framework, and design of the first national counter narcotics strategy. The Counter

Narcotics Directorate established in 2003, with the UN assistance, drafted the first Law on Counter Narcotics, and the first National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS) for Afghanistan. Lacking critical elements, the Law was revised in 2005 by the newly established Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN) and the Ministry of Interior (MoI) with the assistance of the United States and UNODC. The revision included offences, penalties, evidence, and the roles and responsibilities of the law enforcement officials. In addition, the laws on money laundering, and freezing and confiscation of assets were drafted and adopted.

The first version of the NDCS launched in 2003 envisioned five pillars: Alternative Livelihoods, Law Enforcement, Institution-Building, Demand Reduction, and Judicial Reform. The set target with 2013 being the year of elimination of all poppy cultivation and drug trafficking from Afghanistan was exceedingly ambitious and clearly unattainable.

Shortly afterwards, as part of the law enforcement effort, the special Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) and the Afghan Special Narcotics Force (ASNF) were established to conduct seizures, arrests, and disruption of the drugs trade in all regions of Afghanistan, and to create a sense of risk to those in the illicit drugs trade by targeting the narcotics infrastructure (high-value targets, bazaars, laboratories, etc.). Under the 2005 judicial reform, the Criminal Justice Task Force (CJTF), the Kabul Primary Court, and the Kabul Appeal Court were established with jurisdiction to deal with the drug offenders involving over 2kg of heroin, morphine or cocaine, over 10kg of opium, and over 50kg of hashish or precursors chemicals.

An additional three pillars: information, eradication, and international and regional cooperation, were introduced to the first version of the NDCS as the Directorate for Counter Narcotics was transformed into the MCN. The Counter Narcotics Police (CNP) was also established, following the US pledge of US$ 780 million in 2005 and firm commitment to deal with narcotics.

In January 2006, the MCN presented an updated version of the NDCS, setting an over-arching objective for the GIRoA: *"To secure a sustainable decrease in cultivation, production, trafficking and consumption of illicit drugs with a view to complete a sustainable elimination"* (NDCS. 2006. p.17).

To improve coordination and focus of CN efforts, revised NDCS was structured around four national priorities and eight pillars of activity:

The NDCS - four national priorities:

- Disrupt the drugs trade
- Strengthen and diversify legal rural livelihoods
- Reduce the demand for illicit drugs and treatment of drug users
- Strengthen state institutions both at the centre and in the provinces

The NDCS - eight pillars of activities:

(1) Public awareness

(2) International and Regional Cooperation

(3) Alternative Livelihoods

(4) Demand Reduction

(5) Law Enforcement

(6) Criminal Justice

(7) Eradication

(8) Institution Building

Despite some improvements, the performance measuring is still weak and requires further improvement. Only four annual indicators were envisioned:

- reduced level of opium cultivated year-on-year
- sustainable reduction in the relative value of the opium economy vis-à-vis licit GDP

- reduction of trafficking of illicit drugs and precursor chemicals
- reduction in the number of problem drug users and a reduction in a drug-related harm (the baselines only made reference to UNODC 2004 and 2005 reports).

No consideration was given to data gathering and monitoring of opium yields, narcotics stockpiles and prices, seizures, interdiction, eradication, (mobile) laboratories, arrests, prosecutions, demand, alternative income opportunities, and more importantly socio-economic indicators that are critical for monitoring of the drug industry, policy design and informed decision-making process. In addition, the establishment of numerous working groups (pillar working group, senior officials monitoring group, strategy assessment group), and bodies with unrealistically frequent meeting schedules give an impression of commitment to fight the drug industry but actually creating massive managerial and operational problem.

In 2005, the Counter Narcotics Trust Fund (CNTF) a multi-donor funding source was established to mobilize additional resources needed by the GIRoA to implement the NDCS. The Government retained overall responsibility through its designated institutions: the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Counter Narcotics, and the Ministry of Economy, while the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) was tasked with administration of the CNTF until 2009. The NDCS includes the Good Performers Initiative (GPI) established by the GIRoA in 2006 to reward in accordance with three categories: poppy-free provinces (US$ 1 million for each poppy-free province), net poppy reduction (US$ 1,000 per hectare above 10%, total cultivation), and special recognition awards (US$ 500,000 for having less than 1,000 ha poppy-cultivated). In 2008, Nangarhar province (east of Afghanistan) was rewarded with US$ 10 million for acquiring the poppy-free status for the first time. This was short-lived as per UNODC 2009 report, the cultivation and production in Nangarhar has re-emerged.

The ANDS-Counter Narcotics Strategy (ANDS-CNS) from 2008 to 2013 establishes CN as a cross-cutting issue. It is consistent with the NDCS' four national priorities and eight activity pillars which were renamed into Sub-sector CN Strategies. The CNS saw some improvement

compared to the NDCS, addressing a number of pitfalls, but the Executive Summary denies long existence of the problem: ‘*’the poppy economy, which is, at least in its current scale and strategic profile, a relatively new problem and a new threat*” (ANDS-CN Strategy. 2007/8a. p.1).

Still, some improvements evident in the ANDS-CN Strategy deserve to be highlighted:

- The call for strategy that recognizes differing situation across provinces and districts
- A need to include gender context in the demand reduction campaigns
- The alternative livelihood approach should evolve to include the social development
- A formal, centralized, and certified reporting system for targeted eradication and verification should be introduced - usage of maps based on satellite imagery with participation of the Provincial Governors’ Offices and UNODC for verification
- Recognition that an effective management of counter narcotics can be established only through linking community, district, provincial, and national levels of governance, while holding each level responsible and accountable
- Challenges in getting officials to include counter narcotics in their operations
- A need to extend the participation of Central Narcotics Tribunal into other provinces
- A system of regional and international intelligence gathering, information sharing, and coordination, with a possibility of special programs for border districts
- A need to regulate the chemicals used to produce opiates besides cultivation and trade.

Despite these improvements, the need to integrate CN into the wide development agenda, socio-economic development, human and institutional capacity building is not recognized, and envisioned increase in CNP and the poppy eradication force, does not include training needs. The lack of institutional governing structures between national, provincial and district levels also requires an additional attention. An introduction of accountability is a step forward, but having provincial governors ‘’running the show’’ in the state of impunity and weak governance poses additional risks. The key indicators remain weak and in some cases

are simply reformulated and do not address international and regional cooperation, alternative livelihoods, demand reduction, law enforcement, public awareness, criminal justice, eradication, and institution building. Once again, the strategy omits socio-economic indicators and sustained livelihood security. The goals and targets envisioned are entirely unrealistic, unmanageable, and unattainable.

The NDCS ‘’rejects’’ solving the opium problem by purchasing opium crops from farmers, and any form of legalization of opium (supported by UK and UN). The strategy is scattered, without any prioritization of activities hurting its effectiveness and chance of success. The success is based on output indicators such as number of poppy free provinces, metrics tons produced, and hectares cultivated. It neglects to include important socio-economic measures such as access to credit and markets, prices of licit crops and related trends, security such as political and criminal violence and control exerted by anti-state actors, drug trafficking data such as precursors seizure, mobile laboratories, and governance - government control and corruption.

In summary, previous versions of the NDCS, including the current strategy, have number of weaknesses. The officials are not sensitized nor committed to resolving the problem while the national government is disconnected from provinces, districts, and villages and lacks any influence in the field. The institutional and human capacity tasked to lead and implement CN interventions is weak, but NDCS barely tackles the problem. Heavy reliance is placed on the international experts and advisors who frequently change and do not invest much time in building national capacity and institutional memory but responding to inquiries from donor community. A need to extend interventions to provincial and district levels is enlisted, but lacks parameters and guidance. Quality institutional building, governance mechanisms, legislative and institutional framework, and human capital, all should include completely left out ICT which is critical for a successful and informed CN management, implementation, and reporting. This would also address substantial data gap and ensure data storage that could potentially provide better insight into socio-economic situation across Afghanistan, leading to

better orchestrated approach, and custom designed strategies guided by specificities of the region. The regionalization should be one of the key drivers in revisiting the strategy, as north and west have different socio-economic situation than west and south of Afghanistan. This extends to root causes for poppy cultivation. The costing of CN strategy was attempted by the MCN but the task was never completed. The public awareness campaigns were poorly designed, have not reached populations throughout Afghanistan, and are insufficiently complemented with public education campaigns. Due to high illiteracy and poverty radio is primary information dissemination means, apart from surprisingly effective word-of-mouth, due to poverty and high illiteracy. Lastly, the major impediment perhaps is that the counter narcotics issue is treated as the cross-cutting issue and as such is not getting much attention other than on the paper. Lack of defined contributions by the international community adds to the complexity of problem solving.

The United Kingdom

> *"Despite the challenges we face, a nation emerging from three decades of violence can be healed and strengthened; and our country and the whole world can be safer; because together we have the values, the strategy and the resolve to complete our vital task."*
>
> Statement made by the Prime Minister Gordon Brown (UK in Iran web site)

At the Bonn Conference the United Kingdom (UK) as G8 partner nation, was designated the "lead nation" of the international CN efforts in Afghanistan, with special responsibility to help tackle the multibillion-dollar opium industry that fuels corruption (annual revenue from opium ranges from US$ 3 to US$ 4 billion). The UK supports implementation of the GIRoA's National Drugs Control Strategy (NDCS), but its focus is primarily on the three priorities in which they believe will achieve the highest impact:

(1) Developing strong and effective counter-narcotics institutions,

(2) Targeting the trafficker and the top end of the drugs trade,

(3) Strengthening and diversifying legal rural livelihood opportunities (the benchmarks and targets are set in The Afghanistan Compact).

(1) **Developing strong and effective counter narcotics institutions** - the UK has supported the Afghan Ministry of Counter Narcotics providing financial and technical assistance. It has also helped co-host the international conference on counter-narcotics in Kabul (which has not been attended by provincial governors and district officials). In addition, it helped establish the counter-narcotics Criminal Justice Task Force (CJTF). The UK will also contribute to EU-led policing mission by contributing 15 persons to the mission.

(2) **Targeting the trafficker and top end of the drugs trade** - the UK supports development of the Afghan law enforcement agencies to strengthen national capacity to dismantle the traffickers' networks and has helped with the establishment of the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) - the lead law enforcement agency on drugs. The CNPA forensic drug laboratories established under this initiative are operational since 2006.

(3) **Strengthening and diversifying legal rural livelihood opportunities** - the aim is to improve the living standards of the population while ensuring the diversifying income opportunities. Through the UK Department for International Development (DfID), the British committed £510 million in support of the ANDS, what represents an increase compared to the period from 2006 to 2009 during which the UK committed £330 million. The support is provided to the Afghan National Solidarity Program (NSP) - community development program targeting water supply and sanitation, agriculture, education, health and other. In addition, the UK supports the Provincial Plan for Helmand and related CN activities and distribution of free wheat seed to farmers throughout the province.

To ensure further support of the GIRoA objectives as they pertain to the period from 2008 to 2013, support is provided for Security, Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights. More specifically, the UK supports the national institutional capacity development, justice systems in Helmand, and Afghan-led initiatives promoting international cooperation on rule of law. Reform of the Afghan police is also on the UK's agenda. The activities are divided between

the US and EU with primary focus in Kabul, while the British focus on the south - Helmand Province. Unfortunately, the training programs are inefficient as it all boils down to couple of weeks of classroom training without any field training and experience. Upgrading prison capacities and standards is another aspect of the UK's involvement. A new US$ 2 million prison opened in Laskhkar Gah (capital of Helmand Province), establishing the first prison respectful of human rights having washing facilities, communal area, etc.

Lastly, support is provided to the Afghan efforts to combat corruption. The Afghan Government developed the Anti-Corruption Strategy and established Anti-Corruption Commission which was supported by the UK through provision of technical assistance in a form of a multi-agency task force. Although the Foreign Office and the Department for International Development (DfID) have gradually scaled back the amount of direct support, £2m a year is still spent on foreign consultants who work in the Ministry of Interior to train staff. The British partner with a growing Afghan National Army presence in Helmand, work on strengthening of civil-military partnership (including on policing), provide support to the Helmand Governor through strengthening of district government, and build on the success of the ''wheat not heroin'' initiative. The British troops are primarily located in the south of Afghanistan, namely Helmand province, which is known to be the lead province in opium poppy cultivation and production and with the highest level of insecurity, number of security related incidents, and IED-related incidents. Some controversies evolve around military contingent operating in the south as it pertains to the CN efforts. In the New York Times article, dated 27 July 2008, written by Thomas Schweich[20] states that "*although Britain's Foreign Office strongly backed antinarcotics efforts (with the exception of areal eradication), the British military were even more hostile to the antidrug mission than the US military. British forces – centered in Helmand – actually issued leaflets and bought radio*

[20] The Ambassador for counter narcotics and justice reform in Afghanistan under the Bush Administration, currently a special representative to Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean for the UNODC

advertisements telling the local criminals that the British military was not part of the anti poppy effort" (Schweich 2008, p. 4).

In summary, the UK's efforts are primarily located in the South of Afghanistan, the most insecure area with the highest opium poppy cultivation and production (opium cultivation in Helmand accounts for over 80% of the total cultivation in Afghanistan). The access to districts and villages is hampered due to insecurity and activities are conducted in isolated fashion. The program on alternative livelihoods could have been better designed, as distributing wheat seeds in unregulated and isolated fashion is quickly cashed-in by farmers to repay any outstanding debts to traffickers (in some provinces and districts, farmers ''sell'' their daughters to traffickers to reduce and/or clear the debt). The civilian-military partnerships (also introduced by the US) can be counter-productive as the perception among Afghans is that they are all military and civilian "neutrality" is lost, increasing threat towards civilian workers (national and international).

Overall, the strategic areas nicely complement each other, from targeting the traffickers at the top of the drugs chain and dismantling of the trafficking network, to strengthening justice system, law enforcement capacities including prison systems, and CN and anti-corruption institutions and related capacities. These could be strengthened if supported with comprehensive and aggressive alternative livelihoods and agricultural programs, leading to overall socio-economic interventions. The limited resources call for close cooperation with other stakeholders, the UN and US (the biggest donor), both implementing programs throughout Afghanistan.

The United Nations

"Progress depends on more than reducing the amount of opium hectarage: it depends on improving security, integrity, economic growth, and governance. We must concentrate on winning long-term campaigns, not just short-term battles."

Antonio Mario Costa, UNODC Executive Director (UNODC. 2009c. Preface)

"...controlling drugs in Afghanistan will not solve all of the country's problems, but the country's problems cannot be solved without controlling drugs".

Antonio Mario Costa, UNODC Executive Director (UNODC. 2009b. Commentary)

Afghanistan was admitted as a member of the United Nations on 19 November 1946. The UN has a long history in the country, and since 2001 toppling of the Taliban, many UN agencies play a key role in the development and humanitarian assistance working closely with various national and international counterparts while recognizing the lead role of the GIRoA. The key UN players with activities aimed against opium economy are the UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA), the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and UN Development Programme (UNDP).

UNAMA is a political mission established on 28 March 2002 through UNSCR 1401 and supported by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, with the aim to help implement the Bonn Agreement and the mandate to manage all humanitarian, relief, recovery and reconstruction activities. The mandate and priorities are renewed annually, and the last renewal took place on 23 March 2009 with UNSCR 1868. It has two main areas of activities: political affairs, and development and humanitarian issues. With 18 regional and provincial offices in Afghanistan, and liaison offices in Islamabad (Pakistan) and Teheran (Iran), the mission has well established in-country presence with trans-national dimension. The key role is to promote peace, stability and progress with the GIRoA, and international community, and to lead and coordinate all UN agencies including the civilian efforts of the international community in the country. In supporting the GIRoA, UNAMA works in the following areas: capacity building at all levels, good governance and rule of law including anti-corruption, human rights protection, political outreach, electoral processes through the Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan, humanitarian assistance delivery, strengthened cooperation with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and regional cooperation. In early 2009, the UN General Assembly agreed to increase UNAMA's budget by 92%, bringing it to US$ 168 million. This included increase in staffing (Afghans comprise about 80% of UNAMA staff).

UNODC is lead UN agency in providing evidence based policy advice to the GIRoA. It guides interventions on CN and criminal justice to contribute to stability and development of the country hampered by widespread narcotics and crime. The strategic focus is two-fold, in country and regional, with set of interventions designed accordingly. The regional focus is defined in the regional Rainbow Strategy which proposes trans-boundary initiatives to engage neighbouring countries and principal regional players, all affected with the narcotics production and trafficking. The UNODC has brokered a trilateral initiative between Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan with the aim to share the intelligence on counter narcotics and to run joint operations. In addition, it has established the Central Asian Regional Information Coordination Centre which is based in Almaty (Kazakhstan). The Rainbow Strategy is consisted of seven components shown below:

(1) A Blue Paper: To increase number of poppy free provinces
(2) A Green Paper: To increase cross-border cooperation on counter narcotics
(3) A Yellow Paper: To secure Central Asia's borders through intelligence cooperation and border management
(4) A Red Paper: To reduce smuggling of precursor chemicals into Afghanistan
(5) A Purple Paper: To improve security around the Caspian Sea
(6) The Orange Paper: To research financial flows linked to Afghan opiates production and trafficking and prevent money laundering
(7) The Indigo Paper: Preventing and treating opiates and addiction and HIV/AIDS epidemics in Afghanistan and neighbouring countries.

UNODC in Afghanistan establishes its geographic focus in relation to significance of opium cultivation and instability, proximity to sensitive borders such as that of Iran (UN neutrality), low level of attention given by other stakeholders, and lastly, individual agency's field accessibility. Due to UNODC's specialized expertise on drugs and crime and extensive experience in country and the region, it is best fitted to engage in activities on counter narcotics and criminal justice, governance and rule of law, advocacy, demand reduction, HIV/AIDS prevention, etc. More importantly, UNODC is among few that recognized a need to address the negative impact on health, social, and security consequences of opium and heroin in and around Afghanistan. Due to limited resources, most of UNODC interventions are focused on capacity building at various levels in a form of technical assistance, education, and training, while limited assistance is provided in a form of projects that provide concrete

alternatives to poppy growing farmers. In aligning some of the projects implemented by UNODC against the NDCS pillars it becomes evident that they support all pillars as shown below:

(1) **Public awareness**: information dissemination
(2) **International and Regional Cooperation**: strengthening Afghan-Iran border control and cross border cooperation, including cooperation on precursor control between Afghanistan and neighboring countries, etc.)
(3) **Alternative Livelihoods**: capacity building at national and regional level, developing post-release opportunities for women and girl prisoners with extension to provinces
(4) **Demand Reduction**: capacity building and drug demand reduction information, advice and training service for Afghan community, setting up a drug abuse information system
(5) **Law Enforcement**: capacity strengthening, support to drug law enforcement interdiction unit and the unit with the Afghan Police Academy, strengthening operational capability of the Counter Narcotics Police
(6) **Criminal Justice**: Criminal law and criminal justice capacity building in Afghanistan, and extension to the provinces, fast-track capacities building for a functioning counter narcotics criminal justice system, reform of the juvenile justice, penitentiary and prison system with the extension to the provinces
(7) **Eradication**: capacity building on data gathering and mapping
(8) **Institution Building:** Strengthening provincial capacity for drug control, anti-corruption

In partnership with the MCN, support is provided for provincial monitoring and evaluation, especially as it pertains to gathering and verifying data on eradication. Maps designed on satellite images represent a principal tool for the Ministry in developing annual eradication plans distributed to the Provincial Governors who are held accountable for its implementation. Under the Pact Initiative, a UNODC-led partnership of more than 50 countries and international organizations, UNODC has established an internet-based Automated Donor Assistance Mechanism (ADAM) for coordination of technical assistance on counter narcotics to avoid duplication of interventions, and to provide partners with information on demand and supply in automated fashion. However, it is not sufficiently used and/or coordinated with others. In addition, UNODC conducts annual opium surveys that provide basic information on opium cultivation and production in Afghanistan (and globally). The data are estimates and lack ground verification, but still relatively reliable being based on sophisticated satellite imagery. The reports provide national and provincial overview guiding counter narcotics interventions of national and international stakeholders.

UNDP, in partnership with the MoF and MCN, supports the CNTF and GPI mechanism (mainly supported by the UK and US) as discussed on page 48. The UNDP's role is to administer the funds until the Government's capacity is capable to execute functions relevant

for successful implementation. The targeted level of resources to be mobilized through CNTF amounts to US$ 900 million, but the shortfall is significant (over 80 percent remains to be mobilized) while the implementation of approved projects is extremely slow.

Lastly, UN mandated NATO-led **ISAF**, supports the Government in implementing the NDCS through training, intelligence and logistics, and *in-extremis* support, as deemed required and appropriate. ISAF also supports the Afghan partners targeting drug laboratories and traffickers, and helps in communicating CN policy to Afghans through the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (civil-military teams), and other means. In addressing the NDCS, due to limited resources the UN mainly focuses on coordination, capacity building through technical assistance, research and analysis, data collection, information sharing, and evidence based policy development. As the narcotics problem is trans-national in nature, the inclusion of regional dimension and improving the cooperation and intelligence exchange with the neighboring countries adds valuable component to fully address the narcotics trade, trafficking, money laundering, and other aspects of narcotics industry. The UNODC is best positioned to facilitate such initiatives given its expertise and status of neutrality.

The United States

"The explosion in heroin production began ironically not in Afghanistan, but in Pakistan...As in Vietnam where the CIA chose to ignore the trade in drugs by anti-communist guerrillas whom the CIA was financing, so in Afghanistan the US chose to ignore the growing collusion between the Mujaheddin, Pakistani drugs traffickers and elements in the military."

(Rashid, 2002, p. 120)

The United States Government (USG) has not devoted much attention to opium poppy cultivation and production in Afghanistan until 2005. The top priority after the 2001 US-led invasion was fight against terrorism and fast and tangible results, while priority in relation to narcotics was given to Columbia.

By 2004, with the area under opium poppy cultivation at 131,000 ha and annual opium production at 4,200 tones, Afghanistan was already producing about 90% of world's opium and heroin.

In 2005, under the leadership of the State Department and with the support of the Department of Defense, a five-pillar strategy in support of the NDCS was designed:

(I) Public information (State/INL, DOD)

(II) Alternative development (USAID)

(III) Poppy elimination and eradication (State/INL)

(IV) Interdiction and Law enforcement (DEA, DOD, and State/INL), and

(V) Justice reform and Prosecution (DOJ, State/INL).

The Bush Administration supported the plan and initially authorized a total of US$ 780 million, with an additional US$ 1.2 billion pledged in the aftermath of the Paris Conference. The USG strategy focuses on five out of eight pillars in the NDCS aimed at eliminating the drug trade. The remaining three pillars: demand reduction, institution building, and international and regional cooperation, also saw some, although limited assistance. For example, the USG provides to the GIRoA several million dollars annually; technical and training assistance -to help prevent and reduce the domestic drug abuse problem; institution building of ministries and other institutions involved in the drug problem; capacity building of justice sector, law enforcement and prosecution capacities; and regional cooperation programs with neighboring countries *(Note: Iran is excluded)*

Pillar I – Public Information

The support relates to nationwide public information, engagement, and education campaigns implemented throughout the year. The campaigns include messages on eradication, law enforcement, justice reform, and alternative development aimed at increasing public

confidence in the GIRoA. The campaigns implemented before the planting season are aimed at altering perceptions of the risks and rewards associated with the opium poppy cultivation.

Initially, the public information effort was over-reliant on radios, television, posters, billboards, and stickers. Due to limited results new and innovative approaches have been introduced, such as engaging trusted local leaders (tribal leaders, religious leaders, elders, police chiefs, district leaders, and teachers), and the Ministry of Religious Affairs which provided access to mosques creating the ‘’outreach centers.” New outreach approach is more effective as it builds on traditional values and system of Afghan society, but the content and key messages can still be expanded to include success stories of other districts and provinces. This may potentially stimulate replication of good practices and create spin-off effect that is customized to regional and provincial situation, and inclusive of political, socio-economic, ethnic, and security dimension on the ground.

Pillar II – Alternative Development

The aim is to establish sustainable alternatives to opium poppy. Interventions vary from cash-for-work to agricultural and business development projects, including access to credit, training and education on more efficient agricultural practices. The programs primarily target main opium poppy growing provinces by providing economic alternatives and political support to provincial leaders through the GPI and CNTF discussed earlier. In November of 2009, the US signed the Memorandum of Understanding with the GIRoA to provide US$ 38.7 million for 27 provinces (7 poppy-free provinces and 20 that significantly reduced opium poppy cultivation over the last year). The funds will be provided to the MCN for further disbursement to provinces for development and/or alternative crops. The problem with this approach is two-fold: provinces get rewarded after only one season, and the Ministry lacks capacity to administer funds in transparent and accountable fashion.

The USG’s short-term incentives provided throughout the year support livestock health, rural infrastructure rehabilitation, seed, and fertilizers, with particular emphasis during the opium

poppy planting and harvest seasons. These activities are complemented with the long-term incentives: access to credit, agricultural input delivery, training, packaging, marketing of in particular high value products (pomegranates, vegetables, oilseed, animal feed, etc.), promotion, training, and establishment of farmer associations and cooperatives, market facilitation, support to agri-businesses and agro-industries. Apart from security the greatest obstacle is poor infrastructure, lack of electricity, unskilled human resources, and weak legal and regulatory frameworks. The pillar's lead agency, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) has introduced additional interventions: support to the MAIL, small and medium size enterprises, private sector development, irrigation infrastructure projects - to increase arable land, access to water, agricultural jobs and income opportunities, and to restore Afghans confidence in the GIRoA. The USG may consider adjusting its approach by adding socio-economic interventions to eradication efforts, or even before elimination of opium poppy cultivation to ensure sustained switch to licit activities. This is important as the crops' growing cycles vary and in some cases such as fruit trees it takes several years to mature. In addition, many opium growing farmers suffer from incurred debts as they finance winter food consumption and other needs by selling opium to traders before the planting season through futures contracts called *salaam.* This can lead to increase in debt burden due to opium price variations. The advance payment is on average half the price farmer would get at harvest time of the amount contracted. For example if a famer made *salaam* contract for 10kg of opium when the price of opium stands at US$ 40 per kg, the farmer would receive US$ 200 (half the price). Lastly, agricultural programs should diversify activities to increase and secure access to markets, support facilitation of trade, and ensure international food and agricultural standards that may attract foreign investments and promote exports.

Pillar III – Poppy Elimination and Eradication

The goal is to reduce the area under opium poppy cultivation using prevention incentives while creating forced eradication capability (Governor-led eradication, and Afghan

Eradication Force). Lack of political will, poor security and frequent armed attacks hampered the implementation. With the negotiated eradication plan, the eradication teams are often misguided and sent away from certain areas by corrupt local *shura* members who in many cases take bribes from villages, farmers, and traffickers. The US consistently advocates for the Government-led non-negotiated forced eradication, and aerial eradication to which the President Karzai is opposing.

The eradication is viewed as coercive measure, ineffective and conducted in isolated and random fashion, resulting in multiple negative effects, lacking other revenue generating opportunities and sustainable licit income activities. The eradication plans and targeted areas established by corrupt officials and without alternative economic incentives for opium poppy growing farmers are counterproductive diminishing any attempt of increasing the GIRoA's credibility, pushing farmers deeper into poverty and creating even greater support for traffickers.

Pillar IV – Interdiction and Law Enforcement

The goal is to reduce drugs trafficking and processing by supporting capacity of the GIRoA to disrupt and dismantle trafficking organizations. The interventions target large-scale traffickers involved in moving drugs and money in the north across the border of Afghanistan to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and in the south at traffickers associated with terrorist activities and non-government elements supported by the narcotics trade. The USG interventions are part of the unified effort under the umbrella of Operation Containment[21]. The drug trafficking network is difficult to penetrate, and most efforts resulted in disrupting the mid level traffickers pushing the narcotics chain vertically, up into the government, and aligning it along the lines of patronage and protection system. The interdiction and seizure of drugs was shadowed with an aggressive focus on eradication efforts, and per UNODC reports, only

[21] Operation Containment is a large-scale, multinational law enforcement initiative begun in early 2002 under the leadership of the DEA and with special support from Congress. Emphasizing coordination and information sharing among nineteen countries from Central Asia, the Caucuses, Europe and Russia, the program aims to implement a joint strategy to deprive drug trafficking organizations of their market access and international terrorist groups of financial support from drugs, precursor chemicals, weapons, ammunition and currency.


about 1% of world drugs supply produced in Afghanistan were seized in country. Recent data show however an increased seizure of heroin, initiation of hundreds of investigations, and increased number of arrests. The interventions include capacity development of the Counter Narcotics Police (CNP), Special Narcotics Force (SNF), and Narcotics Investigation Unit (NIU) to arrest and prosecute. Without adequate justice system and current state of impunity, many walk away by bribing corrupt officials and public servants. The limited resources initially invested in this pillar coupled with weak Afghan commitment and capacity gave poor results, but with the increased and focused support the trend is going upwards. The disruption and dismantling of trafficking network is critical and should further be explored and complemented with interventions in other pillars such as building strong justice system and law enforcement to cease the lawlessness and state of impunity.

Pillar V – Justice Reform and Prosecution

The goal is to increase the rule of law especially as it relates to narcotics law enforcement, including the police and justice system. The interventions range from renovation of judicial facilities, building of the central justice system, to training of judges, lawyers, prosecutors, and corrections personnel. The aim is to expand the justice system reform to provinces, and to increase coordination with other international stakeholders. Developing provincial justice system and capacity of provincial Chief Prosecutor's offices to manage the initial phases of narcotics cases will improve transfer to the Criminal Justice Task Force for trial before the Central Narcotics Tribunal in Kabul. The support is provided for the Attorney General office, anti-corruption activities, and on extradition of drug traffickers to the US, consistent with the USG practices around the world. The successful implementation of this pillar will signal important messages to Afghan population, corrupt officials and traffickers that state of impunity and lawlessness ceases to be a common practice. The US is the biggest donor to

Afghanistan with over US$40 billion appropriated in foreign assistance between FY[22] 2001 and FY 2009 (the FY 2010 request is over US$ 13.1 billion). With US$6.9 billion provided since January 2002, Japan is the second largest donor, and the UK with US$ 2.9 billion is on the third place. For the CN activities, the USG initially authorized US$ 780 million, with an additional US$1.2 billion pledged after the Paris Conference. *"The US Congress appropriated approximately $2.9 billion in regular and supplemental counternarcotics foreign assistance and defence funding for Afghanistan programs from FY2001 through FY2009."*(Blanchard M.C. 2009.Summary)

USG Assistance to Afghanistan FY 2001-FY 2010, ($ in millions)



http://budgetinsight.wordpress.com/2009/09/03/us-assistance-to-afghanistan

The US administration initially focused on military actions, pursuit of terrorist, non-government elements, and Al Qaida, believing that fixing narcotics production and trade is a development issue only. The civilian assistance aimed at short-term tangible, visible results (reconstruction of schools, clinics, roads, etc.) was also ignoring the problem. It was not until 2005 that the USG recognized the urgency of the issue and in following years designed the five-pillar CN strategy, but with many pitfalls. The pillars have not been properly prioritized, adequate resources assigned, and coordinated. The priority was given to eradication activities which are costly, slow, counter-productive not offering alternative income source, and result in opium poppy growing farmers quickly returning to illicit activities.

[22] Fiscal Year in the US is from October 1 to September 30

In March 2009, Obama Administration Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Ambassador Richard Holbrooke called US counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan *"the most wasteful and ineffective program I have seen in 40 years in and out of the government."* (Blanchard M.C. 2009.Summary).

The US is designing new strategy and media reports indicate that a shift will be made in favor of interdiction and rural/agricultural development. It can be assumed that this change is reflective of failed eradication efforts, established connection between drugs industry and insurgencies, and the UNODC finding that poverty is not directly associated with opium poppy cultivation. Some from the US community are strongly against alternative incentives immediately after poppy elimination viewing it as rewarding farmers for growing opium poppy. All of the eradication efforts were neglecting the different realities on the ground and related socio-economic conditions.

On 27 June 2009, while addressing the G8 summit, Richard Holbrooke indicated that the US anti-drug efforts whose primary focus was crop eradication have been a failure and that "*The anti-drug policy did not result in any damage to the Taliban, but they put farmers out of work*," (Quqnoos.2009). He further suggested that the millions of dollars spent should have been invested in the economy, pursuit of drug lords, and restrictions on drug trade. The new policy includes emphasis on combating trafficking and promotion of alternative crops.

The US is running a risk of another poorly structured strategy likely to waste resources. A proper assessment inclusive of regional and provincial differences on the ground and interventions of other key stakeholders should be conducted. The assessment should be all encompassing of narcotics industry, root causes, the extent to which it is embedded into the society and implications on other sectors (health, education, transportation, etc.), different socio-economic conditions across provinces and regions, development potential and security, feasibility of sequenced approach, cost-analysis, measurable and verifiable monitoring systems and tools (inclusive of ICT). With opium economy estimated at US$2.8 billion

annually and US$ 2.5 billion paid in bribes by Afghans, the functioning of Afghan economy and planned interventions have to be carefully analyzed and sequenced. It is indicative that the reduction and/or elimination of narcotics in Afghanistan will likely take decades.

IV. Conclusion

"Efforts to persuade farmers to stop growing opium poppies have failed in the past year, the United Nations said Wednesday, predicting as much land will be under poppy cultivation this year as in 2009. A report found that a downward trend in poppy cultivation, which fell by more than a third from 2007 to 2009, had ended"

(The New York Times. 2010)

"…drug is determining the politics of the region…''

(Rashid A., 2002, p. 123)

Afghanistan supplies over 90% of the world's demand for opium and heroin with large segments of population benefiting directly or indirectly. Since 2001, billions of dollars invested in reconstruction and development and millions in counter-narcotics (CN) initiatives, the UNODC reported that the estimated potential revenue on opium trade in 2009 stood at US$ 2.8 billion, matching US$ 2.5 billion Afghans paid in bribes. The narcotics problem goes beyond poppy cultivation and production constituting whole industry, the narcotics industry that stretches through Asia, Balkans and Europe to the West. The future seems grim and it may take decades to dismantle drug industry and related corruption, state of impunity and insecurity and to create stable and secure country respectful of human rights, the rule of law, transparent and accountable governance, and with secure livelihoods and sustainable market oriented economy.

All counter-narcotics strategies aim to reduce and eliminate illicit drugs in Afghanistan. The Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) is firmly against the legalization of illicit narcotics as it is unlawful and un-Islamic[23] despite some pro-legalization voices among the US community. Before presenting specific observations and recommendations, it is

[23] The UK and EU are also against legalization of illicit narcotics production and trade.

important take a brief view of country's conditions surrounding implementation of CN efforts:

- **Over 80% of Afghans** are involved in agricultural activities primarily through small labor intensive irrigated farming which includes throughout the country subsistence and cash crop cultivation
- **About half of national GDP – illicit activities / informal economy**
- **High poverty level** - Afghanistan is the poorest country in the world
- **High illiteracy rate** – weak human capital (over 80% of female population, and about half of male population)
- **High number of refugees and IDPs**
- **Social services** – poor and/or non-existent in some parts of the country
- **Weak governance** – decentralization and governance mechanisms require strengthening
- **High level of** corruption - Afghanistan is among **the most corrupt countries** in the world –local patronage and protection schemes, at all government levels (national and sub-national), state of impunity, mentality of bribery
- **Weak infrastructure** (power supply, roads, etc.) and limited access to clean water – high production costs (generators, transportation, illegal taxation, etc.)
- **Water scarce resource** and valuable commodity - depleted and/or non-existent efficient distribution system; current system favors upstream land holders at the detriment to downstream farmers
- **Limited access to health care and education** – among the highest maternal and child mortality rates in the world (one in five children dies before age of five, and one out of every eight women die from pregnancy and child-birth related causes; life expectancy in the country is only about 44 years for both sexes;)
- **High insecurity** - limits accessibility to particular areas in the country preventing from implementing development activities
- **Porous borders** - trafficking of illicit drugs and other due to weak border control management
- **Dependence on foreign markets** – for exports and/or import substitution
- **Inflated prices and costs** - to large extent driven by international community: wages, rental of offices, houses, etc.
- **Budget sustainability** in question - maintenance costs incurred in relation to infrastructure projects implemented by the international community (roads, schools, clinics, etc.)
- **Inflation** - lack of macroeconomic stability
- Large segments of **population indebted** - advance contracts schemes for poppy cultivation
- **Gender inequality** – Afghan women's rights are nearly non-existent, they do not represent an active labor force due to traditional beliefs – illiteracy rate among female population is over 80% and about 40% of women are married before the age of 18, with about third having children before they reach 18
- **International community** - estimated 40% of assistance goes back to donor country, lack of coordination, transparency, accountability and reporting (Afghan government is unaware where about 1/3 of assistance provided since 2001 has been spent due to non-compliance with the MoF reporting requirements); due to donor countries' policies, substantial portion of assistance requires the procurement of donor-country goods and services; profit margins on reconstruction activities for contractors (international or national) ranges from 20% to 50%

General observations

The **National Drugs Control Strategy** with its eight pillars represents an overarching framework guiding efforts in combating illicit drugs cultivation, production, and trade. It represents a good starting point but lacks important elements such as specific interventions planned under each pillar, baseline information and realistic goals, prioritization of pillars and related resource levels, appropriate indicators, monitoring and information management tools and methodologies, roles and contributions of key stakeholders, including reporting requirements. It envisions an excessive number of meetings, coordination entities, and is somewhat process oriented.

The **key international stakeholders** (UN, UK, and US) have separate strategies and even though in some form each contributes to attainment of all pillars, some saw higher level of support and development assistance per their respective strategies (in particular the UK and US):

No.	National Drugs Control Strategy - Pillars	AFG	UK	UN	US
1.	Public awareness	√		√	√
2.	International and Regional Cooperation	√		√	
3.	Alternative Livelihoods	√	√	√	√
4.	Demand Reduction	√		√	
5.	Law Enforcement	√	√	√	√
6.	Criminal Justice	√	√	√	√
7.	Eradication	√		x[24]	√
8.	Institution Building	√	√	√	

The counter-narcotics efforts implemented under the overarching NDCS for Afghanistan call for improvement in a number of areas. The first area of improvement relates to positioning of CN efforts in the national development strategy, the ANDS. The efforts are treated as a cross-cutting issue what reduces cohesiveness, effectiveness, resource allocation, measurement, and overall attainment of a sustainable reduction of opium cultivation/production, and in the long-run, a complete elimination. As decades long development practice has shown that the cross-cutting issues are usually not treated as priority and quickly became a ‘’matter of attribution.” It further reduces opportunities for broader participation as some institutions and/or organizations are reluctant to engage in interventions ‘’labeled’’ as counter-narcotics activities, due to their respective mandate and/or inappropriate capacity/expertise. The cross-cutting dimension of narcotics industry cannot be denied as it enters into every fabric of political, social, economic, and security aspect of country’s development, but the potential for effectiveness and creation of more sustainable results would increase if the CN efforts were mainstreamed and integrated into a wider development agenda and related sector strategies.

[24] UNODC supports eradication efforts by providing information and data on area under cultivation.

For example: NDCS pillar - Alternative livelihoods is associated with the CN interventions although its activities fall within agricultural/economic development. If mainstreamed and integrated into the overall agricultural/economic development strategy, the interventions intended to stimulate agricultural and rural development through creation of diversified and sustainable economic incentives, income and employment opportunities, secure markets and favorable and competitive business environment, would expand the donor countries' participation as the "CN label" would not be an impediment. The interventions would be better coordinated, cohesive and ultimately lead to better and more sustainable results. It is unrealistic to claim that if these conditions persist the population will completely abandon opium cultivation, but if combined with a wider development agenda such as security, good governance, law enforcement, health and education, infrastructure, and secure markets, the goal becomes more feasible. The assumptions that must be monitored during the implementation process are at a minimum opium prices and security, as well as socio-economic conditions before and after development interventions as they "compete" against licit activities. As it has been witnessed in some provinces, it is fair to assume that farmers will voluntarily abandon poppy cultivation provided that security, diversified, economically viable opportunities and socio-economic incentives persist.

The NCDS stipulates that responsibility and accountability for field implementation of CN efforts rests with the provincial governors, however indicative targets, preferred implementation modalities, resource management, decision-making, reporting mechanisms and requirements were not provided. The provincial governors in practice mostly rely on international community and its diversified portfolio that can be associated and attributed to CN pillars or in some provinces refrain from CN activities all-together, especially coerced eradication that creates multiple negative effects and typically alleviates population from its government.

Additional weakness relate to tendency to over-emphasize reduction in opium cultivation (noted in multiple strategies) what reduces attention provided to other aspects of narcotics

industry (employed labor force, illegal taxation, social dimension, money laundering and bribes, transportation, organized and transnational crime networks including government and police officials, production/processing laboratories, trafficking, amount of opium in stockpiles); lack of prioritization of pillars and resources and effective coordination mechanisms with all involved, and lack of disaggregated data and regional/provincial plans and guidance on their development. Other weaknesses relate to existence of multiple strategies and diffused programming, excessive number of non-coordinated and uninformed meetings, and lack of knowledge and information management systems connected to provinces. The lack of cohesiveness, focus, measurability, transparency and accountability, and related progress and financial reports, are evident on the part of all stakeholders – the GIRoA and the international stakeholders (the United Nations, the United Kingdom, and the United States).

On the positive note, the NDCS is conscious of short-term and long-term goals and measures; cautions against coerced CN measures and emphasizes importance of social dimension; envisions provincial and/or regional differences; introduces somewhat improved set of measures although still output-based; clearly indicates responsibility and accountability at national and provincial level (but lacks further guidance on the subject); and interestingly enough recognizes presence of corruption among government officials and necessity to pursue arrests and prosecutions. However, no arrest and prosecution of corrupt public official has ever happened (except for limited number of drug traffickers that are outside of government circles and in most cases suffer no consequences).

In summary, all positive aspects recognized and stipulated in CN strategies face different reality in the field and different rules of engagement apply.

As some findings and observations related to individual strategies were introduced in earlier sections and prior chapter, to avoid repetitions the following section focuses on pitfalls and recommendations inclusive to all CN efforts in Afghanistan. They are based on a

comprehensive research and the three-year professional work experience in Afghanistan, from January 2006 and December 2008.

(i) The CN efforts: "Over-strategized'' and "Under-analyzed"

The CN interventions are ineffective as per UNODC the annual opium yield remains high, exceeding the average world demand to date by 2mt or 3mt[25]. The narcotics stockpile is increasing what ironically may create favorable economic conditions for reduction in opium production as saturation of market normally leads to opium price decline. The existence of multiple strategies by GIRoA and international key stakeholders all of which "work in isolation'' creates large obstacle to reverse the current trends. Not only that approaches and interventions are diffused but they are continually revised and/or completely ignored as they become obsolete and irrelevant in a short period of time. The policies and strategies are driven by assumptions and/or ideology rather than evidence and realities on the ground. Such lack of knowledge is evident in implementation of coercive CN policies and interventions, such as poppy ban and eradication that indicate failure to understand the root causes and importance of opium poppy to rural livelihood security. They are visible and convenient ''successes'' claimed through an increase in number of poppy-free provinces, but short-lived being ignorant of socio-economic conditions, push cultivation in different areas, and are accompanied with multitude of negative consequences such as further alleviation of Afghans due to lack of alternative income opportunities for their households. In policy and strategy design, the international community has a tendency to over-utilize terms such as democracy, merit-based practices and gender equality without proper understanding of how these translate to Afghan values, culture, and tradition, adding to the problem.

The multiple strategies designed without an adequate knowledge on realities on the ground, root causes for poppy cultivation, socio-economic and security conditions that are different

[25] Estimated annual world demand for opium : 5,000mt

across provinces and regions, including other factors that shape Afghan society and beliefs, coupled with evident lack of results, call for an immediate well coordinated and participatory re-formulation of CN efforts' framework and interventions. The process should not turn into speculative guesses but should be based on a combination of regional/provincial and/or sector assessments that will enable informed decision-making and provide basis for adequate allocation of resources, capacities, and implementation modalities that rest with the national and international stakeholders at national and sub-national level. The same approach should apply to development of regional and provincial plans related to a wider development agenda that will be inclusive of CN interventions.

To develop feasible strategy that optimizes on all assets available and responds to realities on the ground generated through an assessment, the following questions should be answered:

- What? – overarching goal
- Why? - rationale/realities on the ground
- How? - specific interventions
- Where? - geographic dimension
- When? - time-table
- Resources? - human/financial
- Manageable interest – is it attainable
- Baselines and targets – realistic, measurable, and verifiable
- Beneficiaries
- Partners - national/international
- Implementation modalities and mechanisms
- Risks and assumptions – manageable or outside of sphere of influence
- Communication strategy - internal/external
- Management and performance monitoring tools – ICT mobilization and application

Some of the critical aspects in designing development strategies that will not lose its relevance are expedience of the design process, the time-period a particular strategy covers,

annual progress reviews, and adaptability to changing circumstances. In a case of multi-stakeholders and multi-layered approach, it is of essence to establish overall logical framework with clearly delineated main areas of interventions and entities responsible for implementation. The individual entities or stakeholders can further built on it, and develop separate strategies that will provide greater level of detail on all aspects (interventions, resources, implementers, indicators, etc.) all of which will contribute and fall under the overarching national framework.

The NDCS recommends development of provincial and/or regional plans which carry a lot of potential, but it has not been efficiently explored as stakeholders tend to develop their own provincial plans that as is the case with the national strategy, ‘’work in isolation’’. In the light of delegated responsibility and accountability of provincial governors, different realities on the ground across provinces, the approach offers a lot of potential and should be further explored in a way that responds to the national framework. In addition, cross-provincial interventions, potential for synergies, and replication of successful models should be explored through regional programs and activities building on similar realities and potentials on the ground (exchange of goods and services, infrastructure projects, market centers, dismantling regional trafficking routes, illegal taxation imposed on Afghans transporting farm products and other goods, all of which stimulate cooperation between provinces and people and national ownership). The interventions in the south-eastern areas that are most insecure, with highest opium cultivation and yields, and home to insurgents, will be different in scope and nature but can also build on shared realities (security is utmost priority followed with interventions that promote and introduce diversified agricultural and economic opportunities).

The strategic framework should recognize and include non-government national and sub-national entities such as media outlets, civil society organizations, trade and farmers’ associations, and transnational interventions such as cross-border interventions, policy dialogue, and agreements, and participation of transnational entities with global coverage (intelligence gathering and exchange, trade, transfer of knowledge and technologies, the

Diaspora, and other). All of this combined will create additional networks and increase cohesiveness and interconnectedness of local, national, and transnational dimensions of drug industry.

The strategy should include active communication with the public to manage their expectations, avoid sending messages that create negative perceptions often resulting from ambitious yet unattainable promises and failure to deliver on promises made in timely fashion. As Adam Pain sarcastically commented on failure of international stakeholders to deliver development assistance promised to Balkh province: “Let them eat promises!”(Pain.A. 2008)

The policy of international government agencies prohibits any form of support to illicit drug and terrorist related activities. The situation on the ground is slightly different especially in the south-eastern insecure areas. The implementers of development assistance (corporate and business entities, non-governmental organizations, and other) in setting up their operations, offices, and related logistics, having no other option and/or unknowingly end up using property and services of corrupt officials, warlords, and others connected with organized crime and narcotics industry. These areas represent their power basis and they practically ‘’own the area” easily influencing success and/or failure of development projects’ implementation. As stated earlier, the reality on the ground has different rules of engagement.

Lastly, the multiple strategies differ in understanding and approaches that constitute reward to provinces and/or population that successfully managed to shift from poppy cultivation. The GIRoA is against cash awards as is most of the international community but some of the interventions implemented, include such dimension. For example: the Good Performers Initiative (GPI) rewards provinces in a form of development projects whose value ranges from US$500,000 to US$10 million and is based solely on number of ha freed from poppy but omits to include important parameters and benchmarks. The awards should be made after sustained poppy-free status (at least two years) to avoid cases like Nangarhar province which was in 2008 awarded US$10 million in development projects only to see re-emergence of

cultivation in the following year. In the interim, other forms of assistance can be offered, as such awards ‘’invite’’ coercive and short-lived measures, create negative results and perceptions among Afghans, and pushes cultivation in other areas.

The new overarching and cohesive national CN framework should be developed which is prioritized and mainstreamed into a wider development agenda, responsive to the current realities on the ground, with shared knowledge and understanding among key stakeholders, and inclusive of other recommendations presented in the attempt to reverse the narcotics trends.

(ii) Varying socio-economic conditions and key drivers for opium poppy cultivation

In the NDCS, the GIRoA cautioned on the varying socio-economic conditions and other realities on the ground recognizing that opium poppy is part of a wider agenda, but failed to follow-through, and the international stakeholders continue to tap-in-the-dark or develop semi-provincial plans exclusive of other stakeholders operating in the same area. In addition to different socio-economic conditions, the security and root-causes for poppy cultivation are also different. Opium poppy is usually cultivated for sustained period of time in areas/districts where land quality, water availability, weather, and socio-economic conditions are not favorable for illicit crops while off-farm income opportunities are limited or non/existent. In other areas, the cultivation is continually pushed in different areas in response to changing conditions and factors (coercive CN methods, awards, improved irrigation systems, and other).

Each province is unique and to ensure effective development interventions and their sequencing that will reverse opium trends, it is essential to assess the political, social, economic and security conditions and development potential (land quality, existing financial formal and informal mechanisms, access to market, infrastructure, and other) as it pertains to individual provinces and regions.

Recognizing differing situation and priorities across provinces, in preparing and prioritizing the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) for 2008-2013, the GIRoA consulted individual provinces by generating their ranking of ANDS pillars in order of priority that responds to conditions, needs, and realities on the ground in their respective province. Overall, agriculture was seen by many as the top priority, followed with security, and education. The regions saw different order of ranking. The south-east regions ranked security as the top priority followed with governance and agriculture; the north-west regions indicated employment creation, private sector development and roads as priority areas followed with infrastructure (water and energy), health and education; and north-east and central regions gave priority to roads, education, and agriculture (in some provinces security is high priority such as in Kunar, Nangrahar, Logar, Paktika, and Khost, along the Pakistan border).

The primary ranking: Sectors/pillars and the number of Provinces in which they are a top priority (ANDS.2008.p23)

Sector or Pillar	No. of provinces
Security	17
Infrastructure	5
Education	4
Employment	3
Roads	3
Agriculture	2
Governance	1

*The **primary ranking** puts security, education, and infrastructure in top three places while agriculture is ranked sixth; the **secondary ranking** puts governance, education, and health in top three places while agriculture was ranked fifth followed with employment and private sector; and the **tertiary ranking** puts agriculture, education, and employment in top three places.*

The consultative process of ANDS sectors' prioritization provides evidence of host country's conscience on importance of participatory processes and should be further explored in enhancing the knowledge base of high relevance for informed decision-making, coordination and design of effective and feasible CN interventions at national and provincial levels that are mainstreamed into a wider development agenda and offer sustainable solutions.

The knowledge and awareness of socio-economic conditions and root causes for poppy cultivation will also help establish appropriate baselines and targets and create basis for indicators that monitor conditions surrounding CN interventions alleviating potential for

failures and creation of negative consequences that are conductive to rapid return to illicit activities.

It will help explain if CN interventions were success or failure due to pre-existing conditions and variables such as market adjustments (lower/higher opium or licit crop price), (in)sufficient development potential, variety of off-farm and on-farm opportunities or lack of, weather conditions, and other. As evidenced in some provinces, poppy-growing farmers that voluntarily opted for licit opportunities have not done it because of successful CN interventions but simply opted for something offering higher return. This was simply due to market adjustment, the decline in opium price. As soon as the price of opium increased, the trend was reversed, the farmers returned to poppy cultivation. For example: the five-pillar US strategy formulated in 2005 over-emphasized eradication effort at the cost of interventions that would most likely create better results and incentives favorable to realities on the ground and responsive to securing livelihood of Afghans. The positive perceptions among Afghans, their support for development interventions, better security conditions that existed several years ago, coupled with presence in all 34 provinces of Afghanistan, was completely lost.

It is highly recommended to gather, analyze, and update existing provincial development plans to reflect realities on the ground, CN interventions, and a wider development agenda. The process should include the ICT component to ensure that gathered knowledge is stored, made available and accessible to all stakeholders, and regularly updated and disseminated. This undertaking will have an additional value as it will upgrade provincial capacity to manage and report on developments in the respective province, it will ease cross-provincial cooperation, and increase overall transparency and accountability. The process should be inclusive of media, civil society organizations, trade and farmer associations, religious and tribal leaders, and other, what ensures local ownership and plays an important role in country's development conscious of Afghan values, beliefs, and tradition.

(iii) Shared knowledge management systems with geo-spatial mapping required

Existence of multiple strategies, diffused programs, poor implementation, and lack of basic knowledge of realities on the ground and adequate coordination and monitoring mechanisms prevents from having a comprehensive understanding on number of stakeholders, implementers, activities, resources invested and spent, geographic coverage, and often results in duplicative efforts, weaker results and waste of resources. It furthermore prevents from quality and informed policy discussions, strategic review and analysis, and design of adequate CN interventions.

It is highly recommended to develop comprehensive and automated MIS/GIS[26] that will provide common picture on types of interventions by stakeholders and geographic locations. The system should be multi-layered to enable national and provincial data-feed and processing through establishment provincial information management centers. The system could include provincial development plans mentioned in previous section, against which planned and ongoing interventions will be recorded providing basis for further analysis and future interventions.

The GIRoA and international stakeholders should partner in supporting such system development to address shared interests, ensure common methodology and data classification. The system should include: provincial development plans, socio-economic indicators, and development interventions by status, results, performance measures/indicators, implementing entity, and other data as determined through joint discussions.

Tentative sample is below table: the NDCS pillars, provinces and key stakeholders (it is easier to indicate areas that are either "loaded'' or ''empty"):

NCDS	#	Pillar/ Province	Pillar I: Public awareness	Pillar II: International and Reg. Cooperation	Pillar III: Alternative Livelihoods	Pillar IV: Demand Reduction	Pillar V: Law Enforcement	Pillar VI: Criminal Justice	Pillar VII: Eradication	Pillar VIII: Institution Building
Central Region	1	Kabul					MCN, UN, UK, US			
	2	Khost								
	3	Logar								
	4	Paktya								
	5	Panjshir								

[26] MIS/GIS: Management Information System/Geographic Information System

	6	Parwan								
	7	Wardak								
	8	Ghazni								
	9	Paktika								
Eastern Region	10	Kapisa								
	11	Kunar								
	12	Laghman								
	13	Nangarhar								
	14	Nuristan								
North-eastern Region	15	Badakhshan								
	16	Takhar								
	17	Kunduz								
Northern Region	18	Baghlan								
	19	Balkh								
	20	Bamyan								
	21	Faryab								
	22	Jawzjan								
	23	Samangan								
	24	Sari Pul								
Southern Region	25	Hilmand			UK, US					
	26	Kandahar								
	27	Uruzgan								
	28	Zabul								
	29	Day Kundi								
Western Region	30	Badghis								
	31	Farah								
	32	Ghor								
	33	Hirat								
	34	Nimroz								

The system should include mapping software (GIS) to produce standard and custom designed maps by each category (sector, location: province/district, implementer, funding, activities, results, etc.) as they represent an effective tool for facilitation of evidence-based policy discussions, decision-making, improved planning and coordination, especially if combined with satellite imagery, digital geologic mapping, and land quality analysis. The system is responsive to needs of different audiences and extremely cost-effective as it requires small investment compared to resources wasted as a result of poorly designed and duplicative strategies and interventions. In addition, such tool would increase communication and public outreach to communities, provinces, government, and media.

Numerous unsuccessful attempts to develop information systems on a wider development agenda were made, but as with CN strategies, in isolated fashion. The end result: wasted resources, multiple databases with different data classification making any comparisons and/or merger of systems impossible as the search engine responds to key words. For example: if name of a province is different (Herat-Hirat, Helmand-Hilmand, etc.), including definition and classification of projects, activities, and programs, it is impossible to perform a successful merger and/or to conduct a reliable and accurate data search. In designing

comprehensive and automated MIS/GIS it is of utmost importance to reach common understanding and agreement on standardized data classification by key national and international stakeholders.

(iv) Indicators: Current measures are inadequate and misleading

The CN strategies suffer from inadequate set of measures and indicators that are primarily output based. The data collection on cultivated fields is performed using satellite imagery and limited verification on the field. Field surveys and any field-based data collection is a cumbersome task, costly, and with high risk of getting incomplete and unreliable data as a result of limited accessibility to insecure areas and/or lack of skilled human resources. This explains inconsistent numbers on cultivated and/or eradicated area produced by different entities, but nevertheless the ground-based surveys are still the main source of data on cultivation.

The principal CN measure indicating success/failure and widely used is the number of poppy-free provinces introduced by UNODC in 2007. The only added value was geographic breakdown at the time when all focused on aggregate level of opium cultivation and year on year changes. The change was particularly favored by media. Over time, the indicator transformed from indicative measure into the target. While some naively rush to claim and attribute new poppy-free provinces to CN efforts, the reality on the ground tells a different story and points to a failure to understand root causes and which factors are favorable to sustainable reductions in poppy cultivation and production.

The NDCS and other CN strategies have either weak set of output-based measures or none at all, relying on information generated by other entities. Outputs mealy indicate a completion of an activity or intervention and do not inform on changes stimulated. The causal result chain should be applied and measured: *input-> output -> outcome -> impact.* The changes created by output, are measured at outcome and impact level, “tell the story” and provide insight into the achievements, successes/failures, and/or sustainability of particular interventions.

The necessity to have quality set of indicators to inform on progress of CN interventions and a wider development agenda cannot be overemphasized. The indicators that do not have baselines are useless as the change answering to question "relative to what?" cannot be answered, and interpretation is anecdotal, which is why, many opted for output based indicators, such as number of farmers trained, length of irrigation canal built/reconstructed, number of arrests, number of interdictions, number of ha eradicated, number of credit lines established, number of loans issued, number of public information campaigns conducted, number of judges trained, number of police officers trained, and other. It is impossible to speak of effectiveness of CN interventions as all these output-based indicators have more use in justifying resources invested (*input*) to donor-countries. The outcome indicator represents a measure that calculates return on investments attained with completed development activities such as rate of return on loans issued instead of only number of loans issued, disaggregated by sex, what further indicates if men or women are more successful in managing money and business, etc.

Quality of indicators, regular monitoring and validation, are critical for informed and timely strategic decisions on type of CN interventions, results achieved, and need for any adjustments of interventions. The current measures on CN interventions are incapable of such task being weak, insufficient, and misleading. An immediate revision and upgrade of overall statistical capacity and monitoring tools is required and as mentioned in prior section, the 21st ICT potential (satellite imagery, digital geologic mapping, land quality analysis, and other) can be of great help in alleviating weaknesses caused with inability to conduct quality ground-surveys and data collection, especially as it pertains to insecure areas. The efforts in defining overarching CN framework indicators, pillar indicators, and sub-set of indicators on particular interventions would benefit from coordination with other stakeholders to ensure comparability and shared knowledge base, while project specific measures can be custom-designed to respond to any additional needs of individual stakeholders and implementing entities. In addition, lack of transparency and accountability of the national and international

stakeholders would be reduced, and "telling the story" part would be easier potentially reducing attacks by various interest groups and media as information and human interest stories on actual difference created in the lives of Afghan people would be verifiable.

(v) Eradication: Coercive CN intervention, or target?

Since 2005, the US Government has been aggressively implementing poppy eradication, one of pillars in its five-pillar strategy. Some say that approach was based on successes in India and elsewhere and attempts were made to introduce aerial spraying but it was rejected by the GIRoA and international community representatives, especially the UK.

The eradication, apart from poppy ban, represents a coercive measure and if conducted in environment where pre-eradication socio-economic conditions are weak and not adequately assessed, the ''poppy-free'' result is short lived and creates multiple negative results some of which are difficult to reverse. Unless diversified off-farm and on-farm opportunities and socio-economic incentives are established, the population generally alleviates from its government, their debts are increasing as a result of previously incurred debt on advance contracting for poppy cultivation and additional debt due to losses from eradication, the risk of higher support and loyalty to anti-government elements increases along with negative perception related to international community and real intentions in Afghanistan.

The MCN has been delegated an annual eradication plan preparation in close cooperation with UNODC and other key stakeholders working on eradication. The plan is based on information/imagery gathered and produced by UNODC and officially is not released to the public before the planting season. Considering level of corruption in Afghanistan, including government officials, and responsibility entrusted to provincial governors on implementing CN interventions in the field many of which are connected and profit from drugs industry, it is highly unlikely that the plan is not shared with various warlords and key power basis. This often results in eradication of fields that are the only source of income for some households

and/or pushing cultivation to different areas, or eradication implemented aiming at award through the GPI.

In addition, the ANA whose primary task should be to protect citizens and their rights, are often perceived as anti-people being associated with the coercive eradication process.

The eradication interventions are costly, short-lived, ineffective, and prone to bribes and corruption in different circles: authorities, police, and others, and in most cases the poorest suffer the first as wealthier have diversified on-farm and off-farm revenues.

The philosophy on eradication process and surrounding measures evidenced among many US representatives is that it constitutes an appropriate form of punishment and that an immediate should not be provided regardless to existing socio-economic conditions as that would constitute a reward for growing poppy. Naturally, the cash is not an option, but diversified income generating opportunities and incentives should be created if sustained licit activities are the aim. Ironically, eradication was/is a mean for some provinces to receive the reward from the GIRoA through the GPI that issues (re)wards for substantial and/or complete elimination of poppy without assessing its sustainability and/or socio-economic conditions. The US Ambassador Richard Holbrooke (Special US Envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan) has been extremely critical of the US CN strategy finding it wasteful and ineffective.

On the positive note, recent media reports indicate that the US is determined to shift focus from eradication to agriculture and rural livelihoods development, and creation of sustainable diversified income opportunities. However, the CN interventions are viewed as part of the larger Counter-Insurgency strategy, especially in the light of recent UNODC report indicating that poppy cultivation is not associated with poverty but insurgencies, anti-government elements, and terrorist groups. These priorities will be supported with wider development agenda: security, governance and rule of law, social and economic development, gender equality and human rights.

(vi) Alternative livelihood: Temporary or sustainable?

The alternative livelihood should be mainstreamed into economic development with emphasis on agricultural and rural development. The term ‘’alternative livelihood’’ carries notion of temporary and/or optional livelihood (“if poppy is not available”) as if leaving room to farmers to choose, even though the intention is to replace opium cultivation and production as a main source revenue. In addition, alternative livelihood is associated with CN interventions preventing other stakeholders’ contribution that refrain from CN-associated activities. Mainstreaming will broaden the scope and increase opportunities as other members of donor community and international organizations joint efforts, resources and programs in creating sustainable and diversified income opportunities. It will improve overall coordination, allocation and use of resources, and monitoring of results and accomplishments.

The economic growth is wider in scope and includes economic governance, favorable business environment, private sector development, market and trade development, labor force issues, trade facilitation, competitiveness, and other. More specifically, creation of value chains, extension services, application of international food and agriculture standards critical for exports to foreign markets, credit facilitation and forward-contracting opportunities (for example juice production), improved irrigation, livestock, reforestation (important for water preservation), price-guaranteed schemes, (cold)storage and processing facilities, farmers associations, and other all aimed at creation of a combination of on-farm and off-farm income opportunities. The approach should introduce all relevant socio-economic indicators to avoid market saturation and/or tipping over the situation in favor of opium market.

Even though Afghanistan is the poorest country in the world, landlocked and with limited water resources, it has potential capable of producing various licit crops for local consumption as well as for export. This was evidenced in late 19th century when country exported an estimated 65% of the world trade in dry raisins, and significant export in natural gas, animal skins, cotton, carpets, and other products. The horticulture potential is significant and can be further explored with the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (MAIL). It has

also been known for production of saffron which is drought resistant and takes little looking after, even less then opium poppy. The cultivation of pomegranates, almonds, pistachios, grapes, apricots, is already finding way to foreign markets. The oil roses and rose oil represents a significant profitable potential as it can easily be cultivated and transported to international market at low cost. It is a competitive product in terms of potential revenues, what is important when ‘’competing’’ with opium market. The rose oil is used by cosmetic industry which can easily be secured through market and trade facilitation and return is much higher compared to wheat whose price fluctuations are high due to global market fluctuations, Pakistan ban on wheat import from Afghanistan, and uncertainties caused with unfavorable weather conditions. The cultivation and production of all of the above is labor intensive offering many employment opportunities and businesses' development related to processing, cold storage, and transport to internal and/or external markets. These labor-intensive activities that do not require long and intense training present themselves as opportunities to mobilize large youth and female labor force that is mostly inactive due to cultural values and tradition, but also due to widespread lack of employment opportunities. Providing diversified and sustained income generating opportunities, especially for young men and women will reduce risk of potential support and/or joining to anti-government elements and terrorist networks.

The international community should expand support at policy level, trade negotiation and facilitation, to secure markets for Afghan products. For example, India is a potential market for export in horticultural products followed with Pakistan, the US, Tajikistan, Netherlands, and others. The large-scale humanitarian programs distributing food, wheat, and other food products should be conscious of potential market distortions and a possibility that significant portion of humanitarian aid quickly finds a way to black market as large segments of population are struggling to settle growing debts incurred from poppy cultivation advance contracting.

The shift to licit economic activities will not occur immediately due to varying growing cycles of individual agricultural products (apricot takes seven years to bear), which is why the

agricultural and rural development should consider sequencing in response to crops' growing cycles, and prioritize other diversified licit revenue generating opportunities in accordance with the socio-economic conditions that vary across provinces and regions.

(vii) Institution and system building, interdiction, and law enforcement: Mixed results

The importance of human and institutional capacity building, development of justice system, and enforcement capabilities is critical to fighting drug industry, corruption, and establishment of rule of law ceasing the state of impunity typical for Afghanistan. It is critical for these capacities to be developed simultaneously at national and provincial level, while securing borders.

The law enforcement side has shown some progress through limited number of arrests, but the accomplishment is short-lived as they use bribes and almost immediately walk free. The border control management and interdiction requires much more attention and coordinated support. With porous borders interventions aimed at prevention and reduction of narcotics trade and trafficking, organized crime, and overall drug industry will fail. In this regard, the regional level interventions and cooperation with neighboring countries should be strengthened. The political dimension and sensitivities associated with particular countries, call for engagement of stakeholders with higher level of "neutrality" such as UN (although, the credibility and ''neutrality'' is somewhat on decline). The UN structure offers substantial skills and expertise, and comparative advantages such as regional presence, combating drugs and crime, intelligence gathering and sharing platforms, and other. The ongoing programs provided by the US and others, primarily aimed at capacity building through provision of training, equipment, and technical assistance, are not proving to be effective. The efforts are narrow, poorly implemented, such as two-week classroom training of police members primarily provided in Kabul, without field training, and skills testing, unaccounted equipment and ammunition distributed, and other. The technical assistance is mostly consisted of

expensive advisors with frequent turnovers who spend most of their time responding to reporting requests coming from donor community, and not human and institutional capacity building. The end result: foreign experts and advisors leave, the knowledge is lost and not transferred, and more foreign assistance wasted. The positive element is that the UK and the US are increasingly targeting mobile heroin-processing laboratories, trafficking routes, and implement interdiction interventions.

It was not until recently, that the connection between poppy cultivation and anti-government elements, terrorist networks, and insurgencies was established. However, the problem is broader and requires dismantling of a whole industry, the narcotics industry that generates an estimated US$ 2.8 billion annually. The strategy should include tackling of financial mechanisms and hubs, and money laundering channels (formal and informal). The regional UN strategy tackles the problem, but should be further emphasized in the revised CN framework and a wider development agenda through establishment of various audit and financial investigative capacities.

Weak legislative and institutional capacities coupled with extreme corruption and drug industry, undercut the legitimacy and effectiveness of the GIRoA, and strengthen tribal and informal systems, while nepotism continues to influence decision-making. The people increasingly tend to turn away from the "corrupt formal systems" and government officials living in expensive houses and villas, and return to informal justice systems that satisfy cultural norms but usually uphold Afghan society inequalities.

(viii) Public information campaigns: underutilized

The CN aspect of public information should expand its scope and include campaigns that will disturb the state of impunity by disseminating information on successful CN interventions (eradication should be excluded). The Afghans have to regain trust in their government, and this is possible only if the GIRoA improves its effectiveness, increases transparency and

accountability to its people, introduces rule of law, and helps them secure their livelihoods. The campaigns should move beyond messages that drugs are non-Islamic and un-lawful, and provide specific examples on actions taken by the GIRoA. The information on arrests and prosecutions should be broadly disseminated, human interest stories and accomplishments achieved in cooperation with the international community (discussed in sub-section on indicators), promote stories on provinces and/or districts with similar socio-economic conditions that have successfully moved towards licit economic activities what will help in reducing regional and political polarization, and other. The communication strategies should utilize a variety of tools:: calendar of events, thematic stories, live interviews, variety of materials targeting diversified national and foreign audiences, documentaries, PSAs, mobile media crew, promote GIRoA-owned "road show'' whenever possible to strengthen its relationship with its people, and other. The information and education campaigns and events should be aimed at broad and frequent information dissemination and to include, as appropriate and relevant, key national and international electronic media (internet, television, and radio) diversified audiences and interest groups in Afghanistan and abroad.

Final comment by the author:

The NDCS and other strategies in circulation should be updated and integrated under the Afghan-led comprehensive and cohesive strategic framework while the cross-cutting treatment of CN interventions should be revisited, and possibly integrated into a wider development agenda. The over-emphasis on poppy cultivation should be expanded to include other aspects of drug industry and its sequential dismantling as it constitutes substantial portion of country's GDP. The cultivation is only at the beginning of the drug industry's chain and affects mainly farmers, while more complex and deeper problems that call for more aggressive attention and interventions rest with weak governance, corrupt officials and networks profiteering from narcotics processing, trade, trafficking, including anti-government elements and insurgencies. Updated strategy should be based on socio-economic realities on

the ground and customized to provincial/regional needs and development potential, and include evidence-based policies, increased commitment and accountability of all stakeholders (host country government and international partners), improved/verifiable measures and indicators, knowledge base and information/mapping systems, and continual communication with the public and other audiences on successes and failures. The interventions should avoid and/or substantially reduce counter-productive coercive measures such as eradication to avoid negative effects that multiply the problem. In the end, all stakeholders should fulfil promises and commitments made, or should refrain from making them.

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
Annex Documents:

1. Map - Countries in the region
2. Map – Afghanistan Administrative Divisions
3. Map – Trading Routes “The Silk Road”
4. UNODC Data gathering methodology on estimating opium cultivation and production
5. Global illicit cultivation of opium poppy, 1994-2008, by UNODC
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Countries in the Region



Afghanistan Administrative Divisions



Map of Trading Routes – "The Silk Road"



UNODC Data Gathering Methodology on Estimating Opium Cultivation and Production in Afghanistan

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime supports the GIRoA to estimate the annual area under opium poppy cultivation by using high-resolution satellite images as different crops reflect sunlight in a specific way. In a case opium poppy plants, this is thanks to a certain shade of green, different from other crops. In addition, other characteristics such as the texture, shape or size of the field are also utilized in conducting image analysis. However, the system and analytical processes do not rely solely on satellite images, but also on information gathered by surveyors on the ground. They map small portions of the area covered by the image and identify which crop is grown where. All is documented by photos and GIS[27] devices creating an interpretation template for the image similar to population survey that interviews only a sample of the population, but leads to understanding of the preferences of the population as a whole. In regards to opium production estimates, it is being estimated by surveyors who visit fields in several hundreds villages and measure the number of poppy capsules and their size in sample plots. With the application of a scientific formula, the analysts are able using the measured poppy capsule to estimate how much opium gum each plant can potentially yield, and moreover the opium yield per hectare can be estimated. This methodology has a number of weaknesses in particular as it relates to the ground work, i.e. the work of surveyors who are not able to conduct adequate data/image gathering in highly insecure areas of Afghanistan. The collection and processing of satellite images has to be conducted in multiple series to confirm the initial finding. The analysts confirm that freshly ploughed poppy fields show clearly on the images with a darker tone demonstrating clear distinction from wheat fields left for the cattle to graze on the stubble. The following link presents one example of a map marking in darker shades provinces that are highest cultivators and producers of opium poppy per 2009 report http://maker.news.geocommons.com/maps/135

[27] A geographic information system (GIS) or geographical information system captures, stores, analyzes, manages, and presents data that is linked to location. Technically, a GIS is a system which includes mapping software and its application to remote sensing, land surveying, aerial photography, mathematics, photogrammetry, geography, and tools that can be implemented with GIS software.

Global illicit cultivation of opium poppy, 1994-2008 (UNODC World Drug Report 2009), Cultivation in Hectares

SOUTH-WEST ASIA															
	1994	**1995**	**1996**	**1997**	**1998**	**1999**	**2000**	**2001**	**2002**	**2003**	**2004**	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**
AFGHANISTAN	71,470	53,759	56,824	58,416	63,674	90,583	82,171	7,606	74,100	80,000	131,000	104,000	165,000	193,000	157,000
PAKISTAN	5,759	5,091	873	874	950	284	260	213	622	2,500	1,500	2,438	1,545	1,701	1,909
Sub-total:	**77,229**	**58,850**	**57,697**	**59,290**	**64,624**	**90,867**	**82,431**	**7,819**	**74,722**	**82,500**	**132,500**	**106,438**	**166,545**	**194,701**	**158,909**
SOUTH-EAST ASIA															
LAO PDR	18,520	19,650	21,601	24,082	26,837	22,543	19,052	17,255	14,000	12,000	6,600	1,800	2,500	1,500	1,600
MYANMAR	146,600	154,070	163,000	155,150	130,300	89,500	108,700	105,000	81,400	62,200	44,200	32,800	21,500	27,700	28,500
THAILAND	478	168	368	352	716	702	890	820	750						
VIET NAM	3,066	1,880	1,743	340	442	442									
Sub-total:	**168,664**	**175,768**	**186,712**	**179,924**	**158,295**	**113,187**	**128,642**	**123,075**	**96,150**	**74,200**	**50,800**	**34,600**	**24,000**	**29,200**	**30,100**
LATIN AMERICA															
COLOMBIA	15,091	5,226	4,916	6,584	7,350	6,500	6,500	4,300	4,153	4,026	3,950	1,950	1,023	714	394
MEXICO	5,795	5,050	5,100	4,000	5,500	3,600	1,900	4,400	2,700	4,800	3,500	3,300	5,000	6,900	n.a.
Sub-total:	**20,886**	**10,276**	**10,016**	**10,584**	**12,850**	**10,100**	**8,400**	**8,700**	**6,853**	**8,826**	**7,450**	**5,250**	**6,023**	**7,614**	**n.a.**
OTHER															
COMBINED	5,700	5,025	3,190	2,050	2,050	2,050	2,479	2,500	2,500	3,074	5,190	5,212	4,432	4,185	n.a.
GRAND TOTAL:	**272,479**	**249,919**	**257,615**	**251,848**	**237,819**	**216,204**	**221,952**	**142,094**	**180,225**	**168,600**	**195,940**	**151,500**	**201,000**	**235,700**	**n.a.**

Global illicit potential production of dry opium in metric tons, 1994-2008 (UNODC World Drug Report 2009)

SOUTH-WEST ASIA															
	1994	**1995**	**1996**	**1997**	**1998**	**1999**	**2000**	**2001**	**2002**	**2003**	**2004**	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**
AFGHANISTAN	3,416	2,335	2,248	2,804	2,693	4,565	3,276	185	3,400	3,600	4,200	4,100	6,100	8,200	7,700
PAKISTAN	128	112	24	24	26	9	8	5	5	52	40	36	39	43	48
Sub-total:	**3,544**	**2,447**	**2,272**	**2,828**	**2,719**	**4,574**	**3,284**	**190**	**3,405**	**3,652**	**4,240**	**4,136**	**6,139**	**8,243**	**7,748**
SOUTH-EAST ASIA															
LAO PDR	120	128	140	147	124	124	167	134	112	120	43	14	20	9	10
MYANMAR	1,583	1,664	1,760	1,676	1,303	895	1,087	1,097	828	810	370	312	315	460	410
THAILAND	3	2	5	4	8	8	6	6	9						
VIET NAM	15	9	9	2	2	2									
Sub-total:	**1,721**	**1,803**	**1,914**	**1,829**	**1,437**	**1,029**	**1,260**	**1,237**	**949**	**930**	**413**	**326**	**335**	**469**	**420**
LATIN AMERICA															
COLOMBIA	205	71	67	90	100	88	88	80	52	50	49	24	13	14	10

MEXICO	60	53	54	46	60	43	21	91	58	101	73	71	108	149	n.a.
Sub-total:	**265**	**124**	**121**	**136**	**160**	**131**	**109**	**171**	**110**	**151**	**122**	**95**	**121**	**163**	**n.a.**
OTHER															
COMBINED	90	78	48	30	30	30	38	32	56	50	75	63	16	15	n.a.
GRAND TOTAL:	**5,620**	**4,452**	**4,355**	**4,823**	**4,346**	**5,764**	**4,691**	**1,630**	**4,520**	**4,783**	**4,850**	**4,620**	**6,610**	**8,890**	**n.a.**
Potential heroin	**562**	**445**	**436**	**482**	**435**	**576**	**469**	**163**	**452**	**478**	**495**	**472**	**606**	**735**	**n.a.**

Opium cultivation (2005-2009) and eradication (2008-2009) in Afghanistan (UNODC)

PROVINCE	Annual overview: 2005-2009					Change 2008-2009		Eradication	
	2005 (ha)	2006 (ha)	2007 (ha)	2008 (ha)	2009 (ha)	(ha)	(%)	2008 (ha)	2009 (ha)
Kabul	Poppy free	80	500	310	132	-178	-57%	20	1.35
Khost	Poppy free	133	Poppy free	Poppy free	Poppy free	NA	NA	0	0
Logar	Poppy free	Poppy free	Poppy free	Poppy free	Poppy free	NA	NA	0	0
Paktya	Poppy free	Poppy free	Poppy free	Poppy free	Poppy free	NA	NA	0	0
Panjshir	Poppy free	Poppy free	Poppy free	Poppy free	Poppy free	NA	NA	0	0
Parwan	Poppy free	124	Poppy free	Poppy free	Poppy free	NA	NA	0	0
Wardak	106	Poppy free	Poppy free	Poppy free	Poppy free	NA	NA	0	0
Ghazni	Poppy free	Poppy free	Poppy free	Poppy free	Poppy free	NA	NA	0	0
Paktika	Poppy free	Poppy free	Poppy free	Poppy free	Poppy free	NA	NA	0	0
Central Region	106	337	500	310	132	-178	-57%	20	1.35
Kapisa	115	282	835	436	Poppy free	NA	NA	59	31
Kunar	1,059	932	446	290	164	-126	-43%	103	11
Laghman	274	710	561	425	135	-290	-68%	26	0
Nangarhar	1,093	4,872	18,739	Poppy free	294	NA	NA	26	226
Nuristan	1,554	1,516	Poppy free	Poppy free	Poppy free	NA	NA	3	0
Eastern Region	4,095	8,312	20,581	1,151	593	-558	-48%	217	268
Badakhshan	7,370	13,056	3,642	200	557	357	179%	774	420
Takhar	1,364	2,178	1,211	Poppy free	Poppy free	NA	NA	0	0
Kunduz	275	102	Poppy free	Poppy free	Poppy free	NA	NA	0	0
North-eastern Region	9,009	15,336	4,853	200	557	357	179%	774	420
Baghlan	2,563	2,742	671	475	Poppy free	NA	NA	85	0
Balkh	10,837	7,232	Poppy free	Poppy free	Poppy free	NA	NA	0	0
Bamyan	126	17	Poppy free	Poppy free	Poppy free	NA	NA	0	0
Faryab	2,665	3,040	2,866	291	Poppy free	NA	NA	0	261
Jawzjan	1,748	2,024	1,085	Poppy free	Poppy free	NA	NA	0	0
Samangan	3,874	1,960	Poppy free	Poppy free	Poppy free	NA	NA	0	0
Sari Pul	3,227	2,252	260	Poppy free	Poppy free	NA	NA	0	0
Northern Region	25,040	19,267	4,882	766	0	0	NA	85	261
Hilmand	26,500	69,324	102,770	103,590	69,833	-33,757	-33%	2,537	4,119
Kandahar	12,989	12,619	16,615	14,623	19,811	5,188	35%	1,222	69
Uruzgan	2,024	9,703	9,204	9,939	9,224	-715	-7%	113	74
Zabul	2,053	3,210	1,611	2,335	1,144	-1,191	-51%	0	0
Day Kundi	2,581	7,044	3,346	2,273	3,002	729	32%	0	27
Southern Region	46,147	101,900	133,546	132,760	103,014	-29,746	-22%	3,872	4,289
Badghis	2,967	3,205	4,219	587	5,411	4,824	822%	0	0
Farah	10,240	7,694	14,865	15,010	12,405	-2,605	(-17%)	9	43
Ghor	2,689	4,679	1,503			NA	NA	38	0
Hirat	1,924	2,287	1,525	266	556	290	109%	352	67
Nimroz	1,690	1,955	6,507	6,203	428	-5,775	(-93%)	113	0
Western Region	19,510	19,820	28,619	22,066	18,800	-3,266	-15%	512	110
Total (rounded):	**104,000**	**165,000**	**193,000**	**157,000**	**123,000**	**-34,000**	**-22%**	**5,480**	**5,351**

*Due to administrative boundary changes, the 2009 estimates for Farah and Nimroz were calculated considering parts of Khash Rod district, the main opium cultivating district in Nimroz, as being in Farah province. The 2008 figures include all of Khash Rod district in Nimroz province.

Total US Obligations for Major Programs: FY 2001 – FY 2009 ($ millions) (Katzman K. 2009.p. 78)

Security related programs (mostly DOD funds)	
Afghan National Security Forces	21,297
Counter Narcotics	3,436
Karzai Protection (NADS funds)	226
DDS (Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration of militias)	20.42
Detainee Operations	57.33
MANPAD Destruction (Stingers left over from anti-Soviet war)	2.25
Small Arms Control	10.59
Commander Emergency Response Program (CERP)	1,976
De-Mining Operations (Halo Trust, other contractors)	98.53
International Military Education and Training Funds (IMET)	3
Humanitarian – Related Programs	
Food Aid (P.L. 480, other aid)	958
Refugee/IDP aid	743
Debt Relief for Afghan governance	11
Democracy and Governance Programs (mostly ESF)	
Support for Operations of Afghan Government	80.86
Good Governance (incentives for anti-corruption, anti-narcotics)	1,044
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (funds National Solidarity Program)	305.5
Civil Society (programs to improve political awareness and activity)	31.88
Elections support	600
Rule of Law and Human Rights (USAID and INCLE funds)	552.66
Economic Sector – Related Programs (mostly ESF)	
Roads	1,908
PRT-funded projects (includes local governance as well as economic programs)	698.11
Education (building schools, teacher training)	535.93
Health (clinic-building, medicines)	620.59
Power	934.38
Water (category also includes some funds to compensate Afghan victims/Leahy)	128.02
Agriculture (focused on sustainable crops, not temporary alternatives to poppy)	441
Private sector Development/Economic Growth (communications, IT, but includes some cash-for-work anti-narcotics programs)	627.52
State Dpt operations/Embassy construction/USAID operations/educational and cultural exchanges/SIGAR operations	2,445
Total (including minor amounts not included in the table)	**39,730**